Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.  

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for December can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route remains unavailable
2. During the “Safe Arctic 2025” drills, emergency scenarios on the Northern Sea Route were simulated only in its western part

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. New Sanctions from the U.S. and the U.K.
4. Consequences of the Sanctions Imposed on January 10
5. The EU will not include a ban on Russian LNG imports in its next sanctions package
6. Novatek’s LNG Tankers Adjust Routes Due to Sanctions

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
7. Based on the results of geological exploration in 2024, estimated reserves increased by 103 million tons of oil and gas condensate and 633 billion cubic meters of natural gas
8. Norilsk Nickel News: Profit Decline in 2024, Additional Capital Expenditures for Extending Field Development in Murmansk Region
9. Development of Other Mineral Deposits in the Russian Arctic

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
10. Scientists have detected mercury and cadmium in the bodies of walruses living in the Arctic
11. Existing permafrost monitoring capacity in the Arctic is insufficient, with the situation being worst in the Russian sector
12. Among all Russian regions, permafrost degradation poses the greatest threat to the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area. However, other regions are also facing related challenges
13. A third of the Earth’s northern regions have transformed from carbon sinks into carbon sources
14. The temperature of Norway’s coastal waters has increased by 2°C over the past 90 years

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Northern sea route and shipping

Year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route remains unavailable ↑

Despite forecasts from Russian officials that year-round navigation on the eastern route of the Northern Sea Route would begin by the end of 2024, this has not happened. As in previous years, shipping is currently limited to the western route with icebreaker escort. This was reported by Ilya Chernov, a representative of Russia’s Ministry for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, on January 29.

Nevertheless, officials continue to express hope for year-round navigation. On January 23, at a roundtable held at the House of the Russian Historical Society on the history of the Northern Sea Route’s development, Vladimir Panov, Deputy Chairman of the State Commission for Arctic Development, stated that establishing year-round navigation along the entire route is a ‘top-priority and urgent task.’ He also noted that experimental voyages had been successfully conducted in cooperation with Sovcomflot and Novatek. This likely refers to the voyage of the LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie, which traveled the Sabetta – Jiangsu (China) – Sabetta route in January-February 2021 under the escort of the icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy.

Panov also announced that a target speed of 10 knots has been set for vessels navigating the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route in winter. In 2024, the average navigation speed along the route was 10.6 knots, compared to 9.8 knots in 2023. Additionally, promoting the history of the Northern Sea Route was named a priority for the Russian Historical Society.

During the “Safe Arctic 2025” drills, emergency scenarios on the Northern Sea Route were simulated only in its western part ↑

From January 29 to 31, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) conducted the interagency exercises “Safe Arctic 2025” in 10 Arctic regions of Russia. EMERCOM head Alexander Kurenkov noted that the active development of the Arctic and the increase in cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route inevitably lead to new challenges and threats.

Over the three-day drills, 19 emergency scenarios specific to each region were simulated and practiced, including a train collision, a bus falling through ice, an avalanche at a ski resort, and others.

Two emergency scenarios were simulated in maritime areas:

• An accident involving a vessel trapped in difficult ice conditions while navigating the Northern Sea Route in the Arkhangelsk region.
• An accident on a nuclear submarine in the Murmansk region.

Meanwhile, the drills did not include scenarios for responding to oil spills in maritime areas, nor did they simulate emergency situations in the eastern part of the Northern Sea Route.

A significant portion of the drills focused not on practical emergency response training but on additional activities, such as educational campaigns, workshops, and sports events. More than 60,000 people participated in these supplementary activities.

Bellona’s comment:

«Russian officials continue to reiterate the mantra of year-round navigation on the Northern Sea Route, but its economic viability and safety remain highly uncertain. The experimental LNG tanker voyage from Yamal to China in the winter of 2021 has not been repeated. In 2024, navigation on the route was closed earlier than usual due to unfavorable weather conditions.

While rising average temperatures in the Arctic are causing increased ice melt, they do not make navigation on the Northern Sea Route any safer. Nevertheless, at every public event, officials claim that year-round navigation is about to begin or that it has already started on the western section of the route. This appears to be an attempt to convince China and other countries that year-round shipping on the Northern Sea Route is both feasible and achievable.

At the same time, serious concerns remain about the safety of navigation on the Northern Sea Route, particularly in its eastern section. Emergency response infrastructure along the route is insufficient for rapid intervention, and vessels trapped in ice often have to wait weeks for assistance. There is a shortage of ice-capable rescue vessels, and their construction is lagging behind plans. EMERCOM aviation does not cover most of the maritime area. The absence of emergency scenarios for the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route in the recent ‘Safe Arctic 2025’ drills is likely another reflection of the inadequate infrastructure.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

New Sanctions from the U.S. and the U.K. ↑

On January 10, the U.S. Treasury Department announced new sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. This move is part of the Biden administration’s final measures to increase economic pressure and prevent a weakening of support for Ukraine ahead of Trump’s inauguration on January 20.

The sanctions aim to limit revenue from Russian energy exports, which partially fund military operations against Ukraine. According to Russia’s Ministry of Finance, oil and gas revenues accounted for approximately 31.7% of total budget revenues from January to November 2024.

Sanctions targeted more than 180 vessels transporting oil and gas, including Russia’s ‘shadow fleet,’ as well as oil traders, service providers in the oil industry, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials. The restrictions affected two major extraction companies, infrastructure facilities, and vessels involved in the development of hydrocarbon fields in the Russian Arctic.

Extractive companies operating in the Arctic zone that have come under sanctions:

“Gazprom Neft” – One of Russia’s largest oil producers, ranking among the top three in terms of oil production and refining volumes. It was also the first company to begin offshore oil production in the Russian Arctic at the Prirazlomnoye field in 2013. In 2014, it launched the first maritime shipments from the Novoportovskoye oil field on the Yamal Peninsula. A significant portion of Gazprom Neft’s operations are located in the Arctic.

“Surgutneftegaz” – Another major oil producer in Russia. The company operates in the Beloyarsky District of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, which was incorporated into Russia’s Arctic zone in March 2024.

More than two dozen subsidiaries of Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegaz have also come under sanctions. Additionally, the document states that all subsidiaries are subject to blocking, even if they are not explicitly listed in the sanctions list.

The UK Foreign Office also announced sanctions against both companies on January 10.

In addition, in January, the U.S. imposed sanctions on 183 vessels, including those involved in hydrocarbon development in the Russian Arctic and servicing the Prirazlomnaya project in the Pechora Sea, the Novy port project in the Ob Bay, and the Varandey Terminal in the Barents Sea:

• The largest shipping operator, Sovcomflot, including 54 oil and petroleum product tankers, as well as four LNG carriers—Christophe de Margerie, Pskov, Veliky Novgorod, and Vostochny Prospekt—has come under sanctions. Restrictions also targeted operators Fornax Ship Management FZCO (UAE) and Stream Ship Management FZCO (UAE), which manage tanker fleets and provide services to Sovcomflot.

• The floating storage vessels Umba and Kola, each capable of holding up to 300,000 tons of oil and moored in the Kola Bay, have also been sanctioned. Several tugboats involved in transshipment operations, as well as the companies LC Volga and RPK Nord, which own these storage vessels and tugboats, were also targeted.

• The shipping company Rosnefteflot and its 14 tankers have come under sanctions.

• Gazpromneft Marine Bunker (a subsidiary of Gazprom Neft), a Russian fleet operator and bunkering service provider, was also targeted.

• Tankers of the so-called shadow fleet, currently used to transport Arctic oil from the Kola Bay, have also been sanctioned.

• Sanctions also targeted two insurance companies, Ingosstrakh and the Alfastrakhovanie Group, which provide coverage for tankers transporting Russian oil and petroleum products. Previously, both companies had been sanctioned by the United Kingdom.

• For the first time, U.S. sanctions have targeted oil tankers still under construction at the Zvezda shipyard.

The investigative project Important Stories estimated that the U.S. sanctions imposed in January affected vessels that transported one-fifth of Russia’s oil exports in 2024. According to analytics firm Kpler, the sanctions target tankers carrying about 42% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports, primarily to China.

Arctic projects sanctioned by the U.S. on January 10:

• Rosneft’s major oil production project, Vostok Oil, includes the development of oil fields in the Krasnoyarsk region and the construction of infrastructure for oil extraction and transportation on the Taimyr Peninsula.

• The Lavna Seaport, a major transshipment port complex on the shore of the Kola Bay in the Murmansk region, which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2024 but is still under construction, was also included in the sanctions list.

• Polar Lithium – a joint venture between Norilsk Nickel and Rosatom, established to develop the Kolmozerskoye lithium deposit in the Murmansk region. The project is intended to cover ore mining, processing, and the production of battery materials. The first stage of the mining and processing plant, designed to produce 400,000 tons of ore, is scheduled to launch in 2026. Reaching full capacity of 2 million tons is planned by 2030.

On January 21, changes were made to the Russian state register indicating that Polar Lithium’s charter capital was increased by 1.6 times to 4 billion rubles. Rosatom and Norilsk Nickel each raised their stakes in the company from 1.3 billion to 2 billion rubles.

The Barents Observer links this measure to the sanctions, noting that the capital increase is aimed at strengthening Polar Lithium’s financial stability and securing additional resources for project implementation.

On January 15, the U.S. imposed additional sanctions aimed at undermining Russia’s defense-industrial base and countering sanctions evasion. The list included Novy Kosmos, a company developing the Oculus project—an ice navigation platform intended for use along the Northern Sea Route.

Consequences of the Sanctions Imposed on January 10 ↑

Although the U.S. sanctions include a grace period until February 27 for cargo loaded before January 10 to reach its destination, some vessels have already started canceling their voyages.

According to Bloomberg, several tankers not subject to sanctions have also adjusted their routes. Notably, two vessels en route to the Arctic port of Murmansk—where sanctioned storage and shuttle tankers are stationed—turned around near Tromsø, Norway, and then headed toward the Baltic Sea.

Sanctions are forcing Russian oil tankers to change flags. The Barbados ship registry announced that it will delist 46 vessels by the end of the month, while Panama has already begun removing 68 sanctioned vessels from its registry.

At the same time, India has expanded its support for Russian insurance companies to ensure coverage for tankers transporting Russian oil. The Indian regulator has authorized the insurance company Soglasie to provide insurance for vessels calling at Indian ports until February 2026. India continues to accept Russian oil tankers that have come under sanctions. According to shipping data obtained by Bloomberg, at the end of January, three sanctioned tankers departed from the Arctic port of Murmansk and headed toward the Suez Canal, with their final destinations listed as Indian ports.

Additionally, the new sanctions have disrupted the Arctic LNG 2 project’s ability to obtain critical equipment. Chinese company Wison New Energies had manufactured modules for the third production line of Novatek’s plant, which were to be delivered by the Chinese vessel Wei Xiao Tian Shi. In January, Wison’s shipyard in Zhoushan was sanctioned by the U.S. for providing substantial support to the Arctic LNG 2 project. Nine months after the voyage began, the vessel returned to China without delivering its cargo.

The EU will not include a ban on Russian LNG imports in its next sanctions package ↑

On January 29, it became known that the European Commission did not include a ban on Russian LNG imports in the draft of its new sanctions package due to the risk of a shortage of alternative supplies, including U.S. gas, whose export capacity is limited. Despite the EU’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian fuel, the lack of reliable alternatives has forced a postponement of a full embargo decision.

Earlier, ten EU countries—Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Ireland—called on the European Commission to ban or gradually phase out Russian LNG imports. These nations have already stopped purchasing Russian gas and seek to deprive Russia of revenues that could be used to fund the war. However, France, Belgium, and Spain continue imports, citing energy security, and in 2024, Russian LNG deliveries to the EU have even increased.

Novatek’s LNG Tankers Adjust Routes Due to Sanctions ↑

The 15th EU sanctions package, introduced in December 2024, disrupted gas transportation from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects. In early January, five Novatek-linked tankers—Christophe de Margerie, North Way, North Mountain, North Air, and North Sky—became stranded in the Pechora and Kara Seas, unable to continue their voyages due to EU sanctions.

In early January, the sanctioned LNG carrier Mulan, transporting natural gas from the Arctic LNG 2 project, was spotted in the North Sea, maneuvering between Norwegian oil platforms for a week. The vessel has a complex ownership structure and is owned by Plio Energy, a company sanctioned by the U.S. for its involvement in circumventing Russian gas supply restrictions.

In late January, two new LNG carriers, North Light and North Moon, were spotted heading to Russian Arctic waters to load gas from the Yamal LNG plant. These tankers are part of a series of seven North-class LNG carriers built at the Hanwha Ocean shipyard in South Korea and originally intended for the Arctic LNG 2 project. According to Tradewinds, the two new tankers are managed by White Fox Ship Management, a Dubai-based company sanctioned by the UK in September 2024.

Bellona’s comment:

«Despite the seemingly extensive sanctions against Russia’s oil and gas sector, they have failed to significantly impact export revenues from hydrocarbons to G7 countries and the EU. In 2024, Russia’s budget revenues from oil, gas, and coal sales declined by just 3% compared to 2023 and only 8% compared to the pre-war level in 2021. This is due to the reluctance of Western countries to destabilize global and domestic energy markets, as well as their inability to swiftly implement measures to replace suppliers and restructure energy consumption.

A telling example is the EU, which has been unable to find alternative suppliers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for three years to replace 19% of its LNG imports. The inclusion of Novatek’s tankers in the EU sanctions list is highly selective and does not threaten shipments from Yamal LNG to European ports—five tankers are still operating under the flag of an EU country, Cyprus, and are managed by a Greek company.

That said, it would be incorrect to claim that sanctions have had no impact on Russia’s oil and gas industry. Unlaunched projects are facing significant delays, logistics costs are rising, and social and environmental programs are being cut.

Currently, the future of sanctions directly depends on the success of newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in mediating a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. Unlike the EU, the U.S. likely has the capacity to tighten oil sanctions against Russia to the extent that they would significantly reduce revenues in the short term. However, whether this aligns with the objectives of the current U.S. president remains unclear.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Based on the results of geological exploration in 2024, estimated reserves increased by 103 million tons of oil and gas condensate and 633 billion cubic meters of natural gas ↑

Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources reported that 39 new hydrocarbon deposits were discovered in 2024. Among the most significant finds, the ministry highlighted the Mitykyakhskoye gas condensate field in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area and the Severo-Baikalovskoye gas field in the Krasnoyarsk region, both located in the Arctic.

According to the State Commission on Mineral Reserves, in 2024, the increase in Arctic reserves amounted to 103 million tons of oil and gas condensate and 633 billion cubic meters of natural gas. By comparison, in 2023, these figures were significantly lower—13.4 million tons of oil and condensate and 60.6 billion cubic meters of gas.

In 2024, Russia carried out the first stage of the federal project “Geology: Revival of a Legend,” under which geological exploration was conducted at eight hydrocarbon sites considered key to the creation of a new gas cluster intended to support cargo volumes along the Northern Sea Route. The main criterion for selecting exploration sites was their transport accessibility to the Lena River in Yakutia, which simplifies logistics and future field development.

In 2025, Rosnedra will hold auctions for the rights to mineral deposits explored with federal funding between 2022 and 2024 under the “Geology: Revival of a Legend” project. Among the Arctic sites to be offered are the Kiryavolakhtinskaya area (Karelia), Pinkeljavr (Murmansk region), and the Deputatsky ore cluster (Yakutia). The Deputatsky cluster contains ore-grade silver, lead, and zinc; Pinkeljavr hosts iron ore deposits; and the Kiryavolakhtinskaya area contains large-flake graphite.

Norilsk Nickel News: Profit Decline in 2024, Additional Capital Expenditures for Extending Field Development in Murmansk Region ↑

Norilsk Nickel, a leading Russian metallurgical company and a key player in the Russian Arctic, has published its results for 2024.

According to the report, nickel production fell by 2% to 205,000 tons, while copper output rose by 2% to 433,000 tons. Palladium and platinum production increased by 3% and 0.5%, respectively. The company’s financial performance declined, with revenue down 13% to $12.5 billion and net profit dropping 37% to $1.8 billion. At the same time, capital expenditures decreased by 20% to $2.4 billion as part of a program to improve investment efficiency.

According to the company’s forecast, nickel, copper, palladium, and platinum production in 2025 is expected to remain at 2024 levels.

Norilsk Nickel also announced plans to invest over 25 billion rubles in the development of the Severny mine in Zapolyarny (Murmansk region). Its subsidiary, Kola MMC, plans to launch the initial phase of a project in 2028 to access and develop the Zhdanovskoye, Bystrinskoye, and Tundrovoye copper-nickel deposits at the Severny mine. This will extend copper-nickel ore extraction at the site until 2048, with annual production volumes expected to reach 7 million tons starting in 2028.

Full completion of construction is expected by 2031, with mining operations reaching a depth of minus 730 meters, and potential future expansion to minus 1,400 meters, extending the mine’s lifespan until 2100. The development of the Severny mine deposits has been underway since the 1930s.

Development of Other Mineral Deposits in the Russian Arctic ↑

In the Yamalsky District, the development of the Tambei oil and gas condensate field is planned, including the construction of a marine terminal and infrastructure. The Department of Natural Resources of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug has announced public discussions on the environmental impact assessment of the project.

In Yakutia, tin extraction increased in 2024. The company Yanolovo extracted 800 tons of tin, exceeding the 2023 figures by 41% and ranking second in Russia in tin mining. The Tirekhtyakh deposit, developed by Yanolovo, is part of the emerging Kyuchus Mining and Industrial Cluster in the Arctic region of Yakutia. In addition to tin, gold and silver extraction is planned at the Kyuchus deposit. The cluster’s energy center will be the world’s first land-based small modular nuclear power plant (SMR) in the Ust-Yansky District of Yakutia. It will supply energy to the cluster’s enterprises as well as to the settlements of the Ust-Yansky and Verkhoyansky districts.

Bellona’s comment:

«Russia continues to systematically explore and develop mineral deposits in the Arctic, primarily oil and gas, aiming to replace depleting oil fields and increase the production and export of natural gas, which Russian authorities view as a promising global energy resource. Сurrent efforts focus on onshore exploration, offshore Arctic fields are also being considered strategically, despite the significant environmental risks associated with their development.

In the case of Norilsk Nickel, the decline in revenue and profit—despite only minor changes in nickel and copper production levels—may be linked to a drop in global nickel prices in 2024 compared to the previous year. It is worth noting that EU countries continue to purchase nickel and copper from Russia. In 2024, the EU imported Russian nickel and copper worth $1.3 billion, down from $2.1 billion in 2023.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

Scientists have detected mercury and cadmium in the bodies of walruses living in the Arctic ↑

Scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences have presented findings on the concentration of heavy metals in Pacific and Atlantic walruses, both of which inhabit the Arctic.

In Pacific walruses, cadmium was detected as early as the embryonic stage, with concentrations in the internal organs of embryos and calves in some cases exceeding those found in the mothers. In older animals, high levels of mercury and cadmium were observed in the kidneys and liver. Elevated concentrations of heavy metals may affect the animals’ immune systems, hormonal balance, reproductive health, and the survival of offspring.

In addition, since the walrus is at the top of the food chain and has a lifespan of around 40 years, it serves as a good indicator of pollution in its habitat. Collecting samples over different years will help illustrate the dynamics of environmental contamination.

The concentration of heavy metals in the internal organs of the Atlantic walrus has yet to be determined, but it is already known that its skin contains higher levels of heavy metals compared to the Pacific walrus.

Existing permafrost monitoring capacity in the Arctic is insufficient, with the situation being worst in the Russian sector ↑

A new study by George Washington University (USA) has found that existing permafrost monitoring systems in the Arctic are insufficient to adequately and promptly respond to emerging risks, including those related to infrastructure damage. The study highlights that monitoring systems are least developed in the northern part of Eurasia, the vast majority of which lies within Russia.

Currently, 78 observation sites of the State Permafrost Background Monitoring System are operating across 12 regions in Russia. These sites were commissioned in 2023–2024 by the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI). The monitoring system is expected to be fully established by 2025–2026, when the number of data-transmitting boreholes will reach 140. In addition to boreholes, scientists from George Washington University recommend using other ground-based observation methods as well as satellite monitoring.

Among all Russian regions, permafrost degradation poses the greatest threat to the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area. However, other regions are also facing related challenges ↑

The current Russian permafrost monitoring system indicates that the issue of permafrost degradation is most acute in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area, according to the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. It has recorded the presence of degrading permafrost in the southern parts of the region.

Data from the institute show that the western part of the Eurasian Arctic is generally the most vulnerable, due to the stronger influence of warm atmospheric and oceanic masses. This is reflected in higher permafrost temperatures at the depth of annual zero amplitudes: -3.3°C in a borehole on Svalbard, compared to -9.1°C on Franz Josef Land. The depth of seasonal ground thawing decreases from west to east.

Nevertheless, similar issues are observed in the eastern part of the Russian Arctic. A working meeting was held at the Ministry for the Development of the Arctic and the Affairs of the Peoples of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) to discuss the results of a new study by the Permafrost Institute named after Academician P.I. Melnikov. The event focused on practical measures to ensure the safety of infrastructure in the village of Tiksi, known as the “Sea Gates of Yakutia” – a transport hub on the Northern Sea Route. Specifically, measures were discussed to counteract the thawing of the ground beneath buildings’ foundations in the settlement.

A third of the Earth’s northern regions have transformed from carbon sinks into carbon sources ↑

Over the past two decades, about a third of the total territory of the Arctic and the adjacent regions of North America and Eurasia have transformed from carbon sinks into one of the largest sources of carbon dioxide emissions. This was reported by the press service of the Woodwell Climate Research Center (WCRC).

Scientists reached this conclusion based on an analysis of data collected between 2001 and 2020 by two hundred climate stations located in Canada, Alaska, Greenland, Scandinavian countries, including Svalbard, as well as in the Russian Arctic. A significant portion of the Northern ecosystems still acts as carbon sinks, but the increasing frequency of wildfires and the growing number of CO2 emission sources are rapidly reversing this trend, WCRC warns.

The temperature of Norway’s coastal waters has increased by 2°C over the past 90 years ↑

The Norwegian Institute for Marine Research emphasizes that this is directly linked to global climate change. The data was obtained from eight hydrographic stations located along the entire coastline of Norway, including its Arctic region. The rise in temperature is affecting ecosystems along the coast, particularly negatively impacting the cod’s spawning, as it cannot lay eggs in water temperatures above 10°C. Additionally, there has been an increase in the number of fish species typical of warmer waters. This is also relevant for the Barents Sea, which washes the Arctic coast of Norway.

Accidents and incidents in the Northern sea route ↑

On January 26, in the Kara Sea, the Russian nuclear icebreaker “50 Years of Victory” collided with the bulk carrier “Yamal Krechet” while icebreaking around it. As a result of the incident, no one was injured, the nuclear icebreaker sustained non-critical hull damage, which did not prevent it from continuing operations in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. The bulk carrier also did not require assistance and continued its voyage along the route.