In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic.

Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for August can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of Shipping News on the NSR in September
2. The shipping company Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) has confirmed its decision not to use the Northern Sea Route
3. Review of Russia — China Cooperation in Arctic Shipping
4. Draft Law Prepared to Ease Environmental Requirements for Dredging in NSR Waters
5. Development of the Northern Sea Route Discussed at the Eastern Economic Forum

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. The United Kingdom Added 16 Oil Tankers Operating on the NSR to Its Sanctions List
7. LNG Carriers Transporting Gas from the Russian Arctic Continue to Use Norwegian Ports
8. South Korea Allocates Funds for Icebreaker Construction and Port Modernization to Develop Arctic Routes

Commentary by Bellona

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
9. Rosatom and the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation Sign Agreement to Develop the Pavlovskoye Deposit on Novaya Zemlya
10. At the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF-2025), Chukotka Signed Agreements to Launch Gold Mining at the Nutekin Deposit and New Exploration Work in the Anadyr District
11. Development of the Syradasay Deposit on Taimyr Threatened by Potential Bankruptcy of the Operator

Commentary by Bellona

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
12. Unprecedented Ice Loss in Svalbard Contributed 10% of Glaciers’ Share to Global Sea Level Rise in 2024
13. Migratory Birds Are Forced to Accelerate Migration Due to Earlier Arrival of Spring in the Arctic
14. Scientists Found Particles from Car Tires and Road Surfaces in the Arctic Seas

ACCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of Shipping News on the NSR in September ↑

In September 2025, scientists from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute recorded an exceptionally early onset of autumn ice formation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which may complicate navigation. Ice formation has been observed in the Laptev, East Siberian, and partially in the Chukchi Seas. According to experts, despite the general trend of global warming, ice conditions in the Arctic seas remain rather difficult.

At the same time, the number of vessels without an ice class operating along the Northern Sea Route continues to grow, raising concerns among navigation specialists and environmentalists. As reported by The Barents Observer, in 2025 the Russian authorities approved the passage of more than 20 cargo vessels without ice class along the route — ranging from bulk carriers to container ships. Among them are the vessels Hong Chang Sheng and Honwell, both over 20 years old, as well as the 20-year-old oil tanker Mires.

Monitoring service data showed that on September 11, Mires was sailing without icebreaker escort near the coast of the Chukotka Peninsula. According to the permit issued by the Northern Sea Route Administration, in the absence of ice the tanker is allowed to travel the entire route without icebreaker support. The vessel, sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone, is under sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom and Ukraine. Mires managed to avoid ice, but other vessels were less fortunate.

The tanker Lynx (formerly Leo), carrying Russian oil from Murmansk to China, encountered severe ice conditions on a section of the Northern Sea Route. On September 7, the vessel was forced to stop in the East Siberian Sea, and after several days of waiting, resumed its voyage, proceeding at a very low speed along the coastline. Lynx exited the NSR waters and by September 15 reached the Bering Sea.

Earlier, a similar situation occurred with the gas carrier Arctic Metagas, transporting a batch of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Arctic LNG-2 project. The vessel became stuck in the East Siberian Sea as early as August 29 and had to wait more than a week for release from the ice. On September 23, the ship approached southern Japan.

Neither Lynx nor Arctic Metagas possess the ice class required for navigation in ice-covered waters, nor had they arranged icebreaker escort in advance. According to estimates on the Glavsevmorput website, icebreaker assistance for Arctic Metagas along the remaining sections of the route cost more than $600,000, which could have significantly increased the total transportation cost.

Both vessels are under international sanctions and are part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet.” Moreover, Lynx lacks the mandatory permit for Arctic navigation and is not mentioned in the Northern Sea Route Administration’s daily vessel movement summaries. Information about Arctic Metagas was also removed from the Administration’s public registries.

In addition, in September, NOVATEK continued shipments along the Northern Sea Route from its sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project. The first batch of LNG was delivered by the tanker Arctic Mulan at the end of August. In September, three more LNG carriers arrived in China in succession — Voskhod (second batch), Zarya (September 9), and Buran (September 14). Since the end of August, China has received more than 552,000 m³ of LNG from the first four shipments. The fifth tanker, Iris, carrying over 166,000 m³ is currently en route.

On September 20, the container ship Hong Chang Sheng, which lacks an ice class and is owned by the Russian company Aurora Line, completed a transit voyage through the Northern Sea Route, delivering cargo from St. Petersburg to China. The vessel transported products from the chemical, woodworking, and metal processing industries. The passage through the NSR itself took seven days, while the entire voyage lasted less than 30 days. According to the press service of the Delo Group, the container ship will return to St. Petersburg via the Suez Canal.

From August 20 to September 11, the Panamax-class container ship Istanbul Bridge, operated by China (in 2024 the vessel sailed under the name Flying Fish 1), traveled from St. Petersburg to China via the Northern Sea Route, completing the Arctic section in six days. On September 23, it departed from China to Europe, completing the first international transit voyage through the NSR since 2021.

The container ship departed from the Ningbo–Zhoushan Port, with a route including calls at Felixstowe (United Kingdom), Rotterdam (Netherlands), Hamburg (Germany), and Gdańsk (Poland). China expects that using this new Arctic route — which is part of the “Polar Silk Road” — will reduce delivery times by 7 to 20 days compared to the traditional route through the Suez Canal.

On September 2, Bellona sent an open letter to EU officials, mayors of port cities, and the administrations of European ports, warning about the risks of using the Northern Sea Route as a commercial transit corridor and calling on them not to assist Russia in its operation. Under conditions of Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, in addition to climate and environmental risks, the intensification of shipping along the NSR could also lead to political and security risks for European countries, as well as to the strengthening of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the Arctic.

The international coalition “Clean Arctic Alliance” likewise expressed concern over the start of regular commercial voyages along the Northern Sea Route, pointing out that the combustion of heavy fuel oil (HFO) releases black carbon, which accelerates the melting of snow and ice. (It should be recalled that Russia is the only Arctic state that has neither joined the ban on the use and transport of HFO in the Arctic nor announced any national plans to do so.) The coalition also emphasized that oil spill response in Arctic conditions is extremely difficult. Additional concern has been raised about the reliability of the container ship Istanbul Bridge, a 25-year-old vessel sailing under the Liberian flag.

The shipping company Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) has confirmed its decision not to use the Northern Sea Route ↑

In September, the company stated that the route remains insufficiently safe and developed for commercial shipping, and its active use could harm the fragile Arctic ecosystem and local communities. MSC emphasized that its existing global network allows it to ensure reliable transportation without using Arctic routes, so it has no operational need to transit through the Arctic.

MSC President Diego Aponte first announced the company’s decision to avoid Arctic routes in 2019, reaffirming this position in 2021 following the Ever Given incident in the Suez Canal, and again in 2024 amid Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. This position is shared by other leading shipping companies — Maersk, CMA CGM, Evergreen, and Hapag-Lloyd — which have also committed not to use Arctic shipping routes.

These companies signed the “Corporate Arctic Shipping Pledge,” initiated by the organization Ocean Conservancy. The document acknowledges that the development of shipping in the Arctic carries serious environmental risks and threats to the region’s Indigenous peoples. The signatories commit to refraining from Arctic shipping and advocating for stricter safety measures in Arctic navigation, including a ban on the use of heavy fuel oil and the adoption of stricter overall pollution control measures, as well as supporting the International Maritime Organization’s initiative to designate the central part of the Arctic Ocean as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area.

Review of Russia — China Cooperation in Arctic Shipping ↑

Centre for High North Logistics published a review of transit voyages along the Northern Sea Route for the first half of the summer–autumn navigation season, from June to August. In this context, a “transit voyage” is understood as a vessel passing through the NSR waters without calling at ports and crossing both borders of the route.

According to the review, in 2025, Russia-China cooperation in Arctic shipping continued to develop. From June to August, a total of 52 transit voyages were recorded along the route (compared to 45 voyages during the same period in 2024), most of which took place between Russian and Chinese ports. At the same time, 97% of cargoes moved eastward — from Russia to China. The main volume of shipments consisted of oil, LNG, bulk cargo, and containerized goods.

The review notes the passage of 13 oil tankers carrying around 5,5 million barrels of oil, including vessels without an ice class, as well as several LNG carriers from the “shadow fleet.” Container traffic increased to 150,000 tons, mainly between Saint Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Shanghai, and Qingdao.

In September, the Chinese company NewNew Shipping Line signed a series of agreements aimed at developing Arctic logistics and container transportation along the Northern Sea Route.

On September 5, at the X Eastern Economic Forum, NewNew Shipping Line and the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation signed an agreement to build a logistics complex in Provideniya Bay, Chukotka, to service vessels traveling along the NSR.

The project involves transferring cargo from Arctic vessels to conventional container ships, which will reduce transportation costs. The investment volume is expected to reach 5 billion rubles, and around 100 jobs will be created. The project concept is currently under development.

On September 30, the Governor of Murmansk Region, Andrey Chibis, and representatives of NewNew Shipping Line signed an agreement to develop container shipping through the ice-free port of Murmansk. The document provides for the organization of regular container lines and the implementation of joint infrastructure projects to increase cargo turnover.

NewNew Shipping is already cooperating with Rosatom within the framework of the joint venture Northern Sea Route Shipping Line, which will be engaged in building container ships for NSR transportation. The company is also developing the “Arctic Express No. 1” route and plans to invest up to 200 billion rubles in the construction of a deep-water port in Arkhangelsk.

Draft Law Prepared to Ease Environmental Requirements for Dredging in NSR Waters ↑

On September 19, the authorities of Arkhangelsk Region advocated for changes in legislation to remove environmental barriers to dredging in the waters of ports located within the boundaries of specially protected natural areas (SPNAs).

Deputies of the Arkhangelsk Regional Assembly proposed amendments to federal legislation (Federal Law “On Internal Sea Waters, the Territorial Sea, and the Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation”) to allow the disposal of dredged material during dredging operations within SPNAs if these areas overlap with the waters of seaports. The initiative, supported by Governor Alexander Tsybulsky, is aimed at creating conditions for the development of the Arkhangelsk transport hub and preventing a decline in cargo turnover along the Northern Sea Route.

In 2023, the Russian government approved a comprehensive plan for the development of the Arkhangelsk transport hub until 2035, which includes dredging works in the port waters. However, their implementation is complicated by the fact that part of the waters lies within the boundaries of the Belomorsky Nature Reserve, where the disposal of dredged material is prohibited, explained Leonid Kaporikov, a representative of the Regional Assembly Committee on Industry, Communications, and Infrastructure.

From September 23 to 26, the international exhibition “Neva-2025” was held in Saint Petersburg, where plans for dredging operations in the waters of the Northern Sea Route were discussed. Andrey Chumachenko, a representative of the Hydrographic Enterprise (part of the state corporation Rosatom), reported that in 2026-2030 the volume of dredging works on the Northern Sea Route is expected to reach 60 million m³. Of this, 25,5 million m³ will be maintenance dredging, and approximately 30 million m³ will be capital dredging associated with the construction of new port facilities.

Andrey Chumachenko noted that Rosatom, as the infrastructure operator of the NSR, is already implementing plans to create its own dredging fleet, including the purchase and construction of specialized vessels.

In early September, the head of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, Alexey Chekunkov, told TASS in an interview that the state corporation Rosatom plans to purchase 10 high-capacity dredging vessels in 2026-2028. They will be used for operations at the port of Sabetta, where the annual volume of maintenance dredging is estimated at 3,9-5 million m³.

Development of the Northern Sea Route Discussed at the Eastern Economic Forum ↑

From September 3 to 6, the 10th Eastern Economic Forum (EEF-2025) was held in Vladivostok — an annual international event aimed at developing the Russian Far East and strengthening cooperation between Russia and countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The development of the Northern Sea Route was addressed in several sessions of the forum.

• During the sessions “Safe Territory,” “Responsible Partnership for the Comprehensive Development of the Arctic and the Far East,” “Russia — China,” “500 Years on the Horizon: From Discoveries to Innovations of the Northern Sea Route,” and “Arctic: Information Policy,” participants discussed issues related to Arctic shipping safety, international cooperation, infrastructure investments, interaction between business and government in the development of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, and other related topics.
• At EEF-2025, the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport (Rosmorrechflot) and the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation signed a cooperation agreement on the development of transport and logistics infrastructure in the Far East and the Arctic. The agreement provides for joint work on developing maritime and river shipping, increasing cargo transportation — including NSR routes — and attracting investment. The parties will establish working groups and work on projects for multimodal logistics centers.
• At EEF-2025, Rosatom presented the progress of the pilot project for the Unified Maritime Operator for Northern Supply, under which 161,000 tons of cargo will be delivered to Chukotka in 2025, including 154,260 tons of oil cargo and 6,900 tons of containerized cargo. Due to the absence of its own fleet, at the first stage cargo delivery is carried out using market vessels that were previously employed for Northern Supply. In the future, it is planned to form its own fleet, as a significant portion of the vessels currently in use are outdated: the average age of ships operating in the Northern Sea Route waters in 2023 was 32,8 years. This creates risks for the reliability and stability of Northern Supply operations.

International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

The United Kingdom Added 16 Oil Tankers Operating on the NSR to Its Sanctions List ↑

On September 12, the United Kingdom once again updated its sanctions list, adding three individuals, 27 legal entities, and 70 ships. Among them are 16 oil tankers that transported crude oil and petroleum products along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 and 2025:

• IMO 9397535 (JUPITER), petroleum product tanker
• IMO 9333682 (KIRILL LAVROV), oil tanker operating at the Prirazlomnaya oil platform
• IMO 9333670 (MIKHAIL ULYANOV), oil tanker operating at the Prirazlomnaya oil platform
• IMO 9837547 (MIKHAIL LAZAREV), oil tanker operating at the Vorota Arktiki oil terminal
• IMO 9255270 (NP DIKSON), petroleum product tanker
• IMO 9650016 (RN SAKHALIN), petroleum product tanker
• IMO 9759939 (SHTURMAN KOSHELEV), oil tanker operating at the Vorota Arktiki oil terminal
• IMO 9752096 (SHTURMAN MALYGIN), oil tanker operating at the Vorota Arktiki oil terminal
• IMO 9752101 (SHTURMAN OVTSYN), oil tanker operating at the Vorota Arktiki oil terminal
• IMO 9759927 (SHTURMAN SHCHERBININ), Gazpromneft oil tanker
• IMO 9372561 (TIMOFEY GUZHENKO), shuttle tanker operating at the Varandey oil terminal
• IMO 9372547 (VASILY DINKOV), shuttle tanker operating at the Varandey oil terminal
• IMO 9621601 (VASILY LANOVOY), petroleum product tanker
• IMO 9885879 (VALENTIN PIKUL), oil tanker
• IMO 9256054 (NEVSKIY PROSPECT), oil tanker
• IMO 9256078 (LITEYNY PROSPECT), oil tanker

LNG Carriers Transporting Gas from the Russian Arctic Continue to Use Norwegian Ports ↑

The analytical portal High North News notes that Norway remains an intermediate point for LNG carriers transporting Russian gas. Although direct transshipment of Arctic gas from ship to ship in Norwegian waters was halted five years ago, vessels involved in Russian energy projects continue to use Norwegian shore infrastructure for crew changes and supplies.

On September 13-14, off the coast of Honningsvåg (Nordkapp region, Norway), the LNG tanker Merak, flying the Hong Kong flag and transporting gas from the Yamal LNG project, was recorded in the area. The vessel remained there for about 18 hours before heading back toward Yamal.

Norwegian authorities state that they have no legal grounds to prohibit Russian ships that are not subject to sanctions from entering their territorial waters or receiving shore-based services. At the same time, a number of European service companies have refused to service Russian LNG carriers, creating additional difficulties for fleet operators. As Bellona reported in the August digest, the Dutch company Damen Shiprepair ceased servicing vessels of the Yamal LNG project, and some of these vessels are now forced to undergo dry-dock maintenance in China.

South Korea Allocates Funds for Icebreaker Construction and Port Modernization to Develop Arctic Routes ↑

In September, the government of South Korea announced that the 2026 budget draft would include funding to support the construction of vessels designed to operate in Arctic waters. The initiative is connected to the country’s plans to launch pilot commercial voyages along northern maritime routes in 2026, as we reported in the August digest.

On September 11, South Korea’s Minister of Oceans and Fisheries, Chung Jae-soo, announced that the government would provide financial support for the construction of icebreakers intended for Arctic shipping routes. Each ice-capable vessel will receive an investment of 11 billion won (approximately €6,5 million) from the ministry’s budget for the following year. Referring to a study by Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH), Chung Jae-soo noted that full-scale operation of Arctic corridors is expected to be feasible by 2030.

Within the budget, 1,66 trillion won (€1,15 billion) will be allocated to the modernization of key southern ports, including Jinhae in Busan and the port of Gwangyang. These funds are intended for the development of infrastructure necessary to support Arctic logistics.

The ministry also plans to invest in research and technology development related to Arctic operations. Funds will be directed toward the creation of next-generation ice-capable research vessels and the establishment of a training system for polar marine engineers.

On September 19, South Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cho Hyun, stated that cooperation with Russia in the Arctic could be restored after the war in Ukraine. According to him, the Northern Sea Route remains a promising direction for international trade; however, since 2022, joint Arctic development efforts have effectively been halted.

South Korean shipyards have built most of the world’s Arc7 tanker fleet for the Arctic, primarily for Russian ports. Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) constructed a series of LNG carriers for Russia’s NOVATEK Arctic LNG-2 project, but after the imposition of Western sanctions, the fulfillment of these contracts was effectively frozen.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Russia’s “shadow fleet“ in the Arctic is rapidly being replenished with oil tankers that Western countries regularly include on sanctions lists. While seven “shadow fleet“ tankers were observed on the Northern Sea Route in 2024, by 2025 their number had grown to several dozen. Although these are no longer always old vessels, as was often the case before, operating under sanctions requires flag changes and minimal insurance from unreliable insurers, which in any case increases safety risks, including environmental risks.

While oil tankers are actively added to sanctions lists, Russian LNG carriers continue to supply LNG to the EU and receive services in Norwegian ports. During the first seven months of 2025, the EU paid €5,1 billion for Russian LNG compared to €4 billion during the same period in 2024. The main buyers remain Belgium and France. Vessels transporting this LNG continue to be granted permission to call at Norwegian ports. Norway’s formal response that there is no legal basis to prohibit servicing these ships in its ports indicates a lack of political will. The Dutch company Damen was able to refuse servicing Russian LNG carriers in accordance with the Netherlands’ policy of tightening sanctions against Russia. Likewise, Norway does not need to wait until the EU or other allies include these vessels on their own sanctions lists.

Recently, the media has actively covered South Korea’s declaration of its Arctic shipping ambitions, analyzing the opportunities and reasons for the country’s active promotion of this topic domestically. Among the most likely reasons are the desire not to lag behind China and Japan in shipbuilding technologies and logistics, as well as the political necessity for South Korea’s current president to gain support from voters in the Busan region, where a base for Arctic shipping development is planned. At the same time, statements by South Korean leaders claiming that by 2030 Arctic shipping will be much more accessible than it is today appear highly questionable.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Rosatom and the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation Sign Agreement to Develop the Pavlovskoye Deposit on Novaya Zemlya ↑

On September 26, within the framework of the International Forum “World Nuclear Week,” Rosatom’s Mining Division and the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation signed a strategic cooperation agreement for the development of the large Pavlovskoye lead-zinc deposit on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago.

The agreement provides for joint work on the creation of a mining and processing plant with a capacity of 3,5 million tons of ore per year, as well as the construction of port infrastructure for export via the Northern Sea Route. The first step will be to submit an application for the project to obtain the status of a resident of the “Northern Capital” TOR (Territory of Advanced Development), which will allow the use of tax and administrative preferences.

In addition, the state corporation announced a return to the concept of a floating processing plant, which is planned to be built in Russia. According to estimates, this approach will reduce capital expenditures by half — to 50 billion rubles — and simplify logistics in the Arctic section. Under the terms of the license, the deposit must be brought into operation no later than December 31, 2031.

The Pavlovskoye lead-zinc deposit is one of the largest in the world, with estimated resources of 19 million tons (1,967,000 tons of zinc, 453,000 tons of lead, 672 tons of silver). Nevertheless, the project timeline has already been postponed several times. Rosatom’s initial plans envisaged project launch in 2021–2022 with the involvement of Western contractors and the use of Finnish technologies for the construction of the floating processing plant.

In particular, Finnish companies Aker Arctic, Wärtsilä, and Metso Outotec participated in the project. However, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions, the Finnish partners withdrew from the project. In June 2022, Rosatom announced the start of production in 2026, and in 2023, a representative of the state corporation announced the abandonment of the floating processing plant. The current production launch date has been postponed to 2031.

At the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF-2025), Chukotka Signed Agreements to Launch Gold Mining at the Nutekin Deposit and New Exploration Work in the Anadyr District ↑

On September 3, at EEF-2025, the government of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation, and the company Overbest Rus signed an agreement to establish a placer gold mining enterprise based on the Nutekin deposit.

Investments in the project will amount to approximately 7 billion rubles, with an annual production volume of about 700 kilograms of pure gold (for comparison, a total of 24,5 tons of gold was mined in Chukotka in 2024). Around 300 jobs are expected to be created. The development will take place on a site whose license belongs to the company Bering Gold, which has included Overbest Gold as a shareholder since 2025. Although the license was issued back in 2016, industrial mining has not yet been carried out, as the project remained at the exploration stage.

The Nutekin deposit was discovered in the late 1960s in the valley of the Nutekingenkveyem River. The placer deposit stretches almost 4 km and contains several horizons of gold-bearing sands. Gold reserves are estimated at more than 8 tons, and the license for their development is valid until 2036.

In addition, on September 3 at EEF-2025, the government of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and the Bystrinsky Mining and Processing Plant (part of the Norilsk Nickel group) signed a memorandum of intent for the implementation of a geological exploration project in the region. The document provides for an eight-year project to conduct geological studies of the South Tanyurer area in the Anadyr district, aimed at discovering and subsequently developing a large-scale deposit of copper, gold, silver, and molybdenum. Work is planned to begin in 2025.

Development of the Syradasay Deposit on Taimyr Threatened by Potential Bankruptcy of the Operator ↑

One of the largest Arctic coal deposits, Syradasay, in Krasnoyarsk Krai may be put on hold due to the potential bankruptcy of the operating company, LLC Taimyrgormash.

In September, the Arbitration Court of Krasnoyarsk Krai accepted a petition to declare the company bankrupt. The process was initiated by the Arkhangelsk Sea Commercial Port, which claimed 59 million rubles in debts and penalties from Taimyrgormash for coal transshipment services. According to Kommersant, project credit financing has been halted, and without new investments, work at the deposit may be suspended.

The Syradasay deposit is located 110 km from the settlement of Dikson on Taimyr, with estimated reserves of 5.7 billion tons of coal. The project, being implemented by the company Northern Star (affiliated with the AEON corporation), involves the construction of a coal open-pit mine with a capacity of 5 million tons per year, eventually growing to 10 million tons, along with a processing plant, a highway, a power station, a shift settlement, and the Yenisei seaport.

Industrial mining at the Syradasay deposit was originally planned to start in 2022, but the timeline has been postponed to 2025. Construction of the processing plant was halted due to sanctions and equipment supply issues, as well as the absence of vessels required by Northern Star for transporting coal via the Northern Sea Route.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The news about the potential bankruptcy of the company developing the Syradasay deposit can actually be considered positive, since coal mining there has not yet begun. The deposit was planned to be developed as an open pit mine, with the extracted coal transported via the Northern Sea Route. This could have had a significant negative impact on the environment and climate. The experience of coal mining in Chukotka confirms this: vast amounts of coal dust inevitably settle on the snow and ice around the deposits and transshipment sites, increasing the heat-absorbing capacity of the surface and exerting toxic effects on living organisms.

By contrast, plans to develop a placer gold deposit in Chukotka are a reason to monitor river pollution in the region. Examples of placer gold mining in other Russian regions demonstrate that it is accompanied by severe river contamination and is not effectively controlled by government authorities.

The timeline for the development of the Pavlovskoye lead-zinc deposit on Novaya Zemlya is highly uncertain, as Rosatom has apparently not yet secured enough investors to finance the construction of the processing plant and all associated infrastructure, and it does not have sufficient own funds for such a project. In March 2024, a memorandum was signed with two Chinese companies, NFC and Pauerite Limited, regarding the development of the deposit. However, judging by the fact that Rosatom continues to search for investors, the Chinese companies are either insufficiently interested in the project or not willing to bear the majority of the costs.»

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

Unprecedented Ice Loss in Svalbard Contributed 10% of Glaciers’ Share to Global Sea Level Rise in 2024 ↑

This conclusion was reached by researchers from the Norwegian Polar Institute (Norsk Polarinstitutt) after analyzing data on glacier melting in Svalbard in 2024.

Glaciers cover 53% of Svalbard’s land area. However, in just a few months, the archipelago lost about 1% of its ice cover — roughly the same amount that Greenland lost during the same period, even though Greenland’s area is nearly 50 times larger.

Scientists state that this volume of melting contributed approximately 10% of the total glacier contribution to global sea level rise. The cause of ice loss in Svalbard was six weeks of anomalous heat: on August 11, the largest settlement in the archipelago, Longyearbyen, recorded a historical temperature maximum for the month — 20.3°C.

The authors of the study warn that such heatwaves may become common by the end of the century not only in Svalbard but also in other Arctic territories, potentially leading to even more extensive glacier melting.

Migratory Birds Are Forced to Accelerate Migration Due to Earlier Arrival of Spring in the Arctic ↑

Due to global climate change, spring is arriving earlier in the Arctic, and bird species that migrate there to breed are being forced to travel faster, adjusting their feeding times before flights and during stopovers. This is the conclusion of a new study conducted by an international team of scientists from the University of Amsterdam and the Netherlands Institute of Ecology, published in Nature Climate Change.

The researchers analyzed over 500 spring migrations of five large waterfowl species: black brent geese, barnacle geese, white-fronted geese, pink-footed geese, and Bewick’s swans. By combining the migration data with long-term observations of body mass at the birds’ wintering sites, the scientists found that the birds can reduce the time spent foraging before departure and during migration, allowing them to arrive in the Arctic earlier.

On one hand, the study confirms the flexibility of these bird species in terms of migration. On the other hand, specialists warn that, according to current climate trends, this strategy may remain effective for only another 18-28 years. By the middle of the century, to meet the timing of Arctic spring, birds will likely need to adopt other strategies, such as changing wintering locations or completely altering migration routes.

Furthermore, the researchers caution that accelerated migration has natural limits: rapid replenishment of energy during the journey requires high-quality food and favorable conditions — at minimum, low disturbance — which are not always available.

Additionally, faster migration may result in birds becoming more exhausted. This, in turn, could affect reproductive success and overall population numbers.

Scientists Found Particles from Car Tires and Road Surfaces in the Arctic Seas ↑

A group of researchers from Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas (National Research University) and the Far Eastern Federal University studied for the first time the impact of particles from tires and roads on the Arctic Ocean.

Over a period of three years, the researchers examined the condition of the marginal seas of the Arctic Ocean: the Barents, Pechora, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi Seas. They collected microplastic samples from the sea surface to determine their composition and impact on the biosphere.

The particles, formed as a result of friction between car tires and asphalt road surfaces, can contain polymers, resins, asphalt, and impurities from automotive oils and paint coatings.

This pollution affects marine organisms by disrupting their reproduction, growth, and development, and can lead to mutations and malignant tumors. For example, polyurethane varnish in the particles can transform the process of amino acid biosynthesis in cellular DNA.

Between 2014 and 2025, several studies showed that tire wear products account for 35% to 85% of all microplastic particles entering terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.

Accidents and Emergencies in the Russian Arctic ↑

From September 3 to 30, a state of heightened readiness was in effect in Murmansk due to a spill of petroleum products in the waters of the Kola Bay. Rosprirodnadzor recorded significant pollution in the area of the Murmansk CHPP, but an interagency commission did not identify any violations at the facility. The volume of the pollution has not been specified, and the source of the leak has not yet been determined. The situation reflects a systemic problem, as similar incidents occur regularly. In the summer of 2024, near the Kola Bridge, the concentration of oil-containing substances exceeded permissible levels by more than 400 times.

Recommended Publications ↑

Bellona has prepared the report Vessels on the Northern Sea Route, which examines ships that have received permission to navigate the Northern Sea Route. The review will be useful for policymakers, researchers, experts, NGO representatives, and journalists interested in Arctic shipping issues.

The study shows that passage permits are granted to old oil tankers of the “shadow fleet” and cargo ships without ice class certification.

According to the review, in 2024 Rosatom issued 1,312 permits for 975 vessels to transit the Northern Sea Route, 100 of which sailed under foreign flags. A significant portion of these vessels was used to transport Russian oil and LNG in circumvention of European sanctions. One-third of them lacked ice-class certification, and more than half of the tankers were older than 15 years.

Old oil and LNG tankers pose a serious threat to the Arctic due to potential spills and insufficient insurance coverage. Russia is not taking effective measures to mitigate the resulting environmental and climate risks.