After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for August 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for July, June and May. Download a PDF of this digest here.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for August 2024

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Euratom Supply Agency annual report shows increase in uranium deliveries from Russia in 2023
3. Kazatomprom lowers expected production volume for 2025; one of the causes is the lag in production schedule at the Budyonovsky field developed with Rosatom

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
4. The Kursk NPP
5. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for August 2024 ↑

Military threats. In August, as in previous months, experts from the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) reported that practically every day they heard signs of military activity in the environs of the plant.

On 4 August due to the risk of shelling, Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) staff started a pump that transfers water from the ZTPP inlet channel to the ZTPP discharge channel later than planned (this transfer is important as it provides water to the ZNPP sprinkler pools).

The ISAMZ team reported that in the second week of August, military activity in the area of the plant had been very intense. The team heard frequent explosions, repetitive heavy machine gun and rifle fire and artillery at various distances from the plant.

On 9 August, ZNPP representatives reported that artillery had struck the power and water substation in Enerhodar, causing the failure of two transformers and leading to a citywide power outage that lasted until 11 August.

On 17 August, ZNPP representatives informed the ISAMZ team that an explosive carried by a drone had detonated just outside of the plant’s protected area, close to the essential cooling water sprinkler ponds and about 100 meters from the 750 kV power line. The experts, who were immediately able to visit the area, reported that the damage seemed to have been caused by a drone equipped with an explosive payload.

On 20 August due to reports of drone threats in the area, a planned walkdown of plant sites by the team was postponed to 26 August.

Fire at cooling tower 1. On 11 August, Russian representatives of the occupied ZNPP reported that one of the plant’s cooling towers had been attacked by drones, causing a fire (the ISAMZ team heard explosions at the same time that the Russian representatives reported that a drone had struck the cooling tower).

Rosatom claims that the fire began as a result of an attack by the Ukrainian army, while the Ukrainian side says that the cause of the fire was either negligence or arson. For example, they suggested that the Russians set fire to car tires in the cooling tower, causing thick black smoke to rise above the tower. Energoatom points out that ZNPP buildings and structures, including cooling towers, are used by the occupiers as facilities for storing weapons and military equipment, which significantly increases risks of fires breaking out.

Information appeared on social networks that a mobile diesel generator could be located in the cooling tower for powering electronic warfare equipment installed on the cooling tower.

The cooling towers are located to the north of the cooling pond outside the site, and their damage does not directly influence safety at the plant, as all units are in cold shutdown mode, but the IAEA notes that one cannot ignore the risk of fire spreading to other plant facilities that have high importance for nuclear safety.

On the morning of 12 August, the ISAMZ team was able to inspect the damaged cooling tower. They observed burnt areas in the internal equipment near the water nozzle distribution level (at a height of around 10 m), droplets of burnt plastic and fragments of fallen concrete distributed across the cold-water basin at the base of the cooling tower. Samples of the debris, including burnt and molten plastic, were collected.

The team requested access to the water nozzle distribution level (they could only see the lower part from the concrete foundation columns), and also to the cold-water basin (which they could only see from above), but were not permitted to access them.

The ISAMZ team also requested to accompany ZNPP staff who will be photographing the upper part of the water nozzle distribution level.

According to the ISAMZ experts’ assessments, there was no sulfur smell (from which they concluded that the fire had been more likely caused by burning plastic), and they also did not see remains of tires or drones.

The following day, 13 August, the ISAMZ team observed from ground level as ZNPP staff filmed and photographed the internal damage to the cooling tower, were immediately shown the photographs and footage, and were later provided with copies. No foreign objects or materials were visible in the video footage.

The team requested access to the second cooling tower in order to compare the inside of the structure and identify similar materials and specifications which may have been present in cooling tower 1 prior to the fire.

Immediately after this request, the ISAMZ team was “promptly accompanied back to a secure location due to an air raid alarm.”

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi commented that the Agency would continue to request access to the water nozzle distribution level of the damaged tower.

Other threats. In August, as in previous summer months, there were frequent fires in the environs of the ZNPP. Several times over the first days of August experts saw smoke at various distances from the plant and nearby villages. On 3-4 August smoke was observed coming from an area to the north of the ZNPP, near the ZTPP inlet channel. The plant confirmed that the fire was underneath the overhead cables of the Dniprovkska 750 kV and the Ferosplavna-1 330 kV lines – the last two remaining external power lines for the ZNPP.

On 22 August, ZNPP representatives reported that the plant’s 330 kV back-up power line was disconnected due to a short-circuit and was left with a single power source, the 750 kV line. They did not state the cause of the short-circuit or possible damage to the line, but the Ukrainian side reported that damage to the line took place as a result of Russian shelling. The Ukraine dispatch service put the line under maintenance and it was reconnected on 23 August.

ZNPP maintenance. On 7 August four diesel steam generators for processing accumulated liquid radioactive waste (around 1000 m³) were put into operation (they were installed with this purpose in January 2024 and are being put into operation as the need arises).

On 2 August, maintenance was completed on the safety train and emergency diesel generator of unit 1, which were put into standby mode. Maintenance continues on the safety systems of unit 6 and also on the main transformer of unit 3. One of the breakers for the automatic transfer that connected the 750 kV switchyard to the 330 kV switchyard was placed under maintenance.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The IAEA missions at the Khmelnytsky, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs, and also the Chernobyl NPP, reported continuing air raid alarms. As a consequence of Russian attacks on the electrical infrastructure of Ukraine, at the Khmelnytsky and Rivne NPPs the power levels of some reactor units were temporarily lowered due to grid limitations.

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna informed the IAEA that around 19-21 August Russian drones were detected by the South Ukraine NPP. They flew in the immediate vicinity of the plant, and the debris of one drone was found at a distance of 1.7 km from the industrial site of the plant.

On 26 August, as a result of an attack power units 1, 3 and 4 of the Rivne NPP were disconnected from the grid, and power to other units was decreased to a total level of 1,800 MW, and later that day power unit 3 of the South Ukraine NPP was disconnected due to problems in the power grid.

In late August attacks also affected the power supply of the Khmelnytsky and Chernobyl NPPs (there was not a complete loss of power).

Information on walkdowns by the team of experts described in July in IAEA updates and information circulars of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in Vienna (this information is given in italics):

1 – 7 August (Update 241)

– Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility.

– Offsite ZNPP Central Warehouse.

– Unit 2: main control room back-up diesel electric station, turbine hall. The IAEA update states that experts were not allowed to access to the western part of the turbine hall.

12 – 16 August (INFCIRC/1239)

– Unit 1: electrical equipment, automation and measurement rooms.

– Unit 2: Containment, cooling pond, main circular pump, steam generators and other equipment; main control room, backup diesel power station. Present during testing of the second safety system train.

– Unit 3: unit transformer, backup auxiliary transformer 1 and 2, turbine hall (experts were not permitted access to its western part).

– Unit 4: turbine hall (experts were not permitted access to its western part).

– Unit 6: third safety system train, observed hydraulic testing of heat exchangers.

19 – 23 August (NFCIRC/1243)

– Hydrotechnical structures of the plant (checked the level of ground waters in wells, examined drainage pumps, sprinkler pools, recirculating pump of unit 4).

– Unit 2: present at tests of the first safety system train.

– Unit 3: containment, cooling pond, main circular pump, steam generators, reactor section; present at tests of the third safety train.

 22 – 28 August (Update 247, INFCIRC/1245)

– Units 5 and 6: turbine halls, experts were not permitted to access the western parts of the buildings.

– Units 1-6: main control rooms.

– Unit 1: reactor section and containment (cooling pond, main circulating pump, steam generators and other elements).

– Main backup diesel power station.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The war continues, so events which are observed around the nuclear sites of Ukraine, as in the rest of the country, remain “war-related”, i.e. shelling, explosions, air raids, fires etc. There have fortunately not been any nuclear and radiation incidents inside nuclear facilities, but external threats that could cause them have arisen from time to time. NPPs are not only threatened by direct strikes on nuclear units and equipment, but also, for example, from strikes on external energy distribution centers that are located at a considerable distance from the plant.

The fire at cooling tower 1 of the ZNPP was the most serious incident in the period surveyed. Predictably, the precise cause of the fire was not established. The warring sides blame each other, and IAEA representatives only saw and heard what they were shown and told by the Russian administration of the ZNPP. There is not much point in giving one’s own opinion about why the cooling tower caught fire, as it is quite impossible to carry out an investigation, which is required to establish the cause of any fire. There is not even any point in trying to look for a culprit who could have benefited from this fire, as it is hard to find any “strategic interest”, and the combustion of highly flammable substances or a drone accidentally hitting the cooling tower can hardly be called “strategic interest”. We may only point out that the fire at the cooling tower is not a nuclear or radiation hazardous incident for the unit, which is in cold shutdown, but may present a significant problem if the unit is put into operation, as then the cooling tower will have to be repaired.

As we can see, IAEA representatives continue to conduct walkdowns of ZNPP facilities. On the one hand, everyone (including the IAEA) understands that this is part of the “Rosatom show” in which they are permitted to take part, and on the other hand, as the saying goes, “if you can’t do much, then at least do something”. Objectively, this is not the IAEA’s fault, but rather its misfortune»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Euratom Supply Agency annual report confirms Bellona’s information on a growth in EU purchases of uranium and nuclear fuel from Russia in 2023 ↑

The Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) published its annual report surveying supply and demand for nuclear fuel in EU countries for 2023.

The report states that in 2023 requirements of natural uranium in the EU came to around 22% of world requirements. The volume of purchases grew in comparison with 2022 by 24% – in 2023 14 578 tons of uranium were purchased against 11 724 tons in 2022. Russia remains one of the four main uranium suppliers, holding second place after Canada (including natural uranium contained in enriched uranium product).

European organizations bought 3 419 tons of uranium (23.45%) from Rosatom, which is 72.99% more than in 2022. Canada’s share came to 33%, the volume of purchases increased 86% from the previous year, Kazakhstan’s was 21%, 2.7% less than in 2022, Niger’s was 14.3%, a drop of 30%.

In 2022, the main suppliers of natural uranium were distributed differently: Kazakhstan 26.82%, Niger 25.38%, Canada 21.99%, Russia 16.89% (including natural uranium contained in enriched uranium product).

The volume of conversion services compared with 2022 grew by 22%, coming to 13 364 tons of uranium. Here Russia’s share was 26,5%, 3 543 tons, which is 45% more than in 2022.

Also in 2023 there was a 12% increase in services delivered for uranium enrichment, coming to 12.3 million SWU. In this segment, Russia’s share was 37.9% (4.6 million SWU), compared to 30.2% in 2022. The largest supplier of conversion services remains Orano (the Philippe Coste facility).

The report states that the EU and its allies took a number of restrictive measures after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, concerning organizations, individuals and certain forms of activity, transport and trade. Although nuclear fuel and services connected with it have not come under direct restrictions, various problems have arisen affected transport routes, in particular nuclear fuel logistics and related financial transactions. The USA is also moving towards banning the import of Russian enriched uranium in 2027. So concerns are expressed that markets may become even tougher and more restrictive, taking into account dependence particularly on conversion and enrichment capacities, and also on fuel deliveries for the operation of reactors of Russian design.

Commentary by Bellona:

«In spring 2024, Bellona published the article “Europe doubled its import of Russian nuclear fuel for 2023”, discussing the increase in purchases by five EU countries of Russian fuel assemblies for their VVER reactors of Soviet design. The ESA report, although it does not reveal details on purchases by individual countries and specific nuclear fuel segments, confirms Bellona’s conclusion and assessments both of the growth in purchases, and the reasons for them.

The report states that the countries are making additional reserves of fresh fuel for VVER reactors for the period in which they plan to complete the process for licensing fuel assemblies that are alternatives to Russian ones. For this reason, deliveries of natural uranium and services at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle increased in 2023, as these services were included in overall fuel deliveries. A number of purchasers have already made reserves of enriched uranium.

Bellona agrees with Euratom’s assessment that at this stage one should not see the increase of purchases from Rosatom as a trend and an increase in EU dependence on Russian deliveries, but rather as a temporary phenomenon during a period of diversification of suppliers»

Kazatomprom lowers expected production volume for 2025; one of the causes is the lag in production schedule at the Budyonovsky field developed with Rosatom ↑

On 23 August Kazatomprom published financial results for the first six months of 2024 and reported an update in production plans for 2025 arising from the continuing uncertainty on supplies of sulfuric acid for 2025, and delays in schedules of construction works at new sites.

One of these sites is field developed by the JV Budenovskoye LLP in which Uranium One Group, an affiliated structure of Rosatom, has owned a 49% share since mid-2023, and Kazatomprom owns 51%. Delays in putting ground infrastructure facilities into operation have shifted plans for mining preparation works: in 2024 -500 tons (the previously established level was 2500 tons according to the CPR report), in 2025 1300 tons (previously approved level of 4,000 tons), in 2026 3,750 tons (previously approved level 6,000 tons) with reaching planned capacity not expected before 2027. (100% of the volume of Budenovskoye’s production in the period from 2024-2026 is completely reserved for raw-material provision of the Russian civic nuclear energy industry on market conditions under offtake contacts).

The lag behind in the schedule on this site has a considerable impact on the adjustment for production in 2025. Based on all the factors taken together, the company reduced its production expectations by 5,000 tons (from the previously planned 30 500 – 31 500 tons to 25 000 – 26 500 tons). It notes that the adjusted figures will still be approximately 12% higher than the predicted figures for 2024.

Commentary by Bellona:

«According to Rosatom’s annual report in 2023 its affiliated company Uranium One Group produced 4,831 tons of uranium at all its assets in Kazakhstan, which is 373 tons more than the previous year. This confirms Kazatomprom data on a reduction in plans and production indicators at the Budyonvosky field. However, if the revised plans are kept to, then in 2025 Rosatom will be able to increase its foreign uranium production by around 10% of the present level»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom’s projects abroad

Kursk NPP ↑

On 6 August, Ukrainian troops crossed the border with Russia into the Kursk Oblast and took control of a section of Russian territory. Reports began appearing in the media that the attack could lead to a military threat to the Kursk NPP, located 60 km from the Ukrainian-Russian border. Two units of this plant with RBMK-1000 reactors are in shutdown mode, operating without generation, and the other two RMBK-1000 reactors are working. Construction of two VVER-510 units is also underway.

The Russian Permanent Mission at international organizations in Vienna reported that on 8 August fragments of downed missiles were detected at the Kursk NPP, including in the area of the complex for processing radioactive waste.

“Cases of direct shelling of the town of Kurchatov, the NPP and energy infrastructure facilities have not yet been recorded,” the report stated.

On 9 August, Rosatom director general Aleksey Likhachev held a telephone conversation with Rafael Grossi, on Likhachev’s initiative. Likhachev emphasized that “the actions of the armed forces of Ukraine create a direct threat not just for the Kursk NPP, but for the development of the entire nuclear energy sphere.” Rosatom also reported that on the evening of 9 August the transformer substation suffered a malfunction, causing a blackout in Kurchatov. The report states that the Kursk NPP itself continues to work according to schedule. However, in connection with the announcement of a federal-level emergency situation in this region, there was a reduction in staff numbers on the construction site of the Kursk NPP new power units.

Later, on 9 August, IAEA director general Rafael Grossi issued a statement calling for both sides to remember the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict established by the IAEA after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the capture of the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, and to show “maximum restraint”. These pillars include the imperative to ensure the physical integrity of a nuclear power plant, regardless of where it is located.

As far as the operation of the plant according to schedule is concerned, on 15 August the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) completed a mission at Kursk NPP-2 where the team observed staff working in the main control room on a full-scale simulator.

On 17 August, Likhachev and Grossi held another telephone conversation. They discussed the situation surrounding the Kursk and Zaporizhzhia NPPs (on 11 August one of the cooling towers at the ZNPP was damaged by fire). Rosatom reported that in Kurchatov on 14 August as the result of a “Ukrainian army drone atack an explosion took place in the open switchyard. Fortunately, no one was injured. Air raid alarms go off in the town 10-12 times a day. Over the last 24-hour period there have been 21 of them.”

The Russian side also claimed the Ukrainian army was planning a provocation at the Kursk NPP and the ZNPP (Ukraine refuted these allegations, saying that this was not the first case that Russian had spread propaganda of this kind).

Likhachev invited Grossi to visit the Kursk NPP and “personally assess the situation unfolding around an operating nuclear facility.”

On 22 August, Russia informed the IAEA that fragments of a drone had been found at the Kursk NPP site. They were allegedly found approximately 100 meters from the plant’s spent nuclear fuel storage facility. (Details or documentary evidence were not provided).

On 26 August, Grossi announced in a general statement: “Since new developments and increased levels of military activity in the vicinity of the KNPP, I have been closely following developments on the ground, especially with respect to the plant. It is important that when the Agency is called upon to fulfil its mandate to ensure that nuclear is used in a peaceful manner, we are present.  It is also important that when the international community needs an independent assessment of the safety and security of a nuclear facility, we will be there.”

Grossi visited the Kursk NPP at the head of the IAEA delegation on 27 August, where they were given a tour of Units 3 and 4 (RMBK-1000) and were briefed on the progress of construction of the second section of the KNPP. “The IAEA director general personally saw the marks of strikes made by the Ukrainian army on the industrial site of the Kursk NPP, and had the opportunity to assess nuclear safety risks created by attacks on the facility,” Rosatom reported.

Speaking with journalists after the visit to the plan, Grossi said that at present the Kursk NPP was currently still operating very close to normal conditions, but that this makes the security situation even more serious when fighting is taking place in the region, as the RMBK-1000 reactors have no containment dome.

Bellona wrote about the risks of armed conflicts near nuclear facilities with RMBK type reactors in the article “Will Ukraine’s attack on Russian territory lead to the seizure of the Kursk Nuclear Plant?”

Commentary by Bellona:

«It is difficult to say whether the Ukrainians plan to capture the Kursk NPP. But it seems unlikely. In any case, the situation will continue to remain tense, as the line of battle is just 60 km away (and according to some sources 30 km), increasing the probability that drones, missiles or even shells may accidentally (or deliberately) reach the Kursk NPP.

Evidently Russia is very interested in the KNPP power units remaining operational, although in this situation it would be more sensible to shut them down, if safety is a concern. At least if a shutdown unit is hit, the consequences may be less serious than if the unit is working at capacity. It is touching to hear Likhachev’s statement that “the actions of the armed forces of Ukraine create a direct threat not only to the Kursk NPP, but for the development of nuclear energy worldwide.” One would like to ask him: what about the actions of the armed forces of Russia, don’t they also create a threat? The IAEA had a predictable reaction to Russia’s “nervous” reports about planned provocations, drone fragments found at the Kursk NPP site etc. The IAEA director general visited the Kursk NPP, inspected the site, mentioned the “seven indispensable pillars”, expressed concern, announced that the plant was “operating very close to normal conditions”, and left. Bellona cannot help being surprised that after 2.5 years of ongoing war, the conditions at nuclear facilities almost right next to the line of battle can still be assessed as “close to normal”.

It is no secret that the Kursk NPP power units have poor structural protection, with no concrete protective domes. The Ukrainian side is aware of this and knows what this means, as it has experience in operating the similar Chernobyl reactors, so it is unlikely to make these reactors a target. In these “close to normal” conditions, we can only hope that no missile, drone or shell accidentally hits one of them»

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Paks-2 NPP, Hungary. On 1 August, the first large piece of equipment, a molten core catcher, was delivered to the construction site of the Paks-2 NPP. The equipment components for unit 5 were delivered from Russia by sea from Volgograd via Turkey (Istanbul), Romania (Constanța) and Serbia to Paks in Hungary.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On August 22, the lower dome section of the outer protective dome was installed in final position at the Unit 1. On 14 August the fifth tier of the inner protective dome was installed at the Unit 3.

Kudankulam NPP, India. On 13 August, the Times of India reported that India and Russia were working on a deal worth 105 billion rupees (over USD 1.2 million) for the supply of nuclear fuel (initial load and five subsequent reloads) and core components for the reactors of units 3 and 4 in the period from 2025 to 2033, along with control rods and fuel assemblies.

The paper also reported that the two countries are also looking at the possibility of creating a joint venture with Rosatom for manufacturing nuclear fuel for the Kudankulam NPP in India.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. On 15 August, Touhid Hossain, foreign advisor to the Bangladesh interim government (formed after the regime change following mass protests in June) stated at a meeting with Russian ambassador Alexander Mantytsky in Dhaka that the Bangladesh government would continue its cooperation with Russia in areas of mutual interest “…particularly in establishing the Rooppur NPP project…” The physical launch of unit 1 is planned for December this year.

Meanwhile, on 21 August the transport lock was delivered to the construction site of unit 2 (part of the nuclear fuel system).

Xudapu NPP, China. On 14 August the reactor shell and steam generator for unit 4 of the Xudapu NPP were dispatched from the Atommash production site.

Tianwan NPP, China. On 21 August, the Petrozadovskmash plant (part of the Rosatom machine-building division) dispatched the first of four shells of the main circulating pumps for unit 8. On 27 August equipment was delivered to the construction site of unit 8, including two steam generators, a reactor shell and pressure compensator (dispatched from Atommash in June).