After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.

Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.

This survey covers events from August 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for June and July, May and April.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1.  The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for August 2025
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities
1.3. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
2. Military threats at nuclear facilities in Russia
3. Ukraine considers alternative options for completing the Khmelnytskyi NPP

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
4.  Kazatomprom may reduce its uranium production plans

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
5. Shirondukuy uranium project approved by Glavgosexpertiza
6. Rosatom and Niger sign memorandum on peaceful nuclear cooperation
7. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for August 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

On August 8, Ukraine imposed sanctions on 18 individuals and 17 legal entities linked to Rosatom’s activities aimed at integrating the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into the Russian power system. The list also includes those involved in the seizure of the Chernobyl NPP in 2022, in the production and maintenance of dual-use nuclear equipment, and in the export of enriched uranium through Rosatom subsidiaries registered in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Finland, and Cyprus.

The Ukrainian government called on EU member states, the United States, and other countries to consider introducing similar restrictive measures.

On August 21, a scheduled rotation of IAEA teams took place at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, with the thirtieth mission starting its work at the plant.

Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities ↑

Two key problems persist at the ZNPP: the extreme vulnerability of its external power supply and difficulties in ensuring reliable access to water for cooling.

Throughout August, the plant remained connected — for the fourth consecutive month — to its only available external power line, the Dnipro 750 kV line. This situation followed the damage to the backup 330 kV power line on May 7, caused by Russian shelling. (Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the seizure of the ZNPP, the plant had access to ten power lines.)

The Russian side accuses Ukraine of taking the damaged backup line “out of service for repairs with no timeframe specified for completion” and of not taking any measures to restore it. Ukraine, in turn, reported in July that “the occupying forces systematically prevent Ukrainian repair crews from accessing the damaged section, making restoration impossible.”

As for the plant’s water supply, IAEA experts stationed at the ZNPP continued to monitor the situation throughout August.

In early August, they conducted a walkdown of some of the site’s hydraulic structures but still could not obtain access to the cooling pond isolation gate.

On August 13, the IAEA reported that its team at the ZNPP had received technical updates on the plant’s water distribution system, including the supply of water to nuclear safety and support systems, and noted increasing challenges of ensuring a reliable cooling water supply in hot weather conditions.

Since the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023, the water level in the cooling pond has dropped by more than 3.2 meters, including about 60 centimeters over the three summer months of 2025.

Comparable data were also provided by the Russian side. According to the information made available, the water level in the cooling pond decreased from 14.03 meters at the end of May to 13.49 meters as of August 19 (in June 2023, when the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed, the level stood at 16.65 meters).

On August 16–17, IAEA experts at the ZNPP were informed by the plant’s Russian management that a new dam had been constructed to isolate one of the plant’s channels from the cooling pond. This channel is used to supply service water that provides cooling for several plant systems essential to the operation of safety systems for all six reactor units, including the main unit transformers. (Water used for cooling the reactor cores, their safety systems, and the spent fuel pools comes from groundwater wells that feed the sprinkler ponds.)

The construction of the dam was explained as a measure to maintain the water level in the channel at about 14 meters, which would be two meters above the threshold at which the technical water pumps would cease to operate. To achieve this, water from the cooling pond is being pumped into the isolated section of the channel.

The IAEA reported that its experts had not yet been granted access to the dam, with security concerns cited as the reason, and emphasized the importance of such access for assessing the cooling water situation.

Director General Rafael Grossi noted that IAEA teams will continue to seek access to the new dam and will closely monitor the situation.

In the final days of August, the IAEA mission experts inspected twelve sprinkler ponds replenished by groundwater wells and confirmed that all ponds were full.

In addition, the IAEA experts reported that routine maintenance activities continued at the plant throughout August, including work in non-reactor areas such as turbine halls and transformers (including backup transformers), as well as maintenance of two safety trains on different units. It was noted that no work was being carried out inside the containment structures of any of the six reactors at that time.

On August 6, together with Rostekhnadzor specialists, the IAEA team took part in a scheduled monitoring activity of the operational status of the reactor building of Unit 3.

On August 25, the IAEA team inspected the turbine hall of one of the units (the specific unit was not identified) but was not granted access to the western part of the building.

On August 26, Rostekhnadzor carried out an inspection of the nuclear material accounting system at all six units of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

On September 4, Russia released a report on the “actual situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP” covering the period from May 17 to August 20, which provided a brief overview of military activity in the vicinity of the plant, its technical condition, radiation monitoring results, personnel training, and interaction with IAEA expert teams. (The previous similar report was published on June 2.)

On August 13, the Russian press service of the ZNPP stated that, as in the previous year, there are no plans to transfer any reactors from cold to hot shutdown during the upcoming heating season. During the past winter, modular gas-fired boiler houses were used to provide district heating in Enerhodar.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

Throughout August, the IAEA expert team at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) continued to hear explosions and observe other indications of military activity near the site on an almost daily basis.

On August 2, the IAEA team reported explosions and smoke in the vicinity of the plant. According to Russian representatives at the ZNPP, one of the auxiliary facilities located about 1.2 kilometers from the site perimeter came under attack from shelling and drones. It was reported that a fire broke out in the industrial area, and that a fire truck of the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations was attacked by a drone while extinguishing the blaze.

On August 6, it was reported that, during a walkdown of the spent fuel storage facility, the IAEA team heard outgoing artillery fire for just over an hour in close proximity to the site’s perimeter.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern over this incident, describing such military actions as systematic: according to the ministry, Russia uses the Zaporizhzhia NPP as cover to launch attacks on Ukrainian territory, taking advantage of the limited ability to return fire toward the plant. It was noted, in particular, that last year similar shelling damaged critical infrastructure, including several external power lines essential for supplying the ZNPP’s own needs.

The Russian press service of the ZNPP reported that, on August 6, the industrial area outside the plant’s site, where the transport workshop and printing house are located, came under shelling. The IAEA team was also notified of this incident.

On August 12, while at the administrative building of the plant, IAEA experts observed smoke following reports from the Russian plant management about a fire near the cooling towers caused by burning grass and dry vegetation. During a walkdown the next day, the experts observed burned trees near the cooling towers.

In the preceding days, the IAEA experts also received reports of multiple shelling incidents in the industrial area near the plant, located approximately 1.2 kilometers from the site’s perimeter.

On August 14, Russia sent a note to IAEA Member States accusing Ukraine of attacking the Zaporizhzhia NPP and its satellite city of Enerhodar, noting a sharp increase in their intensity. Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev linked this to the talks held between the Russian and U.S. presidents on August 15, stating that in recent days not only drone attacks but also daily artillery shelling has been recorded.

In addition to incidents occurring in the immediate vicinity of the plant site, Ukraine reported that, on August 10, a Russian missile strike on the city of Zaporizhzhia damaged and partially destroyed the premises of the external crisis center of the ZNPP branch. This center was established in 2022 to provide round-the-clock monitoring of the radiation situation in the plant’s observation area on the territory controlled by Ukraine, as Russia blocks the automatic transmission of nuclear and radiological data through the IAEA’s International Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS).

According to Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna, Yuriy Vitrenko, disabling or damaging such a center undermines the stability and resilience of emergency-response measures, reduces situational awareness, and may delay the initiation of protective actions.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities in Ukraine ↑

Throughout August, IAEA teams at Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine NPPs — as well as at the Chernobyl site, reported air-raid alerts almost daily.

On August 21, the Agency’s team at the Chernobyl site heard explosions. It was later informed that these were sounds of air-defense systems operating, as several drones had been detected in the Exclusion Zone, approximately 5 kilometers from the site.

As a reminder, in February 2025, the Chornobyl site was attacked by drone, which caused significant damage to the New Safe Confinement (NSC). In August, the IAEA received information that temporary repairs to the NSC are planned to begin in the fall of 2025. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) is reviewing the repair documentation, and the IAEA will provide support under the memorandum signed in July 2025 at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The war that Russia started by attacking Ukraine has been going on for more than three and a half years. There is nothing new or exceptional about what is happening today at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Shelling continues, power transmission lines and NPP water-supply systems are being destroyed, dams, auxiliary facilities, and other structures are being damaged. The situation is essentially the same as it was one or even three years ago.

Bellona is somewhat more interested in reports about the introduction of new sanctions of various types related to Rosatom’s activities. During the war, the most severe personal and targeted corporate sanctions against Rosatom’s leadership and certain subsidiaries were imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. Canada and several other allies have their own lists or restrictions as part of broader anti-Russian sanction packages. The European Union, due to its energy dependence and complex contractual obligations, has so far formally avoided a full ban on Rosatom’s activities but continues to consider and introduce restrictive measures in related sectors where Rosatom is present.

As noted above, on August 8, 2025, Ukraine imposed additional personal and sectoral sanctions against 35 individuals and legal entities connected with Rosatom and the Russian energy sector. Among the specific organizations targeted by these sanctions were Uranium One Holding N.V. (Netherlands), Rosatom Finance Ltd (Cyprus), and Kirov-Energomash (Russia).

It is clear that the sanctions significantly limit—or even completely deprive—Rosatom of access to Western financing and insurance, complicate export control over key technologies and equipment, and increase reputational and contractual risks. However, Rosatom has not yet experienced a complete “disconnection” from the international financial and nuclear markets, nor a collapse in its order portfolio.

The issue of the imposition and impact of sanctions is complex and debatable. Expert opinions are divided. Some analysts argue that nuclear sanctions could lead to irreversible geopolitical consequences, such as the development, acceleration, and proliferation of nuclear programs, including in countries like Niger, Uganda, and Burkina Faso, which are not politically, economically, or academically prepared for the use of nuclear technologies.

Another group of experts notes that, under sanctions and restrictions, Russia, and Rosatom in particular, has intensified its presence in countries such as North Korea and Iran. Economists point out that Beijing and Moscow are forming a financial and energy alliance against the West, within which Rosatom and Gazprom are preparing to issue bonds denominated in yuan, thereby taking their first step toward full integration into the Chinese financial market after being cut off from the West.

Yet another group of experts argues that the sanctions against Rosatom are working and producing the intended effect.

All of this requires constant attention; therefore, Bellona intends to continue studying and analyzing the opinions and proposals of expert groups and government representatives from various countries regarding sanctions against the Russian nuclear agency, in order to understand their possible consequences and the impact they may have on current geopolitics, energy challenges, and the field of nuclear energy use.»

Military threats at nuclear facilities in Russia ↑

Rosatom reported that, on August 17, a combat drone was “neutralized by technical means” on the industrial site of the Smolensk NPP near Unit 3. Upon crashing, it detonated, damaging windows in the unit’s building. The incident did not affect the plant’s operation.

On August 24, it was reported that a fixed-wing drone had been shot down near the Kursk NPP. It detonated upon impact, damaging the plant’s auxiliary transformer. As a result, the power output of Unit 3 at the Kursk NPP was reduced by 50%.

Ukraine considers alternative options for completing the Khmelnytskyi NPP ↑

On August 18, answering journalists’ questions about the results of talks with the Bulgarian side during the Ukraine Recovery Conference held in Rome in July, Ukraine’s Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk stated that there has been no progress in negotiations with Bulgaria on the sale of VVER-1000 reactor vessels considered for use in completing Units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnytskyi NPP. In this regard, Ukraine has begun considering alternative options for these units.

Talks on the sale to Ukraine of preserved equipment originally intended for the Belene NPP project began in July 2023. In March 2025, the Ukrainian government authorized Energoatom to conclude a purchase agreement with Bulgaria’s state energy company Natsionalna Elektricheska Kompania EAD. However, following this decision, in April several members of the Bulgarian government announced the suspension of negotiations on the reactor sale.

«Bellona previously commented in its digest on Ukraine’s intention to complete Units 3 and 4 at the Khmelnytskyi NPP and proposed preparing a working document that would allow experts representing different sides to present their arguments, provide data and figures, and address the unresolved issues.

However, the situation has since changed: the Bulgarian side refused to sell the reactor vessels of the Russian VVER-1000 units, and Ukraine began exploring alternative options.

It is difficult to predict what decision will eventually be made, but Bulgaria’s refusal may not be the worst outcome for Ukraine today. Of course, it should be kept in mind that the lifetime of the old “Soviet” units at KhNPP is nearing its end, but at present Ukraine faces a far more pressing issue — the costs required to end the war.

Only after that will it be possible to assess the country’s remaining energy potential and make informed decisions about building new generating capacities to replace the aging units at KhNPP. These might not even be nuclear facilities, which is the direction favored by the new leadership of Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy.»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Kazatomprom may reduce its uranium production plans ↑

On August 22, Kazakhstan’s national uranium mining company, Kazatomprom, announced in its financial results for the first half of 2025 that it may revise its 2026 production plans downward and that, as part of efforts to improve operational efficiency, some of the company’s uranium mining subsidiaries are making amendments to their subsoil use contracts.

According to the company’s 2024 Competent Person’s Report (CPR) on mineral assets, the nominal production level for 2026 stipulated by previous subsoil use contracts will decrease from 32,777 metric tons of uranium to 29,697 metric tons. Thus, the reduction amounts to more than 3,000 metric tons, or about 10%. Most of this decrease is related to the adjustment of production volumes at the Budenovskoye joint venture between Rosatom and Kazatomprom. While earlier plans envisioned uranium production of 6,000 metric tons in 2026, the revised strategy projects 3,750 metric tons. At the same time, the production forecast for the current year 2025 stands at 1,300 metric tons – nearly double the 2024 output of 622 metric tons.

It should be recalled that 100% of uranium production at Budenovskoye LLP for the 2024–2026 period has been fully reserved to supply raw materials for Russia’s civilian nuclear power industry.

This reduction in production remains within the permissible 20% deviation outlined in Kazatomprom’s 2025–2034 development strategy. The company noted that actual production plans for 2026 are still subject to negotiations with joint venture partners and to uranium market dynamics and will be disclosed as part of the 2026 operational guidance.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Budenovskoye LLP, in which Rosatom increased its share to 49% in 2023, is expected to become the Russian state corporation’s largest uranium mining asset in Kazakhstan in the long term. However, its development is progressing more slowly than initially planned. Nevertheless, in 2024 Rosatom’s total uranium production in Kazakhstan reached 5,800 metric tons—almost 1,000 metric tons more than the previous year. This growth, however, was driven by higher output at several Rosatom–Kazatomprom joint ventures, mainly at Karatau LLP (+345 metric tons attributable to Rosatom), JV Southern Mining and Chemical Company LLP (+219 metric tons), and JV Akbastau JSC (+179 metric tons). The increase in production at Budenovskoye LLP attributable to Rosatom, based on its ownership share, amounted to about 210 metric tons.

At the same time, uranium production at two Russian–Kazakh joint ventures in which Rosatom sold its stakes to Chinese companies at the end of 2024—JV Zarechnoye and JV Khorasan-U (now renamed Turanium LLP)—grew only slightly in 2024, by a total of just 50 metric tons attributable to Rosatom.

According to Kazatomprom’s 2024 Competent Person’s Report on the company’s mineral assets (Tables ES23 and ES24), Rosatom’s total uranium production in Kazakhstan is expected to reach about 5,500 metric tons in 2025, which is 300 metric tons less than in 2024, as the increase in output at Budenovskoye LLP and other deposits will not offset the current decline resulting from the transfer of assets to China.»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Shirondukuy uranium project approved by Glavgosexpertiza ↑

Russia’s Glavgosexpertiza (Main State Expert Review Board) has issued a positive conclusion on the project developed by the Engineering Center of Rosatom’s Mining Division for the development of the Shirondukuy deposit in Krasnokamensk, Zabaykalsky Krai. The review confirmed that the project’s design solutions comply with current regulations and safety standards.

The next stage of the Shirondukuy project will involve the start of construction of the surface facilities. Mine development works required to access the deposit are already underway. Production is scheduled to begin in 2028.

Rosatom’s uranium mining enterprise, E.P. Slavsky Production Mining and Chemical Association (PPGHO), acquired a license for the exploitation of this molybdenum-uranium deposit in February 2025. The proven reserves include 8,000 metric tons of uranium and 40 metric tons of molybdenum.

Rosatom and Niger sign memorandum on peaceful nuclear cooperation ↑

During the visit of Russia’s Minister of Energy Sergey Tsivilev to the Republic of Niger on July 28, Rosatom and Niger’s Ministry of Energy signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and related high technologies. Tsivilev commented that Russia’s goal is not merely to participate in uranium mining but to establish a framework for the development of peaceful nuclear energy in Niger, including the construction of power generation facilities.

Similar agreements were signed in June with Mali and Burkina Faso.

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Kazakhstan. On August 8, initial work began in the village of Ulken under the project to construct a nuclear power plant—engineering surveys to determine the optimal site and prepare design documentation for the construction of a large-capacity nuclear power plant. The event was attended by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan Almasadam Satkaliyev.

Deputy Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency Aset Makhambetov stated that the engineering surveys are planned to last 18 months.

On August 9, Likhachev met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Olzhas Bektenov. The meeting discussed mechanisms for ensuring the use of Kazakhstani equipment and materials, the involvement of local specialists, and the localization of nuclear fuel cycle processes.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. On August 5, the cold and hot functional tests of Unit 1 were completed with blowdown of the fresh steam pipelines in the turbine compartment. From August 10 to 27, at the request of the Government of Bangladesh, the IAEA conducted a Pre-Operational Safety Review Team (Pre-OSART) mission to assess the safety of Unit 1 of the Rooppur NPP. These missions are specifically designed by the IAEA to evaluate a plant’s readiness before its first fuel loading. According to Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, the physical start-up of Unit 1 is expected to take place before the end of this year.

Bangladeshi media report that the loading of the first fuel into the Unit 1 reactor is expected on November 6, 2025.

Originally, Unit 1 was scheduled to be commissioned on December 23, 2022, and Unit 2 on December 27, 2023. However, the dates were postponed due to a number of difficulties, including the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020. Under the revised schedule, preliminary handover of Unit 1 is now expected on December 31, 2026, and of Unit 2 on December 31, 2027.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On August 21, Rosatom announced that it had begun the control assembly of the VVER-1200 reactor vessel for Unit 4—the final stage of the three-year reactor plant manufacturing cycle. Meanwhile, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated that the state corporation plans to commission Unit 1 in 2026.