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Who we are

The Bellona Environmental Transparency Center is an environmental non-governmental non-profit organization monitoring Russia’s impact on the environment both within and beyond its borders. 

We focus on nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine and Russia, climate change, and industrial pollution in the Arctic. We write reports and share analysis with interested stakeholders. 

Our office is located in Vilnius, Lithuania, and employs Russian-speaking staff who left Russia in 2022 after the start of the war in Ukraine. The organization is part of The Bellona Foundation, whose headquarters are in Oslo, Norway.

Illustrations and photos for your publications

Experts

Click on the expert to get more information (photo and biography)

Aleksander Nikitin

Nuclear advisor

Dmitry Gorchakov

Nuclear advisor

Ksenia Vakhrusheva

Project Manager, Arctic project advisor

Oskar Njaa

General Manager for International Affairs

Yury Sergeev

Administrative manager, Arctic project advisor

FAQs

Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom is a multidisciplinary holding company that owns assets and expertise across all stages of the nuclear energy production and technology chain: geological exploration and uranium mining, uranium conversion and enrichment, nuclear fuel fabrication, nuclear power plant design and construction, mechanical engineering, electricity generation, decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (RW). 

In addition, the state corporation’s activities include the production of innovative nuclear and non-nuclear products, conducting scientific research, developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and environmental projects, including the creation of eco-industrial parks and a national system for handling hazardous industrial waste. 

Recently, Rosatom has been actively developing new business areas such as wind energy, nuclear medicine, advanced materials and technologies, digital products, infrastructure solutions, additive technologies, energy storage systems, automated process control systems, electrical engineering, environmental solutions, and others. 

In the military-defense sector, the Nuclear Weapons Complex Directorate of the State Corporation Rosatom ensures the implementation of state policy in the development of the nuclear industry, fulfills the tasks of the state armament program, and carries out the state defense orders.

The leading enterprise of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex is the Mayak Production Association, where stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium are produced and stored for the manufacturing of nuclear munitions.

More detailed information about the corporation’s structure and activities can be found in our organization’s report: The Russian nuclear industry during wartime, 2022 and early 2023. 

Rosatom remains the world’s leading nuclear power plant builder. In fact, every third reactor unit in the world has either been constructed by the state corporation’s tehnicians or based on its designs. Major projects are currently being implemented in the middle east, Asia and Europe, and several EU countries remain heavily dependent on nuclear fuel supplies from, and uranium enrichment within Russia 

Five European countries purchase nuclear fuel their Soviet-designed VVER-440 and VVER-100 reactors. These countries include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. These are thereby the most vulnerable and dependent on Russian nuclear fuel supplies, despite the lack of sanctions or bans on such deliveries from Russia to Europe. 

In 2023, the EU even doubled its purchases of Russian nuclear fuel. However, the market could change significantly in the next five years, and last year’s increase in imports only reflects the intention of nuclear power plant operators to hedge against a challenging transition to new suppliers. By 2030, the volume of nuclear fuel supplied to the EU could decrease by 60%. 

Compared to other Russian export sectors, the volume of nuclear fuel deliveries to EU countries is relatively modest, amounting to about $3 billion annually.

No. Unlike other Russian companies, Rosatom has not been subjected to sanctions, and its foreign projects are virtually unaffected by the sanctions policies of the U.S. and the EU. 

Today, there is active discussion about banning the import of Russian enriched uranium into the U.S.

For many years, Rosatom was headed by the current Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Sergey Kiriyenko. Today, he chairs Rosatom’s highest governing body – the supervisory board. 

Rosatom operates within a personalized political system, addressing not only energy and economic objectives but also national security tasks, such as the testing and development of nuclear weapons.

Rosatom is actively involved in the military campaign in Ukraine, while trying not to openly disclose this in its international reports. The most dangerous action by the state corporation during this time has been the occupation of the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, the Zaporizhzhia NPP. 

What is happening at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant? 

Russian troops captured the Zaporizhzhia NPP on the night of March 4, 2022, and much has happened during the two years of occupation. 

In the first months, Russian authorities did not interfere with the operation of the plant. The NPP continued to be administered by Ukraine, with some of the reactor units functioning and supplying electricity to Ukraine. 

In August 2022, heavy shelling of the plant began, increasing the risk of a nuclear incident. More than eight times, the NPP has lost access to electricity and had to operate on emergency generators. Since September 2022, all the plant’s reactors have been placed in “cold shutdown” mode, effectively reducing the risk of a major accident. 

The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 deprived the plant of its usual cooling water source. 

In September 2022, an IAEA mission arrived at the plant for the first time. The mission remains an important source of information about what is happening there. 

In October 2022, by presidential decree, the NPP was officially placed under Russian control, but the plant is barely mentioned in the annual reports of Rosatom. The head of the corporation, Alexey Likhachev, has not visited the Zaporizhzhia NPP even once during the entire conflict in Ukraine, fearing reputational risks. 

Today, Rosatom is responsible for the operation of the plant’s equipment, managing personnel, and negotiations with the IAEA.

Russia owns about a third of the Arctic territory (including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean). These territories are rich in various natural resources, such as oil, gas, metals, and diamonds. 

Since tsarist times, Russia has sought to economically develop the Arctic territories, primarily focusing on industries related to the extraction and processing of natural resources — all while paying scant attention to the potential harm to the region’s fragile ecosystem or impacts on global climate processes, which are occurring four times more intensely in the Arctic than in other parts of the Earth. 

In modern Russian strategic documents regarding the Arctic region, the priority remains on economic development rather than environmental protection. Plans include the development of new resource deposits, construction of mineral processing plants, and an increase in cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route. For a better understanding of future projects in the Arctic, watch our video (in Russian).

There are 30 industrial sites in Russia’s Arctic zone classified as the highest hazard level (Class I) and listed among the enterprises causing the greatest environmental damage. This list includes 300 enterprises, whose cumulative emissions account for at least 60% of total industrial emissions in Russia. These 30 industrial sites are owned by nine companies and represent five industries: oil and gas extraction, non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy, pulp and paper production, and coal mining. 

The volume of greenhouse gas emissions from these sites in the Russian Arctic is higher than in other Arctic countries. 

Moreover, the issues of past industrial pollution remain unresolved—Norilsk, Vorkuta, and the Murmansk region, which suffered from toxic emissions and discharges decades ago, continue to experience polluted air, water, and soil even today. 

The Northern Sea Route is the shortest maritime corridor between Europe and Asia. It traverses the seas of the Arctic Ocean and stretches approximately 5,600 kilometers. The NSR is only ab half as long as other sea routes from Europe to the Far East. 

Rosatom serves as the infrastructure operator for the Northern Sea Route and is responsible for organizing shipping along the route, constructing infrastructure, providing navigation and hydrographic support, and ensuring the safety of navigation in Arctic conditions. 

Russian authorities believe that climate warming will expand opportunities for using the NSR both for domestic Russian needs and for international transit. At the same time, the environmental consequences of intensifying shipping on the NSR are not being seriously considered. 

For example, Russia has not abandoned the use and transportation of heavy fuel oil (mazut) on Arctic vessels, which is one of the main polluting factors of shipping. The burning of mazut is accompanied by the emission of greenhouse gases, harmful substances, and soot particles into the atmosphere, which, when settling on the ice surface, increase its heat absorption capacity and thereby accelerate climate change. 

Before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, Russia planned to increase cargo traffic on the NSR to 80 million tons in 2024 and to 150 million tons in 2030. However, under Western sanctions, these plans are being adjusted downward. Thus, cargo traffic on the NSR in 2024 was first adjusted to 72 million tons, then to 40 million tons. You can read about the history and plans for the development of the NSR in our article.

The Soviet Union left behind a massive global nuclear legacy in the Arctic region, where the main bases of the Soviet military and civilian nuclear fleets were concentrated, and where some of the main test sites for new weapons were located, including the Novaya Zemlya test site. 

In the late 1990s, when access to information about Soviet nuclear projects became available, it became clear that no other region in the world had such a large concentration of old nuclear submarines and ships, as well as nuclear and radioactive waste left on the coast and sunk in the seas, as the Russian Arctic region. 

The Soviet nuclear legacy in the northwest of Russia includes buildings of a former military base in Andreyeva Bay contaminated with radionuclides, spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines, and sunken nuclear and radioactively hazardous objects on the seabed of the Arctic seas. 

In the Russian Arctic, seven nuclear submarine reactors with unloaded spent nuclear fuel and nine assembled reactors with technological equipment but without nuclear fuel are still submerged. 

Over the past few decades, up until 2022, thanks to the efforts of many countries, financial institutions, and with public oversight by Bellona, the problems of Arctic nuclear pollution have gradually begun to be addressed. However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has changed many things, including the conditions, scale, and intensity of projects to clean up the Arctic from the Soviet nuclear legacy. 

All international companies have withdrawn from joint projects with Russia, ceasing funding as well as technological, political, public, and other participation. Russia, in turn, has taken a number of domestic political steps and made several high-profile statements that all projects to clean up the Arctic will continue and that the state corporation Rosatom will continue to address these issues.

Get our monthly Nuclear Digest for a comprehensive overview of nuclear and radiation safety news in Russia and Ukraine. We provide expert commentary and a curated list of related publications. Subscribe to the Russian or English version. 

Our Arctic Digest keeps you informed about the latest developments in the Arctic. Available in both English and Russian. 

Any questions left?

Nikita Petrov

Communications advisor

Bellona’s sources of income

Bellona’s sources of income The Foundation has over many years developed several different income streams and revenue models that together finance our activities. Our revenues come mainly from philanthropy, project funding, the cooperation programme with the business sector, and a modest share of public operating grants.