For a country where more than four hundred Soviet nuclear bomb tests were carried out during the Cold War, Kazakhstan would seem an unlikely candidate to embrace nuclear energy. But a referendum last year on whether the country should endeavor to build its first ever nuclear power plant received a resounding yes, with 64 percent of Kazakh voters backing the idea.  

The vote broke a psychological barrier. The Semipalatinsk Test Site, where Moscow conducted hundreds of nuclear explosions while Kazakhstan was still a Soviet republic, remains one of the most contaminated places on Earth. Generations in nearby villages lived with radioactive fallout, and a legacy of illness and displacement shaped Kazakhstan’s post-independence identity. When the country officially closed the site in August of 1991, the United Nations later marked the date as an international day against nuclear tests. 

Leading up the consortium that will build Kazakhstan’s nuclear plant is Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation—a dicey choice given the company’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine and its record of cost overruns and missed deadlines in projects from Turkey to India. Rosatom’s supply lines have also been hit with Western sanctions over the war, putting in question the corporation’s ability to fulfill the order.  

And while the Rosatom plant is cited for Ulken, on the shores of Lake Balkhash, Kazakhstan has also named China National Nuclear Corporation to construct a second nuclear station likely in the Almaty region—a development that could set Rosatom up for embarrassment.  

“Given that China builds NPPs much faster than Rosatom—even using Russian designs—there is reason to believe that the ‘first’ Russian NPP in Kazakhstan will actually be completed second—something that would not reflect well on Rosatom’s reputation,” says Dmitry Gorchakov, a Bellona nuclear analyst.  

Added to this sense of competition is just how hard Rosatom had to work to be considered for the project in the first place. Following last summer’s pro-nuclear referendum, Moscow dispatched a raft of high level officials—from Rosatom head Aleksei Likhachev to Vladimir Putin himself—to woo Astana into granting it the project. That Rosatom emerged as merely the head of the construction consortium—rather than as the sole contractor—makes for only a qualified victory for the corporation.  

Kazakhstan nonetheless has power shortages to address. Frequent electrical outages, particularly in the industrial south, have exposed how little new generation capacity has been built since Soviet times. Coal still accounts for roughly 70 percent of Kazakhstan’s power mix, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s pledge of carbon neutrality by 2060 has turned carbon-free electricity into a political goal. 

In August, engineers began drilling and geotechnical surveys at Ulken, marking the first visible steps toward construction of the nuclear plant. The facility will use Rosatom’s VVER-1200 reactor design — a model already running in Belarus and under construction in Egypt and Turkey. The total cost is expected to reach $10–12 billion, with Rosatom offering to finance much of it, allowing it to be repaid over decades of electricity sales. 

On paper, Rosatom’s offer looks convenient: minimal upfront cost and long-term operational support. But Rosatom’s performance record gives reason for skepticism. The Akkuyu plant in Turkey, touted as a high-profile showcase for Russian nuclear know-how, is years behind schedule. Reactor projects in Hungary and India have been hobbled by rising costs and equipment delays. Sanctions against Russia over the Ukrainian invasion complicate access to components and credit, while the Kremlin’s war spending has tightened Rosatom’s export financing.  

In contrast, the selection of Beijing’s to build a second plant comes without that baggage and could prove to be a model of efficiency. China’s record with its Hualong One-type reactors—completed on schedule in Pakistan and China—might mean that its own Kazakh plant could nudge past Rosatom to finish first.  

The two-track approach gives Astana some leverage: if one partner falters, the other might deliver. For Moscow, it’s a wager on its own prestige—or a potential reminder that its dominance in Central Asia’s energy landscape is no longer assured. 

“The details of the contract have not been disclosed, but one can hope that Kazakhstan has taken into account the experience, as well as the advantages—and especially the disadvantages—accumulated by those countries where Rosatom has built and continues to build NPPs,” says Bellona expert Alexander Nikitin.  

Nikitin noted that, unlike other former Soviet republics where Rosatom is building reactors, Kazakhstan approached the Rosatom bid cautiously and included the public in its decision to pursue nuclear power.  

“This is very different from how things have always been done in Russia and how they continue to be done there,” Nikitin said immediately after the referendum a year ago.  

Still, the ghosts of Semipalatinsk linger. Nuclear weapons testing made large swaths of land in Kazakhstan’s northeastern Semei region uninhabitable, devastating the local environment and affecting the health of nearby residents. In total, 456 tests were carried out between 1949 and 1989 at the Semipalatinsk test site. An older generation of Kazakhs remembers this well. 

Meanwhile, some environmental groups have questioned the Ulken site’s proximity to Lake Balkhash, warning of risks to one of Central Asia’s largest freshwater bodies if its water levels continue to fall. 

Kazakh government officials insist the project meets IAEA safety standards and that modern containment systems make catastrophic failure unlikely. Yet, for many, the advent of a nuclear power plant will contend with the memory of careless nuclear testing. 

Financing could yet determine whether Ulken becomes a model or a cautionary tale. Rosatom’s loans may look generous, but they come with fine print—and with a partner whose financial flexibility is becoming more constrained. Western lenders are steering clear of Russian projects, and Kazakhstan may need to tap its sovereign fund or Chinese credit to bridge any gaps in funding. 

Establishing a bureaucracy to oversee nuclear power is another hurdle. Kazakhstan’s newly established nuclear regulator must draft safety frameworks, train inspectors, and build emergency-response capacity from scratch. Even small bureaucratic delays could stall construction—all of which puts Rosatom’s mid-2030s target date in question.   

If completed, Ulken would be Central Asia’s first modern nuclear power plant, a milestone that could enhance Kazakhstan’s reputation as a regional energy producer. It would also extend Russia’s influence — or, if China’s project finishes first, mark a decisive shift in Central Asia’s balance of technological power. 

Globally, the race reflects a familiar pattern: while Western firms wrestle with regulation and public opposition, Russia and China are exporting reactors as instruments of statecraft. For Moscow, every new deal abroad is a way to maintain relevance. For Beijing, it’s a demonstration of speed, financing muscle, and delivery discipline—qualities Rosatom struggles to match. 

Still, the irony is striking: a nation once scarred by nuclear fallout bets on the atom for its future power needs. Whether that future arrives on schedule may depend less on Kazakhstan’s ambition than on Rosatom’s capacity — and on how fast China moves to show that it can do better.