Dear readers, 

Welcome to the November Nuclear Digest by Bellona’s Environmental Transparency Center. Here’s a quick taste of just three nuclear issues arising in Ukraine, Russia and worldwide that our analysts have been discussing. Stay tuned below for the entire digest and lots more nuclear news.

‘Divided’ control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

“Virtually unacceptable.” That’s how Bellona’s nuclear experts describe various proposals for the so-called “divided” or “50/50” operation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in our latest Nuclear Digest. This refers to the idea of somehow dividing management of the enormous, six-reactor complex between the Russian and Ukrainian sides—a notion that has emerged in many of the peace proposals under discussion to end the war in Ukraine. Basically, “50/50” operation describes a scheme wherein Russia and Ukraine—and in some iterations, the United States—would jointly operate the plant that Russian troops overran early in the war as part of any peace brokered between the nations.

Our nuclear experts say this approach is doomed on all fronts. First, using plant’s shared cooling, control, power supply and safety systems in some sort of bifurcated manner would be next to impossible, and attempts to do so would seriously degrade overall plant safety.

Further, who, in fact, would be in charge? Which side would issue key commands in the event of an emergency (of which, in time of war, there is no shortage)—and in what language would they be communicated? What country’s nuclear regulator would be responsible for ensuring safety and radiation safety regimens, and whose regimens would be observed? Which side would legally own the nuclear fuel used at the plant and make sure that its use complies with international nonproliferation norms? How would the US-origin Westinghouse fuel burning in four of Zaporizhzhia’s reactors be treated? And how would a technical staff comprised of people from bitterly warring sides be expected to cooperate?

The questions are almost too numerous to list. But a final one we propose would be: Is this the sort of world we want to live in? A divided Russian-Ukrainian operation of the Zaporizhzhia complex would only serve to normalize the taking of nuclear plants as prisoners of war—then when peace comes, dividing the baby with Solomon’s sword.

As before, we at Bellona stipulate that the only safe outcome for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant is to return it to Ukrainian hands. Read our full commentary here.

Nuclear cooperation between Hungary and the US…and Russia 

The US played a role in other nuclear developments, this time in Hungary. A White House meeting between US President Donald Trump and his Hungarian counterpart Victor Orban in November yielded a $114 million deal for Westinghouse to supply fuel to the Russian-built PAKS I nuclear plant, a supply ample enough to run the plant’s four Soviet-style VVER-440 reactors for about a year. The US side also agreed to lift any trade restrictions impacting the construction of the Rosatom-built PAKS II nuclear plant—a project that makes Hungary the sole EU member state where a Russian nuclear plant is currently under construction.

Our analyst Dmitry Gorchakov says this development is notable given Hungary’s close cooperation with Rosatom and Budapest’s efforts to block EU-wide sanctions on the Russian nuclear behemoth. Hungary’s opposition to such measures has somewhat frayed the Brussels response to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Still, Gorchakov notes that even Hungary, despite its warm ties to Moscow, is seeking to diversify its nuclear fuel supplies amid western pressures to abandon Russian sources. The US agreement offers further evidence of that—though for the US side, the deal is likely driven by commercial, rather than political, considerations. Foremost in Trump’s foreign policy is securing deals for US companies—like Westinghouse.

The lifting of US restrictions on supplies to the PAKS II plant places Hungary and the EU at fork in the road—with one route encouraging EU unity against Russia’s invasion while the other further unravels it. With Westinghouse able to cover some of the demands for fuel that have traditionally been filled by Russia, Hungary can scarcely continue to oppose sanctions by arguing that its energy security depends upon trade with Rosatom.

However, very fact that the PAKS II project is getting the US nod to continue trade relations with Russia may give other EU countries reason to argue that they should get the same relief. Read more about this conundrum here.

Kazakhstan to start uranium enrichment—with a little help from its friends

In Kazakhstan, new laws on “subsoil use” could set the stage for a major expansion in nuclear cooperation between Astana and Moscow. Legislation passed in November envisages adding uranium processing to Kazakhstan’s role as the world’s largest uranium exporter—with a little enforced help from its foreign partners.

Essentially, foreign customers contracting to mine uranium in Kazakhstan will also be required to build and operate uranium conversion and enrichment facilities for what they mine, as well as commit themselves to buying at least half of what these new facilities produce.

It’s a novel idea that Bellona analyst Dmitry Gorchakov says fits into Kazakhstan’s long-term strategy for developing and diversifying its nuclear sector—especially now that Russia and China are leading consortiums to help Astana build its first two nuclear power plants. By adding enrichment capabilities to its already extant mining and conversion capabilities, Kazakhstan is eliminating a bottleneck in the process that could allow it to eventually fuel its own reactors, says Gorchakov.

While it’s still unclear if China, Russia and other foreign partners Kazakhstan has will fully buy into the new legislation, the dependence of Russia and China on Kazakh uranium likely means they will. See what else we think of these developments here.

For our complete coverage of international nuclear industry issues though November, read the whole digest, out now!

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for November 2025
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities
1.3. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Sweden’s Parliament Approves Lifting the Ban on Uranium Mining
3. New US–Hungary Nuclear Agreements: Memorandum of Understanding, Fuel for Paks I, and Sanctions Relief for the Paks II Project
4. Kazakhstan Revises the Terms for Foreign Companies’ Participation in Uranium Mining
5. Belarus Plans Construction of a Third Unit at the Ostrovets NPP
6. Rosatom and Vietnam: Fuel Supply for a Research Reactor and Environmental Cooperation

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Sixth serial Project 22220 nuclear-powered icebreaker laid down at the Baltic Shipyard
8. Rosatom’s Projects Abroad in Brief

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for September and October 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

On November 10, Ukraine sent a note to the IAEA regarding the issuance by Russia’s nuclear regulator, Rostekhnadzor, of a “license” to operate the dry spent nuclear fuel storage facility (DSFSF) at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Ukraine stressed that such an act is unlawful and has no legal force under international law or Ukrainian legislation.

It was further noted that the “license” entails a serious violation of intellectual property rights, as the DSFSF was constructed using proprietary technology developed by Duke Engineering & Services / Westinghouse. Any attempts by the occupation administration to operate the facility, modify it, or use the relevant technologies and fuel without the consent of the rights holders, constitute unauthorized use of intellectual property and a breach of international obligations in this area.

On November 14, another meeting took place in Kaliningrad between a delegation of the IAEA led by Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and a Russian delegation headed by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev. The meeting addressed issues related to ensuring nuclear safety and nuclear security at the ZNPP.

The previous meeting of this kind took place in June 2025.

On November 19–21, a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors took place. Canada presented a joint statement on behalf of 57 delegations expressing concern over the instability of power supply that is critical to the nuclear safety of Ukraine’s NPPs. The document emphasizes that the complete loss of off-site power at the Zaporizhzhia NPP — which has occurred ten times since 2022 and most recently lasted for almost a month — constitutes an unprecedented situation from a nuclear safety perspective.

The statement also expresses serious and growing concern about the impact of repeated attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including strikes on electrical substations, which in November disrupted the normal operation of all three nuclear power plants currently operating in the country (see below).

Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities ↑

In November, regular IAEA updates on the situation in Ukraine contained limited information on the technical condition of the ZNPP. Only the update issued on November 27 reported that the IAEA team was continuing walkdowns of site facilities. Over the previous days, the team conducted walkdowns of two turbine halls (the specific units were not specified) and the radioactive waste storage facility. The update also noted that experts observed testing of an emergency diesel generator and held discussions on the situation with cooling water, which remains one of the most challenging issues for nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP.

Meanwhile, Russia submitted a report to the IAEA on the status of the ZNPP covering the period from August 21 to November 7, stating, inter alia, that:

• plant personnel, together with specialized organizations, are performing work required to maintain equipment in operable condition;
• as of October 30, 2025, the water level in the cooling pond stood at 13.17 m; work was under way to construct a cooling-pond make-up water pumping station with a design capacity of up to 18,000 m³/h;
• 20 diesel generators (18 unit-specific and 2 common-unit generators) remained on constant standby. Total diesel fuel stocks amounted to 2,805 metric tonnes, providing a calculated operating time of 18.7 days.

It is also noted that during the reporting period Rostekhnadzor carried out 65 control and supervision procedures, 24 of which were carried out with the participation of IAEA experts, and that the report includes a list of ZNPP facilities visited by Agency specialists.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

On November 7, a localized ceasefire came into effect in the vicinity of the ZNPP, allowing work to begin on restoring the plant’s connection to the 330 kV Ferrosplavna-1 back-up off-site power line, which had been unavailable since May 7.

As a reminder, on September 23 the ZNPP completely lost off-site power after losing its connection to the second power line, the 750 kV Dniprovska line. This resulted in the longest off-site power outage at the plant since the start of the hostilities. Restoration work began only on October 18, after temporary ceasefire zones were agreed upon in two areas on opposite sides of the front line.

Initially, it had been planned to restore both lines simultaneously; however, during work on the Ferrosplavna-1 line, additional damage was identified on a section located closer to the plant but outside the agreed ceasefire zones, leading to a delay in its reconnection.

On November 7, demining operations and preparatory work were carried out near the damaged section of the backup line, approximately three kilometers from the plant site, and on November 8 off-site power supply was restored. The IAEA team present at the ZNPP monitored the progress of the repair work.

On November 14, the 750 kV Dniprovska line at the ZNPP was disconnected again. It was reported that the protection system was activated, while the cause of the disconnection remained unknown. The connection was restored on November 19. The IAEA reported that the restoration work was carried out approximately 16 kilometers from the plant site.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

On November 8, following a Russian attack that affected an electrical substation critical to nuclear safety and security, the Khmelnytskyi NPP and the Rivne NPP had to reduce electricity generation. Each plant was disconnected from one of its two 750 kV power lines.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, stated that these were “not accidental, but well-planned strikes.”

On November 17, the IAEA reported that these NPPs were still operating at reduced capacity. By that time, one of the affected power lines had been restored, while the other remained out of service. Three reactor units continued to operate at limited power at the request of the grid operator.

On November 19, following another Russian attack on Ukraine’s energy system, four of the nine reactor units at the country’s three operating NPPs reduced output. The Khmelnytskyi and the Rivne NPPs, which were already operating at reduced power, further curtailed generation after each plant lost its connection to one of its high-voltage power lines.

The South Ukraine NPP also lost its connection to one of its high-voltage power lines. According to the plant administration, 11 drones were detected overnight one kilometer from the site.

According to the IAEA, overall electricity generation at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine NPPs returned to normal by November 27. Almost all units were operating at full capacity, with only one unit remaining at reduced power. All high-voltage power lines lost during the attacks had been restored.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that, following sustained attacks on Ukraine’s electrical grid, the Agency is preparing to deploy an expert mission to visit several substations critical to nuclear safety. This will be the sixth such mission. Its purpose is to assess the latest damage and potential impact on NPP operations.

In November, at the request of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine, the IAEA deployed experts from its Department of Nuclear Safety and Security to the Chernobyl NPP site, in addition to the Agency mission that has been permanently present there since January 2023.

The mission’s task was to carry out a comprehensive safety assessment of the New Safe Confinement (NSC) damaged by a drone strike in February 2025. The experts assessed the current condition and operational status of the NSC and considered possible risk-mitigation measures and plans to restore its functionality.

A drone strike caused significant structural damage, affecting the confinement’s protective function and its design service life. Following the assessment, experts confirmed that the NSC had lost its primary safety functions; however, no permanent damage to its load-bearing structures or monitoring systems was identified. It was noted that temporary work on the roof had already been carried out, but timely and comprehensive restoration would be required to prevent further degradation.

Following the mission, the IAEA recommended further restoration and protective measures for the NSC, including humidity control measures, an update to the corrosion monitoring program, and upgrades to the integrated automated monitoring system of the Shelter.

In 2026, additional temporary works are planned at the Chernobyl site with the support of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, aimed at restoring the NSC’s confinement function, with a view to full restoration after the end of the war.

Commentary by Bellona:

«We did not include this issue in the main body of the digest, however, we consider it important to address it separately, as it appears in various peace plans discussed in recent months between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia. The issue concerns the so-called “divided operation” of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, sometimes described as a “50–50” scheme.

From a nuclear safety perspective, such an approach appears highly problematic and virtually unacceptable.

First and foremost, the Zaporizhzhia NPP was originally designed and has always been operated as an integrated technical complex. A substantial portion of the plant infrastructure – including power supply, cooling, control, and safety systems – is shared across all power units. Any attempt to “divide” the plant administratively or technically would inevitably either degrade the level of safety or prove fundamentally unworkable in practice.

Additional risks stem from the fact that the Ukrainian and Russian power systems operate in different synchronous zones. The Ukrainian system is synchronized with the European ENTSO-E, while the Russian power system operates separately. These systems cannot be directly interconnected. Under a divided-operation arrangement, this would deprive the plant of mutual backup: an accident or loss of off-site power supply in one part of the plant could not be compensated by the other.

Equally serious are issues of governance and responsibility. It remains unclear who would issue key commands on the plant site and on what legal basis, how coordination among personnel would be organized in emergency situations, and which regulator would be responsible for ensuring compliance with nuclear safety and radiation protection requirements. Staffing conditions constitute an additional risk factor: the language barrier, the fragmentation of professional teams, and the replacement of operating documentation, which prior to the occupation had been maintained in Ukrainian and was subsequently translated into Russian by the Russian side.

A separate and fundamentally important issue concerns nuclear materials. Nuclear fuel must have a clearly defined legal owner who bears responsibility for compliance with the non-proliferation regime. In the case of a “divided” plant, the legal status of the fuel remains unclear, including fuel of Western origin, particularly Westinghouse fuel.

Against this backdrop, risks of sabotage, diversion, or terrorist threats also cannot be ruled out, given the persistently hostile relations and the ongoing armed conflict.

Beyond the technical aspects, there is also a serious political risk: the very logic of “dividing” the plant effectively normalizes a situation in which a seized nuclear facility becomes an object of bargaining and can be used in the interests of the occupying power. This creates a dangerous international precedent, first and foremost from the perspective of global nuclear safety.

It should also be emphasized that any “50–50” scenarios in practice imply preparations for restarting the reactors. Under conditions of occupation and ongoing hostilities, this would sharply increase the likelihood of a severe accident and reduce response times to a matter of hours. Such a restart would pose a threat not only to Ukraine, but also to neighboring European countries.

From a safety perspective, the most acceptable short-term option remains to keep the plant in a shutdown state until active hostilities have ceased, along with the establishment of at least a minimal security regime around the Zaporizhzhia NPP. This would include a halt to military activity in the vicinity of the site and expanded monitoring capabilities for the IAEA.

In the long term, the only sustainable solution is the return of the Zaporizhzhia NPP to full Ukrainian control through diplomatic means – either directly or with the involvement of international intermediaries, including the IAEA or third countries. Only after that would it be possible to objectively assess the condition of the plant and decide on its future – restoration, restart, or decommissioning.

Alternative scenarios – including the establishment of a deep demilitarized zone, the temporary transfer of management to a third party, or even the decommissioning of the plant with the removal of nuclear and radioactive materials – are theoretically conceivable but extremely difficult to implement.

The inability to return the ZNPP to lawful control would entail further erosion of international norms for the protection of nuclear facilities and control over nuclear materials. In the context of European security, agreeing to place part of the ZNPP under the control of Russia would leave it with dangerous levers of pressure and future threats.»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Sweden’s Parliament Approves Lifting the Ban on Uranium Mining ↑

On November 5, Sweden’s parliament (the Riksdag) voted to lift the ban on uranium exploration and mining that had been in place since 2018. The legislative changes will enter into force on January 1, 2026. Uranium will be classified as a concession mineral, that is a mineral which is especially useful for society.

According to estimates by the Geological Survey of Sweden, approximately 27% of Europe’s known uranium resources are concentrated in the country’s bedrock.

At least two companies are ready to begin exploration activities. Aura Energy (Australia) and District Metals (Canada) hold projects in Sweden under which significant volumes of uranium in the form of triuranium octoxide (U₃O₈) are being assessed as potentially recoverable as part of co-product mining. The Häggån project includes about 363,000 metric tonnes of U₃O₈ contained in vanadium ores, while Viken comprises approximately 79,800 metric tonnes of U₃O₈ contained in polymetallic ores confirmed by geological data, as well as a further roughly 698,500 metric tonnes of U₃O₈ that have been preliminarily estimated and require additional exploration.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The renewed interest in nuclear power in recent years in a number of European Union countries, combined with the need to diversify supply chains, has revived attention to uranium mining – an industry that had previously been phased out within the EU. As of 2024, EU member states are 100% dependent on external supplies of natural uranium. Historically, in the second half of the 20th century, the largest uranium producers within the EU were the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, and Romania; however, these countries shut down their mines due either to resource depletion or to a lack of economic competitiveness compared with cheaper uranium production in Canada, Australia, or Kazakhstan.

Sweden has had a very limited history of uranium mining: in the 1960s, total production amounted to only about 200 metric tonnes, while the country’s current annual demand is on the order of 1,000 metric tonnes of natural uranium and is fully met through imports.

Based on the figures cited, Sweden appears to possess uranium resources that could theoretically fully cover domestic demand for many decades. In practice, however, extraction may be constrained by low uranium grades in the host rocks, stringent environmental requirements, and lengthy permitting procedures.»

New US–Hungary Nuclear Agreements: Memorandum of Understanding, Fuel for Paks NPP, and Sanctions Relief for the Paks II Project ↑

On November 7, following a bilateral meeting between Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and US President Donald Trump in Washington, it was announced that Hungary and the US had signed a Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear energy. According to the US side, the Memorandum signals an intention to begin negotiations to facilitate cooperation across the civil nuclear industry, including small modular reactors (SMRs) and spent fuel storage facilities.

It was also announced that a contract worth approximately $114 million had been concluded between Hungary’s MVM Group and the US company Westinghouse for the supply of fuel for Paks I, which operates VVER-440 reactors.

Subject to licensing approval, fuel deliveries are expected to begin in 2028. Tarik Choho, President of Westinghouse Nuclear Fuel, stated that, with this contract, Westinghouse now serves all VVER operators in Europe and in Ukraine, thereby enhancing the reliability of fuel supplies.

As noted by Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó, the fuel contract with Westinghouse will complement existing Russian fuel supplies for Paks I. From 2027, Hungary also plans to receive VVER-440 fuel manufactured by the French company Framatome.

In addition, following the meeting with the US President, Viktor Orbán stated that an agreement had been reached to fully lift all US sanctions affecting the construction of Paks II, for which the United States had previously granted only temporary exemptions.

Subsequently, on November 21, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a general license authorizing certain transactions necessary for the implementation of the Paks II project for a specified group of Russian banks.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Hungary remains one of the key countries blocking EU efforts to impose sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector. It is the only EU member state where Rosatom is implementing a project to build a new nuclear power plant, and one of five EU countries that purchase Russian nuclear fuel for VVER reactors at operating facilities. Nevertheless, even Hungary, under pressure from the EU and the US, has moved toward a gradual, time-deferred diversification of nuclear fuel supplies.

For the US and the Trump administration, such pressure may be driven to a significant extent by the interests of Westinghouse, whose main assets are located in the US. As a result, the company has secured contracts with all five EU countries operating VVER reactors.

Thus, the interests of US business play an important role for the current US administration – possibly a more significant one than politically motivated pressure on Russia and efforts to compel it to end the war against Ukraine.

In this context, the lifting of restrictions on the Paks II project may be viewed as a bargaining chip in negotiations – one that costs the US nothing. At the same time, it is precisely the interests of American business that may prompt the Trump administration to adhere to its predecessor’s course and refrain from revising the ban already introduced on purchases of Russian enriched uranium by US NPP operators starting in 2028.

For intra-European discussions, however, the situation is unlikely to change substantially. On the one hand, contracts with Westinghouse and Framatome remove one of Hungary’s key arguments against sanctions on Rosatom – concerns over energy security. On the other hand, these contracts do not imply a full replacement of Russian fuel and, in practice, can only supplement existing supplies: a contract worth $114 million roughly corresponds to the cost of one year’s fuel procurement for the operating Paks I plant with its four VVER-440 reactors, or to fuel for a single reactor for four years of operation.

Moreover, the Paks II project is not only being preserved but is also receiving additional political backing due to the lifting of US restrictions. This may give some EU countries grounds to argue that, if the US is making exceptions for Rosatom projects, similar exceptions could also be justified on their part.»

Kazakhstan Revises the Terms for Foreign Companies’ Participation in Uranium Mining ↑

In November, the Mazhilis of the Parliament of Kazakhstan adopted the law “On Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Subsoil and Subsoil Use’ regarding the improvement of subsoil use in the hydrocarbon and uranium sectors”. On December 4, the proposed amendments were approved by the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan.

In the uranium mining sector, the amendments are intended to strengthen the role of the national uranium mining company Kazatomprom. In particular, the article governing the granting of uranium subsoil use rights to Kazatomprom through direct negotiations proposes increasing its minimum ownership interest in the relevant legal entity from 50% to 75%.

The law also revises the conditions for extending uranium production contracts. Under the amendments, a subsoil use agreement may be extended only if it incorporates one of two mandatory conditions.

Under the first condition, Kazatomprom’s ownership interest in the authorized capital of the joint venture must be at least 90%.

The second condition requires the foreign partner in the joint venture to transfer to Kazatomprom, or to a jointly established legal entity, uranium conversion and enrichment technologies. This includes the construction of a plant and a guaranteed off-take contract for at least 50% of the plant’s output for the entire duration of the uranium production extension.

In addition, the right to conduct additional exploration at producing uranium deposits, aimed at refining geological structure and reserve estimates, is to be reserved for Kazatomprom or entities in which it holds at least a 90% ownership interest.

Commenting on the proposed amendments to the Kursiv publication, Meirzhan Yussupov, CEO of Kazatomprom, noted that not all of the company’s foreign partners are “enthusiastic about this initiative,” citing Orano in particular. At the same time, he expressed hope that they would approach the forthcoming changes with understanding.

The article also provides information on joint uranium mining ventures and the expiration dates of their subsoil use agreements. It notes that, in the near term – in 2028 – the subsoil use agreement for the Zarechnoye joint venture is set to expire; Kazatomprom holds a 49.98% stake, while another 49.98% is owned by the Chinese company SNURDC.

In addition, subsoil use agreements for two deposits developed by the Southern Mining and Chemical Company joint venture are due to expire in 2026 and 2029. Kazatomprom holds a 30% stake in this venture, while 70% is owned by Uranium One of the Russian state corporation Rosatom.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The proposed legislative changes to subsoil use conditions fit logically into Kazakhstan’s long-term strategy for developing and diversifying its nuclear sector. While remaining the world’s largest exporter of natural uranium, the country is simultaneously focusing on expanding its domestic nuclear fuel cycle – from raw material extraction to deeper processing and fuel use.

In addition to uranium mining, Kazakhstan already has uranium conversion capacity and a nuclear fuel fabrication facility. Uranium enrichment technologies are virtually the only missing link in this chain. The new legislative requirements are effectively aimed at removing this “bottleneck” by attracting foreign technologies and capital, but on terms that ensure control by the national operator.

Several years ago, when discussing the prospects for building a nuclear power plant, Kazakhstan’s authorities emphasized that they expected prospective partners not only to construct the plant itself, but also to provide access to critical elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This, in turn, would allow a greater share of the plant’s needs to be met domestically and would expand opportunities for exports.

In this context, the choice of Russia and China as contractors for the first nuclear power plants may from the outset have implied deeper technological cooperation, including the localization of certain stages of the fuel cycle. Both countries are heavily dependent on Kazakhstan’s resource base and are interested in maintaining access to it, which increases the likelihood of compromises including in the form of joint projects in uranium conversion and, potentially, enrichment.

Accordingly, there is a high likelihood that Russia could agree to establish a uranium enrichment joint venture in Kazakhstan based on its own technology. To date, Russia has officially transferred uranium enrichment technologies and equipment only to China, which makes the Kazakh case particularly illustrative. If such projects are implemented, this would set an important precedent not only for bilateral relations but also for the global nuclear market, as the transfer of enrichment technologies to a non-nuclear-weapon state directly raises sensitive nuclear non-proliferation concerns.

Separate attention should also be paid to the policy of partner diversification. Kazakhstan’s uranium sector already includes companies from Canada, France, China, and Russia; in fuel fabrication, French and Chinese partners are involved; and in nuclear power plant construction, two states are participating whose companies are set to lead international consortia. Amid high geopolitical uncertainty, such a multi-vector approach across virtually all segments of the sector appears more pragmatic than reliance on a single strategic partner. Even given Kazakhstan’s objective economic and geographic proximity to Russia and China, the presence of alternatives provides Kazakhstan with additional room to maneuver and strengthens its negotiating position.»

Belarus Plans Construction of a Third Unit at the Ostrovets NPP ↑

On November 14, Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Karankevich announced that the government had decided to proceed with the construction of a third unit at the Ostrovets NPP. In parallel, work will be carried out to assess potential sites in the Mogilev region for the possible construction of a second nuclear power plant, depending on future growth in electricity demand in the country.

At present, the Ostrovets NPP operates two VVER-1200 units with a combined capacity of 2.4 GW, which were commissioned in 2020 and 2023, respectively. Nuclear power accounts for approximately 40% of the country’s electricity mix.

Rosatom and Vietnam: Fuel Supply for a Research Reactor and Environmental Cooperation ↑

On November 11, Rosatom reported that, as part of the Russia–Vietnam Interdepartmental Roadmap for Developing Nuclear Technologies up to 2030, TVEL had fulfilled a contract for the supply of nuclear fuel to Vietnam for the research reactor in Da Lat.

The reactor, reconstructed under a Soviet design on the site of an American-designed TRIGA Mark II reactor that was shut down in the early 1970s, has been in operation since 1984. The facility is used for radioisotope production, activation analysis, scientific research, as well as for the training and professional development of specialists.

The previous supply of Russian fuel for the Da Lat reactor was completed in December 2010. Unlike nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel for research reactors is supplied on an irregular basis and is typically delivered in quantities sufficient for extended periods of operation.

On November 26, a trilateral agreement was signed between Rosatom enterprises Federal Environmental Operator and Rosatom Environmental Integrator, on the Russian side, and the Science and Technology Development Fund of the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology. The agreement is aimed at developing long-term cooperation in the fields of environmental safety, hazardous waste management, and the remediation of accumulated environmental damage.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Sixth serial Project 22220 nuclear-powered icebreaker laid down at the Baltic Shipyard ↑

On November 18, a keel-laying ceremony took place at the Baltic Shipyard (St. Petersburg) for the sixth serial Project 22220 universal nuclear-powered icebreaker, Stalingrad. The icebreaker Stalingrad is scheduled for delivery to the customer in 2030.

Construction of the Project 22220 icebreakers Chukotka and Leningrad is also continuing at the Baltic Shipyard, with the latter laid down on the slipway in January 2024. According to Andrey Puchkov, CEO of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, work is proceeding on schedule, with the fourth and fifth universal nuclear-powered icebreakers planned for delivery in December 2026 and December 2028, respectively.

Rosatom’s Projects Abroad in Brief ↑

Paks II NPP, Hungary. On November 4, Hungary’s nuclear regulator (OAH) issued construction licenses for three buildings at Unit 5 of the Paks II NPP, as well as licenses for partial commissioning related to ground-strengthening works for the Unit 5 nuclear island.

Obtaining these licenses is described as an important step toward starting concreting works, including the construction of the foundation slab of the Unit 5 nuclear island. Pouring of the “first concrete” is expected in February 2026.

El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On November 19, the reactor vessel of Unit 1 was installed in its design position at the El Dabaa NPP.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On November 12, the reactor vessel for Unit 4 was delivered to the Akkuyu NPP construction site. The shipment also included the transport airlock for Unit 3 and the pressurizer for Unit 4.