After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.

Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments in order to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.

This survey covers events from February 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for January 2025, November–December, and October 2024. Download a PDF of this digest here.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1.  The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for February 2025
1.1.  Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP
1.3.  Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team
1.4.  Military threats at the ZNPP
1.5.  Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
2. Ukrainian government authorizes Energoatom to purchase reactors from Bulgaria’s Belene NPP project

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. KHNP signs supply contract with Centrus for enriched uranium
4. Construction of a new production hall begins at Urenco’s enrichment plant in the Netherlands
5. International sanctions on Russia in February

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
6. Rosatom and Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil sign contract for conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium
7. Rosatom resumes low-enriched uranium deliveries to the US
8. Rosatom-affiliated enterprise repairs imported equipment
9. Serbia considers cooperation with Rosatom
10. Baltic Shipyard files new lawsuit against Wärtsilä seeking damages
11. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for February 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

On February 4, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited Kyiv, where he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior officials. The meeting focused on the IAEA’s efforts to help prevent a nuclear accident amid the ongoing military conflict. This was his eleventh visit to Ukraine since the start of the war nearly three years ago.

One of the main issues discussed during the visit was the assessment of damage to power infrastructure vital for the safe operation of nuclear power plants, caused by recent Russian attacks.

In recent months, Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — have repeatedly been forced to reduce power output due to large-scale military activity affecting the electricity grid (see Bellona’s digests for October–December 2024 and January 2025). In September 2024, Ukraine and the IAEA agreed that the Agency would assess the risks and scale of damage to the country’s energy infrastructure and work on targeted technical assistance to help prevent a nuclear accident. Since then, IAEA experts have visited nine different power substations.

Before meeting with President Zelensky, Grossi personally visited one of these substations. In February, the IAEA continued its work to assess the condition of electrical substations critical to the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants that were damaged in Russian attacks on the power system. The information gathered is expected to help determine possible next steps or areas where the Agency could provide technical assistance to strengthen nuclear safety.

On February 5, a rotation of IAEA teams at the Zaporizhzhia NPP was scheduled to take place. However, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IAEA was forced to postpone the rotation due to Russia’s failure to provide the necessary security guarantees. The Ministry noted that this was not the first time Russia had resorted to blackmail and pressure on international experts, recalling that a convoy carrying IAEA staff came under fire on December 10, 2024, during a previous rotation at the ZNPP.

Russia, for its part, stated that it had provided security guarantees in advance, including a description of the previously used rotation procedure. However, two days before the scheduled rotation, the IAEA proposed changes to the agreed scheme for crossing the line of military contact. Russia refused to accept the changes, and as a result, on the morning of February 5, the IAEA cancelled the rotation.

On February 7, interagency consultations between the IAEA and Russia took place in Moscow. The Agency’s delegation was led by Director General Rafael Grossi. The Russian delegation included Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, Rostechnadzor Head Alexander Trembitsky, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov, as well as representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian Armed Forces’ Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops, and the National Guard (Rosgvardiya). According to Rosatom, the discussions focused on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which is under Russian control, and of Russia’s domestic nuclear power plants.

It was noted that the issue of regular IAEA expert rotations at the Zaporizhzhia NPP was discussed specifically (the scheduled rotation on February 5 had been disrupted).

On February 12, the rotation of the IAEA team at the Zaporizhzhia NPP was disrupted for a second time. The IAEA reported that the cancellation was due to intense military activity in the region, despite earlier written security assurances provided by both sides.

According to a statement by Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia followed a familiar pattern: “First, the Russian side fails to agree on the point and time of the rotation for a long time, then gives vague signals about its alleged readiness to guarantee safe passage, but an hour before the start of the rotation opens fire or starts hostilities in the area. After that, Russian fighters appear with white flags and IAEA flags, and Moscow claims that ‘everything is ready’ for the mission. This is not the first time such actions have been repeated, but the security risks are getting higher every time.”

The Ukrainian side believes that in doing so, Russia is trying to force the IAEA to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by sending international experts to the ZNPP through temporarily occupied territories.

Russia blamed Ukraine for the disrupted rotation, stating that it began as planned but that the movement of IAEA representatives was blocked by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian military personnel reportedly waited for several hours at the designated location, but due to a deterioration in the situation (presence of drones and threat of shelling), the Russian team was withdrawn.

The Russian Foreign Ministry also published a video showing that during the withdrawal, the convoy — which included a vehicle identified as an IAEA vehicle — came under drone and mortar fire. Note that, unlike in footage from December, where a damaged IAEA vehicle displayed clear organizational markings, the vehicle in this video bore only an IAEA flag.

It was also reported that a drone crashed 300 meters from Unit 1 of the ZNPP. (According to the IAEA, its team at the ZNPP heard an explosion near the site on February 12, which coincided with external reports of a drone attack.)

IAEA Director General Grossi expressed deep regret over the cancellation of the rotation, emphasizing that IAEA staff are carrying out vital work in very challenging circumstances to help prevent a nuclear accident. He called the threat to their safety completely unacceptable.

Grossi stated that he is holding active consultations with both sides to guarantee the mission’s safety and to maintain the IAEA’s continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia NPP in support of nuclear safety and the protection of the facility.

The rotation was eventually carried out only on March 1. This was reported by Yury Chernichuk, the Russian-appointed director of the ZNPP, who noted: “It is fundamentally important that, for the first time, the route passed through Russian territory.”  (Bellona’s note: through Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia.)

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko sent an official letter to Grossi, stating that the rotation cannot be carried out without the approval of the Ukrainian authorities and constitutes a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sent a note of protest to senior IAEA officials. The document emphasizes that Ukraine considers the IAEA’s actions a humanitarian evacuation carried out in response to threats to the life and health of Agency personnel.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the only reason for the decision to rotate the Agency’s experts at the ZNPP through Russian-controlled territory was to protect the lives of staff under extraordinary circumstances, and that any political considerations in this context were inappropriate. He also noted that the decision had been discussed with Ukrainian President Zelensky and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha.

Following the IAEA Board of Governors meeting held from March 3 to 7, 47 countries issued a joint statement expressing their concern over the recent IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) rotation. The statement also emphasized the exceptional nature of this rotation and condemned “Russia’s actions that deliberately obstruct the IAEA’s work in Ukraine and place Agency personnel under unprecedented pressure in a high-risk environment.”

Meanwhile, on February 18, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated that, on his instruction, a program is currently being developed to put the Zaporizhzhia NPP into operation. “This includes obtaining the necessary licenses — for the facilities and for personnel operations. It also involves work with nuclear fuel, the creation of a power output system, and the calculation of electricity demand across different regions,” he said. According to Likhachev, the plant will be brought into operation as soon as the military and political situation allows.

More details about this statement and the potential technical challenges associated with restarting the ZNPP can be found in a separate article on Bellona’s website: “Rosatom head says Russia will restart seized Ukrainian nuclear plant.”

Operational status of the ZNPP ↑

On February 1, connection to the 750 kV power line, lost on January 29, was restored. Two external power lines were once again available to the ZNPP.

However, on February 11, the backup 330 kV line was disconnected. According to the Russian representatives at the ZNPP, the disconnection occurred due to the activation of the electrical protection system. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine informed the IAEA that the disconnection was caused by military activity that damaged the line. On February 27, the IAEA reported that connection to the backup line was restored approximately a week after the outage.

In information circular INFCIRC/1273 submitted to the IAEA, Russia describes the “actual situation” at the ZNPP for the period from November 13, 2024, to February 16, 2025. In the section on plant maintenance, it is stated in general terms that a repair campaign was launched on January 13, 2025. Scheduled maintenance is being carried out on safety systems and other systems important to the operation of the plant at Units 2–6. Work is also underway to reinforce emergency power supply and alternative water supply systems.

As for February, IAEA reports stated only that the Agency’s experts had been informed of the completion of scheduled maintenance on one part of safety systems at Reactor Unit 1 and the start of work on another.

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team ↑

The IAEA’s updates on the situation in Ukraine for February do not specify which particular areas or facilities at the ZNPP were visited by the Agency’s experts as part of their monitoring of nuclear safety and security. They only state that walkdowns continue to be carried out on a regular basis.

It is worth noting that in earlier updates, the IAEA provided a significant amount of information about the activities of its expert team at the ZNPP — including where they had or had not been granted access, as well as current technical issues and malfunctions (leaks, equipment failures and repairs, etc.). Since October 2024, such information has been published less frequently.

The same applies to the data provided by Russia in its information circulars. In October 2024, Russia stopped regularly submitting updates on the situation at the ZNPP. The above-mentioned Russian INFCIRC/1273, dated February 25, presents general information for the period from November 13, 2024, to February 16, 2025:

“During the specified period, the IAEA Secretariat experts visited the training centre with a full-scale simulator, the dry storage site for spent nuclear fuel, the central control room and the external radiation monitoring laboratory; the radioactive source storage laboratory… If the operational situation allows, IAEA Secretariat experts make weekly visits to Enerhodar, accompanied by security personnel and translators.”

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

Throughout February, as in previous months, the IAEA team at the ZNPP reported hearing signs of military activity at varying distances from the plant on an almost daily basis. Some explosions were heard at very close range. No damage on the ZNPP site was reported.

Russia informed the IAEA that between November 13, 2024, and February 16, 2025, 1,190 drone strikes were recorded, along with artillery attacks on Enerhodar and the ZNPP.

During talks with Rafael Grossi, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated that the risk of attacks in the area around the ZNPP is increasing, as evidenced by the number of intercepted drones and artillery strikes.

As for the drone attack in which a downed UAV fell onto the roof of the ZNPP’s training center, Grossi stated after his meeting with Likhachev — according to TASS — that the collected drone fragments do not allow for identification of their origin, but that these issues are being raised in discussions on international platforms.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities in Ukraine ↑

IAEA teams at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine NPPs, as well as the Chernobyl NPP, reported daily air raid alarms. There were also reports of drones being detected near the NPP sites. At the South Ukraine NPP on February 25, drones were detected three kilometers from the plant, along with anti-aircraft fire and a subsequent explosion at some distance.

On the night of February 14, a drone attack at the Chernobyl NPP caused a fire on the building confining the remains of the Unit 4 reactor, which was destroyed in 1986.

Ukrainian authorities reported that the strike hit the New Safe Confinement (NSC), a structure designed to prevent radioactive releases and protect the remains of the destroyed reactor from external hazards.

Firefighters promptly arrived at the scene and began extinguishing the blaze; however, it continued smouldering for several hours. IAEA representatives observed damage to the outer layer of the confinement structure caused by the explosion.

Ukraine informed the IAEA that the attack resulted in a direct impact on the protective shell of the confinement structure at a height of 87 meters. The explosion damaged both the outer and inner cladding of the NSC Arch, as well as equipment related to the main crane system. The resulting fire affected an area of 40 square meters of the structure.

More details about this incident and its potential consequences are available in a separate commentary on Bellona’s website: “Bellona’s Comment on the Military Drone Strike at the Chernobyl Reactor Shield.”

The following day, on February 15, firefighters continued to deal with smouldering hotspots. The IAEA team gained unrestricted access to the impact site and confirmed that the fire had affected a significant area. The explosion created a hole approximately six meters in diameter in the roof of the structure, damaging both the inner and outer cladding, as well as some equipment and electrical cables. However, the structural support beams were not significantly affected.

Radiation levels at the site remained within the normal range, as confirmed by measurements taken by the IAEA. The drone debris was collected by Ukrainian specialists for analysis. The IAEA team was informed that once the remaining smouldering hotspots are extinguished, repair work will begin and additional radiation monitoring sensors will be installed.

As of February 27, efforts to extinguish smouldering hotspots inside the confinement structure were still ongoing. The operation was complicated by the fact that the hotspots were located between layers of thermal insulation. Thermal imaging and a surveillance drone were used to detect them. More than 400 emergency personnel were involved in the response, working in shifts. It was only on March 5 that the IAEA reported no smouldering hotspots had been detected in the preceding two days.

Air raid alarms repeatedly sounded at the Chernobyl site, forcing a temporary suspension of firefighting efforts. The IAEA also received information about drones being detected within a five-kilometer radius of the site, including two drones observed over one of the intermediate spent fuel storage facilities.

In Kyiv, IAEA experts examined drone debris that, according to Ukrainian authorities, had been collected after the strike. They concluded that it was consistent with a Shahed-type UAV but did not make any assessments regarding its origin.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The ongoing developments surrounding the Zaporizhzhia NPP are a direct consequence of the military and political events unfolding during the Russian-Ukrainian war and in its broader context.

The goals of both sides are clear. Russia, having occupied the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, is seeking by any means — including military and criminal — to legitimize its presence and ultimately claim ownership of the facility and return it to operation. Ukraine, for its part, is firmly determined to reclaim what is rightfully its own — an asset seized by force.

Hence all the “armed exercises” around the IAEA mission’s rotation. It’s extremely difficult to determine who is doing the shooting and from where — but one thing is certain: Russia has a clear interest in maintaining a state of tension that allows it to argue that rotating the mission through Ukrainian territory poses unacceptable risks to IAEA personnel. This is one of several ways Moscow is exerting pressure on the IAEA, which refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the occupation or the presence of Rosatom staff at the plant.

Russia will most likely insist that the route used by the IAEA team during the next rotation run through Russian territory — a point of principle for Moscow. Ukraine, of course, will not agree to this. As a result, the disputes between the warring parties, which turn into “armed exercises” during the IAEA team’s movements, are likely to continue.

Russian officials at various levels are making increasingly frequent and insistent statements about preparations to restart the ZNPP reactor units. We keep hearing about programs, licenses, technical procedures, social measures, and so on.

It is difficult to imagine how two warring parties could reach an agreement, coordinate their actions, and determine the fate of the ZNPP. Most likely, they cannot. At present, a peaceful resolution around the plant seems out of reach — though various proposals are being made and even negotiations involving a third party are reportedly underway. Predicting the outcome is impossible, but if no agreement is reached, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe is likely to remain in a “half-dead” state — that is, shut down and gradually deteriorating for a range of reasons.

The technical maintenance information currently being provided by Russia says very little. Ukrainian experts familiar with the ZNPP claim that bringing the plant back into operation from its current state would take 2 to 2.5 years, along with the necessary equipment, materials, and personnel. Meanwhile, however, the IAEA Director General maintains that the plant could resume operation within a few months after hostilities cease.

It’s hard to say who’s right without addressing broader questions — such as the fate of the U.S.-supplied fuel currently in four of the reactors, how the technical challenges associated with the switch to that fuel will be resolved, and many other smaller legal, technical, and operational details where, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. One thing is clear: full-scale operation of the ZNPP amid ongoing active hostilities is virtually impossible.

But if the Russian side does decide to bring the ZNPP back into operation, it will undoubtedly create real conditions for a nuclear and radiological disaster — something that surely must be understood not only at Rosatom, but even in the Kremlin. The IAEA’s updates and Russia’s own information circulars are offering less and less detail about the current state of the plant. The Agency’s inspectors have stopped reporting which specific areas they are visiting as part of their monitoring, or what they are finding there. Since October 2024, Russia’s Permanent Mission to International Organizations in Vienna has ceased submitting its reports on the “actual situation” at the ZNPP. This likely reflects a general understanding of at least the minimum level of threat posed by the plant in its current cold shutdown state.

On the Russian side, it appears that any serious technical activity is being postponed until military and political decisions are made. In the meantime, Moscow continues to declare that the Zaporizhzhia NPP will never be given up under any circumstances — because of the so-called “referendum” and other nonsense manufactured by the Russian authorities.

IAEA inspectors, observing the relative “calm” at the plant, seem to understand that no one really needs their detailed reports anymore. Ukraine continues to assert — and rightly so — that the plant and the territory are theirs. It will never stop insisting on that, but at the same time, it can do little to reclaim what was taken. Everyone remains in a state of waiting — and Bellona is waiting too.»

Ukrainian government authorizes Energoatom to purchase reactors from Bulgaria’s Belene NPP project ↑

On February 11, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved legislation allowing Energoatom, the operator of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, to purchase equipment from Bulgaria’s suspended Belene NPP project for the completion of Units 3 and 4 at the Khmelnytskyi NPP.

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the decision is of great importance for the country’s energy system: “Completing the construction of the Khmelnytskyi NPP is a strategic priority for Ukraine.”

Several Ukrainian politicians opposed the legislation, arguing that Ukraine should not purchase Russian-made equipment at a non-transparent price during a time of war with Russia. However, Energy Minister Halushchenko emphasized that there would be no Russian involvement in the project — specifically, no Russian fuel or servicing. All work will be carried out by Ukrainian and US companies.

On February 5, Westinghouse confirmed that it would be able to supply compatible fuel assemblies for Units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnytskyi NPP if the reactors are completed using the VVER-1000 (V-466B modification) design.

Plans to purchase equipment from the unfinished Bulgarian project were also discussed during a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on February 6. The IAEA is providing technical support and consultations on nuclear safety as part of this project.

Negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria on the purchase of nuclear island equipment for the two units began in July 2023 and sparked debate in both Ukraine and Bulgaria.

On February 12, a political party in the Bulgarian parliament proposed cancelling the negotiations on the sale of Belene NPP equipment. At the same time, Tsanko Bachijski, head of Bulgaria’s Nuclear Regulatory Agency, stated that a review is underway to determine whether the steam generators included in the list of equipment planned for sale could be used at the Kozloduy NPP. This issue has been raised several times in recent years, as some components originally intended for Belene have already been used to extend the operational life of Units 5 and 6, and Unit 6 may soon require replacement of a steam generator. The view that Belene equipment could be used at the Kozloduy NPP is also supported by organizations such as Greenpeace Bulgaria.

On March 13, the law on purchasing equipment from the Belene NPP was signed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

On March 14, Halushchenko stated that Ukraine is now awaiting a decision from the Bulgarian government.

«The decision to purchase Russian-made reactors from Bulgaria — originally intended for the Belene NPP — has sparked a serious debate in Ukraine, involving not only the public, but also nuclear industry experts and government officials at various levels, including the President.

It is extremely rare for a Ukrainian law to be adopted specifically to enable a single international procurement. Yet that is precisely what happened in this case: the law was passed to enable the purchase of Russian-made equipment from Bulgaria for the completion of Units 3 and 4 at the Khmelnytskyi NPP.

Each of the groups involved in the debate presented its own arguments. Many of those who opposed the purchase pointed to the fact that the equipment is of Russian origin — raising concerns about potential future dependence on Russia and its continued involvement in the project, which is considered unacceptable in wartime. In addition, the economics of the project remain unclear: Who is paying — Westinghouse, which has expressed interest, or Energoatom, possibly with funds from Ukraine’s military budget? What is the real cost of the equipment? And why invest in building nuclear units right now — in the middle of a war?

Some opponents of the project argue that the equipment is outdated, has been preserved for too long, and cannot be guaranteed to meet the necessary standards of functionality and quality. Others add that the entire project is morally obsolete. Environmental groups have also joined the debate, insisting that nuclear energy is inherently harmful and that the chosen construction site is environmentally unsuitable — citing insufficient water resources for cooling and violations of international norms and conventions, such as the Espoo Convention. Moreover, according to a public opinion survey commissioned by the NGO Ecoaction and supported by the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Kyiv Office and Friends of the Earth Norway (Naturvernforbundet), 68% of Ukrainians oppose the implementation of the project.

The initiative to complete Units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnytskyi NPP is being led by Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy and Energoatom. The adoption of the law signals that the initiative has the backing of the Verkhovna Rada and the Office of the President. Judging by this, the country’s political leadership appears intent on maintaining the relatively high share of nuclear energy (43%) that Ukraine had before the war — recognizing that regaining control of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, occupied by Russia, will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

With that in mind, the effort to complete the new units at the Khmelnytskyi NPP can be seen as an attempt to partially compensate for the loss of the Zaporizhzhia plant. Moreover, the Khmelnytskyi site is located on the right bank of the Dnipro River, in the western part of Ukraine — in a relatively safer zone. This gives it a certain advantage over, for example, the South Ukraine NPP or even the Rivne NPP, which lies just 60 kilometers from the Belarusian border. Still, when engaged in a war with a nuclear-weapon state, it is difficult to speak of reliable protection based solely on distance from the adversary.

In light of the ongoing debate over whether to proceed with construction, Bellona would suggest preparing a working document that would allow experts from different perspectives to present their arguments — supported by facts, figures, and answers to the many open questions.

It is important to understand that the construction of Units 3 and 4 at the Khmelnytskyi NPP is a long-term project that is only just beginning, with no clear end in sight — or any certainty about how it will end. We will continue to follow developments.»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

KHNP signs supply contract with Centrus for enriched uranium ↑

On February 4, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP) and Centrus Energy Corp. signed a 10-year contract for the supply of enriched uranium, formalizing a conditional supply commitment reached in September 2024.

A press release by the Korean company notes that Centrus is currently the only company in the United States licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to produce high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). The agreement will thus provide KHNP with access to fuel for both existing reactors — low-enriched uranium (LEU) — and future next-generation reactors.

In its 2024 annual report, Centrus notes that its LEU supply portfolio includes contingent contracts and commitments totaling $2.0 billion, $1.2 billion of which are in support of potential construction of LEU production capacity at the company’s facility in Piketon, Ohio.

The agreement signed with KHNP formalizes $0.8 billion of the $1.2 billion in contingent commitments. The report also states that fulfilling these contingent LEU supply contracts and commitments depends on Centrus’s ability to attract substantial public and private investment.

According to the media outlet Business Korea, KHNP is expanding cooperation with the American supplier as part of its efforts to diversify sources of nuclear fuel, including reducing dependence on supplies from Russia. The contract is expected to strengthen energy security in both South Korea and the United States by supporting the development of US uranium enrichment capacity. The same publication reports that from 2019 to 2023, South Korea imported about one-third of its enriched uranium from Russia.

«In recent years, South Korea has consistently ranked among the top four importers of enriched uranium from Russia — alongside the United States, China, and France — purchasing approximately 150 to 250 tons annually (243 tons in 2023), according to Comtrade data analyzed by Bellona. Based on average purchase prices over these years, the $800 million contract with Centrus may imply the purchase of no more than 500 tons of low-enriched uranium over ten years — or an average of no more than 20–30% of the volume South Korea has been importing from Russia in recent years. Therefore, if this contract is intended to reduce dependence on Russia, it is unlikely to fully replace Russian supplies.»

Construction of a new production hall begins at Urenco’s enrichment plant in the Netherlands ↑

On February 6, Dutch construction company BAM Bouw en Techniek announced that it had begun work on a new production hall at Urenco’s uranium enrichment plant in Almelo, the Netherlands. The implementation agreement for the construction between BAM and Urenco was signed in July 2024.

The company has now moved from the basic design phase to detailed design and has set up the construction site, where the first foundation pile was driven on January 7, 2025. Construction is expected to be completed in the summer of 2026.

As a reminder, in March 2024 Urenco held a ceremony marking the start of a project to expand production capacity at the Almelo site by 750,000 SWU per year. The first additional cascades are scheduled to be commissioned in 2027.

«The expansion of Western uranium enrichment capacity continues, aimed at meeting growing demand and reducing Western countries’ dependence on Russian supplies in this sector. In the fall of 2024, the digest highlighted the start of expansion work at Urenco’s plant in the United States and Orano’s facility in France.

At Bellona, we have long noted that such changes in the market were possible — not fast, but inevitable. The announced capacity expansions, which so far appear to be proceeding according to plan, could enable the EU and the US to replace at least 60% of their enriched uranium imports from Russia by 2030.»

International sanctions on Russia in February ↑

On February 24, the European Union adopted its 16th package of sanctions against Russia, targeting sectors such as energy, trade, transport, infrastructure, and financial services. The energy-related measures focus on the oil and gas industry. (Switzerland aligned its sanctions list with the EU’s restrictive measures.) The package does not include any companies associated with Rosatom.

Australia and New Zealand also expanded their sanctions lists on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. New Zealand imposed sanctions on FSUE Atomflot — a step already taken by many other countries.

On February 14, the United Kingdom added Rosatom Additive Technologies to its sanctions list. The company had previously been sanctioned by the United States and Ukraine.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Rosatom and Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil sign contract for conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium ↑

On February 27, Rosatom announced the signing of an agreement between its subsidiary Internexco GmbH and Brazil’s state-owned company Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) for the conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium at Russian facilities. The contract is valued at approximately $40 million.

Later, on March 11, INB reported that the deal involves the export of 275 metric tons of uranium concentrate (U₃O₈) produced at the Caetité uranium production facility in Brazil. The enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), with an enrichment level of up to 4.25%, is expected to be returned to Brazil by December 2027.

The contract was awarded following an international tender in which the selection criterion was the lowest overall cost, provided that INB’s technical requirements were fully met.

It was also noted that conversion is the only stage of the nuclear fuel cycle not performed by INB. The company’s uranium enrichment plant is being commissioned in phases at the nuclear fuel production facility in Resende (Rio de Janeiro state). Once fully operational, the plant will be able to supply about 70% of the enriched uranium needed for each fuel reload of the Angra 1 reactor.

Rosatom also has an existing contract with Brazil for the supply of 330 metric tons of Russian enriched uranium between 2023 and 2027.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Rosatom remains a major player on the international nuclear market, and Brazil is one of the state corporation’s key partner countries in Latin America. The company’s regional office — Rosatom Latin America — is based in Rio de Janeiro. Their strong partnership is supported by a politically favorable climate: Russia and Brazil are both members of BRICS, a Global South political bloc that also includes India, China, and several other countries. Last year, an initiative for cooperation in the nuclear sector was proposed within the BRICS organization.

In addition to its uranium projects in Brazil, Rosatom is implementing a project to build a Center for Nuclear Research and Technology featuring a research reactor in Bolivia, and is in talks on the potential construction of small modular reactors in Chile, El Salvador, and Argentina.

It is unlikely that this kind of cooperation will decrease in the near future unless comprehensive sanctions are imposed on Russia’s nuclear sector by Western countries, or unless secondary sanctions are introduced targeting Rosatom’s partners and projects abroad. However, the likelihood of such sanctions remains low.»

Rosatom resumes low-enriched uranium deliveries to the US ↑

On February 24, the pro-Kremlin outlet EADaily, citing the ImportGenius database, reported that Rosatom’s subsidiary Tenex (Techsnabexport) had resumed deliveries of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the United States. According to the outlet, the previous shipment of LEU had taken place in November 2024.

On November 14, 2024, Russia imposed temporary restrictions on LEU exports to the United States in response to US sanctions introduced in May 2024, which included limitations on imports of Russian enriched uranium and a complete ban starting in 2028. As a result, Tenex — which supplies LEU to the US company Centrus — lost its general export license and was required to obtain separate licenses for each shipment.

In its annual report, Centrus states that, as of now, Tenex has received three specific export licenses from the Russian authorities. Centrus plans to use most of the delivered LEU to fulfill delayed orders. Tenex has also informed Centrus of its intention to apply for additional export licenses to meet its delivery obligations under the Tenex supply contract for other current and future orders. However, there is no certainty that the Russian authorities will issue further licenses. Even if new licenses are granted, it remains unclear whether they will be issued in a timely manner or might be revoked before shipment.

Centrus had preliminarily applied for waivers from the US ban on the purchase of Russian enriched uranium and received the necessary licenses for deliveries in 2024 and 2025 from the US Department of Energy.

According to EADaily, in March Tenex also supplied LEU to the US subsidiary of French company Framatome and to Global Nuclear Fuel.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The issue of resumed Russian enriched uranium deliveries to the United States is covered in a separate article by Bellona’s Nuclear Project expert Dmitry Gorchakov, published by The Moscow Times.»

Rosatom-affiliated enterprise repairs imported equipment ↑

Rosatom reported that one of its enterprises — the power generating company Quadra (part of the Rosatom Infrastructure Solutions division) — has, for the first time, carried out repairs on a foreign-made gas turbine at the Voronezhskaya CHPP-2 without the involvement of the original equipment manufacturer. The turbine in question is an LM6000 model produced by General Electric. According to the report, more than 500 components and assemblies were either replaced or restored. (It is likely one of the two turbines in the combined-cycle unit commissioned in 2010.)

As of today, Quadra operates a fleet of 19 imported gas turbine units. Following the start of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent withdrawal of a number of foreign suppliers from the Russian market, Quadra and other power generating companies have faced refusals by manufacturers to service or repair turbines. In addition, deliveries of original spare parts have ceased.

Serbia considers cooperation with Rosatom ↑

On February 13, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev held talks in Belgrade with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and other senior officials. The parties discussed plans to deepen cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the participation of Serbian companies in Rosatom’s international projects, training Serbian students in nuclear disciplines at Russian universities, and prospects for joint work in high-tech sectors in Serbia.

Since 1989, Serbia (then part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had a law banning the construction of nuclear power plants. The law was adopted three years after the Chernobyl disaster. However, on November 29, 2024, the Serbian parliament lifted the moratorium.

The topic of nuclear energy became increasingly relevant for Serbia following the First Nuclear Energy Summit held in Brussels in March 2024. The summit focused primarily on growing interest in developing nuclear power among European nations and other participating countries as a means to achieve net-zero emissions and promote sustainable development.

In his speech at the summit, Aleksandar Vučić noted that while Serbia has no prior experience in nuclear energy, the country is facing pressing energy challenges and is interested in building at least four small modular reactors (SMRs) with a total capacity of about 1,200 MW. However, Serbia faces three main obstacles on this path: identifying a technology provider, securing financing (including the possibility of support from leading European countries), and addressing public opinion.

According to Serbia’s Minister of Mining and Energy, Dubravka Đedović Handanović, the country’s new Energy Development Strategy considers the potential integration of nuclear power plants into Serbia’s energy system after 2040. At this stage, the government is studying available technologies and seeking solutions that would be suitable for the country.

Russia is one of the countries with which Serbia is holding consultations on cooperation in nuclear and related technologies — not limited to nuclear energy, but also including areas such as nuclear medicine. Following his visit to Belgrade, Alexey Likhachev stated that Rosatom had offered the Serbian leadership a wide range of cooperation opportunities and expressed optimism about the prospects, despite the existing competition.

Baltic Shipyard files new lawsuit against Wärtsilä seeking damages ↑

Baltic Shipyard, which is building Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers, has filed another lawsuit in the Arbitration Court of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region against Finnish company Wärtsilä and its subsidiaries — Wärtsilä Corporation, Wärtsilä Solutions, Wärtsilä Finland, Wärtsilä Norway, and Wärtsilä Technology.

The shipyard is seeking to recover over €235,000 and 1,200 Swiss francs in losses incurred during international arbitration proceedings, plus interest for late payment.

The court denied Baltic Shipyard’s request for interim measures to freeze Wärtsilä’s patents in Russia. The court justified its decision by citing a lack of evidence that Wärtsilä or its subsidiaries are taking actions that could hinder enforcement of the ruling, a lack of direct connection between the requested interim measures and the subject of the lawsuit, and the fact that the existence of debt (as determined in previous rulings) alone is not grounds for granting interim measures.

Legal disputes between the Russian shipbuilder and the Finnish company began in 2022, when Wärtsilä exited the Russian market following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As a result, despite advance payments, shaft line equipment kits for the icebreakers Yakutia and Chukotka were never delivered.

Baltic Shipyard has previously filed claims in Russian courts seeking €7.6 million and €5.1 million in damages. In both cases, rulings were made in favor of the Russian shipbuilder. In addition, a series of lawsuits against the Finnish supplier from other United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) enterprises are currently being reviewed by Russian courts.

Wärtsilä attempted to have the dispute transferred to the Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce but was denied by the Russian courts.

At the end of 2023, the Baltic Shipyard reported losses of almost RUB 19 billion. The company ended 2024 with a profit of about RUB 4 billion, but due to accumulated losses totaling RUB 32.2 billion, there is a high probability of bankruptcy, according to RBC, citing the company’s annual report.

The shipyard’s management attributes its financial difficulties to the broader crisis facing the shipbuilding industry.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Baltic Shipyard is something of a mirror for the Russian shipbuilding industry. Until recently, it was the only shipyard in Russia capable of building nuclear-powered surface vessels — including nuclear cruisers for the Navy and all of the nuclear icebreakers for Atomflot. There were no other shipyards constructing nuclear-powered surface ships, and in fact, there still aren’t to this day.

There have been attempts to modernize and restructure the Far Eastern shipyard Zvezda for the construction of nuclear icebreakers, but the process of upgrading the facility — along with parallel efforts to build the first Project 10510 Lider nuclear-poweredicebreaker — has faced serious difficulties and delays due to a lack of resources, including financial ones.

Thus, despite facing organizational, financial, and technological challenges, Baltic Shipyard remains the main hope for the Northern Sea Route — which, as proclaimed at the recent Arctic forum in Murmansk, is expected to become a key transport artery and one of the safest, most environmentally friendly, and most promising maritime routes in the world.

In recent years, Baltic Shipyard has been haunted by serious problems — ranging from strained relations with the main designer of nuclear surface vessels, Central Design Bureau Iceberg, to recurring annual losses. These losses are attributed to low planned profitability of contracts, rising costs of materials and equipment, and the withdrawal of foreign subcontracting partners, with whom the shipyard is now entangled in ongoing legal disputes.

Due to accumulated losses, the shipyard now finds itself on the brink of bankruptcy. According to experts, the difficulties facing this key player in Russia’s nuclear shipbuilding sector are a symptom of the broader crisis in the Russian shipbuilding industry — a view shared by Baltic Shipyard’s own management.

It is difficult to say how the situation will be resolved. However, at the Murmansk forum, Chairman of the United Shipbuilding Corporation’s Board and head of VTB Bank Andrey Kostin stated that new shipyards would be built — including in the Far East — and that a major upgrade of the shipyard in St. Petersburg was also planned. But this is a long-term process: building or modernizing a shipyard takes at least five to seven years. We will continue to follow developments.»

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey.  On February 11, Bloomberg reported that Russia and Turkey are negotiating a plan to settle payments for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP using natural gas instead of money transfers, in an attempt to circumvent restrictions on cross-border transactions that have become more difficult following tighter US sanctions introduced in June 2024.

According to the outlet’s sources in both countries, the proposed scheme would involve Turkey covering part of the construction costs for the $20 billion plant (Bellona note: Akkuyu is being built under a build-own-operate model financed by Rosatom). Rosatom would then reimburse this amount to Gazprom in rubles, after which Gazprom would deduct it from Turkey’s monthly gas import payments.

Although Rosatom, Gazprom, and the Akkuyu project are not formally under sanctions, cross-border transfers between the two countries have faced delays due to increased caution on the part of foreign banks.

On February 2, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US Department of Justice suspects Russia and Turkey may be using the Akkuyu project to circumvent US sanctions against the Russian Central Bank. In a short period, more than $5 billion was transferred from Russia to Turkey through US banks JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup. While the funds were formally designated for NPP construction payments, they may have been used for other purposes. As a result, in 2024, $2 billion in Russian payments to Turkey under the Akkuyu project were frozen at JPMorgan.

Meanwhile, at the construction site, the start-up and adjustment phase began on February 3 for the main equipment of the on-shore pumping station at Unit 1. On February 21, the first standby diesel power plant for this unit was launched. On February 26, the diaphragm separating the Unit 1 pumping station from the Mediterranean Sea was dismantled.

China. On February 10, Rosatom announced the shipment of equipment for nuclear power plants under construction in China — a set of four reactor coolant pump casings for Unit 4 of the Xudapu NPP and four pump units for Unit 7 of the Tianwan NPP.