Bellona Nuclear Digest. September and October 2025
Publish date: 06/12/2025
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Bellona Nuclear Digest. September and October 2025
A survey of events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.
Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.
This survey covers events from September and October 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.
You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for August, June and July, May.
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On September 4, Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration, visited the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and its satellite city, Enerhodar. The visit focused on preparing key infrastructure facilities for the upcoming fall–winter season. At the ZNPP, Kiriyenko held a meeting on the plant’s current condition and on plans to bring it into a power-generating mode in line with Russia’s nuclear industry standards and regulations.
On September 11, the IAEA released a new report (GOV/2025/55) by Director General Rafael Grossi reviewing the state of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in Ukraine for the period from May 31 to August 29, 2025. The document primarily focuses on the work of IAEA missions at five Ukrainian nuclear facilities—the Zaporizhzhia, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine nuclear power plants, as well as the Chernobyl site—and is based on information provided to the Agency and verified by it during the reporting period.
Overall, the situation has remained unchanged since the publication of the previous report in June 2025.
According to the observations of the IAEA experts at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, summarized in the report, six of the Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security identified by the Agency in March 2022 remain fully or partially compromised. The teams continued to hear explosions and gunfire at various distances from the plant, as well as to receive reports of drone activity near the site and in Enerhodar, where most of the plant’s staff live.
The report notes the continued presence of Russian military personnel and equipment on the plant’s site, creating serious risks to compliance with the Five Concrete Principles for ZNPP established by Grossi in May 2023. It also states that the IAEA’s ability to provide an objective assessment of the situation is constrained by ongoing limitations on access and information available to the mission.
At the 69th annual IAEA General Conference, held in Vienna on September 15–19, Grossi stated that IAEA teams deployed at other Ukrainian sites — Chernobyl NPP, Rivne NPP, South Ukraine NPP, and Khmelnytskyi NPP — had also reported a significant increase in military activity in recent weeks.
Grossi stressed that shelling or other military activity occurring close to major nuclear facilities has become a regular occurrence and again called for maximum military restraint near nuclear power plants.
The report also states that the IAEA continued to assess the risks and extent of damage at substations critical to the safe operation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. From July 29 to August 8, 2025, an IAEA mission took place in Ukraine, during which specialists visited seven substations, including those previously inspected in 2024–2025. The experts documented damage and gathered evidence of the Ukrainian power system’s vulnerability as a result of attacks on energy infrastructure. It was noted that several substations were hit again in 2025. Repairs to critical equipment are ongoing, and some substations remain only partially operational.
On September 18, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution reaffirming its “serious concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the repeated calls by the Board of Governors and the General Conference to immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine and to withdraw its military and other personnel from the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.”
The resolution was adopted with 62 votes in favor, 7 against, and 46 abstentions. (In September last year, a similar resolution was adopted with 65 votes in favor, 8 against, and 43 abstentions.)
On October 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at a meeting of the Valdai Club that in response to strikes on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia region — even if not on the Zaporizhzhia NPP itself — Russia could launch strikes against other Ukrainian nuclear power plants.
On October 3, Ukraine’s Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna submitted a note to the IAEA expressing deep concern over the public threats by the Russian President to strike Ukrainian nuclear facilities.
Ukraine stated that such remarks create acute nuclear safety risks and run counter to the purposes and principles of the IAEA Statute, as well as international humanitarian law, which prohibits the use of civilian nuclear facilities as instruments of pressure or attack.
On August 27, the Russian administration at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant reported that, following instructions from Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, the plant had begun implementing parts of the plan for its potential transition to a power-generating mode that are considered feasible before the end of hostilities in the region and before security guarantees are provided by all sides. It was specified that the priority areas include obtaining all necessary licenses for the operation of the reactor units and personnel activities, carrying out repair and restoration work, and maintaining the qualifications of the plant’s staff.
On September 21, ZNPP Director appointed by the Russian side, Yuriy Chernichuk, stated that implementation of the plan was progressing, including efforts to address issues related to securing water for reactor cooling and ensuring external power supply.
In early September, IAEA mission experts visited one of the reactor units (the specific unit was not indicated) to observe safety-related maintenance activities. They also inspected the 750-kV switchyard. At the same time, access to the diesel fuel storage facility to verify fuel inventories was not granted, with security concerns cited as the reason.
In October, representatives of the ZNPP Emergency Preparedness and Response Department informed IAEA experts that an updated emergency response plan had been in effect at the plant since September and that a new off-site emergency response center had been established in Enerhodar, as “the former off-site center is inaccessible due to its location on the other side of the front line.” The new center is intended to provide coordination in emergency situations if needed and will serve as a backup to the temporary on-site emergency response center, which remains temporary because the original on-site center is still unavailable.
As a reminder, in August Ukraine reported that the off-site crisis center established in Zaporizhzhia in 2022 on Ukrainian-controlled territory had been damaged and partially destroyed as a result of military action.
In mid-October, experts visited six pumping stations along the channel that supplies the service water, fire protection, and emergency diesel generator cooling systems, and which had been isolated from the cooling pond in August. They confirmed that the pumps were operating normally and that the water level in the channel remained about two meters above the minimum allowable level.
On October 20, the Russian administration at the Zaporizhzhia NPP reported that the plant had received a Russian license to operate its dry spent fuel storage facility for a period of 25 years.
The IAEA mission at the Zaporizhzhia NPP noted in its reports for the period under review that military activity near the plant was audible on an almost daily basis.
On September 4, experts reported six explosions very close to the site. No impact on nuclear safety and security was reported.
On September 6, the Russian administration at the ZNPP reported a drone attack on the Training Center. It stated that fires and critical damage “were avoided.” On September 11, the Russian side again reported an attack on the Training Center. On September 20, it reported an attack involving at least three drones, two of which detonated on the roof of the Training Center building without causing significant damage.
On September 16, Agency experts reported that for about two hours they heard sporadic shelling near the plant. Gunfire was also heard. Later, while in the main administrative building of the ZNPP, the experts saw black smoke rising from three locations.
According to the plant’s Russian management, multiple artillery shells struck an area outside the site perimeter, around 400 meters from the off-site diesel fuel storage facility, igniting vegetation. The fire was brought under control. No casualties or equipment damage were reported.
An inspection of the shelling site was requested for the following morning, subject to the security situation, but subsequent IAEA updates did not mention it.
On October 6, the IAEA team stationed at the ZNPP heard numerous rounds of incoming and outgoing shelling — about 15 rounds over the course of an hour — at short and medium distances from the site. According to the ZNPP, two rounds of shelling struck around 1.25 kilometers from the site perimeter, near a fire extinguisher charging station. No casualties were reported, and there was no information about any damage.
On October 7, members of the IAEA team heard five consecutive explosions close to the site, strong enough to shake the windows of the building they were in. On the same day, the Russian administration at the ZNPP reported artillery shelling and a strike on the grounds of the fire station located about 1.2 kilometers from the site perimeter.
On September 23, the Zaporizhzhia NPP experienced a complete loss of off-site power for the tenth time since the start of the full-scale war in February 2022.
The IAEA team at the ZNPP reported that the plant had been disconnected from its last remaining 750-kV off-site power line. This was also confirmed by the Ukrainian nuclear regulator. Following the loss of external power, 18 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) started operating to provide the plant with the necessary electricity.
The ZNPP had relied on a single external power line since May 7, 2025, when it lost connection to the backup 330-kV line after it was damaged in territory controlled by Ukraine. Ukrainian repair crews were unable to restore the line during this entire period due to ongoing military threats.
During the previous blackout in July 2025, the plant operated on diesel generators for about four hours. According to information provided to the mission members by the Russian administration at the ZNPP, the fuel tanks were refilled after that incident to ensure that the emergency generators could operate for roughly 20 days in the event of another loss of off-site power.
According to the information provided by the Russian administration at the plant, the 750-kV transmission line was damaged on Russian-controlled territory about 1.5 kilometers from the site as a result of military activity. The IAEA team was unable to access the location of the damage at the time due to the security situation.
The plant stated that it had the necessary spare parts and personnel for the repair work and that they were ready to begin once conditions allowed. Ukraine also informed the Agency that it was prepared to restore the 330-kV back-up line when the military situation permits.
Power transmission from the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Four 750-kV lines (blue) and six 330-kV lines (yellow). The alleged damaged section of the “Dniprovska” 750-kV line is circled in red. Map based on Bellona’s 2024 report “Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
Ukraine accused Russia of deliberate actions aimed at disconnecting Ukrainian nuclear facilities from the national power system and altering electricity flow routes in the occupied territories.
Greenpeace Ukraine expressed the same view, having for several months maintained that Russia is preparing to shift the plant to power-generating mode and connect it to the Russian power grid. In its reports, Greenpeace cited the findings of an analysis of satellite imagery from September 26, carried out together with McKenzie Intelligence Services, which stated that no signs of shelling or attacks could be seen along the transmission line. Therefore, the Dniprovska 750-kV line was not damaged as a result of military activity but, in Greenpeace’s assessment, as a result of a deliberate act of sabotage by Russia.
On September 24, the IAEA reported that, as in previous similar situations, the number of operating EDGs was reduced to seven to save diesel fuel.
On September 30, Grossi stated that he was holding meetings with both Russian and Ukrainian officials and remained in constant contact with both sides, seeking to secure the earliest possible reconnection of the plant to external power lines.
At that time, power supply to the ZNPP’s critical systems — the safety systems and the cooling systems of the six reactors and the spent fuel pools — was being provided by eight EDGs delivering 20–22 MW. Nine were kept in reserve, and three were undergoing maintenance. The generators were used in rotation to carry out maintenance as required.
According to the Russian administration at the plant, each generator has its own fuel tank with a capacity sufficient for at least ten days of operation. Fuel was delivered daily from an external storage facility, where three large tanks are located, to maintain this level. Four mobile diesel generators could also be used if needed.
(Incidentally, on October 2, ZNPP Director appointed by the Russian side, Yuriy Chernichuk, said that the EDGs used at the plant are marine diesel generators manufactured in the 1960s at the now-closed “Russkiy Dizel” plant. He added that there are successor companies in Russia that produce spare parts and are prepared to supply the plant with them if necessary.)
Grossi noted that operating the plant on emergency diesel generators does not pose an immediate danger but is an extremely unstable and unsustainable solution from a nuclear safety perspective. The ZNPP’s reactors have been in shutdown mode for more than three years, which reduces heat generation and the amount of radioactive material in the fuel. The current condition of the reactors and the spent fuel pools remains stable while the emergency generators supply power to the safety and cooling systems. However, in the event of a complete loss of power without the diesel generators operating, fuel melting could occur.
According to the IAEA Director General, both the Ukrainian and Russian sides stated that they were ready to carry out repairs on their respective sections of the line, but an improvement in the security situation was required for the specialists to be able to work without risking their lives.
On October 3, the ZNPP continued to receive power from eight EDGs, with another twelve kept in reserve. The diesel generators were operating without interruptions, and fuel supplies were sufficient. (It was noted that, after the loss of off-site power, scheduled maintenance of a pair of reserve transformers had been suspended, and the equipment was returned to operation on October 2.)
On October 9, the IAEA reported that, as a result of the discussions Grossi had been conducting with Ukraine and Russia following the ZNPP’s loss of off-site power, a process had finally been initiated to prepare for the restoration of the damaged power lines located on different sides of the frontline. The main focus was on creating the necessary security conditions for repair work on the damaged sections of the lines, as they were situated in an area of active hostilities.
At that time and thereafter, the plant was being supplied with electricity by seven EDGs, with another thirteen kept in reserve.
On October 18, technical work to restore off-site power began. The IAEA reported that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to the Agency’s proposal to establish temporary ceasefire zones in two areas on opposite sides of the frontline to allow specialists to repair the damaged power lines.
On that day, after demining, work began on restoring two cables of the 330-kV Ferosplavna-1 line on the Ukrainian-controlled side.
Demining along the 750-kV Dniprovska line took longer, and work began on October 20.
The IAEA deployed teams to monitor the repair work at both locations.
On October 23, the Zaporizhzhia NPP was reconnected to Ukraine’s power system. Off-site power from the 750-kV Dniprovska line was restored across the entire site, and the last emergency diesel generator — which had supplied the plant with electricity for 30 days — was shut down.
On this line, specialists replaced several damaged cables, repaired a metal component of the tower, and installed new insulators.
This blackout, the tenth since the Zaporizhzhia NPP was seized in March 2022, was the longest to date. Throughout the entire period, the IAEA team continuously received data on safety parameters — including the temperature of the cooling water in the reactors and the spent fuel pools — and confirmed during walkdowns the stable operation of the emergency generators, the normal water level in the sprinkler ponds, and the absence of elevated radiation levels both on and off the site.
On the Ferosplavna-1 line, outside the ceasefire zone, new damage was identified — two severed cables located 1.8 kilometers from the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant’s switchyard. On October 30, the IAEA reported that efforts to arrange repairs of this line were ongoing, with talks between the warring sides focused on its full restoration.
IAEA teams working at other Ukrainian nuclear power plants — Khmelnitskyi, Rivne, South Ukraine, and the Chernobyl site — also regularly reported military activity in the vicinity of the facilities.
On September 2–3, the IAEA team at the Rivne NPP, while staying at a hotel located about four kilometers from the plant, heard gunfire and observed unidentified flying objects. The plant’s management informed them that eight drones had been detected within the monitoring area.
At the South Ukraine NPP, the Agency team was informed about the detection of three drones two kilometers from the site, as well as about the disconnection of one of the external power lines due to damage.
During the night of September 10, coinciding with reports of large-scale attacks in western Ukraine, the IAEA teams at the Khmelnitskyi and Rivne NPPs reported that, while they were in the cities of Netishyn and Varash, located several kilometers from the respective plants, they heard drones and bursts of gunfire.
According to the data later provided to them, nine drones were detected within the monitoring area of the Khmelnitskyi NPP at distances of up to three kilometers, and thirteen drones were detected in the vicinity of the Rivne NPP.
During the night of September 25, a drone was shot down and exploded near the South Ukraine NPP, at a distance of about 800 meters from the site perimeter. According to the plant, 22 unmanned aerial vehicles were detected within its monitoring area over the course of the night, some approaching as close as half a kilometer. The South Ukraine NPP, where all three units are operating at full power, was not damaged.
IAEA mission members located near the plant heard gunfire and explosions at around 1 a.m. and inspected the drone crash site in the morning. They recorded a crater measuring about four square meters and roughly one meter deep, as well as shrapnel damage to nearby metal structures and shattered car windows. No casualties were reported.
On October 1, the New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chernobyl site experienced power issues. As a result of military activity, the 330-kV substation in the city of Slavutych, located 40 kilometers from the Chernobyl site, was damaged, which led to the disconnection of a back-up transmission line and, consequently, to a partial loss of power to the NSC for several hours. The NSC’s radiation monitoring and ventilation systems continued operating through their connection to Units 3 and 4, which remained on off-site power. Radiation levels remained within normal limits, as confirmed by IAEA measurements.
The other facilities at the Chernobyl site continued to receive off-site electricity, although voltage fluctuations were recorded.
The IAEA reported that, as of October 15, the connection to the back-up line had still not been restored. The expert team at the Chernobyl site was informed that, in the time since the damage occurred, the NSC’s emergency diesel generators had been tested, and their readiness confirmed in the event of a power outage. Additional diesel fuel had been ordered to supplement the generators’ existing ten-day supply.
It should be noted that in early October, the opening in the NSC’s outer cladding — which had been damaged in a drone attack in February 2025 — was closed. This was an important step ahead of winter to reduce the ingress of precipitation into the structure. The solution is only temporary: to fully restore the NSC’s functionality, a set of measures must be carried out, including the replacement of the sealing membranes that ensure a tight connection between the Arch and the concrete structures of the Chernobyl NPP, as well as the restoration of full airtightness of the outer cladding — a highly complex technical task.
On October 4, the IAEA team at the Khmelnitskyi NPP was informed about 16 drones detected near the plant, the closest of which was located 5.5 kilometers away. The following day, three drones were detected at the same distance to the north of the South Ukraine NPP.
On October 30, the IAEA received information from Ukraine that Russia had carried out deliberate strikes on substations critical for maintaining reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian nuclear power plants. These substations are among those regularly visited by IAEA teams to assess damage, the progress of repair work, protective measures, and implications for nuclear safety and security.
IAEA teams at the South Ukraine and Khmelnitskyi NPPs reported the loss of one external power line at each plant. At the Rivne NPP, the output of two of the four units was reduced at the request of the grid operator. The team at the Khmelnitskyi NPP remained in shelter for several hours.
Commentary by Bellona:
«The armed seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant by Russia will have lasting consequences, including internationally, even after the Russian–Ukrainian war comes to an end.
In the eighty-year history of peaceful nuclear energy, an event of this scale has occurred for the first time. This means that the experience of this armed takeover—and everything that has taken place at the largest nuclear power plant in a European state—must be examined and studied, with conclusions drawn and practical steps taken to prevent, or at least mitigate, the dangers that may arise in similar situations in the future.
Of course, this military story has not yet reached its final point, and it is difficult to say with certainty how it will end. However, over the past three and a half years, important stages have already been passed—stages that can and must be examined, analyzed, and even used as a basis for certain practical steps aimed at preventing nuclear incidents. Already today, we need to start seeking answers to the questions that have arisen at every level and in every sphere, from technical and technological to geopolitical.
A reasonable starting point would be to review and analyze the existing international rules and arrangements, as well as the current international security system and its strengths and weaknesses, since the war has shown that this area requires substantial change.
Many of the issues that require close analysis concern the technical and technological safety of civilian nuclear facilities — starting with the fact that armed attacks on nuclear installations were never considered at the design stage, not even among beyond-design-basis accidents, and ending with the reality that today’s power-supply (and power-delivery) systems, as well as reactor and spent-fuel cooling systems at nuclear power plants, are extremely unreliable and, in essence, unprotected against even minimal military impact. This is why we see the near-constant blackouts at the ZNPP and the ongoing threats of loss of off-site power at other Ukrainian nuclear plants.
Nuclear energy is becoming increasingly popular and, in various forms, is starting to make inroads even into countries that have never had the basic foundations for it — education, science, let alone the technologies needed to use nuclear power. In light of the lessons of the Russian–Ukrainian war and some other recent developments, as well as the broad discussion of different nuclear power plant projects (large, small, floating, transportable, etc.), the question arises: what approach should be taken to choosing whether to build civilian nuclear facilities, on the condition that their safety must be maximized? This is a crucial issue, especially for countries that, unlike Russia, do not have vast territories and must consider different nuclear power plant projects without jeopardizing their energy security.
Of course, everything depends on the country where a nuclear facility is to be built, but today no one is insured against the sudden outbreak of war — whether between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states, or between two nuclear-armed states. An important issue is a state’s readiness to protect its nuclear facilities and, above all, the nuclear material that is typically stored there. Ukraine’s experience — when it was unable to protect the reactor in Sevastopol, the nuclear facility at Chernobyl, and the Zaporizhzhia NPP — needs to be examined in great depth, and rules and recommendations must be developed for similar situations, should they arise in the future. It is particularly important to look at how the Ukrainian state apparatus functioned in this context and where it went wrong.
A separate issue is the real legal, material (or military) responsibility of an aggressor that carries out an armed attack on a civilian nuclear facility, in the eyes of the international community. To this day, such responsibility not only does not function in practice, it has not even been meaningfully established at the level of international institutions. Many object, pointing to existing international treaties while stubbornly refusing to acknowledge that these treaties do not work. Others place their hopes on sanctions that may be imposed against the aggressor. But, as one politician said in response to the EU’s intention to adopt yet another sanctions package: if you are adopting sanctions for the nineteenth time, it means they are not working.
There are quite a few questions regarding the international system for controlling the non-proliferation of nuclear material. As a result, there is no clear legal or practical answer to the question of who owns the nuclear material seized by Russia at the ZNPP, or under what rules (or agreements) the nuclear material from the Sevastopol reactor ended up — or did not end up — in Russia’s possession.
What fate awaits the Zaporizhzhia NPP is impossible to predict. But any of the scenarios currently being discussed at various levels requires recognizing that the time has come to reform the international nuclear safety system in light of Ukraine’s experience. Without such reform, civilian nuclear facilities — in terms of the risks they pose (for example, the risk of a “dirty bomb”) — have come dangerously close to nuclear weapons, and their use (or even their mere existence) under conditions of military confrontation becomes critically dangerous.»
In September and October, Russia accused Ukraine several times of carrying out unmanned aerial vehicle attacks on Russian nuclear power plants.
According to Russian reports, on September 12 a drone flying at an altitude of 125 meters collided with the ventilation pipe of Unit 3 at the Smolensk NPP. The blast caused the loss of several windows in auxiliary facilities, including the start-up and reserve boiler rooms and the refrigeration station. It was the second such drone-related incident reported at the Smolensk NPP.
On September 25, a drone attacked the construction site of the Kursk NPP-2. According to Russia, the drone was suppressed by electronic warfare systems, after which it fell onto the construction area of the plant and detonated. A cable tunnel leading to the reserve boiler house was damaged.
On October 6, Russia reported that a drone over the Novovoronezh NPP had been suppressed by electronic warfare systems, after which it collided with the cooling tower of operating Unit 6 and detonated.
On October 7, another fixed-wing drone was observed flying at an altitude of about 100 meters over the station’s territory.
International nuclear events and their connection with Russia
On September 10, Urenco USA — a subsidiary of the European consortium Urenco — announced that it had completed ahead of schedule the next stage of the expansion of its enrichment plant in New Mexico by bringing a second cascade of new centrifuges online.
The expansion plan for the U.S. facility, launched in July 2023, provides for a 15% increase in the plant’s capacity, adding roughly 700,000 separative work units (SWU) between 2025 and 2027. The first set of new cascades was commissioned in May of this year.
In December 2023, Urenco also announced plans to add several centrifuge cascades at its site in Almelo, the Netherlands, to increase that facility’s capacity by 15%, or by approximately 750,000 SWU per year.
Uranium hexafluoride cylinders at the Urenco USA plant. Credit: Urenco USA
On October 20, Urenco reported that the project is moving forward and that the new cascades are expected to be commissioned in 2027. The company also announced that a decision had been made to proceed with a second phase of expansion at the Netherlands facility, aimed at doubling the planned additional capacity and providing a total of about 1.5 million SWU of extra capacity at Almelo by 2030.
Urenco noted that, globally, it has committed to bringing 2.5 million SWU of new enrichment capacity online. Ad Louter, Managing Director of Urenco Almelo, stated that the company will evaluate further expansion options based on long-term contracts and emphasized that stable government policy is crucial — in particular, the European Union’s intention to phase out the use of Russian nuclear materials under the REPowerEU program.
Commentary by Bellona:
«Rosatom’s main competitor on the global uranium enrichment market — Urenco — is actively expanding its capacity and is capable of significantly reducing Western countries’ dependence on Russian services. However, implementing such a strategy requires clarity: investors and governments must be confident that there will be no return to the previous level of cooperation with Moscow, even in the event of a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
For the EU to meaningfully reduce its dependence, it will need to establish — either through sanctions or another legal mechanism — a long-term ban on imports of Russian nuclear materials, similar to the United States, which has imposed such a ban for 2028–2040.
As long as Russia remains a source of threat to Western countries, any economic or technological interaction that gives it additional leverage must be halted or reduced to a minimum.»
On September 12, the Slovak power company Slovenské Elektrárne announced that it had signed a long-term contract with Canada’s uranium company Cameco for the supply of natural uranium hexafluoride and for conversion services for the Mochovce and Bohunice nuclear power plants for the period from 2028 to 2036.
Mochovce NPP, Slovakia. Credit: Slovenské Elektrárne
Earlier, in July 2025, Slovenské Elektrárne signed a memorandum of understanding with the Kazakh state uranium producer Kazatomprom outlining plans to arrange deliveries of natural uranium concentrate from Kazakhstan, as well as a long-term agreement with Urenco for uranium-enrichment services for the Slovak NPPs through the mid-2030s.
On September 30, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) released its report on the US uranium market for 2024.
According to the data, total deliveries of uranium concentrate (including the equivalent uranium contained in UF₆ and enriched uranium) in 2024 were 8% higher than in 2023 — 25.4 thousand metric tonnes, of which 2.9 thousand metric tonnes were enriched uranium. Ninety-one percent of the deliveries were made under long-term contracts.
Foreign supplies remained the primary source of uranium for the US. According to Table 3 of the report, Canada was the largest foreign supplier (33% of total deliveries), followed by Kazakhstan (22%) and Australia (15%). Uzbekistan accounted for 8% of deliveries and Namibia for 4%. Russia’s share in 2024 was about 4% (921.6 metric tonnes of U₃O₈ equivalent), compared with 12% in 2023 (2,740.7 metric tonnes).
Uranium of US origin accounted for 8% in 2024, up from 5% in 2023.
As for enrichment, the total volume of delivered services (Table 16) remained almost unchanged, amounting to 15.159 million separative work units (SWU). Of this total, US suppliers accounted for 28% and Russia for 20% (down from 28% in 2023). The remaining enrichment services were provided by European suppliers: 18% from France, 15% from the Netherlands, 9% from the United Kingdom, and 7% from Germany.
According to Table 16 of the EIA report, which lists enrichment deliveries in SWU, and using the average price of 97.66 dollars per SWU indicated there, the value of Russia’s enrichment services in 2024 amounted to 297 million dollars. However, the document does not provide exact contract values for Russia.
At the October 2 meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is “the second-largest supplier of uranium to the American market, roughly 25 percent,” and that in 2024 Russia earned 750–760 million dollars on the US uranium market. He also said that in the first half of 2025 Russia had sold more than 800 million dollars’ worth of uranium to the US and that by the end of the year the figure could reach 1.2 billion.
As a reminder, in May 2024 the US adopted legislation restricting imports of Russian uranium, introducing a full ban starting in 2028. In response, in November 2024 Russia imposed temporary restrictions on exports of enriched uranium to the United States.
Commentary by Bellona:
«EIA data reveal two key trends. First, in recent years the United States has depended on Russia for 20–25% of its uranium enrichment services — significantly higher than its dependence on Russian supplies of natural uranium (less than 10%). Natural uranium deliveries have never been Rosatom’s strong position on foreign markets, and they are much easier to phase out in the context of policies aimed at reducing reliance on Russia.
Second, in 2024 U.S. imports of Russian enriched uranium declined noticeably. According to the EIA, Russia’s share fell from 28% to 20%. In our report “Rosatom in the war years of 2023 and 2024” (p. 66), based on Comtrade statistics, we previously showed a similar decline: in 2024 the United States imported 335 metric tonnes of enriched uranium worth USD 624 million, compared with 702 metric tonnes worth USD 1.2 billion the previous year.
However, in 2025 supplies increased again — a point also noted by Putin in his remarks. Comtrade data show that in the first seven months of 2025 the United States imported more than 332 metric tonnes of enriched uranium from Russia — essentially the same amount as during all of 2024 — valued at roughly USD 833 million. As we have written before, as long as such deliveries remain legal and economically advantageous for both sides, they will continue.
Under current U.S. legislation, Russian enriched uranium can still be imported in 2026–2027, with purchases ending completely in 2028. There is a risk that the Trump administration, seeking to accelerate a peace agreement on Ukraine and normalize economic relations with Moscow, may attempt to ease these restrictions. Nevertheless, the argument that the United States must support its domestic uranium enrichment industry — especially at a time of nuclear energy expansion — may prevent the White House from weakening the ban on Russian uranium imports.»
On October 9, the US removed the Turkish shipbuilding yard Kuzey Star Shipyard Denizcilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi from its sanctions lists. The company had been added to the SDN list in January this year due to its ties with Atomflot.
On October 23, the European Union adopted its nineteenth package of sanctions against Russia, primarily targeting the energy sector: a ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) and tighter controls over the shadow fleet.
This time, the sanctions list under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — which entails a ban on all transactions, as well as on the provision of technical, financial, brokerage, and insurance services, and prohibits exporting any shipbuilding technologies, equipment, or components to the sanctioned entity — included a logistics company within Rosatom’s corporate perimeter, FESCO (Far Eastern Shipping Company). The updated sanctions list also included the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex, which specializes in large-tonnage shipbuilding, including oil and gas tankers and the Project 10510 Leader nuclear icebreaker.
Commentary by Bellona:
«At the beginning of 2025, we anticipated that FESCO might be added to sanctions lists. The grounds for this included the company’s significant role in Rosatom’s strategy to expand its logistics assets, as well as its possible involvement in logistics schemes linked both to the aggression against Ukraine and to the support of Rosatom’s overseas projects.
After being integrated into Rosatom’s structure in 2023, FESCO showed growth across key indicators in 2024: total maritime cargo volumes increased by 18%, international shipments by 39%, and traffic on the Russia–China and Russia–India routes also expanded. The company opened new international routes and delivered heavy equipment for Rosatom projects in India and Turkey. In other words, the integration was broadly successful.
In the EU’s sanctions rationale, it is stated that FESCO “is supporting materially and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine, and is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.”
This example illustrates that integration into the Rosatom state corporation does not shield non-nuclear assets from sanctions. In some cases, transferring assets to state entities or state corporations — including Rosatom — may even increase scrutiny of such companies. At the same time, sanctions primarily affect new business areas and auxiliary divisions rather than Rosatom’s core nuclear export segment. They create additional obstacles for implementing Rosatom’s international nuclear projects — in the form of delays and rising costs — but they do not halt them entirely.»
In October 2025, Bolivia’s new president, Rodrigo Paz, announced plans to review the lithium-development agreements signed by the previous administration and to introduce a more transparent system for attracting foreign investment. His statement reignited public debate about the prospects of the national lithium sector, while international partners expressed cautious optimism about the possibility of unfreezing long-stalled projects.
These contracts were signed in 2023–2024, when Bolivia concluded several agreements with foreign companies to develop the Uyuni, Coipasa, and Pasto Grandes salt flats. In June 2023, agreements worth about 1.4 billion dollars were signed with Rosatom and China’s CITIC Guoan. In November 2024, the government reached an agreement with the Chinese consortium CBC Investment (including CATL) on building two direct-lithium-extraction (DLE) plants worth at least 1 billion dollars, with the Bolivian government expected to receive a 51 percent stake in the project.
However, the implementation of these projects was effectively frozen. The contracts required ratification by Bolivia’s Congress, where they faced strong criticism: lawmakers and local community representatives pointed to a lack of transparency, insufficient benefits for the country, environmental risks, and the absence of consultations with Indigenous populations. Bolivia’s lithium legislation, which gives the state a dominant role in the sector, also complicated efforts to attract investors and slowed the conclusion of operational agreements.
Now, following the change of government, the issue has returned to the agenda. The Paz administration says it intends to maintain state control over natural resources but is prepared to establish more predictable and transparent rules for foreign companies operating in Bolivia. This has revived interest in the projects, although risks of renegotiated terms and potential delays remain.
Commentary by Bellona:
«The situation in Bolivia demonstrates that major infrastructure projects in countries with unstable democratic and legal institutions often face the risk of having their terms revised when political power changes hands.
The example of Bolivia — like the recent change of government in Bangladesh, where Rosatom is building a nuclear power plant — highlights the vulnerability of Rosatom’s nontransparent projects in countries with weak institutional resilience and high levels of corruption. Such projects are easily subjected to political review and may face investigations, suspensions, additional costs, or even complete cancellation.
Beyond that, the Kremlin’s inclination to partner with dictatorships and countries with weak democratic institutions creates heightened risks for those states themselves. In environments with low transparency and weak oversight, large-scale technological projects — including nuclear ones — that receive strong approval from the top can lead to systemic corruption, a decline in safety standards, and weaker environmental requirements. This increases the likelihood of industrial incidents, accidents, hazardous-material leaks, and other consequences that will primarily harm the population, the environment, and the long-term development of these countries.»
Dmitry Gorchakov
Nuclear advisor
Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad
On September 8, the state corporation Rosatom released its public annual report for 2024. According to the document, Rosatom’s consolidated revenue in the publicly available portion amounted to nearly 3.1 trillion rubles in 2024, exceeding the previous year’s figure by 20 percent. The report notes that this growth was driven primarily by increased revenue from transportation services, uranium-containing products and enrichment services, nuclear power plant construction projects, purchased and generated electricity, heat, and capacity, as well as other energy resources.
The total amount of taxes paid to budgets at all levels was 436.4 billion rubles, compared with 443.1 billion rubles in 2023.
Revenue from international projects reached 18 billion dollars, up 10 percent, compared with 16.4 billion dollars in 2023.
Unlike the 2023 report, which referenced the state corporation’s activities in occupied Enerhodar, the satellite city of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the 2024 report mentions only its interaction with the IAEA on issues related to ensuring the safety of the plant. The explicit reference to Zaporizhzhia Region has also been removed from the consolidated employee statistics broken down by region.
Commentary by Bellona:
«Rosatom’s revenue from its international projects amounted to almost half of the state corporation’s total revenue — about 1.66 trillion rubles (USD 18 billion at the average annual exchange rate of 92.4 rubles per U.S. dollar) out of 3.1 trillion rubles. At the same time, by our estimates, the main Western export projects — the supply of uranium and nuclear fuel to the EU and the United States in 2024 — accounted for no more than USD 1.5–2 billion, or no more than 6% of Rosatom’s total revenue. Thus, the potential loss of this market in the coming years would not be catastrophic for Rosatom.
The main sources of Rosatom’s foreign revenue in the nuclear sector are nuclear power plant construction (USD 8.7 billion) and the supply of nuclear fuel cycle materials and services (USD 3.5–4 billion, excluding Western deliveries). However, sanctions pressure has had little effect on the development dynamics of these areas.»
In October, Russian media outlets, citing comments from Rosatom, reported that the Russian government had allocated funding in the draft federal budget for 2026–2028 for raising and disposing of the K-27 and K-159 nuclear submarines, which sank in the Arctic seas.
According to a Rosatom press-service statement, “funding is envisaged for the rehabilitation of Arctic Sea areas from sunken and scuttled radiation-hazardous objects starting in 2027.” The statement also notes that Rosatom is not disclosing further details, including the amount of financing. The explanatory note to the draft federal budget likewise does not specify which concrete activities the funds are intended to support.
On October 27, Russia adopted a law denouncing the intergovernmental agreement with the United States on the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium no longer used for defense purposes, as well as all associated protocols regulating issues of financing and civil liability for damages and setting out the arrangements for disposing of the plutonium covered by the agreement through irradiation in nuclear reactors.
The agreement, reached in 2000 and ratified in 2011, required each side to dispose of at least 34 metric tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium. The document was suspended in 2016 by a Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation and a federal law. In addition to political reasons (US sanctions and unfriendly actions toward Russia, NATO expansion), the suspension was justified by the claim that the United States was not fulfilling its obligations to dispose of plutonium in accordance with international agreements.
The plan was to use the plutonium to fabricate MOX fuel for subsequent irradiation in reactors. Other disposal methods could be used only with the approval of both parties. In 2016, Russia stated that the United States had begun disposing of plutonium by diluting the material and disposing of it as waste, without Russia’s consent, which violated the agreement, as this method leaves open the potential possibility of the material being reused in a weapons program.
The BN-800 sodium-cooled reactor of Unit 4 at the Beloyarsk NPP, operating on uranium–plutonium MOX fuel. Credit: Rosatom
By the way, in May 2025 the United States, under the Executive Order “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base,” suspended its surplus-plutonium disposition program and plans to replace it with a reprocessing program.
On October 21, the US Department of Energy issued a request for proposals from commercial companies for reprocessing and disposition options, including financial commitments and schedules for using existing surplus plutonium stocks as nuclear fuel for reactors in the United States. Several companies, including Oklo and Newcleo, expressed interest in developing and investing in facilities to convert plutonium into reactor fuel.
Commentary by Bellona:
«Russia’s denunciation of its plutonium disposition agreement with the United States concludes a process that had, in effect, been frozen for nearly a decade, yet still carries important political and technical implications.
First, disagreement over plutonium disposition methods was one of the key reasons the agreement was suspended and ultimately abandoned. In the end, however, both sides (Russia earlier, and the United States under the current administration) arrived at the idea of using excess weapons-grade plutonium in the form of reactor fuel. Russia initially planned to dispose of its weapons plutonium by burning it in MOX fuel for fast reactors such as the BN-800. In practice, that reactor was eventually switched to MOX fuel made from reactor-grade plutonium recovered during spent fuel reprocessing. The United States, meanwhile, decided in 2025 to allocate part of its weapons plutonium for fuel programs supporting advanced civilian reactors.
Second, it is important to note that the 2016 presidential decree suspending the agreement nevertheless prohibited the use of the plutonium specified in it for military purposes. Some experts believe that the new law does not overturn this decree; therefore, even though cooperation has ended, Russia’s commitment not to use this plutonium for military purposes remains in force.
In the end, the current denunciation is primarily a political gesture that formally seals the breakdown of US–Russian nuclear cooperation on plutonium. Unfortunately, the abandonment (de facto earlier, and de jure now) of yet another bilateral agreement in the nuclear sphere reduces opportunities for mutual oversight and transparency — which, in the long run, may create new risks for global security.»
Uzbekistan. On September 26, Rosatom and the Atomic Energy Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzatom) signed documents expanding their cooperation within the framework of the nuclear power plant construction project in Uzbekistan. The updated agreements confirm that the project — which had originally envisaged the construction of up to six small modular reactors (SMRs) — will now have increased capacity and will include two generation III+ VVER-1000 units and two RITM-200N reactor units with an output of 55 MW each.
On October 6, the head of the Nuclear Power Plant Construction Directorate, Abduzhamil Kalmuratov, stated that the contract for building the large-capacity units is expected to be signed by March 2026.
On October 9, excavation work began at the construction site in the Jizzakh Region for the foundation pit of the unit with a RITM-200N reactor. The first concrete pour is planned for spring 2026.
Model of the Integrated NPP in Uzbekistan. Credit: Rosatom Newsletter
Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On September 1, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during a meeting with the Russian President in China, stated that the mechanism for financing the construction of the Akkuyu NPP using gas payments from the Turkish state energy company BOTAŞ had completed testing. Under this scheme, BOTAŞ will transfer payments for Russian gas directly to the account of the Turkish-Russian joint venture Akkuyu Nükleer A.Ş., registered in Ankara and responsible for the NPP project.
Paks II NPP, Hungary. On September 11, it became known that the Court of Justice of the European Union upheld Austria’s appeal and annulled the European Commission’s decision approving Hungary’s state aid for the construction of the Paks II NPP (2017/2112), issued on March 6, 2017.
That decision had approved the investment aid Hungary intended to provide to the state-owned company MVM Paks II for the construction of two new nuclear reactors at the Paks site. MVM Paks II was to become, free of charge, the owner and operator of the two new units.
Austria challenged the Commission’s approval before the General Court. In its judgment of November 30, 2022, the General Court dismissed the action. Austria subsequently appealed the General Court’s judgment to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The Court of Justice of the European Union found that the European Commission could not limit itself to verifying whether the aid measures complied with EU state-aid rules. It also had to examine whether public-procurement rules were respected when the contract was awarded directly to the Russian company without a competitive tender and provide adequate justification for this.
The ruling of the Court of Justice obliges the European Commission to reassess its approval of Hungary’s financing of the Paks II expansion. Formally, the judgment means that the procedure has returned to the stage at which the state investment had been notified but not approved. The Commission must now re-evaluate the measures in light of the Court’s legal interpretation.
Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, stated that the court’s decision in no way restricts or slows the progress of the investment. On the contrary, Hungary has recently accelerated it. He also stressed that the country’s national energy balance falls within national competence and that each state has the sovereign right to determine it.
Rosatom commented that it will continue the Paks II construction project despite the EU court’s ruling.
On October 22, Szijjártó also stated that, as part of diversification efforts, Hungary will begin negotiations on purchasing nuclear fuel from the United States, but it has no plans to abandon Russian fuel.
Reactor vessel for Unit 1 delivered to the El Dabaa NPP construction site. Credit: ASE JSC
China. On September 26, Rosatom Service JSC (part of Rosatom’s Power Division) and the CNNP Operation & Maintenance Company (CNOM) signed an agreement expanding the scope of their cooperation and increasing the number of Chinese nuclear power units for which Rosatom Service JSC provides technical support: Units 1–4 of the Tianwan NPP, as well as the newly commissioned Units 7 and 8 of the Tianwan NPP and Units 3 and 4 of the Xudapu NPP.
Iran. On September 24 in Moscow, Rosatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in constructing small-scale nuclear power plants in Iran. The agreement is reported to pave the way for preparing and signing contracts for the design and construction of NPPs based on small modular reactors.
On September 26, also in Moscow, Iran Hormoz-Energy Co. and Rosatom signed an implementing agreement on the construction of four new nuclear power units with a total capacity of 5,020 MW at a site near Sirik in Hormozgan Province. Engineering and environmental studies are currently under way, and site-preparation work is reported to be in an active phase.
Rosatom is currently building Units 2 and 3 of the Bushehr NPP. The agreement on NPP construction in Iran, signed on November 11, 2014, provides for the construction of eight nuclear power units.
Kudankulam NPP, India. On September 24, Holtec International announced the delivery of the first batch of wet-storage modules for the away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facility under construction at the Kudankulam NPP, manufactured by its subsidiary Holtec Asia.
El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On October 21, the reactor vessel for Unit 1 was delivered to the site.
In September, the World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025 was presented in Rome — an annual report prepared by an international group of experts that analyzes the state of nuclear energy worldwide. This year, Bellona expert Dmitry Gorchakov contributed as a co-author, providing analysis on the development of nuclear energy in Russia, Rosatom’s influence in international nuclear markets, and the dependencies associated with it. A video recording of the presentation is available at the link.
