The following op-ed, written by Bellona’s Dmitry Gorchakov, originally appeared in The Moscow Times.

Russia has long been actively involved in Iran’s nuclear program. The largest project within this cooperation is the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Construction of the first unit at the site began as early as 1975 by the West German company Kraftwerk Union, but was halted in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution. In 1995, Russia signed contracts to complete the unit using a VVER-1000 reactor and to supply nuclear fuel for the first ten years of its operation. Russia also committed to taking back spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing.

The unit was connected to the grid in 2011 and entered commercial operation in 2013. A year later, a contract was signed for the construction of the second phase of the plant, consisting of two additional VVER-1000 units with a total cost of around $10 billion. Notably, according to TASS, the project has been fully financed by Iran without the use of Russian loans. At present, Rosatom is involved in the construction of the second unit at Bushehr, although the bulk of the work is being carried out by local contractors. Construction of the third unit has not yet officially begun.

In September 2025, an agreement was signed to build a second Russian-designed nuclear power plant in Iran, in the Sirik area of Hormozgan province. The project includes four reactor units with a total capacity of 5,020 MW. Its estimated cost is around $25 billion, and unlike Bushehr, it is expected to involve Russian financing.

However, in the context of the ongoing full-scale war in Iran, the prospects for any large-scale nuclear construction in the near future appear highly uncertain.

Why Bushehr Is Not Related to Iran’s Enriched Uranium Problem

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is not directly linked to Iran’s potential military nuclear program. The plant has operated under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards since the very beginning. IAEA inspectors have access to the facility, receive operational data, and monitor it to ensure that nuclear materials used there are not diverted for military purposes.

Even when, after the US and Israel attacks in June 2025, Iran significantly reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, it partially maintained the agency’s access to the Bushehr NPP. Apparently for the simple reason that Iran truly has nothing to hide at this station.

Most of the debates in recent years surrounding Iran’s increasingly advanced nuclear program have focused on other facilities. These include, above all, uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow (which rely on indigenous rather than Russian enrichment technologies), the nuclear complex in Isfahan, and the heavy water reactor in Arak, which has been suspected of being used for plutonium production. All of these facilities were targeted in attacks both in June 2025 and in February–March 2026. Fortunately, according to the IAEA, these strikes did not result in significant environmental consequences or radioactive releases, partly because many of the facilities are located underground. In total, Iran operates more than a dozen nuclear sites.

Particular concern also surrounds an stockpile of slightly over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%. This material could be relatively quickly further enriched to higher levels suitable for the production of several nuclear weapons. Its exact location remains unknown, but the attacks on the aforementioned facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow appear to have aimed both at destroying this material (or more precisely, burying it under the debris of underground storage sites) and at disabling the centrifuges used for its enrichment. In addition, media reports in March widely circulated claims about a possible U.S. special forces operation aimed at seizing this uranium.

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant also hosts a significant amount of nuclear material—approximately 210 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel and around 70 tonnes of fuel in the reactor core, according to Rosatom CEO. However, these materials are subject to safeguards and accounting by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and their use for nuclear weapons purposes (for example, through the extraction of plutonium from spent fuel) is highly unlikely due to the relatively low suitability of reactor-grade plutonium for weapons use and the need for complex reprocessing infrastructure.

According to the author’s estimates, this volume of spent fuel broadly corresponds to what would be expected from a VVER-1000 reactor operating since 2011. At the same time, it suggests that, despite the intergovernmental agreement to return spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Russia, the material has in practice continued to accumulate in Iran over the years.

Nuclear Risks at the Bushehr NPP During Wartime

Such a volume of nuclear material on site—and, more importantly, the presence of the country’s most powerful operating nuclear reactor—makes the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant the most dangerous facility in Iran in terms of potential environmental consequences in the event of an attack. This assessment is shared, among others, by the IAEA Director General.

In the worst-case scenario, a direct hit by a missile or bomb on a reactor unit could damage the operating reactor and lead to the release of radioactive materials beyond the site, with potential consequences extending to neighboring countries.

Notably, the status of a civilian facility under IAEA safeguards has not fully shielded Bushehr from attacks—whether intentional or incidental. Concerns about such risks already emerged during the first Israeli and U.S. operation against Iran in June 2025. At the time, Vladimir Putin reportedly had to engage directly with Israeli leadership to secure the safety of “more than 200” Russian specialists working at the plant. However, no strikes on or near the facility were recorded at that stage, and Rosatom did not report any suspension of construction activities or evacuation of personnel.

However, in March 2026, according to the Iranian side, there were already three incidents involving projectiles striking the territory of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—on March 17, 24, and 27. On the first day of the operation, February 28, an attack was also reported near the city of Bushehr, just a few hundred meters from the plant. In all cases, it was reported that there were no casualties or damage to the facility itself.

Unlike in 2025, Rosatom began evacuating personnel on the very first day of the operation. A total of 94 people were initially evacuated, primarily employees’ children and non-essential staff. As of March 3, according to a statement by the Rosatom CEO, 639 Russian nationals remained at the site. By March 12, an additional 150 people had been evacuated, followed by another 163 on March 25. Ultimately, Rosatom plans to retain only a minimal team of several dozen personnel who will “maintain the operability of the plant, ensure the preservation of equipment, and support the functioning of the residential settlement where the workers live.”

According to the Rosatom CEO, the first unit of the Bushehr NPP continues to operate, and the Iranian side does not plan to shut it down. This increases the risk of a nuclear incident in the event of damage not only to the reactor itself but also to surrounding infrastructure.

Experience from the situation at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine shows that attacks on a country’s broader energy infrastructure can also pose a serious threat to nuclear sites. Such attacks may lead to the disconnection of a reactor from the grid, a station blackout, and the emergency shutdown of an operating unit. Under adverse conditions, such a scenario could potentially result in a large-scale radiological accident.

Against this backdrop, particular concern is raised by repeatedly stated intentions by Donald Trump to target Iran’s power infrastructure, including statements such as “a very strong hit on each of their power plants, and likely simultaneously” (April 1), as well as calls to “strike and destroy” Iranian power plants, “starting with the largest” (March 21).

Although the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is not even among the five most powerful power stations in Iran—being smaller than several gas- and oil-fired plants—the risks associated with disruption to the plant’s operation, including the loss of external power supply following a reactor shutdown, remain significant.

A Troubling Trend

Against the backdrop of long-standing threats from the Iranian regime and well-founded concerns about its nuclear program, it is understandable that discussions about how to locate and neutralize 400 kg of enriched uranium are attracting global attention. However, other developments are equally concerning—and are already forming a dangerous trend.

Over the past four years, civilian nuclear energy facilities have increasingly become targets of direct or indirect attacks in armed conflicts: in Ukraine (including the Zaporizhzhia NPP and other facilities across the country), at the Kursk NPP in Russia—located close to the Ukrainian border and also exposed to risks of attacks (intentional or otherwise), construction delays, and personnel evacuations—and now at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. Ironically, all of these facilities were built based on Russian designs, and all are, to varying degrees, linked to a single state nuclear corporation—Rosatom.

It is difficult to predict how this will ultimately unfold. What is already clear, however, is that neither national authorities, nor international coalitions, nor even UN bodies such as the IAEA are capable of guaranteeing the effective protection of civilian nuclear facilities during armed conflicts. One can only hope that in the coming years we will not witness a man-made nuclear accident at a nuclear power plant caused by military activity, and that the international nuclear community will eventually draw lessons from this turbulent period and develop more effective mechanisms to minimize such risks in the future.