After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.

Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.

This survey covers events from May 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for April, March and February.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for May 2025
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities
1.3. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. EU unveils plan to phase out Russian energy supplies, including nuclear materials
3. Kozloduy NPP once again granted EU sanctions exemption for Russian imports
4. US ramps up domestic nuclear energy development and prepares to compete with Russia and China in the nuclear sector
5. Urenco launches first phase of new enrichment cascades in the US

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
6. Rosatom expects new international orders for NPP construction
7. Rosatom manufactures first RITM-400 reactor for nuclear icebreaker Rossiya
8. Rosatom produced nearly 6,000 metric tons of uranium in Kazakhstan in 2024
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

SPECIAL EXTENDED COMMENTARY ON A SIGNIFICANT EVENT OF THE MONTH
10. Address by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev at the Federation Council of Russia

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for May 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

On May 21, speaking to the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said that the state corporation had developed a plan to bring the Zaporizhzhia NPP to full capacity. At the time, the plan was under review by the Russian Ministry of Energy. The key issues Likhachev said needed to be addressed match those outlined in late March by Yury Chernichuk, the ZNPP director appointed by the Russian authorities, namely:

• Water supply: a high-capacity pumping station is needed.
• Power grid and railway infrastructure: both are currently heavily damaged.
• Fuel: Units 2 and 6 are loaded with Russian fuel, while the other four contain American fuel.
• Electricity consumers: these still need to be identified, and electricity “must be distributed in a balanced and efficient way to supply our large southwestern cluster.”

(Bellona analyzed these issues in its 2024 report “Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia NPP: Analysis of Technical and Political Aspects.”)

In his remarks, Likhachev stated that he had no doubt these problems would be resolved, but “naturally, only when the overall situation allows.”

Regarding fuel, on May 8 Likhachev had said that once a political decision is made, Rosatom would be ready to discuss with the United States the return of Westinghouse fuel assemblies.

On May 27, Greenpeace Ukraine published an analysis of satellite imagery showing the construction of a new high-voltage power line in the Russian-occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions.

According to the analysis, between early February and late May 2025, 90 kilometers of power lines were built along the coast of the Sea of Azov from Mariupol, with approximately 300 transmission towers installed. Greenpeace expects another 100 kilometers to be constructed toward Melitopol, where the line is to be connected to a high-voltage substation. The organization views the construction as confirmation of Rosatom’s intention to restart the Zaporizhzhia NPP and connect it to the Russian power grid in the Rostov region.

The New York Times reported this information, citing Greenpeace, and Bellona also commented on the development. (It is worth noting that reports of power line construction had previously appeared in some Ukrainian media outlets back in January 2025.)

On May 28, Ukraine’s Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna issued an official note to the IAEA stating that Ukraine considers the construction of the power line described in Greenpeace’s report as evidence of preparations for the illegal restart of the plant without authorization from Ukraine’s nuclear regulator (SNRIU). The note emphasizes that any work at the ZNPP without SNRIU’s involvement violates IAEA safety standards. It also notes that the Russian side may intend to disconnect the ZNPP from Ukrainian power lines damaged by shelling. Ukraine has warned that such actions increase the risk of losing off-site power and could pose a threat to nuclear safety.

On June 3, in response to journalists’ questions, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said the Agency was aware of the media reports about the power line construction, but considered them highly speculative, as the Agency had no evidence that any preparatory work was underway at the ZNPP to connect the plant to the Russian power grid. Grossi also stated that the IAEA had satellite images of the region but did not agree with the conclusions presented in Greenpeace’s report — namely, that large-scale preparatory work and construction were underway. “Something is happening there, but we do not agree with the report conclusions,” he said.

Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities ↑

In May, the IAEA team at the ZNPP continued to carry out regular walkdowns at the plant to monitor and assess nuclear safety. According to the IAEA’s updates on the situation in Ukraine:

• Agency staff checked the water levels in the sprinkler ponds twice during the month and confirmed they remained stable. They observed a test of an emergency diesel generator and inspected nuclear safety-related electrical equipment at Units 3 and 4, including circuit breakers, instrumentation, and control cabinets (Update 290, May 8).
• They examined six of the site’s twenty emergency diesel generators. A loose screw was observed on two of the emergency diesel generators, and there were indications that recent work may have been carried out on one of them. ZNPP representatives said that no maintenance had been carried out and that the screw might have loosened due to vibration. The IAEA team planned to observe testing of one of these generators in the coming days (Update 291, May 15).
• They inspected both fresh fuel storage facilities (Update 293, May 29).

On June 2, the Russian Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna submitted information to the IAEA on the status of the Zaporizhzhia NPP for the period from February 26 to May 16. The report states that:

• All necessary work is being carried out to maintain the plant’s equipment in proper working condition.
• The water level in the cooling pond remained stable at around 14.03 meters. (According to Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom, as of May 26 the water level in the ZNPP cooling pond had dropped to 14.01 meters, down from 16.65 meters in June 2023, when the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed.)
• Over 300 cubic meters of water per hour are being supplied to the sprinkler ponds from wells.
• Nineteen diesel generators (seventeen unit-specific and two shared) are on standby in case of a total loss of off-site power. The full diesel fuel reserve is about 3,000 metric tons. In addition, there are three mobile diesel generators rated at 6 kV and 2 MW each.
• A modular boiler unit is used to supply steam to the special water treatment systems for processing floor drain and boron-containing water.
• A total of 4,936 employment contracts have been signed, including 953 for operating personnel. The report states that this is sufficient to ensure the safe operation of the plant in its current state and to carry out scheduled maintenance work.

It is also noted that out of 58 supervisory activities conducted by Rostekhnadzor, 20 were carried out with the participation of IAEA experts.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

On May 7, the Zaporizhzhia NPP once again lost connection to its only backup 330 kV power line and was left dependent on the last remaining operational 750 kV line. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy, the disconnection was the result of military activity. The backup line was not restored during May.

Throughout the month, the IAEA team at the ZNPP regularly, at times daily, reported hearing sounds of military activity at varying distances from the plant, including explosions. On May 13, the mission experts reported hearing gunfire and a sound resembling a drone in flight.

On May 21, the plant’s Russian management informed the IAEA experts that a drone had struck the roof of a training center located just outside the ZNPP’s perimeter. No casualties or serious damage were reported. This was the third drone attack on the training center since the beginning of the year (previous incidents were reported in January and April). That same morning, the IAEA team heard small arms fire but could not confirm whether the events were connected. They requested access to the site of the incident but, unlike the previous time, access was not granted.

Russia informed the IAEA that between February 26 and May 16, a total of 1,170 drones had been “suppressed” in the area of the ZNPP and Enerhodar.

“There are too many drones flying near nuclear facilities, not just the Zaporizhzhia NPP. It should stop immediately,” said Director General Grossi.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities in Ukraine ↑

Air raid alerts continue to sound at Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — as well as at the Chernobyl site. On several occasions, IAEA teams at these facilities were forced to take shelter.

According to Ukrainian authorities, drones continue to appear regularly near nuclear sites. On May 16, the IAEA team at the South Ukraine NPP was informed that a drone had been detected two kilometers from the site, and team members reported hearing anti-aircraft fire from their hotel. That same night, a drone reportedly flew through the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.

On May 23, members of the IAEA team at the South Ukraine NPP witnessed a drone being shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Plant staff reported that ten drones had flown within 2.5 kilometers of the facility. On the same day, two drones were spotted five kilometers from the Chernobyl site.

In May, the assessment of damage to the New Safe Confinement (NSC) arch caused by a drone strike in February continued. According to information provided to IAEA staff, the outer stainless steel cladding panels, insulation materials, and the membrane between the insulation layers designed to prevent the ingress of water and air were damaged. The NSC’s main crane system, one of the structure’s key components, is no longer operational. Several electrical cabinets in the crane maintenance area were also damaged as a result of the attack and subsequent firefighting efforts.

Some NSC systems including radiation and seismic monitoring, decontamination and radioactive waste management, power supply, and fire protection remain operational. The heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems are functional but have not been operated since the drone strike. No increase in radiation levels has been recorded at the site.

“We are gradually getting a more complete picture of the severe damage caused by the drone strike. It will take both considerable time and money to repair all of it,” said Director General Grossi.

On May 14, Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance announced that during a meeting of the Assembly of Donors to the International Chernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA), France pledged €10 million for the restoration of the NSC. (As a reminder, in March the ICCA allocated €400,000 for an expert assessment of the consequences of the Russian drone strike on the NSC’s protective structure.)

Commentary by Bellona:

«There is no doubt that political, expert, and other stakeholders will continue to closely monitor developments at and around the Zaporizhzhia NPP for as long as the military and political situation in the Russia-Ukraine war remains unresolved.

There is currently little hope that the warring parties will quickly resolve the problems facing the plant. Each side has its own objectives and therefore its own demands and capabilities.

All talk of the Russian side planning to bring ZNPP units to power, regardless of which units or what level of power, remains just talk. Even if Russia begins taking steps that could theoretically (or even practically) be seen as preparations to restart the reactors, in wartime conditions such efforts are virtually doomed from the outset.

Of course, the information presented by Greenpeace can be interpreted as evidence of preparations to restart the ZNPP reactor units. However, the facts cited by the environmentalists are not, strictly speaking, conclusive, hence the IAEA’s reassuring statements and, so far, Ukraine’s relatively restrained reaction to the construction of new high-voltage power lines in the occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, which may or may not be carried out by Russia.

Destroying or at least damaging these lines would not be particularly difficult using the means currently available to the Ukrainian military. The fact that this has not happened may indicate that Ukraine does not yet view the potential restart of the ZNPP reactor units as an immediate threat.

If the Ukrainian army begins to deliberately target and actively destroy the newly built power lines, floating and other pumping facilities that would be required to ensure cooling of operating reactor units, transportation infrastructure, and other systems necessary to support ZNPP operations, then we could assume that Russia may indeed be seriously preparing to restart the plant.

Another option previously discussed and written about also remains on the table: reaching an agreement (though it is unclear between whom) with the American side on joint ownership and operation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. However, this scenario is politically, technically, socially, and organizationally very complex, and therefore appears to have little prospect at present. Still, … everything changes, and anything is possible.

In our assessment, Rosatom is unable to restart the plant not only because of likely resistance from Ukraine, but also due to unresolved legal and political issues related to both American and Russian nuclear fuel.

At least five players are involved in addressing the fuel-related issues: Ukraine, the IAEA, Russia, Westinghouse, and the Trump administration. Without an agreement among these actors, it will be impossible to carry out or resolve the tasks related to restarting the ZNPP that Likhachev outlined in his address to the Federation Council. As a result, it remains unclear how the fuel issue will be resolved in principle.

The option of returning the Westinghouse fuel assemblies, as mentioned by Likhachev, is one of several possible alternatives and appears to be the preferred one for Russia. However, that does not mean it is acceptable to other stakeholders.

The plan to bring the ZNPP to full capacity, which Likhachev repeatedly refers to, likely concerns purely technical aspects. However, any technical steps can only be taken after the military and political issues and the legal questions surrounding the fuel are resolved.

As for the emergence of military threats at other nuclear power plants besides the ZNPP, this was to be expected. The country is at war, and no changes are likely in this regard. The Chernobyl sarcophagus will be patched up, there is no real radiation threat from it. The only regrettable part is that considerable funds must be spent on its restoration, when Ukraine so urgently needs money for other critical needs.

Regarding the technical condition of the ZNPP’s systems and components, as we wrote in the previous digest, every day of downtime leads to a gradual loss of their designed functional capabilities, even the simplest of devices. This is no secret to engineers and technical personnel. Every valve or pipeline requires maintenance or testing within the timeframes specified by the manufacturer. It’s like with a car: the oil, brake pads, or headlight bulbs must be replaced over time because they inevitably degrade.

Thus, as we have repeatedly noted in previous digests, if there is any intention to restart the reactor units, absolutely all equipment must undergo inspection, repair, testing, and, if necessary, replacement. This is a major undertaking that requires significant resources in terms of time, technology, personnel, funding, organization, and more. As such, all current activities at the ZNPP, including those demonstrated to IAEA inspectors, are essentially just for show, meant to suggest that everything is under control, but doing nothing to address the plant’s actual technical readiness, and therefore its safety.

If we also consider that, according to the Ukrainian side, specialists from Energoatom had modified and rebuilt many systems and components to adapt them to Ukrainian and European suppliers, this poses an additional challenge for Rosatom. Without resolving this issue, restarting the ZNPP’s high-capacity reactor units would be dangerous.

The conclusion for now is this: nothing has fundamentally changed at the ZNPP. The Russian side continues to talk about possible restart plans. The Ukrainian side and the IAEA are responding calmly. There are no real signs of progress toward resolving the issues required for a restart — so we’ll keep watching.»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

EU unveils plan to phase out Russian energy supplies, including nuclear materials ↑

On May 6, the European Commission published a roadmap for phasing out the European Union’s dependence on Russian energy. The document outlines a plan to end imports of Russian oil and gas, as well as a gradual withdrawal from cooperation with Russia in the field of nuclear energy. The Commission planned to present legislative proposals under the roadmap in June.

In May 2022, in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU had already adopted the RePowerEU plan aimed at rapidly reducing the Union’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. This led to a decrease in gas imports, but as of 2024, Russia remained a significant supplier of gas, oil, and nuclear materials to the EU.

Against this backdrop, the European Commission introduced a roadmap to phase out the remaining Russian energy supplies. The initiative aims to ensure alternative and affordable energy sources, cut Russian revenues, and strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty.

The document notes that the EU’s dependence on Russian supplies in the nuclear sector remains multifaceted: Russia provides products and services across the entire nuclear fuel cycle. The highest levels of dependence are found in five EU countries — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia — which operate Russian-designed VVER reactors. Four of them (all except Hungary) have signed contracts for alternative fuel, but the process of introducing it requires licensing. In 2024, the first test fuel assemblies were loaded into reactors in Bulgaria and Finland. The EU is also providing financial support for the development of alternative fuels through its SAVE and APIS projects.

It is noted that fuel supply risks may emerge in the short term, making it necessary to accelerate the development and licensing of alternative fuel types.

Other EU countries continue to rely on Russian supplies of nuclear materials, some spare parts, and maintenance services. Russia also holds a strong position in the supply of certain medical radioisotopes.

In addition, the EU faces a shortage of uranium conversion and enrichment capacity. Western facilities currently cannot meet the full demand of European countries: in 2024, nearly one-quarter of the EU’s needs for these services were met by Russia. (In contrast, the market for natural and processed uranium is more diversified: in 2024, Russia accounted for 14% of EU purchases.) New European enrichment capacity is not expected before 2027, and new conversion capacity is anticipated in the early 2030s.

The document proposes supporting the gradual phase-out of imports from Russia of uranium, enriched uranium, and other nuclear materials. It calls for making imports of Russian enriched uranium less economically attractive and introducing trade measures to encourage investment in the European nuclear supply chain. The document also proposes restricting new supply contracts for uranium, enriched uranium, and other nuclear materials that are co-signed by the Euratom Supply Agency and Russian suppliers. Deliveries under existing contracts would continue, but extensions and new agreements would no longer be approved by the Agency.

In addition, EU Member States would be required to develop national plans by the end of 2025, setting out specific actions and timelines for phasing out imports of nuclear fuel, fuel cycle services, and spare parts from Russia.

The proposal drew criticism from Hungary and Slovakia. During his visit to Russia in early May, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stated that a complete halt to oil, gas, and nuclear fuel imports from Russia would be economically damaging for Europe, and that in the case of Slovak nuclear power plants, switching to American fuel was not feasible. He also said that if the proposed legislation required unanimous approval, Slovakia would veto it.

On May 27, Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, said that banning the purchase of nuclear fuel assemblies from Russia “would have tragic consequences not only for Hungary but for the entire European energy market,” adding that prices would skyrocket and the impact on Europe’s economy would be devastating.

As a result, on June 16, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen announced that the European Commission would not, for the time being, propose measures to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian nuclear fuel alongside its proposals to ban Russian gas. He said the issue would be postponed until supply chains are less vulnerable.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The European Commission’s initiative to address the EU’s dependence on Russia in the nuclear sector for the first time at the EU level — and to take concrete steps toward reducing and eventually eliminating it — is a welcome development. Until now, the EU’s 17 previous sanction packages against Russia have not affected these supplies. However, the effectiveness of the measures proposed by the Commission will depend on the details, which are expected to be developed later, and on the political will to implement them despite opposition from certain EU Member States.

It is important that the phase-out timeline is not excessively prolonged and that the financial burden does not fall disproportionately on end users. It is also critically important that the proposed restrictions do not contain legal loopholes that could enable covert cooperation in the nuclear field, for example, through licensed assembly of Russian fuel for VVER reactors, as Rosatom is attempting to do in partnership with Framatome at the plant in Lingen, Germany.»

Kozloduy NPP once again granted EU sanctions exemption for Russian imports ↑

On May 21, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers adopted a decision allowing the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant to derogate from certain provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 and to conclude procurement contracts with Russian companies, as well as to import iron and steel products needed to fulfill a number of contracts (the list of contracts was not disclosed).

The exemption is justified by the need to maintain technical and nuclear safety at the Kozloduy NPP, where a significant portion of systems and equipment originates from Russia. Some contracts for the supply of goods related to the safe and reliable operation of Units 5 and 6 have been or are to be signed with Russian contractors.

This is not the first easing of sanctions restrictions for the Bulgarian nuclear power plant — similar decisions have been made in the past. Russian company Atomstroyexport has also been authorized to take part in conservation work on equipment delivered for the cancelled Belene NPP project.

US ramps up domestic nuclear energy development and prepares to compete with Russia and China in the nuclear sector ↑

On May 19, a bipartisan bill was introduced in the US Senate to support the development of nuclear energy abroad. The initiative aims to bolster the United States position in the global nuclear energy sector and counter the growing influence of Russia and China.

The bill proposes the creation of a new office focused on nuclear export, financing, regulation, and licensing, as well as a dedicated fund to support projects deemed important to national security.

The legislation has received backing from senators of both parties, who argue that the United States must lead the advancement of nuclear energy to avoid ceding ground to authoritarian states.

It is also worth noting that in May, US President Donald Trump signed a series of executive orders aimed at large-scale development of nuclear energy within the country.

Among them is the Executive Order “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base,” which underscores the need for urgent action in light of the United States’ loss of technological leadership and its dependence on foreign supplies of uranium and enrichment services. The administration plans to develop a national policy on spent nuclear fuel management, reprocessing and reuse of uranium and plutonium materials, and the establishment of a sustainable fuel cycle. The current program for disposing of excess plutonium is to be replaced with a program to reprocess it for use as fuel in advanced reactors.

In addition, the Department of Energy has been tasked with preparing, within 120 days, a plan to expand domestic capacity for uranium conversion and enrichment — including low-enriched uranium (LEU), high-enriched uranium (HEU), and high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU).

As a reminder, in 2024 the United States identified a list of potential domestic suppliers of LEU and HALEU.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The release of a series of executive orders in support of nuclear energy and the strengthening of its export potential was an expected move by the administration of Donald Trump and reflects his approach to energy security. Despite stark differences with the previous administration — which prioritized the development of low-carbon energy sources to address the climate crisis — both administrations recognize the strategic importance of nuclear energy, albeit for different reasons. For Trump, the key argument is not environmental, but rather the support of domestic industry, energy, and export potential.

Therefore, despite concerns that Trump’s sympathy toward Putin could lead him to roll back measures adopted under Biden to reduce dependence on Russian uranium supplies, it is likely that he will continue this policy — driven by national security considerations, as we have noted in previous publications.»

Urenco launches first phase of new enrichment cascades in the US ↑

On May 19, Urenco USA announced the launch of a new cascade of gas centrifuges as part of the expansion of its uranium enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico. This is the first of several planned cascades scheduled to come online by early 2027.

Urenco USA is currently the only commercial producer of enriched uranium in the United States and can meet roughly one-third of the enrichment needs of the country’s commercial nuclear power plants. Its current capacity is 4.3 million separative work units (SWU) per year. Upon completion of the project, which began in July 2023, domestic US enrichment capacity will increase by approximately 15% (700,000 SWU per year).

The expansion project is aimed at reducing reliance on Russian supplies and strengthening the US nuclear fuel supply chain. The US plant expansion is part of Urenco’s broader strategy to modernize and increase enrichment capacity across several of its sites. The company is building a new enrichment hall at its facility in Almelo, the Netherlands, to add 750,000 SWU to its current capacity of 5 million SWU per year. Urenco also plans to construct a uranium enrichment facility in Capenhurst, UK, with a capacity of up to 10 metric tons of HALEU (high-assay low-enriched uranium) per year by 2031.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Rosatom expects new international orders for NPP construction ↑

On May 10, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev and Vietnam’s Minister of Science and Technology Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng signed an interagency roadmap for the development of nuclear technologies through 2030. The roadmap covers cooperation on the construction of a Center for Nuclear Science and Technology, fuel supply for the Dalat research reactor, Vietnam’s participation in the International Research Center Consortium based on the MBIR reactor, and personnel training for the Vietnamese nuclear industry.

Likhachev noted that during the visit of the Vietnamese delegation, initial talks began on a large-scale nuclear power plant project in Vietnam, including discussions on the technical design and financing arrangements.

A joint declaration following the talks between the two countries’ leaders stated that both sides had agreed to hold negotiations and sign intergovernmental agreements on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Vietnam within a short timeframe.

As a reminder, Vietnam announced the revival of its nuclear energy program in November 2024, and in January 2025 signed a memorandum with Russia on developing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

In addition to the talks with Vietnam, meetings were held during the same period between the Russian president and the leaders of other countries, including Egypt (where Rosatom is building the El Dabaa NPP), Brazil, Mongolia, and Serbia. According to Likhachev, these meetings were largely focused on nuclear cooperation, and Rosatom expects to launch several new international projects in the near future.

On May 12, Brazil’s Minister of Mines and Energy, Alexandre Silveira, announced plans to sign a contract with Rosatom for the construction of small modular reactors. He also noted that Rosatom is prepared to take part in completing the construction of Unit 3 of the Angra NPP.

Rosatom manufactures first RITM-400 reactor for nuclear icebreaker Rossiya ↑

On May 20, Rosatom’s Mechanical Engineering Division (ZiO-Podolsk) announced the completion of the first RITM-400 reactor unit (with a thermal output of up to 315 MW) for the nuclear-powered icebreaker Rossiya.

The Rossiya, the lead vessel of the new Project 10510 icebreaker series, will be equipped with two RITM-400 reactor units. The second reactor is expected to be completed in a few months. The reactors have been named Ilya Muromets and Dobrynya Nikitich, after heroes of Russian epic tales.

To date, ZiO-Podolsk has manufactured and shipped ten RITM-200 reactors for Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers Arktika, Ural, Sibir, Yakutia, and Chukotka. Currently, another ten RITM-series reactor units are at various stages of production at the division’s facilities, destined for Russia’s icebreaker fleet and for small nuclear energy projects on land and at sea. Six of these are RITM-200 reactors for floating power units.

Rosatom produced nearly 6,000 metric tons of uranium in Kazakhstan in 2024 ↑

At the end of April, Kazatomprom published its Integrated Annual Report for 2024. According to the report, joint ventures involving Rosatom’s subsidiary Uranium One produced a total of 11,361 metric tons of uranium (as U₃O₈) in 2024.

These include the Budenovskoye JV (Rosatom share: 49%), Karatau LLP (50%), Southern Mining and Chemical Company JV (70%), Akbastau JV (50%), Khorasan-U LLP (now Turanium LLP), and the Zarechnoye JV (Rosatom held stakes of 30% and 49.98%, respectively, until these assets were sold in December 2024).

The Kazakh news outlet Inbusiness.kz estimated that if Uranium One’s equity stakes matched its share in production, Rosatom could have received 5,828 metric tons of uranium from Kazakhstan last year. All of the listed JVs increased production in 2024. By comparison, Rosatom’s output in Kazakhstan in 2023 could have totaled 4,839 metric tons.

The 2024 estimate is consistent with a statement from a Techsnabexport representative, who said Rosatom received nearly 5,850 metric tons of uranium from five mining sites in Kazakhstan in 2024. He also noted that Rosatom’s total uranium resources in international projects amount to 284,000 metric tons, 73% of which are located in Kazakhstan.

For comparison, uranium production at Rosatom Nedra’s Russian mines in 2024 totaled 2,796 metric tons.

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On May 19, concreting was completed for the second tier of the internal containment at Unit 2 — the cylindrical structure that will house the nuclear reactor and primary circuit equipment.

SMR, Uzbekistan. In May, Rosatom began manufacturing reactor equipment for the first unit of the small modular reactor project: the state corporation’s Mechanical Engineering Division cast an ingot of special alloy steel, which will be used to produce a flange of the RITM-200N reactor pressure vessel — the component that connects the reactor vessel to the upper head. On May 20, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with Hungary’s MVM EGI for the supply of dry cooling systems for the Uzbek NPP.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On May 27, media reports emerged indicating that construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, being built to a Russian design, is facing financial difficulties.

The project is reportedly experiencing a major delay in the expected financing , around $7 billion, which has slowed down work on Units 2, 3, and 4. Amid the funding shortfall, the operating company Akkuyu Nuclear JSC has redirected all available resources to completing Unit 1, which is expected to be commissioned in mid-2026. One of the reasons cited is a dispute between Russia and Turkey over tax and financial issues: the Russian side apparently sought tax concessions that Turkey ultimately did not grant.

Additional complications arose when more than $2 billion was frozen during an attempted transfer through JPMorgan, a move made by the US Department of Justice under sanctions policy. No final decision has yet been reached on unblocking the funds.

The construction of the NPP was discussed on May 26 during a meeting between Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan and Russian president Vladimir Putin. The Turkish side emphasized that the Kremlin attaches great importance to the project, but resolving the accumulated issues may require personal intervention by President Erdoğan. Fidan also stated that he had asked Putin to support ongoing talks between Russia’s Gazprom and Turkey’s pipeline operator Botas, possibly in connection with an option to pay for construction in natural gas rather than cash transfers.

Experts estimate that even Unit 1 alone will require at least $5 billion to complete construction of the shared infrastructure intended to serve all four units.

Special extended commentary on a significant event of the month

Address by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev at the Federation Council of Russia ↑

On May 21, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev addressed a meeting of the Federation Council of Russia with a report on the development of the nuclear industry in the country. Bellona presents a brief overview of this event in the form of a special extended commentary by Alexander Nikitin, Bellona’s Special Nuclear Adviser:

The address by the head of Rosatom at the Federation Council (the upper house of Russia’s parliament) on the “development of the nuclear industry in the Russian Federation” drew commentary not only from Russian media and Rosatom itself, but also from numerous international professional outlets including World Nuclear News and Nuclear Engineering International.

In the February 2024 nuclear digest, Bellona commented on hearings on Rosatom’s activities held during a “government hour” session in the State Duma (the lower house of Russia’s parliament). At the time, Bellona noted that Rosatom’s status had risen to at least the level of a government ministry. Now, however, it can be argued that Rosatom has effectively become a “state within a state,” making it virtually immune to criticism or scrutiny from any current Russian authority except President Putin himself. This notion is indirectly reinforced by the Rosatom chief’s address to the Federation Council.

Reading the materials from the session, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that not a single “tough question” was raised, nor was there a single speech from any senator that even lightly touched on any of Rosatom’s minor issues, let alone actual problems. This may be due to the level of preparation and interests of the Russian senators themselves, which seemingly prevent them from delving into what Rosatom actually does and how it operates. As a result, the impression is that the head of Rosatom was invited to the upper house of parliament merely to be “patted on the head,” praised, and showered with admiration for the agency’s work. The atmosphere of rapturous celebration was so intense that it would be hard to recall anything comparable, even at the Communist Party congresses broadcast in the Soviet era.

However, a closer look at Likhachev’s address to the senators and a comparison of some of his statements with what he said a year earlier in the lower house development of the nuclear industry in the Russian Federation gives rise to a sense of bewilderment, doubt, and even concern.

The first thing that stands out is that Rosatom no longer seems to make any effort to conceal its active role in the war. From the very beginning of his speech, Likhachev repeatedly and proudly declared and “emphatically underscored”  that Rosatom’s “absolute priority, its mission … is the defense of the sovereignty and military capability of our country…”; that “our [Rosatom’s] primary service is fulfilling the state defense order, which we carry out 100% every year…”; and, in addition, that Rosatom is “on its own initiative developing prototypes of non-nuclear weapons and military equipment…”

While Rosatom’s role in the development of the nuclear weapons complex has long been known and undisputed, the corporation’s initiative to branch into the development of non-nuclear weapons is a direct outcome of the current Russian political climate — one that has become increasingly militarized since the start of the war in Ukraine. (Likhachev also mentioned this initiative by the state corporation in February 2024.)

Likhachev also drew the senators’ attention to the fact that “Rosatom is doing extensive work to support participants of the special military operation and their families, cooperates with the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, and assists those returning from the front line, especially after being wounded…” In other words, the involvement of the nuclear agency in the war is now an undisputed fact, even without considering its role in the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Incidentally, the Zaporizhzhia NPP was barely mentioned in the report. Likhachev spoke of Rosatom’s tireless efforts to support Enerhodar and noted that the plant is under Rosatom’s management (though not its ownership). When asked from the floor about the future of the ZNPP, Likhachev reiterated already familiar information: “…a plan has been developed to bring the Zaporizhzhia NPP to full capacity, but four key issues must be resolved first — water supply, connection to power grids, the fuel issue (presumably referring to American fuel), and the technical condition of the units.” It is worth noting that the plan Likhachev referred to is so tightly guarded that neither the Ukrainian side (which undoubtedly has informants at the plant) nor the IAEA, whose approval and cooperation would be essential for implementation, seems to be aware of it.

According to Likhachev, the nuclear energy project now ranks only second among Rosatom’s current priorities.

The senators were presented with familiar figures: 35 reactor units at 11 nuclear power plants across Russia, including the floating NPP. According to Likhachev, nuclear power currently accounts for about 20 percent of the country’s electricity generation. Not a word was said about the fact that both output from Russian NPPs and their share in the overall energy mix have declined due to the aging reactor fleet and delays in commissioning replacement capacity. Nor did the head of Rosatom mention that the share of nuclear in total electricity generation has been falling for four years in a row (down from 20.3 percent in 2020 to 17.9 percent in 2024, according to experts, even though Likhachev claimed in his speech that the figure is roughly 20 percent).

The head of Rosatom also spoke to the senators about the corporation’s “dreams”, which, by all appearances, are far from realistic. According to him, under the approved General Scheme for the Siting of Electric Power Facilities through 2042, Rosatom plans to build 38 new power units of large, medium, and small capacity over the next 17 years. In other words, they intend to commission two or more units every year. These are ambitious plans, but it is worth remembering that Rosatom’s pride, the floating NPP Akademik Lomonosov, took 17 years to build, and the two units of the Kola NPP-2 are scheduled for construction from 2027 to 2037. So here, one might say: dreaming never hurts, but… we’ll be watching.

What Rosatom’s chief takes particular pride in is the fact that the corporation is currently building 22 reactor units abroad at the same time. This is indeed true, but it is a Rosatom achievement made possible by current government policy — which, as Likhachev put it, is a response to “unfriendly states” and takes the form of exporting “technological sovereignty” (and, inevitably, political sovereignty as well) to “friendly countries.” Rosatom is, quite literally, embedding itself into the nations where it builds nuclear power plants, especially if those countries are poor and underdeveloped in terms of energy.

According to Likhachev, the “expansion of the product line abroad” includes nuclear science and technology centers, medical equipment, multifunctional processing centers, localization for local companies, development of regulatory frameworks, workforce training, service, and fuel supply throughout the entire life cycle of the NPP. “Our offer is always comprehensive. Before we come to build a plant, we carry out all the necessary steps to establish a nuclear industry in the country , starting with outreach to the local population, prioritizing general construction contracts for local companies, and preparing those companies to take part in the work…”

Naturally, the report made no mention of how all of the above is financed or under what conditions, but it is clear to everyone that none of it comes for free. One can only speculate on what exactly the less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and South America — the regions Rosatom is eager to enter — are offering in return. But what is beyond doubt is that this is a geopolitical game.

 Without showing much concern, the head of Rosatom noted in his report that “around 150 Rosatom enterprises and the leadership of the State Corporation are on strict sanctions lists. Nevertheless, Rosatom has not effectively left Western markets,” … and this trend, he said, is likely to continue: “one way or another, we will remain present in the markets of European countries, we will continue cooperating with the United States on uranium supplies unless a different decision is made, and our export volumes to friendly countries will increase… It is also clear that a number of negotiations on this topic are being held behind closed doors, including with European states.”

As Likhachev emphasized, Rosatom holds no grudges against any Western countries, with the sole exception of Finland, which unilaterally terminated its cooperation with the corporation and is now engaged in legal disputes with it.

In third place among Rosatom’s current priorities, according to its head, are projects related to technological leadership. What exactly constitutes technological leadership in Rosatom’s case is difficult to define. Based on Likhachev’s remarks, this includes everything the corporation is currently doing under import substitution programs, the development of critical information infrastructure, organizing shipping along the Northern Sea Route, the creation of new materials, and a range of other so-called “sovereign technologies,” as the Rosatom chief put it. Since the start of the war, the term “sovereign technologies” has appeared more and more frequently in official Russian reports, yet it is nearly impossible to assess any concrete achievements in this area. One can hardly regard, for example, the production of the Atom electric car as a marker of technological leadership.

And finally, one last point worth noting. The head of Rosatom opened his speech by presenting an overview of the corporation. “Allow me to present to you a portrait of our country’s nuclear industry at its current stage. The industry comprises more than 580 enterprises, spanning from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka… We have over 120 areas of activity within the nuclear sector…” What followed was half an hour of rather laudatory and boastful remarks about successes and the absence of problems.

But there are some nuances here. A year ago, speaking before the lower house of parliament, Likhachev reported that Rosatom’s structure included more than 460 enterprises working across 100 areas of activity. In other words, in the span of just one year, Rosatom’s structure grew by 120 enterprises, from 460 to 580. Is it possible for a company to expand by 10 enterprises a month and 20 activity areas in a year? Perhaps so, if these “enterprises” are in fact small-scale industrial facilities or workshops facing a choice between shutting down or being absorbed into an existing Rosatom-affiliated organization. In other words, these figures require analysis and clarification. Otherwise, they raise questions about the credibility of everything the Rosatom chief told the senators, including the “accounting figures” (such as $18 billion in foreign revenue in 2024, an average salary nearing 140,000 rubles, EBITDA doubling over the past five years, and so on).

What was presented to the Federation Council was a political and promotional report from Rosatom, one that offers little in the way of practical information for the general public. In theory, the facts presented by the head of Rosatom could be taken at face value. But unfortunately, many of them cannot be verified, confirmed, or, in some cases, even understood.