The Soviet nuclear legacy refers the problems associated with accumulated radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, shutdown and decommissioning-bound nuclear facilities, as well as radioactively contaminated territories and bodies of water. In the USSR, there was no established state policy or systemic approach to addressing the historical challenges of the nuclear sector. As a result, mechanisms for preventing the accumulation of nuclear legacy and eliminating it—generated both in the civilian nuclear energy sector and through military programs—were never developed.

After the collapse of the USSR, the issues of eliminating the nuclear legacy—about 80% of which ended up on the territory of the Russian Federation—had to be addressed virtually from scratch. The Russian state corporation Rosatom began to implement organizational solutions to the accumulated problems. One of these measures was the development and adoption of the Federal Target Program on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (FTPNRS).

For nearly thirty years of work in Russia, Bellona has carried out its nuclear project, whose main strategic goal was to support and directly participate in efforts to eliminate the nuclear legacy. The organization’s experts took part in Rosatom events and in discussions of the development and results of the FTPNRS programs.

In this publication, Bellona examines the operations and outcomes of FTPNRS-2 on the eve of and throughout the entire Russian-Ukrainian war from 2021 to 2024. The report focuses primarily on the results of comprehensive implementation of the program in 2022–2024 and the future prospects for eliminating Russia’s nuclear legacy.

Additionally, the publication briefly analyzes and assesses developments concerning the Arctic nuclear legacy slated for elimination during 2024–2025.

As of today, Russia lacks a unified state system and a single national operator responsible for a comprehensive solution to the problems of the nuclear legacy. There is no integrated structure that has the authority, resources, and functions to centrally manage the remaining spent nuclear fuel, radioactive waste, the decommissioning of nuclear and radiation-hazardous facilities, and the rehabilitation of territories.

Russia’s current system for managing its nuclear legacy is not centralized or optimized and, as a result, is not sustainable. This may pose risks for the future. Without institutional centralization and a long-term strategy, Russia risks facing rising economic costs, increasing environmental threats, and prolonged timelines for eliminating hazardous facilities.

Key Findings / Conclusions (Bullet Points)

• At present, there are no clear—let alone legally defined—answers to the following questions:
  • What is currently considered nuclear legacy infrastructure in Russia;
  • How the process of eliminating the nuclear legacy should be managed;
  • How to finance the elimination of the Soviet nuclear legacy located in border areas, international territories, and marine zones.
• There are no objective criteria by which one can assess whether the process of eliminating the Soviet nuclear legacy is progressing successfully.
• For many years, international programs and the active involvement of independent expert communities remained key drivers of nuclear legacy remediation. After the start of the war in Ukraine, international assistance ceased.
• Currently, only 20% of the financial and material obligations related to the nuclear legacy are secured within the dedicated FTPNRS program, while more than 80% of obligations are not provided for in any regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation.
• At the current pace of work, it would take more than 200 years to dispose of the entire accumulated volume of radioactive waste.
• Due to the destruction of civil society institutions, transparency in the nuclear sector has disappeared, giving way to political manipulation and the imitation of activity.
• Two decades after the adoption of the first federal target programs, the elimination of the nuclear legacy has advanced, but only insignificantly.
• As of today, it is nearly impossible to determine the actual cost of eliminating, or even maintaining in a minimally safe condition, nuclear legacy facilities.
• The full cycle of nuclear legacy elimination may stretch over more than half a century, once again reflecting the depth of the problem and its systemic nature, which goes beyond the span of a single generation of policy decisions.

This report is based on official information from the FTPNRS-2 website, materials from publications and statements by experts and official representatives of Rosatom, as well as materials produced and accumulated during the active period of Bellona’s Russian offices.

Bellona’s new report will be of interest to scholars, nuclear industry professionals, NGO staff, journalists, and government officials who work with, study, or regularly report on issues of nuclear and radiation safety.

• Download the report