After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.

Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments in order to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.

This survey covers events from April 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for March, February and January.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for April 2025
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities
1.3. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
2. Talks on Transferring Belene NPP Reactors to Ukraine in Question

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. Kazatomprom to Supply Natural Uranium to Czech Nuclear Power Plants
4. Final Shipment of Russian Fuel Delivered to Kozloduy NPP

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
5. New Round in the Dispute over the Hanhikivi-1 Project: Rosatom’s Lawsuit and Investigation in Finland
6. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for April 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

According to The Wall Street Journal, on April 17, as part of US efforts to develop a plan for a ceasefire in Ukraine, Washington proposed that the territories around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant be given neutral status and that the plant be placed under US control.

A similar proposal was made by the United States in March, suggesting that US involvement in the management — or even full ownership — of Ukrainian nuclear power plants could offer the best protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

At the time, Kyiv responded that the talks had focused solely on the Zaporizhzhia NPP and that the only acceptable option would be US involvement in restoring the plant after its return to Ukrainian control. Russia, for its part, stated that it had no intention of handing over the plant or operating it jointly with any other country.

Commenting on the information published by The Wall Street Journal, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that no official proposal had been received from the United States.

The Russian side also stated that it had not received any proposals from the United States regarding the management of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. “But if we do, we will explain that the Zaporizhzhia NPP is run by the Russian Federation state corporation called Rosatom and is under the monitoring of IAEA personnel permanently located at the site,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

At the same time, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said he was prepared to discuss possible formats of cooperation with the United States, provided that a political decision to that effect is made by the Russian government.

Due to continued restrictions on IAEA experts’ access to several areas of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, Ukraine lodged a protest on April 30. The statement was published on the Agency’s website only on May 19. It specifically notes that while access to the site is being restricted for official international missions, pro-Kremlin bloggers and media are granted unrestricted access to all areas of the plant. (Bellona’s note: For example, on March 24, Kremlin-aligned journalists and bloggers — including those from Slovenia, Serbia, and India — were granted access to the ZNPP.)

Ukraine reported that during one such visit, photos and videos were published showing Russian military personnel, weapons, and military equipment in sensitive operational areas of the nuclear facility. The images featured soldiers of the 104th Guards Air Assault Regiment, which has been involved in combat operations since the start of the full-scale invasion, including the occupation of the ZNPP. The statement notes that the photos are attached to the verbal note, although the attachment itself has not been made public. (It is possible that the reference is to photographs published on April 30 in several posts on the Telegram channel actual_energodar, which cited reports by Olga Kurlaeva, a war correspondent for the Russian state broadcaster VGTRK, as the source.)

Ukraine qualifies the presence of armed forces in restricted areas of the plant as a violation of international nuclear safety and security standards, as well as an unacceptable militarization of a civilian nuclear facility.

No IAEA team rotation took place at the ZNPP in April. Since September 2022, the rotation of expert teams had been carried out monthly. However, this routine was disrupted after December 2024, when a kamikaze drone struck an IAEA vehicle during a rotation and Russia began calling for the route to be changed to one passing through Russian-controlled territory instead of crossing the front line from the Ukrainian side.

The next rotation, initially scheduled for early February, was disrupted twice. As a result, the new team replaced the previous one only on March 1, using a route through Russian-occupied territory — a move that prompted a protest from Ukraine.

Once again, no rotation of IAEA experts at the Zaporizhzhia NPP took place for more than two months. On May 8, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that he was in daily contact with both the Ukrainian and Russian sides to organize the next rotation. Rosatom’s Director General indicated that the upcoming rotation, expected in the second half of May, would likely again take place via Russian-controlled territory. The rotation was eventually carried out on May 25. The IAEA did not comment on it.

Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities ↑

On March 31, Yury Chernichuk, the ZNPP director appointed by the Russian authorities, gave an interview to the industry publication Strana Rosatom, where he discussed how Russia plans to restart the Zaporizhzhia NPP — all six units of which have been shut down since September 11, 2022 — “as soon as the situation allows.” He said that Units 2 and 6 are considered the most likely candidates for restart, as their reactor cores are loaded with Russian fuel.

According to him, the first issue that would need to be resolved is securing the plant’s water supply. The standard scheme for maintaining the level of the cooling pond can no longer be used following the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 and the subsequent emptying of the Kakhovka Reservoir, which previously supplied the ZNPP with water. He said that the Dnipro River is now being considered as a water source, the technical solutions have already been developed — a new pumping station is planned — and only time is needed for implementation.

(Bellona’s note: The decision to build a pumping station with a capacity of up to 18,000 m³/h was first reported in May 2024. In December 2024, Ramil Galiyev, director of the “Operating Organization of ZNPP” JSC, again referenced this plan in his comments on returning the ZNPP back into operation.)

It will also be necessary to address the water-chemical regime, as the disruption of the circulation system in the cooling pond has caused the water composition to fall out of compliance with technical requirements.

The second challenge is how to use the electricity generated by the plant. At present, there is neither energy infrastructure nor consumers — they are either located in Ukrainian-controlled territory or in areas that were destroyed during the hostilities. As a result, the Russian government is working on identifying potential consumers and changing the power supply scheme for the occupied territories.

In the legal domain, Russia plans to bring the operation of the ZNPP into compliance with its national legislation by 2028. Specifically, it aims to issue operating licenses for all reactor units by the end of 2027. Rosatom’s regulator, Rostechnadzor, has already issued a license for the operation of radiation sources, and work is underway to issue licenses for the operation of the dry spent fuel storage facility and Unit 1. (Russia has recognized the licenses issued by the Ukrainian regulator as transitional; the license for Unit 1 expires at the end of 2025.)

Chernychuk also sees another challenge in the fact that a large amount of foreign-made equipment is used at the ZNPP, while the Russian government, due to sanctions, has adopted a policy of maximum import substitution. He said that this would not affect the main equipment, but that some components — such as electrical equipment — differ significantly from those used in standard Russian designs. This could complicate the plant’s technical preparations for operation.

As for the plant’s personnel, the current staffing level is sufficient to maintain the facility in a safe condition while the reactor units remain shut down. As of February 1, 2024, Russia barred all employees of Ukraine’s Energoatom who had not taken Russian citizenship and had not signed a contract with Rosatom from entering the plant. Specialists from Russian nuclear power plants have been brought in on a rotational basis. “They undergo training and knowledge assessments here and are only allowed to work after receiving authorization from Rostechnadzor,” Chernychuk said. A specialist training program is also being implemented at Sevastopol State University.

In April, the IAEA team at the ZNPP continued conducting regular walkdowns at various parts of the plant to monitor and assess nuclear safety. The visited areas included:

• the dry spent fuel storage facility, the radiation monitoring laboratory, and warehouses located at the site (Update 285);
• the turbine halls of two units — the specific units were not named (based on a report published on the Russian ZNPP website, these were likely Units 3 and 4). The IAEA noted that, as usual, access to the western parts of the halls was denied. The team also visited the water treatment facilities (Special Building No. 1) and observed a test of an emergency diesel generator (Update 286);
• the low-level solid radioactive waste storage facility and other installations across the industrial site (Update 288);
• emergency control rooms for all six reactors, the safety systems of Unit 4, and two fresh fuel storage facilities (Update 289).

During meetings with the Russian representatives at the ZNPP, members of the IAEA mission discussed upcoming maintenance work on electrical equipment and other systems, including some of the safety systems. They also addressed issues related to staffing levels, staff training, and qualifications.

On April 27, Russian representatives at the ZNPP reported that 27 plant employees had completed a retraining program at Sevastopol State University in the field of “Nuclear Power Plants: Design, Operation, and Engineering.” The program is intended for staff with higher education in unrelated disciplines.

On May 19, it was announced that another 58 ZNPP employees had completed retraining courses in four specializations — power plants, refrigeration systems, environmental science, and chemistry. A new group of 88 participants has been assembled. It was noted that the training primarily targets operational personnel in order to staff the plant with the specialists needed to bring the ZNPP’s reactor units into generation mode.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

According to IAEA reports, the nuclear safety situation in Ukraine remained unstable in April. Reports from IAEA teams stationed at nuclear facilities across the country indicated that military activity near NPPs continued.

The IAEA team at the ZNPP reported hearing sounds consistent with military activity — including explosions and sporadic gunfire — almost daily, at varying distances from the plant.

On April 17, the Russian management of the ZNPP reported that on April 16, a drone had been neutralized approximately 300 meters from the plant site, near the Training Center — it was shot down and crashed. On May 17, the IAEA team was granted access to inspect the crash site.

According to the information provided to the experts, the incident caused a fire in the surrounding vegetation, but there were no casualties or structural damage to the Training Center itself. At the site, the IAEA experts were shown what the Russian representatives identified as drone remnants, including four small electric motors and plastic fragments — presumably parts of the drone’s body.

On the morning of April 23, the IAEA team was forced to remain inside the administrative building housing their office after hearing loud gunfire nearby. The plant’s Russian management informed the team of a “drone threat,” which led to the postponement of the group’s scheduled activities. A plant-wide shelter order was issued at the site.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The military and political situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP remains virtually unchanged. As for the operational and technical condition of the ZNPP’s systems and equipment, the longer the reactor units remain in cold shutdown, the more difficult it will be to bring them back to an operational state and return the plant to its intended function.

This may involve not only a full inspection and verification of the functionality of all equipment — both nuclear and non-nuclear — but also the reloading of nuclear fuel in the reactors, repairs, or even replacement of non-nuclear island equipment such as turbines, generators, transformers, control systems, and other mechanisms and devices. Some of these were manufactured at Ukrainian and European facilities that no longer cooperate with Rosatom.

In addition to operational and technical issues, there are also serious problems with personnel readiness, numerous legal dilemmas, and, most importantly, unresolved military and political decisions. Ukrainian sources claim that the personnel brought in from Russian nuclear power plants are mostly not considered highly qualified or valuable specialists at their home plants — which is why they are either permanently released or temporarily assigned to this newly acquired high-risk Rosatom facility, lured by extra pay “for danger and hazardous conditions” offered in the occupied territories.

Rosatom’s current leadership — along with the management of the ZNPP — refers to all of this as “the situation,” which at some point, somehow, and by someone must be resolved before the reactor units can be restarted. In Bellona’s view, the situation increasingly resembles a dead end. The proposal from the Trump administration to place the plant under US control does not offer a resolution — on the contrary, it exacerbates the problem, adding a range of complex new challenges related to territorial governance, the distribution of responsibility, and ensuring both public and nuclear safety at the plant itself.

As for the IAEA’s position, it gives the impression that the Agency’s leadership has adopted a wait-and-see approach, hoping that no nuclear incidents will occur that they are unable to prevent.

For now, everything points to the fact that the largest nuclear power plant in Europe will remain out of operation for its intended purpose for a long time — if not permanently.»

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

At Ukraine’s other nuclear power plants, air raid alarms continued to sound frequently, and explosions were heard at a distance from the sites.

At the South Ukraine NPP, plant representatives informed IAEA experts that on April 9, eight drones were detected flying no more than 4 km from the site. On April 12, the team was again informed of five drones spotted 2 km from the plant. The experts observed the drones through windows and heard gunfire, likely aimed at intercepting them. On April 17, seven drones were reported at a distance of 2 km from the South Ukraine NPP. On April 25, six drones were detected 1.5 km from the site, and the experts again heard gunfire apparently intended to shoot them down.

In mid-April, the IAEA team at the Chernobyl NPP visited the New Safe Confinement to discuss the ongoing assessment of the building’s structural integrity following the drone strike in February. They also observed repair work on the inner and outer cladding aimed at preventing water ingress. It was reported that radiation levels remain within the normal range for the area, and there had been no release of radioactive substances beyond the established limits.

Power system constraints continue to affect the operation of nuclear power plants. On April 5, two units at the Rivne NPP were forced to reduce their output. In April, power output limitations also affected one unit at the Khmelnytskyi NPP (for 36 hours) and another unit at the Rivne NPP (for several days). Reduced output was also reported at the South Ukraine NPP.

Talks on Transferring Belene NPP Reactors to Ukraine in Question ↑

On April 15, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Atanas Zafirov stated that the nuclear reactors originally intended for the suspended Belene NPP project would not be sold to Ukraine.

He said that the reactors are of key importance for Bulgaria’s energy security and economic independence. Zafirov added that the decision is supported by the ruling coalition.

Bulgarian Energy Minister Zhecho Stankov, commenting on the statement, confirmed that the BSP had raised the issue of blocking the reactor sale.

He noted that an analysis would still be carried out to determine possible uses for the preserved reactors, but the final decision on ending negotiations with Ukraine would rest with the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly.

Talks between Bulgaria and Ukraine on the sale of nuclear island equipment from the Belene NPP for the completion of two units at the Khmelnytskyi NPP began in July 2023. In March 2025, the Ukrainian government passed a law allowing Energoatom to purchase the equipment.

Earlier, in February, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Revival party had already called for an end to the sale negotiations and for an assessment of whether the Belene NPP equipment could be used at the operational Kozloduy NPP. At the end of March, the Kozloduy NPP presented a report in which experts concluded that using part of the equipment at the Kozloduy site would be too complex.

On April 16, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine stated it had not received an official position from the Bulgarian government regarding the reactor sale and therefore refrained from commenting.

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Kazatomprom to Supply Natural Uranium to Czech Nuclear Power Plants ↑

On April 15, Kazakh uranium producer Kazatomprom and Czech energy company ČEZ announced the signing of a contract for the supply of natural uranium concentrate for Czech nuclear power plants. According to the announcement, over the next seven years, supplies of Kazakh uranium are expected to cover about one-third of ČEZ’s demand for raw material for Westinghouse’s manufacture of fuel assemblies for the Temelín Nuclear Power Plant.

Kazatomprom emphasized that the agreement marks an expansion of the company’s presence in the European market. For ČEZ, it is another step toward diversifying nuclear fuel supplies for its two nuclear power plants — Dukovany (which has four VVER-440 reactor units) and Temelín (with two VVER-1000 units).

Until 2023, nuclear fuel for Czech nuclear power plants was supplied by the Russian company TVEL, which provided the full fuel cycle — from uranium conversion and enrichment to fuel fabrication. However, on April 12, 2022, ČEZ announced that the tender for fuel supply, launched in 2020, had been awarded to Westinghouse and Framatome (TVEL had also participated in the tender). The 15-year contracts were signed in June 2022, with fuel deliveries scheduled to begin at the end of 2024.

Westinghouse had previously supplied fuel for the Temelín NPP following its commissioning — from 2002 to 2009. However, during that period, technical issues arose, including fuel deformation and incomplete insertion of rods, which led ČEZ to switch to TVEL-manufactured fuel assemblies. Westinghouse subsequently upgraded its VVER-1000 fuel design, drawing on experience gained from fuel deliveries to Ukraine. In 2016, ČEZ signed a contract with the US company for the supply of six test assemblies for a two-year evaluation. In 2018, the Czech nuclear safety authority (SÚJB) approved their use, and in April 2019, the assemblies were loaded into Unit 1’s reactor at the Temelín NPP.

In March 2023, ČEZ signed another contract with Westinghouse — for the supply of fuel for the Dukovany NPP, with deliveries also set to begin in 2024. In February 2024, Westinghouse announced that the first batches of fuel for Dukovany would be delivered by the end of the year, with deliveries to Temelín starting several months later.

On May 23, the first thirty Westinghouse-manufactured fuel assemblies were delivered to the Temelín NPP. Deliveries to the Dukovany NPP have not yet begun. As for the Framatome fuel, it is currently expected to arrive in 2026.

Uranium enrichment services for ČEZ are provided by Urenco and Orano.

«Two years ago, in April 2023, when representatives of Kazatomprom mentioned that some operators of Eastern European nuclear power plants were seeking new uranium supply contracts to replace Russian sources, we already assumed they were referring to Czech NPPs. Two years later, the contract has been signed. This demonstrates that moving away from Russian supplies in the nuclear fuel sector is possible for European countries — even in the absence of formal EU sanctions on such transactions. However, it takes time. Official sanctions are still necessary to ensure there is no return to previous practices as long as the Russian leadership’s aggressive policies continue to pose threats to neighboring countries.»

Final Shipment of Russian Fuel Delivered to Kozloduy NPP ↑

In early April, media reports indicated that the final shipment of Russian nuclear fuel for Bulgaria’s Kozloduy NPP was delivered on March 24. The fuel reportedly arrived aboard the Russian-flagged ferry Slavyanin at the ferry terminal in Varna and was then transported to the plant site in four rail containers under heightened security. (The source cited is the Maritime website. The ferry terminal in Varna also confirmed the information to the Bulgarian news agency BNT.)

In May 2024, Bulgaria announced its decision to terminate its nuclear fuel supply contract with Russia, which had been set to run through 2025. During scheduled maintenance of Unit 5 in June 2024, one-quarter of the reactor core was loaded with Westinghouse fuel. Plans also call for Unit 6 to switch to Framatome fuel starting in 2025. (It was announced that the final loading of Russian fuel into Unit 6 would take place in October–November 2025, along with a partial loading of French fuel, which will serve as a prototype for the current Russian TVSA-12 assemblies.) The remaining stock of Russian-made fuel will serve as a reserve.

«Bulgaria’s efforts to diversify its supply sources and move away from purchasing Russian fuel are certainly welcome. However, several aspects of this process raise concerns.

First, the readiness of the license-compliant French fuel from Framatome remains in question, and there is a risk that it may not be delivered or loaded into Unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP this year.

Second, there are concerns about the transparency of supply chains and the reporting practices of Bulgaria and the Kozloduy NPP operator. For instance, the Eurostat system has lacked data on nuclear fuel deliveries to Bulgaria for many years — despite the evident existence of such deliveries. Other EU countries that procure fuel from Russia do report this data to Eurostat. This significantly limits the ability of independent observers to monitor the diversification process.»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

New Round in the Dispute over the Hanhikivi-1 Project: Rosatom’s Lawsuit and Investigation in Finland ↑

On April 30, Rosatom subsidiaries — JSC TVEL, JSC Rusatom Energy International, and RAOS Project — filed a lawsuit in the Moscow Arbitration Court against Finnish energy company Fortum and steel manufacturer Outokumpu, seeking compensation in the amount of approximately 227.79 billion rubles (around $2.9 billion). Rosatom stated that the claim concerns losses resulting from the termination of the EPC contract for the construction of the Hanhikivi-1 NPP, breaches of the shareholders’ agreement and the fuel supply contract, as well as the refusal to repay a loan.

Outokumpu and Fortum said they had not received any official notification regarding Rosatom’s new lawsuit.

Legal proceedings between Finnish companies and Russian entities of Rosatom began in 2022 following the cancellation of the Hanhikivi-1 nuclear power plant project, which was to be built using a Russian design. The contract was terminated shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Finnish energy company Fennovoima — a joint consortium in which Finnish shareholders, including Outokumpu, Fortum, and SSAB, initially held a two-thirds stake through a joint venture, while the Russian side held one-third — stated that the termination was not due to the war, but rather to issues on the Russian side and repeated delays in the project (the contract for the plant’s construction and supply was signed in 2013).

According to Rosatom, this was merely a pretext, and the real reason for the termination was political. International arbitration procedures were initiated, with Fennovoima seeking the return of more than €1.7 billion in advance payments, while Rosatom filed counterclaims totaling €3 billion.

Outokumpu commented that the case involves a complex international contractual dispute and that Moscow is not an appropriate venue for resolving such matters. The company also noted that it is not a party to the EPC contract or to any other agreements with Rosatom entities involved in the Hanhikivi-1 project.

Meanwhile, on April 17, Finland’s Customs Authority reported that its Economic Crime Investigation Unit had launched a preliminary investigation into an attempt to export archival materials to Russia related to the construction of a Finnish nuclear power plant. The materials are classified as falling under EU trade sanctions imposed against Russia. The suspect is the managing director of a construction company involved in the project. (Reuters noted that Finland has five nuclear reactors at two nuclear power plants — Loviisa and Olkiluoto. Fortum, which owns the Loviisa NPP, and TVO, which owns the Olkiluoto NPP, stated that their plants are not part of the investigation.)

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Iran. On April 23–25, Moscow hosted the 18th meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation between Russia and Iran. As part of the 20-year strategic partnership agreement signed by the two countries in January 2025, a number of energy-related agreements were reached. It was reported that Russia committed to financing the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Iran.

El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On April 23, the first stage of concrete pouring for the second level of the inner containment (IC) of the Unit 2 reactor building was completed.

Uzbekistan. On April 15, Rosatom announced that construction had begun on a civil and erection base at the site of the planned small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear power plant with a RITM-200N reactor. The base will provide space for administrative and production buildings, warehouses, and a pre-assembly workshop.

Azim Akhmedkhadjaev, head of Uzatom, stated that a consortium of companies from China, Hungary, and other European and Asian countries would be formed for the construction of the SMR. The nuclear technology and reactor island will use Russian technology. Turbine equipment manufacturing and supply are being discussed with China.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On April 22, the installation of the main circulation pump sets was completed in the reactor compartment of Unit 2. These pumps provide forced circulation of the coolant in the primary circuit through the reactor core.

Paks II NPP, Hungary. The AEM-Spetsstal plant (part of Rosatom’s Machine Building Division) has begun manufacturing the blanks for the reactor vessel of Unit 6.

“The Paks II project is progressing according to schedule. The start of long-cycle equipment production for Unit 6, just a year after similar work began for Unit 5, clearly reflects this,” said Vitaly Polyanin, Vice President of ASE JSC and Project Director for the Paks NPP construction.

Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó also announced that production of the first turbine components for Unit 5 had begun at Arabelle Solutions in Belfort, France.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. Russia and Bangladesh have agreed to ease the terms of the loan provided by Russia for the construction of the Rooppur NPP, according to The Business Standard. Under the draft amendments sent by Moscow to Dhaka, Bangladesh will be exempted from paying a $164 million penalty for delayed payments on a $500 million loan used to finance the plant’s feasibility study. The parties also plan to extend the $11.38 billion loan term and postpone the start of repayments by one and a half years. Additionally, according to sources at the Economic Relations Division (ERD), future payments may now be made in Russian rubles alongside US dollars.

ERD officials explained that the payment delays were beyond Bangladesh’s control, as the funds were credited to Rosatom’s account at Sonali Bank but could not be transferred due to US sanctions on Russian banks following the war in Ukraine.

The total estimated cost of the Rooppur project is $12.65 billion, with 90% financed by Russia and the remaining 10% by Bangladesh. Around $7.70 billion has been disbursed so far, but payments were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, which triggered economic sanctions against Russia. If the draft protocol is signed, the remaining $3.68 billion will be paid by December 2026.

Recommended publications ↑

On April 25, 2025, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a report titled Nuclear Facilities as Targets of Military Attack by Darya Dolzikova. The report examines the reasons why states may deliberately target nuclear infrastructure — including reactors, storage facilities, and fuel cycle sites. It analyzes potential targets and consequences of such attacks, and outlines possible risk mitigation measures, including international legal instruments and civil society involvement in monitoring. The report is especially relevant in light of the current threats to nuclear facilities during the war in Ukraine.

On May 13, Bellona organized and hosted a forum in Oslo titled The Transformation of Rosatom and Russia’s Nuclear Sector During the War in Ukraine. The event featured the presentation of Bellona’s new report, Rosatom in the Wartime Years 2023 and 2024. Experts from Norway, the United Kingdom (RUSI), and Ukraine (DiXi Group) participated in the forum. The discussion focused on Rosatom’s activities within Russia, its involvement in the war in Ukraine, and its position in the international nuclear energy market. A video recording of the forum is available at this link; a description of the event and Bellona experts’ presentations can be found here.