The following interview with Bellona’s nuclear expert Aleksander Nikitin originally appeared on Uatom.org.

Since 4 March 2022, the Zaporizhzhia NPP has been occupied by Russian troops. For three years, the largest NPP in Europe has been used as a military facility, in violation of all safety standards and agreements related to such sites. The Russian Rosatom corporation announced appropriation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and is working to connect the power units to supply electricity to the occupied territories. Ukrainian personnel at the plant have been subjected to kidnappings, murders, and inhumane treatment, which has increased the risk of nuclear incidents and accidents. Despite the presence of IAEA experts at the Zaporizhzhia NPP since 1 September 2022, the situation remains unchanged: the power plant is still occupied and Russian military groups continue shelling the ZNPP site and nearby areas.

Russia has repeatedly resorted to nuclear blackmail, particularly at the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP. Despite an agreement to rotate IAEA inspectors from the territory controlled by Ukraine, the rotation on 1 March 2025 was carried out via Russian-occupied territory. By deliberately blocking the safe exit of IAEA experts through Ukrainian-controlled territory and keeping them without rotation for 80 days—far beyond the planned period—Russia actually deprived international experts of their freedom of movement and used them as tools of political pressure on the international community. Therefore, the IAEA’s actions should be regarded not as a rotation of experts at Zaporizhzhia NPP but as a humanitarian evacuation under threat to the life and health of the Agency’s personnel. Ukraine submitted a note of protest to the IAEA leadership, condemning the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity and warning against any repetition of such actions in the future.

The effectiveness of the IAEA in the context of the seizure of nuclear facilities and ongoing shelling—posing threats to nuclear safety and potentially leading to radiological consequences—is a matter of great concern among politicians, experts and the public. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Norwegian international science-based environmental non-profit organization Bellona has published four reports: The IAEA’s Role in Times of War, The Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia NPP: Analysis of Technical and Political Aspects, Rosatom’s Role in the War in Ukraine, and The Radiation Risks of Seizing the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

The Uatom.org Editorial Board spoke with Bellona representative Aleksander Nikitin about nuclear and radiation safety during the war in Ukraine and the IAEA’s role in the situation at the occupied ZNPP.

– Mr. Nikitin, tell us about Bellona’s activities over the past three years. Has Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had an impact?

– Before the war, Bellona had two offices in Russia—in Murmansk and St. Petersburg. The day after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a decision was made to close these offices. All staff who wished to do so were transferred to a new office in Vilnius. In addition, Bellona cut all ties with the official Russian structures and representatives who supported or tacitly endorsed the war. In April 2023, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia declared Bellona an “undesirable organization.”

Following its exit from Russia, Bellona shifted its focus to information and analytical work on nuclear energy. Special attention continues to be paid to safety issues, the influence of Rosatom on the international nuclear sector and economy, the participation of Russia’s nuclear agency in the war, and the crimes committed against Ukraine. Today, our work centers on analysis and dissemination of information.

We traditionally study and analyze all available sources (primarily open ones) and present the information based on our knowledge and experience. Bellona’s nuclear projects involve two nuclear physicists and one engineer specializing in nuclear propulsion systems and nuclear safety. We also engage external experts and take into account the views of our Bellona colleagues. Since 1994, these methods allowed Bellona to prepare and publish over 50 major reports and working documents on nuclear energy and safety.

– You mentioned Rosatom’s influence internationally. In your view, how does Rosatom currently influence global energy policy, and has that influence changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

– After the start of the full-scale invasion, we prepared a working document titled “Rosatom During the War: How Militarization of the Russian Nuclear Giant Took Place,”  which examines Rosatom’s domestic and international projects. We are now finalizing a second similar document covering Rosatom’s activities in 2023 and 2024.

Our analysis showed that Rosatom has practically withdrawn from the European Union, remaining active only in Hungary and Slovakia. Its other projects have either been terminated or are in decline. I don’t know what will happen next, given recent events, but it has lost many ties with the United States. In response, Rosatom has refocused its efforts on the so-called Global South and is developing partnerships with African countries that have little prior experience in nuclear energy.

In summary, Rosatom enjoys full political and economic backing from Russia and has substantial funding. Sanctions against Russia have not actually affected Rosatom. Those with some effect—such as restrictions on the Northern Sea Route or certain research institutions—do not significantly affect its financial situation.

– What are the key nuclear and radiation safety challenges arising from the war?

– The war causes human casualties, environmental destruction, and damage to energy infrastructure. It creates hazardous zones contaminated with mines and other dangerous substances, and poses new challenges for states with civilian nuclear energy and technologies that become dangerously unpredictable in wartime.

– When you refer to challenges for countries with civilian nuclear energy, what exactly do you mean?

– At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, everyone realized what it meant to be dependent on Russian oil and gas—or that of any other country. Everyone wants energy, but no one wants dependence on one or two supply sources.

In Ukraine, we see new challenges related to the war and military operations.  We see what is happening at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, while other plants are constantly under threat. The recent attack on the Chernobyl NPP (Uatom.org editor’s note: referring to a Russian drone strike on the New Safe Confinement above of the Shelter over Chernobyl NPP Unit 4) highlights this.

We are saying that even the UN and its agency, the IAEA, were unprepared for the kind of scenario we are facing today. While some countries may have anticipated theoretical risks, Ukraine is facing real, practical ones.

– Does Bellona cooperate with Ukrainian or international governmental structures to improve monitoring? What are the main challenges you face in your work on nuclear and radiation safety analysis in Ukraine?

– Having understood that without contact and cooperation with governmental structures it is impossible to achieve the goal of nuclear safety, Bellona has strived to interact as much as possible with official institutions and the scientific community of every country where it had interests (EU, Norway, USA, UK, Ukraine, and Russia before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine). In Ukraine, Bellona worked with experts such as Georgiy Lysychenko, Mykola Steinberg, Dmytro Chumak, Andrian Prokip, Sofia Shutyak, and others when preparing reports “The Ukrainian Nuclear Industry” and “The Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant – Ukraine’s Uranium Heritage” (Yuriy Tkachenko).

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have prepared several reports on the Zaporizhzhia NPP and now publish a monthly digest analyzing current developments, especially in Ukraine’s nuclear industry.

As for challenges, I’ve been working with information for a long time, and I always say that information is never enough. What is adequate today may be insufficient tomorrow. We are convinced that accurate and timely information is critical for making sound decisions.

– In your report you mention the IAEA’s insufficient effectiveness in nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine under full-scale invasion. Is there a way for the IAEA to act more effectively?

– It’s a difficult question, but I’m convinced that effectiveness can always be improved. It depends on willingness, capabilities and methods. Each time the IAEA does something, there is usually still room to do it better, faster, or more comprehensively. For example, consider the IAEA’s key principles to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia NPP to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure plant integrity. It is unclear why it took 15 months to prepare such a short but critically important document.

At the same time, this brings us to the matter of powers, as the IAEA has repeatedly acknowledged that both the “Pillars” and “Principles” have been violated, but the Agency has no tools to enforce their implementation. That’s why we noted in our report that the IAEA’s basic capabilities must be revised or strengthened. It must be able to work more effectively and not only to monitor but also to make decisions that are binding. The system and principles upon which the UN and agencies like the IAEA were founded are no longer effective in today’s geopolitical context. Currently, the IAEA lacks influence—such as at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. They can only serve as diligent observers and accurate reporters. But that is not enough.

The IAEA today is a structure with very limited legal authority and resources—not just in terms of funding but also its ability to carry out what falls within its mandate. If the Agency lacks authority, it cannot enforce the implementation of its own requirements, including the “Pillars” and “Principles.” Perhaps the IAEA was sufficient for peacetime. Maybe now it’s not. Bellona hadn’t previously paid close attention to the IAEA’s work, powers or limits. It was only after the full-scale invasion that we began to ask: “Why is this happening, and what international mechanisms or organizations can stop the seizure of civil nuclear facilities and take real steps to ensure their nuclear safety?”

– What is your opinion on the deployment of IAEA monitoring missions at Ukrenergo facilities?

– Bellona believes that placing IAEA monitoring missions at Ukrenergo facilities is one of the Agency’s most important decisions that have been implemented in practice. Of course, Russia could still strike facilities where inspectors are staying, but that would raise the level of international accountability. Even Russia is reluctant to escalate tensions or even break relations with the IAEA. The IAEA missions at Ukrenergo facilities serve as a kind of “umbrella” shielding the facilities from attacks, which is why Russia was very dissatisfied with this decision by the Agency.

– You analyze the speeches of Alexey Likhachev at the IAEA General Conferences in your report. In your opinion, does the legal succession of the USSR create additional preferences, levers of influence on the IAEA?

– In our opinion, Russia’s legal succession in no way affects the place, rights, preferences and opportunities it should have in the IAEA. The IAEA has documents stipulating that all members have equal rights and voting power. And that’s it. The fact that Likhachev constantly emphasizes that the USSR was one of the IAEA’s founders and that Russia regularly finances IAEA projects is simply a form of blackmail or an illegitimate attempt to gain undue advantages.

In addition, Ukraine quite rightly drew attention to the fact that many responsible and managerial positions in the IAEA leadership (including Deputy Director General, Head of Department of Nuclear Energy) are occupied by representatives of Russia, who can influence the decisions made by the Agency, which is unacceptable in this situation. Therefore, the question arises about the possibilities of decision-making within the IAEA structure and rapid response when critical situations occur.

We analyzed the figures showing who contributes and how much to the IAEA’s main budget: as of 2024, Russia is in the 13th place among the IAEA member countries (Uatom.org editor’s note: the largest contributions in 2024 were made by IAEA member countries such as the USA, China, Japan, Germany, Great Britain and Italy). However, the Agency has budgets for different projects, which are usually closed to public access. Therefore, when Likhachev said that they fulfill their financing obligations, he most likely meant that they finance certain projects.

– How could the IAEA enhance its role in preventing nuclear hazards in wartime? Does the IAEA use all its resources to de-occupy ZNPP?

– It is difficult to say what available resources the IAEA could use today. You would have to be “inside” the organization to know that. However, the main issue, which Grossi constantly raises, is that the IAEA is a technical organization without political, legal, investigative or other functions for resolving issues arising from war or the armed seizure of civil nuclear facilities. The IAEA probably lacks the authority and resources. The IAEA has no practice or experience in gathering additional resources in a situation of full-scale invasion, such as the one we are witnessing in Ukraine. The IAEA has no legal mechanism to gather such resources.

We are witnessing how Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi travels around the world and collects money for IAEA projects in Ukraine. This should not happen. In the event of military conflict, a mechanism should be activated to provide the IAEA with international resources and multifaceted support.

As for ZNPP deoccupation, in my opinion, this is a political and military issue that is not within the competence and responsibility of the IAEA today. We have not seen any IAEA decisions on deoccupation that would have resulted in actions. We see only some recommendations that have no political or legal force.

– Is the IAEA able to influence the recognition of attacks on civil nuclear facilities as international crimes? Does the IAEA have mechanisms to identify and punish those responsible for threats to nuclear and radiation safety? If not the IAEA, what structures are responsible for identifying and punishing those responsible for creating threats to nuclear and radiation safety?

– No, and in the current situation this is more likely a question for the UN Security Council. The IAEA is too technical and limited structure today to make such decisions. Even if the IAEA were to make recommendations (which is almost impossible for many reasons), they would be immediately blocked in the UN Security Council, since Russia holds veto power.

There are no other international structures authorized to make such decisions. A clear example is the reaction to some decisions of the UN International Court, which recognized Putin and several other figures as international criminals.

As for identifying and punishing those responsible for threats to nuclear and radiation safety, as I said, the IAEA has no such mechanisms either. Moreover, there are no international structures responsible for punishing the guilty, especially when crimes in nuclear and radiation safety are committed during wartime by states possessing nuclear weapons and holding permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

– You are proposing in your report the idea of splitting the IAEA into two separate organizations: one would focus on developing nuclear science, civil technologies and production, and the other would focus on monitoring and ensuring nuclear safety at both civil and military facilities. Could Russia’s invasion of Ukraine force the international community to reform the nuclear safety oversight system? What international mechanisms should be developed to prevent repeated nuclear power plant seizures in the future?

– We should hope that this war will prompt the international community to reconsider the framework for nuclear and radiation safety. It is necessary to remember that, firstly, nothing is over yet and the outcome remains uncertain and, secondly, the situation could repeat itself. All the prerequisites are there.

In our opinion, the entire international system for making and overseeing political decisions that ensure safety needs to be reformed. The UN and its structures, starting with the Security Council, have failed to cope with this (as exemplified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine).

A mechanism is required that would provide for the early prevention of threats to civil nuclear facilities (including armed international protection in the event of such a threat), rapid investigation and identification of those responsible, accountability, and real punishment of offenders.

– What further research or initiatives do you plan to implement for nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine?

– I would outline five areas:

• facilitate the technical and economic implementation of the project to eliminate the uranium legacy at the Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant;
• provide information and analytical support for Ukrainian projects aimed at the safety of radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian NPPs (including Zaporizhzhia NPP) and nuclear historical sites;
• activate efforts on projects aimed at developing power industry in Ukraine to promote and develop energy sources with low emissions of CO₂ and other harmful gases and energy saving;
• prepare the second part of the Report, to describe the experience of nuclear energy performance and maintenance in Ukraine under war conditions (including the Zaporizhzhia NPP); we are looking for partners in Ukraine for this effort;
• analyze and understand the capabilities of Ukrainian civil society and their cooperation with the state structures in the safe use of  nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Uatom.org Editorial Board