Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for October can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of Shipping News on the NSR in November
2. Ice conditions along the Northern Sea Route during the 2025 summer–autumn navigation
3. Results of transit navigation along the Northern Sea Route in 2025
4. Results of oil shipments along the Northern Sea Route
5. Shipbuilding news
5.1. Sovcomflot has taken delivery of the tanker Ivan Aivazovsky
5.2. The nuclear-powered icebreaker Stalingrad of Project 22220 has been laid down
6. Putin orders the development of the fleet and logistics for the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor
7. Russia has withdrawn from the agreement with the countries of the Euro-Arctic region on joint emergency response
8. The Ministry of Emergency Situations is opening a second Arctic integrated emergency response and rescue center in Sabetta, a key hub of the Northern Sea Route

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
9. Ukraine has imposed sanctions on Russian organizations involved in resource extraction in the Arctic
10. Canada has imposed sanctions on the Arctic LNG 2 project and on vessels belonging to the shadow fleet
11. The United Kingdom introduces a ban on maritime transport of Russian LNG
12. Germany’s Ministry for Economic Affairs demanded that SEFE terminate its long-term contract for the supply of Russian LNG with Yamal LNG
13. Russian shadow LNG tankers have stepped up activity in Arctic waters off Norway
14. The absence of transshipment at Kildin creates risks for Yamal LNG’s winter logistics

Commentary by Bellona

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
15. Rosneft reported on the results of the Vostok Oil project implementation on the Taimyr Peninsula for the first nine months of 2025

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
16. Thawing of permafrost may lead to mercury contamination
17. Approaching seal haul-out sites by vessel closer than 500 meters may pose a threat to their populations
18. Temperatures in Norway have remained above normal for 18 consecutive months
19. A new study on the link between sea ice melt and the strengthening of polar ocean currents has been published

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS
20. In 2025, 100 shadow fleet vessels transited the Northern Sea Route

Northern Sea Route and shipping

Overview of Shipping News on the NSR in November ↑

In November, the summer–autumn navigation season on the Northern Sea Route came to an end. On November 17 the last transit vessel left the route—the oil tanker Vladimir Rusanov. On November 20, navigation was closed at the port of Anadyr in Chukotka. From November 24, the port of Sabetta tightened ice navigation requirements, introducing mandatory icebreaker escorts for vessels of Ice3 ice class and banning operations for ships with a lower ice class.

In November, Rosatom reported the early completion of the Northern Supplies program to Chukotka. Under a pilot project to supply remote regions with fuel, food, and medicines, 152.44 thousand tons of petroleum products and 6.77 thousand tons of containerized cargo were delivered to the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. Starting in early 2026, Rosatom Arctic JSC will officially become the single maritime operator for the Northern Supply program, and the mechanism tested in Chukotka is planned to be extended to other Arctic regions of Russia.

On November 14, the Federal Customs Service reported the dispatch of the last container ships of 2025 along the “Arctic Express No. 1” route via the Northern Sea Route, without specifying the vessels’ names. According to the agency, the ships departed from Arkhangelsk to China carrying sawn timber, pulp and paper products, and nickel concentrate.

At the same time, customs data diverge from information provided by other specialized sources. In its review, the Center for High North Logistics (CHNL) recorded no container vessels on the Northern Sea Route on that date, despite the data covering navigation through the end of November. The outlet gCaptain, for its part, reports that the last transit voyage along the Northern Sea Route in 2025 took place on October 30, when the Chinese container ship Xin Xin Tian 2, which is also not included in the CHNL review, departed from Shanghai bound for Kaliningrad.

In November, several tankers encountered difficulties transiting the Northern Sea Route due to challenging ice conditions. This affected the Russian LNG tankers Buran and Voskhod, which serve Novatek’s Arctic LNG-2 project and are part of the shadow fleet.

On October 29, Buran reached the Northern Sea Route north of the Bering Strait, where it encountered ice. For several days, the tanker probed the ice edge in the Chukchi Sea in search of a passage. On November 14, Buran arrived at the port of Utrenny on the Gydan Peninsula to load LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project, after which it headed to China via the Northern Sea Route.

According to the Neftegaz portal, a similar situation—though on the western side of the East Siberian Sea—was faced by the gas carrier Voskhod. Both vessels, which have Arc4 ice class, spent about a week searching for a passage through the ice before proceeding under escort by nuclear-powered icebreakers. According to Reuters, the gas carrier Voskhodtransited the Northern Sea Route and unloaded at the port of Teshan on November 21.

The dry cargo vessel Ostrov Antsiferova encountered a dense ice barrier in the Anadyr Estuary, which for nearly a week prevented it from approaching the berth at the Anadyr seaport. On November 2, the vessel was able to berth with the assistance of the more powerful tanker Kilikia, which has Arc5 ice class.

Challenging ice conditions disrupted operations at the port of Pevek: in early November, nine vessels were waiting at anchorage for unloading, and the order in which they were handled had to be changed. Under conditions of fast ice and drifting ice, vessels with bulbous bows are given priority, as it is more difficult for them to sail in ice and generally possible only under icebreaker escort.

Ice conditions along the Northern Sea Route during the 2025 summer–autumn navigation ↑

Ice conditions during the 2025 summer–autumn navigation period varied significantly across different areas. According to the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, first-year ice and elevated air temperatures prevailed in the Arctic Ocean this year, particularly in the Barents and Kara seas.

The Center for High North Logistics notes that the open-water period lasted no more than two weeks, from late September to early October. The eastern section of the route remained difficult for navigation, particularly the East Siberian Sea, where ice persisted for most of the navigation season. In September, the onset of ice formation was earlier and more intense.

Results of transit navigation along the Northern Sea Route in 2025 ↑

The Center for High North Logistics published a review of the results of transit navigation along the Northern Sea Route in 2025, which lasted from June 30 to November 17. The review provides an indicative assessment and covers only voyages that crossed both boundaries of the Northern Sea Route without calling at ports. Some shipments, including container cargo, may not have been included in the sample due to a lack of information. At the same time, CHNL’s estimate of total transit cargo volumes is generally close to the official figures. According to a statement by Rosatom made in November, the total volume of transit shipments along the Northern Sea Route in 2025 reached 3.2 million tons.

During the navigation period, 103 transit voyages were recorded, carried out by 88 unique vessels. Some ships completed two voyages. Oil tankers accounted for the largest number of voyages, with 34. Bulk carriers made 23 voyages, container ships 15, general cargo vessels 12, and gas carriers 5.

Compared to 2024, the number of transit voyages increased by approximately 6.2%, while the volume of transported cargo grew by 3.2%. Crude oil remains the dominant cargo on transit routes along the Northern Sea Route. Container shipping showed growth in 2025, with most voyages carried out between Russian and Chinese ports.

For the first time since the pre-war period, an international transit voyage along the Northern Sea Route was also completed. In late September, the vessel Istanbul Bridge departed from the port of Ningbo–Zhoushan and, sailing without icebreaker escort, arrived at a port Felixstowe in the United Kingdom on October 14.

According to the North-Western Customs Administration, more than 300,000 tons of cargo were cleared in the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk during the summer–autumn season, including general and container shipments from China, Korea, and Turkey. Three vessels carrying general cargo arrived in Murmansk, part of which was redirected to Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg. Two container ships from China arrived in Arkhangelsk with spare parts and components for automobile assembly.

Results of Oil shipments along the Northern Sea Route ↑

According to Kommersant, oil shipments along the Northern Sea Route during the summer–autumn navigation season of 2025 did not show the expected growth. The total volume of crude oil transported eastbound via the Northern Sea Route decreased by 4.2%, from 1.91 million tons in 2024 to 1.83 million tons in 2025. Oil exports via the Northern Sea Route still account for less than 1% of Russia’s total oil exports. Experts interviewed by Kommersant said that no significant increase in shipments along the Northern Sea Route should be expected in 2026 either.

The main shipments were carried out via the ports of Murmansk and the Baltic Sea. For the first time, a tanker cargo of Arctic crude oil was shipped from the Novoportovskoye field on the Yamal Peninsula to Brunei. China and South Korea remain the main export destinations.

Shipbuilding news

Sovcomflot has taken delivery of the tanker Ivan Aivazovsky ↑

Sovcomflot reported that it has taken into operation the tanker Ivan Aivazovsky, built at the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex. The vessel is the lead ship in a new series of tankers designed to transport petroleum products. According to vessel tracking services, in late November the tanker Ivan Aivazovsky was located in the Far East region.

The MR-type tanker has a deadweight of 49.8 thousand tons, a length of 183 m, a beam of 32.2 m, a draft of 13.4 m, and an ice class of 1B. It is the first dual-fuel tanker of this class built in Russia, designed to transport petroleum products, including in ice conditions. The vessel’s power plant allows the use of LNG as the primary fuel.

The tanker Ivan Aivazovsky (IMO 9876359) was added to the U.S. sanctions list on January 10, and on September 12 it was placed under UK sanctions as a vessel linked to Sovcomflot.

Previously, Sovcomflot had already operated dual-fuel vessels built outside Russia. In 2019, the company took into operation three Aframax crude oil tankers—Prospekt Koroleva, Prospekt Vernadskogo, and Prospekt Samuela—built at the Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries shipyard in South Korea.

The nuclear-powered icebreaker Stalingrad of Project 22220 has been laid down ↑

On November 18, construction of the new universal nuclear-powered icebreaker Stalingrad began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The vessel will become the sixth serial icebreaker of Project 22220, following Arktika, Sibir, Ural, Yakutia, Chukotka, and Leningrad.

Project 22220 icebreakers are designed for operations in the Arctic and can operate effectively both in deep Arctic waters and in the shallow estuaries of Siberian rivers thanks to their dual-draught design. The new-generation icebreakers are capable of breaking ice up to 3 meters thick and are equipped with two RITM-200 nuclear reactors, each with a thermal capacity of 175 MW.

Putin orders the development of the fleet and logistics for the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor ↑

On November 1, a list of instructions issued by the President of the Russian Federation following the Eastern Economic Forum held on September 5, 2025 was published. Of the 31 items, two (3a and 3b) directly concern the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor—a route from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok via the Northern Sea Route.

The government has been instructed, by February 15 2026, to prepare proposals for developing domestic competencies for the construction of container ships, bulk carriers, gas carriers, supply vessels, as well as dredging and tug fleets required for operations in the waters of the corridor. It has also been tasked with improving the efficiency of cargo deliveries from the Ural, Siberian, and Far Eastern federal districts, including through the possible use of the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena river basins. The responsible official is Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

Russia has withdrawn from the agreement with the countries of the Euro-Arctic region on joint emergency response ↑

In November, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the termination of the 2008 agreement between Russia, Norway, Finland, and Sweden on cooperation in the field of prevention, preparedness, and response to emergencies. This step implemented a Russian government order issued in April, which we covered in the April digest.

According to Barents Observer, nine joint search-and-rescue exercises were conducted during the period of Barents cooperation. The most recent took place in 2019. The tenth exercise was planned for September 2022 in Bodø (Norway) but was cancelled amid the breakdown of cooperation. Russia retains a bilateral agreement with Norway on search and rescue operations in the Barents Sea; however, no joint exercises in the area of the maritime border have been held since 2022.

The Ministry of Emergency Situations is opening a second Arctic integrated emergency response and rescue center in Sabetta, a key hub of the Northern Sea Route ↑

The press service of the Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that the Arctic rescue center of the EMERCOM of Russia in Sabetta will officially begin operations in March 2026, with rescue personnel starting work from early January. Work is also underway to establish an aviation rescue unit based on two Mi-38PS helicopters.

The center was built by EMERCOM of Russia in cooperation with Novatek and is being transferred to the ministry free of charge as part of a public–private partnership. Initially, it had been expected to be completed by December 2024.

The Sabetta center became the second of four planned rescue facilities. In the summer of 2024, a similar center was opened in Pevek, and two more are planned for construction in Dikson and Tiksi. The establishment of these facilities is предусмотрено by the development plan for the Northern Sea Route through 2035, which stipulates that all four centers are to be built by the end of 2025.

Commentary by Bellona:

«With the end of the summer–autumn navigation season at all Northern Sea Route ports, analysts are already summing up the results of this year’s NSR transit navigation and making forecasts for total annual cargo turnover. Despite the fact that all assessments point to a slight increase in transit shipments and an unchanged overall cargo flow for the year (according to Rosatom’s estimates, cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2025 will remain at 37.9 million tons, while transit will grow by 3.8% to 3.2 million tons), it has become noticeable that verifying these figures and tracking shipping along the NSR has become more difficult this year.

First, the number of vessels from Russia’s shadow fleet operating on the Northern Sea Route has increased almost eightfold compared to 2024. These ships frequently change flags and ownership and at times switch off their Automatic Identification System (AIS), making it impossible to fully track their routes.

Second, the NSR Administration has begun actively concealing data: it does not publish permits for passage along the Northern Sea Route for some shadow fleet vessels in the open register, has removed information from its website about the current positions of ships on the NSR, and has stopped including information on accidents and incidents in its public annual report.

As a result, various media outlets and analytical centers publish figures on the number of transit voyages that differ from source to source and are difficult to verify. For example, the latest voyage of a Chinese vessel from Arkhangelsk, which Russian officials publicly celebrated, was not recorded by either the Northern Logistics Center or international media.

As for the structure of cargo transportation, it is worth noting that while transit shipments by dry cargo vessels have increased, the volume of oil transported along the NSR has declined slightly, that can reduce the risk of oil pollution. However, given the large number of shadow oil tankers, on the country, may lead to an increased risk of accidents.

In addition to sanctions on new Arctic resource extraction projects—whose oil and gas shipments were expected to sharply increase cargo turnover along the NSR—Russian Arctic shipping continues to face difficulties in shipbuilding. International sanctions prevent vessels from being built abroad, as was previously the case, while Russian shipyards are unable to supply all the components required for complex Arctic-class ships. Thus, construction of the dual-fuel oil tanker Ivan Aivazovsky, commissioned in November, began back in 2021, with most components supplied by a Korean shipyard. It remains unclear whether Zvezda will be able to complete the construction of two more tankers of the same type on its own (and whether the Korean yard managed to deliver all components), either independently or in cooperation with Chinese shipyards.»

The international situation in the Arctic and sanctions on Russia’s activities in the Arctic region

Ukraine has imposed sanctions on Russian organizations involved in resource extraction in the Arctic ↑

On November 6, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree introducing restrictions against Russian companies involved in the extraction and export of resources in the Arctic. Ukraine expects that the sanctions imposed on Russia will be taken into account by its partners and will form the basis for new international sanctions packages. Those sanctioned include:

• Companies involved in natural resource extraction and infrastructure construction in Russia’s Arctic zone (AZRF), including Vankorneft, Taimyrneftegaz, Norilsk Nickel, Velesstroy, Yamaltransstroy, the VIS Group, and Burenergo.
• The Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex (the United States imposed sanctions on the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex in February 2024, and the EU did so in October 2025).
• State-owned entities such as the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation (the United States imposed sanctions on the FEFC in February 2024) and the Murmansk Region Development Corporation.
• Organizations carrying out geological surveys, scientific research, and engineering design for the implementation of Arctic projects, including NPO Arktikpromizyskaniya, the Arctic Laboratory Center, and the Gipronickel Institute.

Canada has imposed sanctions on the Arctic LNG 2 project and on vessels belonging to the shadow fleet ↑

On November 12, Canada announced another package of sanctions against Russia, targeting 13 individuals and 11 legal entities. The measures are aimed at reducing revenues from energy exports and strengthening oversight of the shadow fleet. These sanctions are coordinated with the European Union and other partners.

The sanctions list includes Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project, as well as the company’s CEO, Oleg Karpushin.

The restrictions also cover around 100 vessels which, according to Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are part of the so-called shadow fleet. Some of these vessels received permits to transit the Northern Sea Route in 2025:

• IMO 9171175 (Cilicia), Oil Products Tanker
• IMO 9183831 (Np Dudinka), Chemical/Products Tanker
• IMO 9255270 (Np Dikson), Chemical/Products Tanker
• IMO 9256078 (Liteyny Prospect), Oil Tanker
• IMO 9385142 (Almond), Chemical/Products Tanker
• IMO 9397547 (Ariadne), Chemical/Products Tanker
• IMO 9842190 (Akademik Gubkin), Oil Tanker

The United Kingdom introduces a ban on maritime transport of Russian LNG ↑

On November 12, the United Kingdom announced a ban on the transportation of Russian LNG by vessels and services linked to the UK. The restrictions will be introduced in stages throughout 2026, in close coordination with European partners. The measure is intended to prohibit UK-linked companies from transporting Russian gas and from providing related maritime services to vessels, such as insurance or technical maintenance.

The ban became a logical continuation of the UK’s sanctions policy. As early as January 2023, the country was among the first to introduce a ban on imports of Russian LNG.

The UK ban creates serious risks for the logistics of the Yamal LNG project. The British company Seapeak Maritime, which operates six Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers, will lose the ability to transport Russian LNG and to use UK-based insurance. These vessels are under long-term charter to the Yamal LNG project until 2045. As a result, Novatek will be forced either to seek alternative Arc7-class vessels, which are in short supply, or to expand the use of conventional LNG carriers.

Germany’s Ministry for Economic Affairs demanded that SEFE terminate its long-term contract for the supply of Russian LNG with Yamal LNG ↑

Germany’s Ministry for Economic Affairs believes that the REPowerEU program and the 19th sanctions package give SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe GmbH) a legal basis to terminate its long-term supply contract with Yamal LNG by invoking force majeure, Bloomberg reports.

SEFE may terminate the contract by January 2027, when the EU ban on imports of Russian LNG is expected to enter into force. The agreement, which runs until 2040, provided for annual deliveries of 2.9 million tons of LNG. Invoking force majeure would allow SEFE to exit the contract without paying penalties of €10 billion.

SEFE had previously already faced criticism over its continued purchases of Russian LNG. In 2024, the company became one of the largest buyers, acquiring 58 LNG cargoes with a total volume of about 5.7 billion cubic metres—approximately 6.5 times the 2023 level. The ability to stop purchases was limited by the terms of a long-term take-or-pay contract, which obliged SEFE to pay for the agreed volumes regardless of actual imports. In the event of refusing to take delivery of the gas, SEFE would still have had to pay the contractual volumes, while Russia could resell the LNG to other buyers, effectively resulting in Russia receiving export revenues twice.

Russian shadow LNG tankers have stepped up activity in Arctic waters off Norway ↑

High North News reports that in November Russian shadow LNG tankers returned to the Norwegian and Barents seas.

In November, the LNG carrier Zarya, loaded with LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project, twice sailed along Norway’s northern coast. On November 1, it departed from the Gydan Peninsula and, after sailing along the Norwegian coast, returned to Murmansk. On November 11, it repeated the same route and then headed to China.

Other LNG carriers are also heading to the Russian Arctic via Norway, including Arctic Metagaz and La Perouse, while Arctic Mulan and Buran are also expected. All of these vessels are under sanctions; some lack an ice class and are therefore forced to operate in the Barents Sea, while questions regarding their insurance coverage remain unclear.

In August, Norway announced the launch of inspections of “shadow fleet” vessels, under which it requests insurance information from oil tankers; however, these measures do not apply to Russian LNG carriers.

The problem of insufficient insurance is systemic in nature. In 2025, Norway’s state broadcaster NRK identified more than 100 vessels that had passed through Norwegian waters without valid insurance.

The absence of transshipment at Kildin creates risks for Yamal LNG’s winter logistics ↑

Kommersant notes that Novatek’s Yamal LNG project has not begun ship-to-ship LNG transshipment in the area of Kildin Island, although after such operations were banned in Europe it had been expected that the company would start using Kildin as early as October–November. Instead, Arc4 ice-class tankers continue to sail directly to Sabetta under icebreaker escort. For example, the Arc4 tanker Clean Vision was loaded in Sabetta on November 10, while Clean Planet was loaded on November 8.

The outlet notes that the situation appears atypical for the start of the winter season and may point to hidden logistical problems. There are no formal sanctions restrictions on the transshipment complex, but shipowners may be acting cautiously due to the risk of secondary sanctions.

So far, the absence of transshipment has not affected shipment volumes, but in December ice conditions may make Arc4 calls at Sabetta impossible even with icebreaker support.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Summing up the preliminary results of the impact of international sanctions on Russia’s economic activity in the Arctic, it can be said that sanctions are negatively affecting the key development indicator of the Northern Sea Route—cargo turnover. In 2025, it is most likely to remain at the same level as in 2024.

At the same time, the number of shadow fleet vessels operating on the Northern Sea Route is increasing, primarily because ships that traditionally sailed along the NSR are being added to sanctions lists. In addition, the number of sanctioned tankers with no or low ice class that had not previously operated on the NSR has also increased.

However, sanctions against Yamal LNG, which accounts for roughly half of the Northern Sea Route’s cargo turnover, have still not been imposed. The EU’s latest decisions to halt imports of Russian LNG from 2027 continue to allow exemptions for importing countries that are not fully prepared to phase out these supplies.

In this situation, UK sanctions prohibiting British companies from participating in LNG exports from Yamal will complicate gas transportation to Europe, potentially increasing logistics costs and reducing Novatek’s profitability. This is particularly relevant given that difficulties are already apparent, as the company began using tankers with a low ice class to sail to Sabetta in November after the end of the summer–autumn navigation season.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Rosneft reported on the results of the Vostok Oil project implementation on the Taimyr Peninsula for the first nine months of 2025 ↑

According to Rosneft’s 2025 performance report, since January the Vostok Oil project has completed 1,200 linear kilometers of seismic surveys. Pilot industrial development of the Payakhskoye and Ichemminskoye fields is ongoing. Drilling of 19 production wells has been completed, with a total drilled footage of 101,000 meters. Trial oil production is underway, with oil transported by road during the winter period from the Payakhskoye field to the Suzunskoye field.

Construction of two cargo berths and a berth for the port fleet at the Port Bukhta Sever terminal is at the final stage. Construction of the first oil loading berth is ongoing, while work on the second has begun. Construction is underway on the oil custody transfer point “Port Bukhta Sever” and the oil pumping stations “Suzun” and “Payakha”.

At the same time, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin noted that during the reporting period the company operated “amid a deterioration in the macroeconomic environment, including falling prices against the backdrop of rising oil supply.”

As a reminder, in the previous digest we wrote that high-quality satellite images of the Taimyr Peninsula from August 2025 appeared on the Google Earth service, clearly showing tracks of heavily treaded vehicles along the entire route of the under-construction Vankor–Payakha–Sever Bay oil pipeline.

The use of treaded all-terrain vehicles in the tundra on Taimyr during the summer period leads to serious damage to the soil cover and is therefore directly prohibited by current Russian legislation, with the exception of search and rescue operations and activities aimed at preventing and eliminating emergency situations.

Environmental and climate issues in the Arctic

Thawing of permafrost may lead to mercury contamination ↑

Norwegian scientists warn that rapid warming in the Arctic, exceeding the global average by about four times, may lead to the release of mercury accumulated in permafrost, including one of its most dangerous forms for the environment and human health — methylmercury.

Methylmercury is a powerful neurotoxin for both animals and humans and is even more toxic than elemental mercury. Exposure to high levels of mercury can disrupt brain function and development, especially in young people. For example, in 2023 a direct link was established between mental health problems and high suicide rates in one Indigenous community in northern Canada and the regular consumption of fish contaminated with mercury.

Since the early 2000s, various rules, regulations, and bans have helped reduce anthropogenic mercury pollution; however, there are currently no measures in place to prevent mercury from entering the environment because of permafrost thawing.

The main natural source of mercury is mercury-bearing rocks. As a result of geological processes, such as volcanic activity or rock weathering, mercury can enter the environment, be transported over long distances, and accumulate, including within living organisms. In the latter case, when it binds with organic carbon, methylmercury is formed. In turn, permafrost, due to low temperatures, effectively preserves both plant and animal remains, including contaminated ones, as well as mercury and its compounds in other forms.

Previously, it was believed that permafrost thaw releases about 40 kg of mercury (including in the form of methylmercury) per 1 km². However, a study conducted last year by the University of Southern California showed that this figure is twice as high — about 86 kg of mercury per 1 km².

“Permafrost soil contains more mercury than all the other soil on the planet, plus all the oceans, plus the atmosphere,” warns Josh West, Professor of Earth Sciences and Environmental Studies at the University of Southern California.

Approaching seal haul-out sites by vessel closer than 500 meters may pose a threat to their populations ↑

Researchers from the Institute of Systematics and Ecology of Animals of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences published the results of surveys and observations of seabirds and marine mammals conducted in 2022 along the Dudinka–Murmansk section of the Northern Sea Route.

In particular, they found that vessels approaching seal haul-out sites closer than 500 meters may pose a threat to both pups and adult animals.

“Vessels are advised to avoid areas where seals concentrate on ice haul-outs and to keep a distance of more than 500 meters, especially in March–April, the breeding period for these animals. Newborn seal pups may end up under a vessel (during the nursing period they do not yet dive underwater), and adult animals may, out of fear, enter the water prematurely, which can critically increase energy expenditure and pose a threat to survival,” the authors of the study write.

The scientists also noted the need to reduce vessel lighting to the minimum necessary level, as it attracts birds at night. At the same time, deck lighting should be directed inward and downward. The researchers recorded how birds and animals reacted to the vessel itself — its noise and light exposure, which can temporarily blind them and lead to disorientation and collisions. Some birds, for example several species of large gulls, were instead attracted by the vessel and followed it.

The authors of the study emphasized that increasing cargo traffic and industrial activity in the Arctic, along with rapid climate change, have a serious impact on populations of marine mammals and birds, as well as on the stability of their food resources.

Temperatures in Norway have remained above normal for 18 consecutive months ↑

Such temperature anomalies were observed across the entire country, including its Arctic regions. The previous record, registered from February 2014 to April 2015, lasted 15 consecutive months.

A similar situation has developed this year in the Russian part of the Arctic as well. According to the Murmansk Department for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, the climatic autumn, which ended in October, was the warmest in the past 90 years of observations.

“According to preliminary data, the average temperature exceeded the climatic norm by 3.3°C. The previous autumn temperature record belonged to 2024,” the agency noted. At the same time, six of the ten highest autumn temperature values were recorded in the 21st century, the department emphasized.

A new study on the link between sea ice melt and the strengthening of polar ocean currents has been published ↑

A new study by a group of scientists from the Institute for Basic Science and Pusan National University (Republic of Korea), published in the journal Nature Climate Change, has shown that as Arctic and Antarctic sea ice melts, oceanic, or mesoscale, eddies also intensify — circular or spiral movements of water in the oceans formed under the influence of currents, wind, gravity, and other forces.

Mesoscale eddies play an important role in global ocean circulation by transporting heat and kinetic energy and influencing the biochemical characteristics of ocean basins. The presence of warm or cold ocean eddies also determines local coastal weather and affects climate.

Their shifts can affect marine ecosystems in unpredictable ways. For example, they may cause plankton to move out of their usual habitats in search of more favorable conditions, which in turn can seriously affect food chains.

In addition, increased mesoscale eddy activity may directly impact Arctic and Antarctic shipping by increasing the risk of accidents.

Recommended Publications

In 2025, 100 shadow fleet vessels transited the Northern Sea Route ↑

This is 87 more than a year earlier. While in 2024 six LNG carriers and seven oil tankers belonging to the shadow fleet were recorded on the route, in 2025 the number of such vessels reached 100 — or nearly one third of all cargo ships operating along this route.

At the same time, the average age of oil and petroleum product tankers is 13.4 years, and 21 of them are older than 15 years. Thirteen of these vessels either have no ice class at all or only a low ice class. At least one case is known in which a shadow fleet tanker without an ice class, loaded with oil, became stuck in the ice and had to wait several days for assistance. This refers to the tanker Lynx (IMO 9412347, flag — Oman, 14 years old) carrying 150,000 tons of oil.

Read more about shadow fleet vessels that transited the Northern Sea Route in 2025 and the associated environmental risks in a new analytical review on the Bellona website.