Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for September can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of Shipping News on the NSR in October
2. In October the Arctic LNG 2 project continued its LNG deliveries to China
3. The Ministry of Transport has proposed postponing until 2028 the restrictions on the use of foreign vessels for hydrocarbon shipments along the NSR
4. A deep-water port for the Northern Sea Route is planned for construction in Yakutia

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
5. The International Maritime Organization failed to reach agreement on adopting the Net-Zero Framework Programme and postponed the decision to 2026
6. In October, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union introduced new sanctions targeting Russia’s oil and gas sector
7. The EU Council has agreed on a position to phase out imports of Russian gas

Commentary by Bellona

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
8. New facilities at the Lavna coal transshipment complex have been commissioned in the Murmansk region. Construction of the complex is nearly complete
9. The Russian government has approved a comprehensive development plan for Vorkuta through 2035, with a total investment volume of 330 billion rubles
10. A new gold deposit is expected to begin operations next year in Yakutia’s Ust-Yansky District
11. Preparations for the launch of the Chernogorsk Mining and Processing Plant in Krasnoyarsk Krai are nearing completion

Commentary by Bellona

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
12. Satellite imagery has revealed violations during the construction of the oil pipeline for Rosneft’s Vostok Oil project
13. Melting sea ice in the Arctic is driving an increase in carbon-absorbing algae

ACCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of Shipping News on the NSR in October ↑

In October, summer–autumn navigation in the Arctic region came to an end, and several Arctic ports switched to winter operations. Glavsevmorput published a schedule of transit restrictions in Pevek for different vessel types starting in early October. In Khatanga, the season was closed on 10 October, with all navigation to the port fully suspended. In Dudinka, river navigation ended on 20 October, and winter ice restrictions were introduced in the seaport on 23 October. In Tiksi, navigation was suspended on 22 October due to persistent ice formation, while the closure of the Bykov Mys, Yana River estuary, and Zelyony Mys marine terminals was scheduled for 25 October. In Anadyr, the transition to winter operations began on 18 October, when the ice navigation period was declared, permitting only vessels with an Ice2 ice class or higher.

In October, FSUE Rosmorport approved the deployment plan for icebreakers for the 2025–2026 winter navigation season. Eight icebreakers will operate in the Arctic region: Dikson, Kapitan Evdokimov, Kapitan Chadaev, and Avraamiy Zavenyagin will be assigned to the White Sea, while Novorossiysk, Tor, and Pomor will operate in the port of Sabetta. In addition, the icebreaker Murmansk has been designated to provide escort services along the Northern Sea Route. Port icebreakers must be ready by 1 November, and line icebreakers by 1 December.

All eight of Rosatom’s nuclear icebreakers will be deployed on Northern Sea Route lines during the winter navigation season, according to the corporation’s director, Alexey Likhachev. He stated that the upcoming season will see the operation of the nuclear icebreakers 50 Let Pobedy, Yamal, Vaigach and Taimyr, as well as the Project 22220 universal nuclear icebreakers Arktika, Sibir, Ural and Yakutia.

Local incidents in which vessels encounter severe ice conditions across different parts of the Arctic also indicate the close of the navigation season. In northern Yakutia, two vessels and three barges belonging to a fishing cooperative became trapped in the ice on the Lena River and were left there until spring. Navigation in the Anadyr Estuary has likewise been hindered by heavy ice conditions. On 30 October, the dry cargo ship FESCO Moneron faced difficulties during mooring, while the motor vessel Ostrov Antsiferova was unable to enter the port for more than a week due to continuous ice fields and its insufficient ice class.

In October, the containership Istanbul Bridge completed its voyage along the “Arctic Express China–Europe” route. The vessel departed the port of Ningbo–Zhoushan on 22–23 September and, after transiting the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker escort, arrived in a UK port on 14 October. Sea Legend Shipping plans to put the Arctic Express into regular service in the summer of 2026, with fixed weekly or biweekly sailings during the summer navigation period, and with the potential to expand to year-round operations once vessels with appropriate ice class are available.

In October the Arctic LNG 2 project continued its LNG deliveries to China ↑

In 2025, China received a total of 13 LNG shipments from the Arctic LNG 2 project, five of them in October.

On 14 October, the LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz delivered the ninth cargo via the Northern Sea Route. The vessel loaded LNG from the floating storage unit SAAM FSU in Murmansk, which serves exclusively the Arctic LNG 2 project. The loading took place on 17 July, after which the tanker appears to have waited for almost a month before departing and then proceeded to the NSR in August. As previously reported, in the East Siberian Sea Arctic Metagaz was forced to remain at the ice edge for several days, awaiting an improvement in ice conditions.

Problems with the ice conditions also affected the Arc4-class LNG tanker Buran, part of the so-called “shadow fleet.” On 29 October, the vessel encountered winter ice in the Bering Strait. Buran was returning after unloading at the Koryak floating storage unit in Kamchatka and spent several days attempting to navigate the dense ice of the Chukchi Sea. Its ice class allows independent operation only in light-ice conditions, which proved insufficient in this case.

Due to a shortage of high ice-class vessels, Novatek is routing part of its cargoes outside the Arctic. For example, the sanctioned LNG tanker La Perouse loaded at the Utrenny terminal on 31 August, sailed around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, and arrived in China on 9 October, delivering the eighth LNG shipment.

The remaining October shipments were carried out by the tankers Arctic Mulan, Arctic Vostok, and La Perouse (its second voyage that month). All of them loaded cargo at the Koryak floating storage unit in Kamchatka, which is used exclusively for transshipment of LNG from the Arctic LNG-2 project.

Although Russia’s total LNG exports for January–October were 3.4% lower than in the same period a year earlier, October showed the opposite trend: monthly exports rose by 21% compared to October last year and reached a record level. The reason for this surge is the start of regular shipments from the Arctic LNG-2 project.

The Ministry of Transport has proposed postponing until 2028 the restrictions on the use of foreign vessels for hydrocarbon shipments along the NSR ↑

Russia has acknowledged delays in building tankers and vessels intended for the Northern Sea Route. The Ministry of Transport has proposed postponing until March 2028 the requirement that only domestically built ships be used on the route.

In 2022, the government approved a broad list of operations in the Northern Sea Route waters that must be carried out exclusively by Russian-built vessels — ranging from the transport of oil, gas, LNG, condensate, and coal to cabotage, offshore hydrocarbon storage, and hydraulic and subsea engineering work. Some of these operations are already in place, including icebreaking and pilotage services, which are performed solely by Russian vessels. The full set of restrictions was initially scheduled to take effect on 1 March 2026.

The shortage of specialized vessels remains a critical obstacle to the development of the Northern Sea Route. Of the 57 ships required for cargo transport, only 27 are currently available.

On 22 October 2025, the government approved at first reading the federal budget bill, which allocates nearly RUB 138 billion for the federal project “Development of the Big Northern Sea Route” for 2026 and the planned period of 2027–2028: RUB 59.6 billion, 56.5 billion, and 21.8 billion respectively. A significant share of these funds is earmarked for the construction of a nuclear service vessel (RUB 9.9 billion), the fifth and sixth serial universal nuclear icebreakers of Project 22220 (a combined RUB 28 billion), the lead icebreaker of the Lider project (RUB 53 billion), and the first Arc7-class hydrographic pilot vessel.

A deep-water port for the Northern Sea Route is planned for construction in Yakutia ↑

On 27 October, the Russian government approved development plans for Arctic support hubs, identifying the Tiksi–Naiba area as a key node of the Northern Sea Route. The central element will be a deep-water port in Naiba, with RUB 4.98 billion allocated for the first stage of construction, scheduled for 2028–2031.

According to the document, a construction-start declaration is planned for 2025–2026, and a feasibility study for the expansion of the Naiba seaport is to be submitted in 2026. Between 2026 and 2030, twelve sunken vessels are to be removed from the waters near the settlement of Tiksi. By 2031, a fuel storage facility valued at around RUB 7 million is planned for construction in Naiba.

Commentary by Bellona:

«With the end of the summer–autumn navigation season on the Northern Sea Route, it is already possible to assume that cargo volumes in 2025 will remain at roughly the same level as in 2024. Officials may report a slightly higher figure to announce another “record” for the NSR, but in reality the cargo structure has hardly changed. As before, LNG and crude oil dominate the flows. At the same time, LNG volumes may increase by year-end due to the regular shipments to China that began in August from the Arctic LNG-2 plant, which is under international sanctions. As we reported earlier, China started buying Russia’s sanctioned LNG as a political gesture during its standoff with the United States, so it is unclear how sustainable these shipments will be. The growth in LNG transport was balanced out by reduced oil loadings from Arctic ports in the first half of the year, mainly due to India’s response to newly imposed sanctions. Container transit volumes also increased significantly, though they still account for too small a share to influence the overall annual total.

Among other developments, difficulties with building vessels in Russia for operations on the Northern Sea Route continue. Plans to rely on Russia-built ships for hydrocarbon transport along the NSR have been pushed back to 2028 — and possibly beyond. The Zvezda shipyard, which is constructing more than 20 oil and LNG tankers for NSR operations, has already faced sanctions-related challenges and has delayed vessel deliveries.»

The international situation in the Arctic and sanctions on Russia’s activities in the Arctic region

The International Maritime Organization failed to reach agreement on adopting the Net-Zero Framework Programme and postponed the decision to 2026 ↑

An extraordinary session of the International Maritime Organization’s Marine Environment Protection Committee was held in London on 14–17 October. The meeting ended ahead of schedule after member states failed to reach agreement on adopting the Net-Zero Framework Programme. Consideration and possible approval of the new rules have been postponed to the next session in 2026.

At the session, country representatives discussed mechanisms for decarbonizing global shipping, including new fuel standards and the development of a Net-Zero regulatory system approved at the 83rd session in April. Participants had planned to adopt amendments to MARPOL Annex VI.

The amendments introduce mandatory fuel standards for ships and establish a global emissions-pricing mechanism. Large ocean-going vessels will be required to reduce their carbon intensity; those exceeding the permitted thresholds will have to purchase compliance units or contribute to the IMO’s new Net-Zero Fund. The proceeds will be used to support low-emission vessels, finance research, develop infrastructure, and facilitate a just transition, including assistance to vulnerable states.

According to media reports, the United States’ position had a significant impact on the IMO negotiations. Ahead of the key vote, Donald Trump publicly criticized the proposed mechanism as a “global green tax,” while behind the scenes the U.S. delegation warned of possible retaliatory tariffs and port charges if the measures were adopted.

Russia’s Ministry of Transport commented on the news, citing unnamed Russian and foreign experts who argue that “the proposed mechanism of mandatory contributions from vessels to an IMO fund raised objections, as it would effectively reallocate financial resources from the shipping industry to other sectors of the global economy. In addition, the amendments would increase the cost of maritime transport, which accounts for up to 90% of global trade, and raise prices for end consumers.”

Meanwhile, a study published in Nature Communications notes that without strict global regulation targeting full elimination of emissions (as envisaged under the Net-Zero Framework), the use of Arctic shipping could increase global maritime emissions by 8.2% by 2100 and raise the Arctic share of those emissions to 2.72%.

In October, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union introduced new sanctions targeting Russia’s oil and gas sector ↑

On 15 October, the United Kingdom announced a new package of sanctions aimed at reducing Russia’s revenues that support the war in Ukraine. The measures targeted not only Russian entities but also foreign actors—including those in China and India—who help facilitate the export of Russian oil or participate in the “shadow fleet.”

The sanctions targeted Russia’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, along with their subsidiaries and affiliated entities. The measures include asset freezes, service prohibitions, and financial restrictions. Both companies are closely involved in the development of the Russian Arctic: Rosneft is implementing the Vostok Oil project on the Taymyr Peninsula and conducting exploration on the Arctic shelf, while Lukoil operates in the northern Timan-Pechora province and manages the Varandey terminal, which handles oil exports from the Arctic zone.

The United Kingdom has banned the import of petroleum products manufactured in third countries using crude of Russian origin. In addition, four Chinese terminals and India’s Nayara Energy Limited—which imported 100 million barrels of Russian oil in 2024—were placed under sanctions.

• IMO 9737187 (CHRISTOPHE DE MARGERIE)
• IMO 9953509 (BURAN)
• IMO 9953511 (VOSKHOD)
• IMO 9953535 (ZARYA)
• IMO 9637492 (CLEAN OCEAN)
• IMO 9637507 (CLEAN PLANET)
• IMO 9655456 (CLEAN VISION)

On 22 October, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions in response to Russia’s lack of genuine commitment to a peace process aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. The measures also targeted Rosneft, Lukoil, and their subsidiaries and entities in which they hold stakes of 50% or more. The sanctions entail asset freezes, prohibitions on transactions with these companies and their affiliates, and, for international partners, the risk of secondary sanctions.

On 23 October, the European Commission released its 19th sanctions package, aimed at depriving Russia of the revenues that sustain its war economy. The central measure is a ban on importing Russian LNG into Europe. The prohibition for short-term contracts will take effect six months after the package is adopted, while long-term contracts will be phased out starting 1 January 2027.

The new package tightens the existing ban on transactions with Rosneft and Gazprom Neft.

It also adds 117 vessels from the so-called “shadow fleet” to the sanctions list. Among them are 12 ships that transported oil and other cargo along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 and 2025:

• IMO 9194012 (ANABAR), oil products tanker
• IMO 9256078 (LITEYNY PROSPECT), crude oil tanker
• IMO 9299771 (MIRES), crude oil tanker
• IMO 9397535 (JUPITER), Chemical/Oil Products Tanker
• IMO 9413559 (ANTARKTIKA), crude oil tanker
• IMO 9650016 (RN SAKHALIN), oil products tanker
• IMO 9741724 (ALARA), Bulk Carrier
• IMO 9036284 (NORDSTRAUM), oil products tanker
• IMO 9274434 (SHANGRI LA), crude oil tanker
• IMO 9305568 (BREEZE), crude oil tanker
• IMO 9390317 (MARINSTRAUM), Chemical Tanker
• IMO 9621601 (VASILY LANOVOY), Chemical/Oil Products Tanker

According to the Barents Observer, at the time the sanctions were announced, at least four LNG carriers were sailing along the Norwegian coast en route to or from a Russian LNG terminal, six others were transiting the Northern Sea Route, and several more were located in the Russian sector of the Barents Sea.

The 19^th package also introduces a ban on the reinsurance of vessels belonging to the shadow fleet.

The sanctions list also includes the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex, Russia’s leading shipbuilder, which constructs tankers for oil and gas exports as well as the Lider nuclear icebreaker. One of its key clients is Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest shipping company.

High North News notes a growing trend among companies previously involved in Russian Arctic LNG projects to seek revisions or removal of sanctions on their activities. China’s Jutal Offshore Oil Services has submitted an official request to OFAC to lift sanctions on its Penglai Jutal Offshore Engineering yard, which had supplied modules for Arctic LNG-2 and was added to the U.S. sanctions list in June 2024.

Meanwhile in Europe, Japan’s MOL succeeded in securing the removal of three of its LNG carriers — North Moon, North Ocean, and North Light — from sanctions. Two Arctic heavy-lift barges operated by Red Box, Audax and Pugnax, which played a key role in the construction of Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2, were also delisted on the condition that they would not be used for Russian projects.

The EU Council has agreed on a position to phase out imports of Russian gas ↑

On 20 October, the EU Council agreed on its position regarding the draft regulation on the gradual phase-out of Russian natural gas imports — a central element of the REPowerEU plan adopted by the EU in May 2022. The document provides for a complete ban on imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG starting 1 January 2028.

Starting 1 January 2026, new supply contracts will be prohibited, while a limited transition period will remain in place for existing agreements. Short-term contracts concluded before 17 June 2025 may continue until 17 June 2026, and long-term contracts may remain valid until 1 January 2028.

The new document provides for a suspension clause — allowing temporary resumption of imports from Russia in the event of crises or threats to supply security.

After agreeing on its position, the Council is ready to begin negotiations with the European Parliament, which must adopt its own stance in order to prepare the final version of the regulation.

Although the EU has reduced its dependence on Russian gas in the three years since the launch of the REPowerEU programme, Russia remains the second-largest supplier of LNG to Europe.

A report published in October by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) states that despite EU political declarations to end purchases of Russian LNG by 2027, imports of this fuel increased by 7% in the first half of 2025 compared with the same period in 2024, with EU countries spending around €4.5 billion on these supplies.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The International Maritime Organization’s decision to postpone until 2026 the adoption of a commitment to reduce shipping emissions to net zero by 2050 came as a surprise and introduced uncertainty into the maritime sector. The decision — influenced by the position of the United States and by unethical pressure exerted by U.S. representatives on delegates from other countries — was undoubtedly welcomed by the Russian authorities, who feared rising costs under the new requirements. Unfortunately, in this case, political and economic interests prevailed over the need to address climate challenges.

In addition, October saw another round of international sanctions targeting Russian entities, individuals, and vessels. Significant expectations were placed on U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, but as third countries increasingly disregard the threat of secondary sanctions—for example, China, which continues to purchase Russian LNG from Arctic LNG-2—the effectiveness of these measures may remain limited.

Following the addition of vessels engaged in regular oil and gas transport along the Northern Sea Route to sanctions lists, the size of Russia’s “shadow fleet” expanded sharply in 2025. Whereas in 2024 only seven shadow-fleet tankers were observed on the NSR, the number now exceeds 100. Most of these vessels do not hide by switching off AIS transponders, but instead change flags and ownership structures—and they will be unable to renew insurance with reputable insurers. This will undoubtedly increase the risk of accidents and incidents, and undermine the ability to respond adequately or provide compensation in the event of damage, including environmental harm.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

New facilities at the Lavna coal transshipment complex have been commissioned in the Murmansk region. Construction of the complex is nearly complete ↑

Natsproektstroy announced the commissioning of several facilities, including nearly 9 km of rail tracks, a berth gallery, conveyor trestles, transfer stations, and storage areas. The entire complex is scheduled for completion in 2026.

Once all facilities are commissioned, Lavna will be able to handle up to 18 million tonnes of coal per year, with the potential to increase capacity to 24 million tonnes. Since its launch in late March 2025, the port has already shipped around 650,000 tonnes of coal. Key export destinations include China, India, North African countries, and Turkey.

All coal currently handled at the Murmansk Commercial Seaport is expected to be rerouted to the Lavna terminal. One of the reasons for this decision is that coal has been transshipped in the open air in the city centre for many years, causing the spread of coal dust and resulting in public-health impacts and environmental harm. Mitigation measures such as dust-suppression systems and protective screens, which were introduced at various times, have failed to resolve the issue — residents continue to report coal dust and blackened windowsills.

As Murmansk Region Governor Andrey Chibis stated in October, the Murmansk port will now be reoriented toward container traffic. At the Lavna terminal, coal is handled using enclosed transshipment methods.

The Russian government has approved a comprehensive development plan for Vorkuta through 2035, with a total investment volume of 330 billion rubles ↑

The program aims to transform the city into a “key outpost of the Russian Arctic” and includes the expansion of coal production, the creation of the Vorkuta Chemical Complex for urea and ammonium nitrate manufacturing, as well as the construction of the Vorkuta–Ust-Kara railway to provide access to the Northern Sea Route. The distance between Vorkuta and Ust-Kara is about 195 km in a straight line, and the two are not connected at present.

Vorkuta is currently the fastest-depopulating city in Russia. The outflow of residents began in 1991, when the city reached its population peak of 117,000. As of 2025, the number of inhabitants stands at 55,000.

Of the 13 coal mines operating in the early 1990s, only four remain in operation today. The region is also home to Yunyaginsky, the world’s first open-pit coal mine located beyond the Arctic Circle.

In 2022 Vorkuta ranked 8th in Russia by the volume of atmospheric emissions — 168 thousand tons. The vast majority of these emissions — 151 thousand tons — were hydrocarbons excluding volatile organic compounds. This figure is explained by the fact that underground coal mining is characterized by high methane emissions, and even closed mines continue to release it.

Among the city’s other challenges are abandoned buildings—around 100 in total, including 80 apartment blocks—as well as a lack of funding to maintain municipal infrastructure. In 2022, on the eve of the New Year, the city’s wastewater treatment facilities collapsed. They had been commissioned in 1976 and had never undergone major repairs, while Vorkuta’s water utility had been declared bankrupt back in 2016.

The new program is intended to address these and other issues. In addition to industrial expansion, it includes a range of infrastructure projects: major repairs of the Usinsk water pipeline, which supplies the entire city, surrounding settlements, and coal mines; reconstruction of the wastewater treatment facilities, the airport, and the railway station; repairs to the ring road and the urban street network; relocation of residents from unsafe housing; major renovation of social facilities and sports infrastructure; construction of a fire station in Vorkuta; and many other initiatives.

A new gold deposit is expected to begin operations next year in Yakutia’s Ust-Yansky District ↑

The company Yanzoloto has received Arctic Zone resident status for the development of the Etinieekh Creek alluvial gold deposit. Investments will exceed 575 million rubles, with planned output of 347 kilograms of gold from 2026 to 2028.

Yanzoloto is already mining gold in the Ust-Yansky District at the Taryng-Yuryakh site, as well as in the Allaikhovsky District at the Nyamnyagingda Creek site. In addition, Yanzoloto’s parent company, the RIK Group, is also engaged in tin production through its subsidiary Yanolovo.

Preparations for the launch of the Chernogorsk Mining and Processing Plant in Krasnoyarsk Krai are nearing completion ↑

The Chernogorsk Mining and Processing Plant is a new major hub for producing palladium, platinum, nickel, and copper. The project is being developed by Russian Platinum. It will become Russia’s second most important producer of palladium and platinum after Norilsk Nickel.

At the site 15 km south of Norilsk, work is underway to prepare the open pit and build the processing plant, gas pipeline, water supply systems, and the thermal power plant. Construction is behind schedule: the facility was initially expected to launch in 2024, but according to the latest information, the first phase—designed to process 7 million tonnes of ore per year—is now expected to begin operation in the second half of 2026.

Total investment is estimated at 215 billion rubles. The project is included in the regional metallurgy development program and is supported by the federal government.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Russia’s industrial development of the Arctic continues, although at a slower pace than envisaged in strategic planning documents. The authorities are allocating budget funds and encouraging companies to operate in the Arctic Zone, as maintaining an active presence there is viewed not only as a means of extracting resources for global markets but also as a matter of national security in a vast, sparsely populated territory. And while the state has had some success—however limited—in incentivizing resource extraction, attracting people to live in the region is far more difficult. Natural population decline in Russia’s Arctic regions exceeds the modest migration-driven increases.»

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

Satellite imagery has revealed violations during the construction of the oil pipeline for Rosneft’s Vostok Oil project ↑

Google Earth has published high-resolution satellite imagery of the Taimyr Peninsula. August 2025 images clearly show tracks from heavy tracked machinery along the entire route of the Vankor–Payakha–Sever Bay pipeline under construction.

The use of tracked all-terrain vehicles in the Taimyr tundra during the summer period is explicitly prohibited under current Russian legislation, except for search-and-rescue operations and activities aimed at preventing or responding to emergencies.

The level of detail in the images makes it possible to see the paired tracks left by crawler-type all-terrain vehicles. The zone of disturbed tundra along the pipeline is several hundred meters wide, reaching 1.5 kilometers in certain locations. Analysis of Planet imagery indicates that the soil degradation in the tundra occurred between 2023 and 2025.

It should be recalled that Vostok Oil is Rosneft’s project aimed at developing the fields of the Vankor cluster. Once commissioned and brought to full capacity, it is expected to become the largest industrial facility in the entire Russian Arctic. The planned oil transshipment volume is 100 million tonnes, nearly three times the total cargo traffic on the Northern Sea Route in 2024, which amounted to 37.9 million tonnes. Exports from Vostok Oil are intended to be shipped via the Northern Sea Route through the Sever Bay oil terminal, which is being built specifically for the project.

Melting sea ice in the Arctic is driving an increase in carbon-absorbing algae ↑

Scientists have identified nitrogen-fixing bacteria under the Arctic ice. They can assimilate nitrogen and convert it into ammonia or ammonium. Previously, it was believed that such organisms existed in the oceans only in warm tropical waters.

“Until now, it was believed that nitrogen fixation could not take place under the sea ice because it was assumed that the living conditions for the organisms that perform nitrogen fixation were too poor,” says the study’s lead author, biologist Lisa von Friesen of the University of Copenhagen.

The researchers recorded the highest rates of nitrogen fixation along the edges of melting sea ice. Based on these findings, the team concluded that as sea ice continues to retreat, nitrogen availability in the Arctic Ocean will rise sharply. This, in turn, will lead to changes within marine food webs. One consequence of this process is an increase in the abundance of CO₂-absorbing algae.

“If algae production increases, the Arctic Ocean will absorb more CO₂ because more CO₂ will be bound in algae biomass,” says study co-author, biologist Lasse Riemann. “But biological systems are very complex, so it is hard to make firm predictions, because other mechanisms may pull in the opposite direction.”

Riemann states that nitrogen-fixing organisms in the Arctic must be incorporated into future climate models. “Sea ice melt may, directly or indirectly, stimulate nitrogen fixation,” the research group concludes.

Accidents and Emergencies in the Russian Arctic ↑

On 2 October, a spill of petroleum products occurred near the settlement of Dikson in Taimyr. According to the prosecutor’s office, the company Taimyrinvest, which had been contracted by the municipality to eliminate an unauthorized waste site, was collecting fuel-and-lubricant storage containers for disposal. However, when the containers were compacted, petroleum products leaked into the soil. The exact scale of the contamination has not been disclosed.