In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic.

Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for May can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of Shipping News on the Northern Sea Route
2. Overview of Events Where NSR-Related Issues Were Discussed
3. Overview of Draft Regulatory Acts Concerning Shipping on the NSR
3.1. The updated draft concept for the development of the natural gas vehicle fuel market in Russia through 2035 envisions a network of LNG fueling stations along the NSR
3.2. The Russian Ministry of Transport has prepared a draft law on the safety of oil and petroleum product transportation

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON rUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
4. The European Commission has presented a draft regulation on a complete phase-out of Russian gas and oil by the end of 2027
5. The European Union has adopted its 18th package of sanctions against Russia
6. Atomflot has filed a lawsuit against the Dutch company Damen over the disruption of tugboat deliveries for the Northern Sea Route
7. A Harvard University report states that the scale of China’s investments in the Arctic has been overstated
8. The Arctic LNG 2 project is ramping up gas production and resuming export shipments
9. Russia is withdrawing from the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands

INCREASED INDUSTRIAL PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
10. Precious metals production in Chukotka continues to grow
11. New industrial projects in the Russian Arctic: a brief overview
11.1. Chukotka has signed two new agreements on the development of gold deposits
11.2. PhosAgro will invest 60 billion rubles in 2025–2027 in the development of the Apatit mining and processing plant
11.3. Rosnedra has announced an auction for the development of the Pinkeljavr iron ore deposit in the Murmansk Region

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHALLENGES IN THE ARCTIC
12. More than 1,000 scientists from around the world have called for restrictions on mining and shipping in the central Arctic
13. In 2024, the temperature in the Russian Arctic was 1.24 degrees above the 1991–2020 average
14. The area of peatlands in the Arctic is increasing due to climate warming
15. Mercury released into the environment as far back as the 19th century is threatening Arctic ecosystems
16. A rise in natural radiation levels has been recorded in Novaya Zemlya, likely linked to permafrost thaw
17. Scientists have recorded unprecedented freshening of Arctic waters

ACCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
18. In the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, serious environmental incidents related to oil production were recorded in June–July
19. Oil spill from a vessel and state of emergency in the Murmansk Region
20. Oil product spills in Komi

RECOMMENDED MATERIALS

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of Shipping News on the Northern Sea Route ↑

As in previous years, the summer-autumn navigation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the eastbound direction began in June–July 2025 and will continue until October–November.

On June 20, NOVATEK dispatched the first Arc7 ice-class LNG carrier of the season, Georgy Ushakov, from the Yamal LNG plant to China via the eastern part of the NSR without icebreaker escort. On July 3, the nuclear icebreaker Vaygach of FSUE Atomflot escorted the first three vessels in the area of Cape Zhelaniya, marking the opening of the summer–autumn navigation for the delivery of petroleum products and cargo to remote regions of Russia. One of the tankers delivered fuel and lubricants to northern Yakutia at the mouth of the Yana River. The other two vessels delivered diesel and aviation fuel to the port of Lavrentiya in Chukotka. The voyages were carried out as part of the Northern Supply and operated by the new Unified Maritime Operator, JSC Rosatom Arctic, appointed in March of this year.

On June 11, the lead nuclear icebreaker of Project 22220, Arktika, arrived in St. Petersburg for basic hull work. Due to the lack of a large dock in the Far North for the Project 22220 icebreakers and the delayed delivery of a 220-meter floating dock from Turkey, stuck in Istanbul because of British sanctions, Arktika had to make a 2,300-mile voyage to St. Petersburg. It will remain in dock for about two months before returning to operate in the NSR waters.

In 2021, Rosatomflot, the operator of the nuclear icebreaker fleet, signed a $68 million contract with the Turkish Kuzey Star Shipyard for the construction of a new dock suitable for servicing the new class of icebreakers. The dock was ordered from Kuzey Star Shipyard in 2021 and was scheduled to arrive in Russia in 2025, but British sanctions imposed in May prevented this.

Cargo traffic along the NSR in 2025 will most likely remain at last year’s level. According to Rosatom’s preliminary estimates, it may reach 36–38.5 million tons (in 2024, NSR cargo traffic amounted to 37.9 million tons). Thus, the volume and destination of cargo transported along the NSR this year will be the same as last year. Cargo turnover of Arctic seaports in the first half of the year decreased by 6.7% compared to the same period last year, due t mainly to reduced oil shipments from the port of Varandey to India in the spring, which we reported in the April digest.

This year, an increase is expected in the number of transit voyages via the NSR from China to Russia’s northwestern ports: Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad, and St. Petersburg. In 2023, the Chinese company NewNew Shipping Line, established in 2022 specifically to handle sea transport linked to Russia, made 7 such voyages; in 2024 — 14 voyages. In 2025, according to Vladimir Panov, Special Representative for Arctic Development at Rosatom, the number of such voyages may exceed 20, and the Russian company Aurora Line may also join the Chinese carriers.

In addition to increasing the number of voyages along the NSR, NewNew Shipping Line plans to invest in its infrastructure. According to the governor of the Arkhangelsk Region, Alexander Tsybulsky, NewNew Shipping Line is prepared to invest up to 200 billion rubles (about €2.1 billion) in the construction of a new deep-water district of the Arkhangelsk seaport in exchange for a 30% stake in the project. In addition, the authorities of Chukotka are trying to involve the company in projects to create a transport and logistics hub in the port of Provideniya for transshipment of cargo between conventional vessels and ice-class vessels, as well as in the modernization of the port of Pevek. At the same time, Rosatom is discussing the joint construction of five Arc7 ice-class container ships, the first of which is planned to be commissioned in 2027.

Notably, during this navigation season, for the first time since the start of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, a Chinese company is planning a transit voyage along the NSR from China to Europe — to the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Gdańsk. The launch of such a regular line was announced by the Singapore-based company Sea Legend Shipping, controlled by Chinese investors. The first voyage, for which the company reports all cargo space has already been booked, is scheduled for September 2025. For this purpose, permission to transit the NSR was granted to the vessel Istanbul Bridge (a Panamax-class container ship, IMO 9200811, built in 2000), which had already sailed the NSR from St. Petersburg to China in 2024 under the name Flying Fish 1 and under a different flag.

Before the war, China’s leading logistics company COSCO had attempted to launch voyages from China to Europe via the NSR, but with the start of the invasion it ceased these voyages and has not sent its vessels along the NSR since.

Bellona believes that under the current political and climate conditions, the use of the NSR for commercial shipping should be minimized in order to preserve fragile Arctic ecosystems, prevent further climate warming, and counter Russia’s ambitions to dominate the Arctic in economic, political, and military affairs. For more details on the current situation along the NSR, see our new report “The Northern Sea Route: Russia’s industrial and political expansion, its environmental costs, and Arctic shipping risks”.

Overview of Events Where NSR-Related Issues Were Discussed ↑

In June–July, several major events were held in Russia where the challenges and prospects of using the NSR were discussed: the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 18–21, the meeting of the Council of NSR Shipping Participants on June 27, and the Arctic – Regions Forum in Arkhangelsk on July 31–August 1. The main issues raised by officials and business representatives included:

• The creation of an integrated organizational and financial-economic model of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (TTC) as mandated by Putin. It is assumed that the implementation of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor project — a new name for the concept of the Greater Northern Sea Route from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok — will increase Russia’s non-resource, non-energy exports, strengthen Russia’s position in the Arctic, and may also become the main hub for consolidating export cargo flows to BRICS countries without passing through the Danish Straits and the Black Sea straits. Since the Northern Sea Route will serve as the foundation for the development of the TTC, its new financial and economic model is also under discussion, with year-round navigation along the entire NSR as an integral part. According to Vladimir Panov, Special Representative for Arctic Development at Rosatom, year-round navigation is already being implemented in the Kara Sea with subsequent transshipment in Murmansk. The second stage will be year-round navigation in the eastern sector of the NSR. At the current “ramp-up” stage of the NSR, an important component is state support for the development of the necessary infrastructure. However, as the transition to the second stage takes place, there is a possibility of reducing this support, provided that logistics along the NSR become competitive.
• Uncompetitive icebreaker escort tariffs. Although tariffs for icebreaker escort along the NSR have increased fourfold over the past 10 years, they still cannot ensure the payback of icebreaker construction. On the other hand, the rising costs are significant for cargo owners shipping via the NSR and may hinder the route’s development. At SPIEF, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East Alexey Chekunkov noted that with the cost of icebreaker escort at 16 million rubles (€168 600) per day, it is impossible to recoup the cost of an icebreaker priced at 1 billion rubles (€1.05 million). For cost recovery, the price of escort would have to be 60 million rubles (€632 200) per day, which is unaffordable for shippers. He also proposed a new model for financing icebreaker support, under which expenses would be shared between shippers, the federal budget, and Rosatom. In other words, it would be directly subsidized by the state for an indefinite period, meaning there is no prospect of commercial payback in the near future.
• Monitoring and forecasting ice conditions through 2050. At SPIEF, Alexander Makarov, head of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, stated that even with ongoing ice melt in the Arctic, the NSR will not become easily navigable year-round in the coming decades. According to him, ice cover is now forming twice as fast as before, offsetting summer melting. There may be years when the NSR is almost ice-free in summer, as well as years with very difficult navigation. In addition, he believes that by the middle of the century a climatic cooling is possible, which could worsen navigation conditions.

Overview of Draft Regulatory Acts Concerning Shipping on the NSR

The updated draft concept for the development of the natural gas vehicle fuel market in Russia through 2035 envisions a network of LNG fueling stations along the NSR ↑

The updated draft concept for the development of natural gas vehicle fuel in Russia through 2035 envisions that by 2035 the country may build infrastructure for LNG-powered vessels, enabling them to sail the entire Northern Sea Route from Murmansk to Vladivostok. At present, only 15 LNG-powered vessels are in operation in Russia, but their number is planned to increase to 107 by 2035. Among Arctic ports, only Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are included in the project for LNG bunkering. Other ports designated for LNG bunkering are Ust-Luga, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Vostochny, Astrakhan, and Makhachkala.

It is worth noting that the concept for the development of natural gas vehicle fuel has not been adopted for more than a year. The current version is also subject to criticism. For example, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Energy Committee Yuri Stankevich, after a discussion in the State Duma on the draft concept, warned that the support measures proposed in the concept are insufficient for the implementation of the target scenario, and that the Ministry of Energy has not carried out the necessary financial and economic calculations with an assessment of the expected effect of providing benefits and budget subsidies.

In addition, plans to expand the use of LNG as marine fuel in Russia may not be realized due to international sanctions and new International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations. Sanctions have cast doubt on Russia’s ability to acquire or build new vessels capable of running on LNG. As of today, Russia does not possess the technology to build LNG-powered vessels, and foreign shipyards that had been constructing LNG carriers for Russia before the war have canceled Russian orders.

The new regulations that the International Maritime Organization plans to adopt in October 2025 may reduce the attractiveness of Russian LNG on the international market, said Sergey Tolmachev, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. Under the new MARPOL standards (the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships under the IMO) for calculating greenhouse gas emissions across the entire fuel life cycle — from extraction and transportation to use — Russian LNG will have a higher carbon footprint than Norwegian or British LNG due to long transport chains (especially from the Arctic) and the high energy intensity of extraction and liquefaction.

The Russian Ministry of Transport has prepared a draft law on the safety of oil and petroleum product transportation ↑

After the major oil spill from tankers in the Kerch Strait in December 2024, the Ministry of Transport drafted a bill to ensure the safety of oil and petroleum product transportation by sea and inland water transport, to improve navigational safety, and to minimize environmental damage in case of accidents. The draft law, which proposes amendments to several existing regulatory acts, would, if adopted, require vessels to have a crew member responsible for the safe operation of the ship, grant port captains the authority to detain vessels suspected of being potentially unsafe, introduce a mandatory notification system for ship-to-ship cargo transfers at sea, and obligate compliance with navigation area and seasonal restrictions as well as hydrometeorological conditions during vessel operations.

It is also proposed to establish a national fund for preparedness and response to oil and petroleum product spills, to be formed from emergency rescue fees collected from all shipowners transporting oil and petroleum products. A public-law company, the Maritime Administration of the Russian Federation, will be created to manage the fund’s resources. The procedure for managing these resources is to be determined by the Government of the Russian Federation.

How much such a draft law could improve emergency preparedness and response in case of oil or petroleum product spills at sea remains unclear, particularly regarding the use of funds collected in the national fund. However, it is clear that this draft law would simplify the process of identifying those responsible in the event of an accident.

The international situation in the Arctic and sanctions on Russia’s activities in the Arctic region

The European Commission has presented a draft regulation on a complete phase-out of Russian gas and oil by the end of 2027 ↑

On June 17, the European Commission officially presented a draft law on the gradual and complete phase-out of Russian gas and oil imports. The document was developed within the framework of the RePowerEU strategy aimed at reducing energy dependence on Russia. As we noted in the May digest, the European Union has set the goal of fully ending purchases of Russian gas by the end of 2027. By the end of 2025, all short-term pipeline gas and LNG supplies must cease. This will be followed by the termination of imports under long-term contracts, including those for Russian LNG signed by France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

France and Belgium did not support the European Commission’s initiative, pointing to the need for additional safeguards against possible economic and legal risks.

France remains the largest buyer of Russian LNG in the EU and does not support an immediate ban on its import. The country is pursuing a diversification strategy, replacing Russian gas with supplies from Qatar, while at the same time expressing concern over potential legal risks. TotalEnergies is bound by contracts with NOVATEK until 2032 and holds a stake in the Yamal LNG project. France’s Energy Minister Marc Ferracci emphasizes that the country needs legal certainty to avoid lawsuits against national companies.

Belgium is the second-largest importer of Russian LNG and likewise does not support the European Commission’s plan. Brussels has requested an in-depth economic analysis to assess the impact on its own infrastructure, primarily the Zeebrugge terminal, a key LNG transshipment hub. Belgium’s Energy Minister Mathieu Bié stated that the country intends to hold technical consultations and expects a detailed impact report from the European Commission before taking a final position.

Spain and the Netherlands, unlike France and Belgium, declared their readiness to support the European Commission’s plan. Spain relies on its developed network of terminals and confidence in its ability to quickly replace Russian volumes with supplies from the U.S., Qatar, and African countries. The Netherlands also advocates a complete phase-out of Russian LNG, emphasizing the importance of uniform rules across the EU, and has already signed long-term agreements with Qatar, although part of the LNG continues to arrive in the country from Russia under existing private contracts.

The phase-out of Russian LNG supplies has proven to be a difficult decision for the EU, and it remains unclear how and when it will take place, since the European Commission’s proposal is not being readily supported by the main buyers of Russian gas — France and Belgium. Moreover, they must first develop their own plans to replace Russian LNG, which could take several more years. It should be recalled that Bellona, together with other organizations, prepared a roadmap at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to which the EU could have achieved this by 2025, had there been the political will.

The European Union has adopted its 18th package of sanctions against Russia ↑

On July 18, the European Union officially approved its 18th package of sanctions against Russia, targeting the Russian energy sector, in particular Arctic projects related to the extraction and export of hydrocarbons. Adoption of the package was delayed due to the threat of a veto from Slovakia, but agreement was reached after assurances that the country would not suffer serious economic and financial losses.

• The sanctions targeted 105 tankers of the “shadow fleet,” 30 of which continue to transport Russian Arctic oil through the Kola Bay, circumventing the price cap and other restrictions. These vessels, such as Matari and Yanhu, frequently change names, flags, and owners to conceal their ties to Russia. In total, the EU sanctions list now includes 444 vessels transporting LNG, oil, military, and other cargo. The activity of the “shadow fleet” along Norway’s northern coast is raising growing concerns over environmental safety.
• As part of the new sanctions package, the price cap on Russian oil is being reduced from $60 to $47.6 per barrel, with a new mechanism for automatic adjustment: every six months it will be set at 15% below the average price of Urals crude. This measure also applies to oil produced at Arctic fields, such as Prirazlomnoye and projects in the Kara Sea.
• In addition, the European Union is introducing a ban on the import of petroleum products derived from Russian oil: the ban now also covers fuel produced from Russian crude in third countries, including feedstock from Arctic fields. This step is intended to block shadow routes through which Russian oil enters Europe via Asian refineries and to restrict sanctions evasion.

A positive development in the European sanctions is the inclusion of a ban on the import of petroleum products derived from Russian oil in third countries. This could reduce the volumes of Russian oil imports by countries that have relied on it, such as India and Turkey. However, the success of these sanctions will directly depend on the EU’s ability to track crude oil supply chains and processing.

Atomflot has filed a lawsuit against the Dutch company Damen over the disruption of tugboat deliveries for the Northern Sea Route ↑

On July 25, Atomflot filed a lawsuit in the Arbitration Court of the Murmansk Region against the Dutch company Damen Shipyards Gorinchem, seeking the return of 1.2 billion rubles (€12.6 million) in advance payments made for the construction of ice-class tugs for the Northern Sea Route.

In 2021, Atomflot (a Rosatom subsidiary managing the nuclear icebreaker fleet) ordered five ice-class tugs from the Dutch company Damen for 4 billion rubles (€42.1 million). These vessels were intended to be used by NOVATEK’s subsidiary Arctic Transshipment for LNG transfer operations along the Northern Sea Route. The tugs were originally scheduled for delivery by the end of November 2022. However, in March of that year, following the imposition of sanctions against Russia, Damen suspended all contracts with Russian clients. This became the basis for the lawsuit.

Earlier, Rosmorport had made similar claims against Damen: under seven contracts, it sought to recover advance payments totaling €22.5 million (about 1.946 billion rubles at the exchange rate at the time of payment). The Moscow Arbitration Court upheld Rosmorport’s claims and ordered the Dutch company to pay the outstanding amount, rejecting Damen’s arguments regarding sanctions and force majeure.

The Moscow Arbitration Court initially awarded about 417 million rubles (€4.4 million) in compensation for exchange rate losses from the company, but the amount was later recalculated and increased to roughly 598 million rubles (€63 million). During the proceedings, Damen attempted to challenge Rosmorport’s claims and filed a counterclaim, but the court rejected it.

Russian companies are filing lawsuits in Russian courts against foreign companies that exited the Russian market under international sanctions, with unclear objectives. In international courts, they would most likely lose such cases, so there is virtually no expectation of receiving court-awarded payments. On the other hand, this may serve as additional PR for the domestic audience, reinforcing the narrative of the legal “rightness” of Russian companies.

A Harvard University report states that the scale of China’s investments in the Arctic has been overstated ↑

In June, a study titled “Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments” was published by Harvard’s Belfer Center and Trent University in Canada, challenging the myth of “Chinese dominance” in the Arctic. The researchers note that the frequently cited figure of $90 billion in Chinese investments in the Arctic is inflated, as it largely includes projects that were never implemented or were canceled.

China’s actual economic presence in the region is much more modest than the impression created by media and political statements.

Russia is the leader in terms of Chinese investment in the Arctic, with the Yamal LNG project being the main example. China’s primary activities in the Arctic are linked to participation in Russian LNG projects, the development of port infrastructure, and Arctic shipping. Nevertheless, the report notes that many joint projects remain frozen, and China’s investments have not managed to fundamentally transform the Arctic economy.

The Arctic LNG 2 project is ramping up gas production and resuming export shipments ↑

According to Bloomberg, Russia has ramped up production at the Arctic LNG 2 project to record levels — on June 28–29, output reached 14 million cubic meters of gas per day. This is the highest level since the plant’s launch in December 2023 (above the initial output of 13.7 million cubic meters in December 2023 and nearly 1.6 times higher than the average June volumes of 8.9 million cubic meters per day).

According to gCaptain, analysis of flaring indicated that the plant was likely not idle but had been regularly producing LNG since at least May 7, and by the end of June its storage tanks may have been filled. Satellite observations showed both trains of the plant in operation.

In June–July, Arctic LNG 2 had already shipped three LNG cargoes: in early June, gas was loaded onto the carrier Iris (formerly North Sky), then onto Voskhod (formerly North Mountain), and in July onto Zarya (formerly North Way).

• Iris was loaded on June 26–27, then set course for Murmansk, before turning east in early July. Since August 15, it has been sailing toward Asia via the NSR.
• Voskhod arrived on July 16 and was loaded, remaining in Russian waters near Arctic LNG 2 until mid-August; on August 15, it also departed eastbound along the NSR.
• Zarya was loaded on July 29 and, like Voskhod, remained near Arctic LNG 2 without unloading until August 15, after which it set out eastward via the NSR.

According to the NSR Administration, at least one vessel is bound for China: the tanker Voskhod is heading to the Beihai terminal in the south of the country, operated by PipeChina. For Iris and Zarya, the destination is not specified, but they are highly likely also bound for China.

In August–October 2024, eight LNG cargoes were shipped from Arctic LNG 2; however, there are no confirmed commercial deliveries from those earlier loadings. As we noted in previous digests, part of the volumes were transshipped to the floating storage units Saam in Murmansk and Koryak in Kamchatka, while some cargo remained on board for a long time without a declared final port.

It appears that Russia has gained hopes for potential LNG customers from Arctic LNG 2. Preliminary agreements may have been reached with Chinese buyers, possibly contingent on the progress of negotiations between the presidents of Russia and the United States with a prospect of easing sanctions.

A positive backdrop around the Arctic LNG 2 project is also being created by Russian state-controlled media. During the 9th OPEC International Seminar in Vienna on July 9–10, 2025, TASS released a news report claiming that the Japanese company JOGMEC does not intend to withdraw from the project and hopes to receive supplies from it in the future, citing a conversation on the sidelines with the corporation’s Executive Vice President Hiroyuki Mori.

In the Arctic LNG 2 project, a 10% stake is indeed retained by the Japanese company Japan Arctic LNG, which is owned 25% by Mitsui and 75% by JOGMEC. France’s TotalEnergies, as well as China’s CNPC and CNOOC, each hold 10% in Arctic LNG 2. Although foreign companies formally maintain their stakes in the project, their participation has been completely frozen since 2022.

Another question is how TASS, one of Russia’s main propaganda media agencies, became a media partner of an event held in Austria, and why correspondents of Russian state propaganda outlets are still present in an EU country that has adopted 18 sanctions packages against Russia.

Russia is withdrawing from the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands ↑

At the end of July, the State Duma unanimously supported the decision to withdraw from the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. The authorities justified their decision by citing the “politicization” of the agreement, including the fact that member states continue to recognize 15 wetlands located in Crimea and other occupied regions as Ukrainian.

Despite government promises to develop a new national mechanism for the protection of wetlands, environmentalists and experts warn that withdrawal from the convention may leave unique ecosystems without real protection.

The Expert Council on Protected Areas, which brings together Russian scientists and nature conservation specialists, criticized the Foreign Ministry’s initiative to withdraw from the Ramsar Convention. In an appeal to Sergey Lavrov, the experts stressed that despite foreign policy tensions, Russia’s participation in the convention serves its national interests and ensures the protection of unique natural areas, while withdrawal from the agreement carries environmental risks.

The Ramsar Convention is an international agreement signed in 1971 that brings together 172 countries with the aim of preserving wetlands. The document is intended to protect ecosystems that play a key role in regulating the climate, maintaining biodiversity, preserving the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples, and serving as habitats for waterfowl and semi-aquatic birds.

In Russia’s Arctic zone, seven wetlands of international importance are protected under the Ramsar Convention. These include the unique territories of Taimyr, such as the valley between the Pura and Mokoritto rivers, the Brekhovskie Islands, and the delta of the Gorbita River; Kandalaksha Bay in the Murmansk Region and the islands of the Onega Bay of the White Sea in Karelia; as well as the Yamal-Nenets wetlands — Nizhneye Dvuobye and the islands of the Ob Bay of the Kara Sea.

Russia’s withdrawal from the Ramsar Convention continues the trend of ending its participation in various international treaties. Given that Russia’s national environmental legislation is weak and will continue to be weakened, the risk of degradation of Arctic wetlands in the event of interest from the extractive industry in these areas is increasing.

Increased Industrial Pressure on the Russian Arctic

Precious metals production in Chukotka continues to grow ↑

In the first half of 2025, silver and gold production in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug increased significantly. Since the beginning of the year, 58.3 tons of silver have been produced — almost one and a half times more than in the same period last year (+47%). Gold production reached 11.3 tons, which is 31% higher than in 2024.

The main contribution to gold production came from Highland Gold group enterprises, which produced 7.8 tons, or 72% of the total volume. The Karalveem mine produced 777.2 kilograms of gold, while Polymetal’s Mayskoye operation produced more than 2.2 tons.

New industrial projects in the Russian Arctic: a brief overview

Chukotka has signed two new agreements on the development of gold deposits ↑

On June 18, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Chukotka signed two agreements on the development of the Lenotap and Sekushcheye gold deposits in the Egvekinot municipal district. The documents were concluded between the regional government and the companies Novaya Syrevaya Kompaniya and Bitfly. The total investment at the first stage will exceed 1.1 billion rubles (€11.6 million): 500 million rubles (€5.27 million) are planned for Lenotap and 650 million (€6.85 million) for Sekushcheye.

Both projects envisage four stages of work — from geological exploration to the construction of mining and processing plants, which are expected to be launched in 2032–2033. The resources of the two deposits are estimated at about 93 tons of gold.

PhosAgro will invest 60 billion rubles in 2025–2027 in the development of the Apatit mining and processing plant ↑

The PhosAgro group has signed a special investment contract with the government of the Murmansk Region, providing for an investment of 60 billion rubles (€632 million) in 2025–2027 in the development of its key asset — the Kirov branch of Apatit in the Murmansk Region. The enterprise mines apatite-nepheline ore and produces apatite concentrate used in the production of phosphate fertilizers, as well as nepheline concentrate for metallurgy. The funds will be allocated for the construction of new mining capacities to replace depleting ones, ensuring increased productivity of the enterprise.

The total volume of investments in the development of Apatit’s resource base is estimated at more than 330 billion rubles (€3.5 billion) through 2033. Key projects include the modernization of the Loparskaya River drainage system by 2028 and the construction of the Rasvumchorr Plateau underground mine. In 2024, the enterprise produced 11.4 million tons of apatite concentrate.

Rosnedra has announced an auction for the development of the Pinkeljavr iron ore deposit in the Murmansk Region ↑

In the Murmansk Region, the Pinkeljavr deposit has been put up for auction, with iron ore reserves exceeding 77 million tons. Of these, proven reserves amount to 22.6 million tons, while estimated resources add another 54.5 million tons. The site, covering 8.5 square kilometers, is located in the Lovozero District.

The starting auction price is 357.2 million rubles (€3.8 million), with applications accepted until July 28, and the bidding scheduled for August 14.

The deposit has been studied since the 1950s, but its development was previously considered economically unfeasible.

Environmental and Climate Challenges in the Arctic

More than 1,000 scientists from around the world have called for restrictions on mining and shipping in the central Arctic ↑

More than 1,000 participants of the UN Ocean Conference in Nice, France, signed a letter calling for an international agreement to ban industrial activity in the high-latitude Arctic.

In their letter, they refer to the international agreement in force since 2021 on the prevention of unregulated fishing in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean (the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, or CAOFA). CAOFA prohibits commercial fishing in the high seas until it is proven that such activity is sustainable and does not cause environmental harm, requires that the views of Indigenous peoples be taken into account when granting permits for such activity, and obliges the creation of international research groups to study the marine ecosystems of the central Arctic and the potential impact of fishing on them. The agreement is valid until 2037 and may then be extended.

The authors of the letter believe that a similar approach should be applied to commercial shipping and deep-sea mining, especially since interest in such activities in the region is growing as Arctic ice retreats.

In 2024, the temperature in the Russian Arctic was 1.24 degrees above the 1991–2020 average ↑

This was reported by Roshydromet.

“Temperatures above normal were observed throughout the Russian Arctic, except for a small coastal strip in the Long Strait area… The warmest conditions (95th percentile extremes) were recorded on the Kola Peninsula, along the White Sea coast, and in the Khatanga River basin,” the document states.

The review notes that average annual temperatures in the Russian Arctic have been rising since the 1970s and have accelerated sharply in the 21st century. The study reports that the waters of the Siberian Arctic seas, through which the Northern Sea Route passes, experienced particularly noticeable warming in the 2010s.

The area of peatlands in the Arctic is increasing due to climate warming ↑

As a result of rising temperatures in the Arctic over the past 40 years, the area of peatlands has expanded, reports an international team led by British scientists from the University of Exeter. The study’s findings were published in June in Communications Earth & Environment (CEE).

On the one hand, peatlands act as carbon sinks; on the other hand, further warming in the Arctic could lead to their degradation and loss, which in turn would release carbon, methane, and other greenhouse gases, driving further temperature increases, the authors warn.

Another recent study conducted by scientists at Tomsk State University showed that the opposite process also occurs, in which peatlands help preserve permafrost. The research team monitored the temperature regime of several types of wetland landscapes for 10 years at the Khanymey research station in the Purovsky District of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

The researchers analyzed how the temperature of the active soil layer (the part of the ground that thaws during summer) differs across various microrelief features of the same wetland landscape — on elevations (hummocks and ridges) and in inter-hummock depressions (bogs). The results showed that even within a small area, soil temperature regimes vary significantly: peat hummocks remain colder and better protect permafrost, whereas bogs, due to high moisture content and thick winter snow cover, are considerably warmer.

Scientists note that with rising temperatures in the Arctic, the thickness of the active soil layer may increase, leading to permafrost degradation and the release of organic carbon, as well as greater accumulation of supra-permafrost water, which in turn further accelerates thawing processes.

Mercury released into the environment as far back as the 19th century is threatening Arctic ecosystems ↑

In a new study published in Nature Communications, a team of scientists analyzed more than 700 samples collected across Greenland over the past 40 years, ranging from animal tissues to peat. The researchers found that during this period the concentration of mercury in Arctic ecosystems has not decreased and, in some cases, has even increased.

The researchers argue that one of the key reasons for this is pollution reaching the Arctic via ocean currents. Mercury released into the air from human activity may remain in the atmosphere for no more than a year before settling on the surface. However, once it enters the ocean, it can migrate for decades, slowly moving northward with deep-water currents.

“Transport of mercury from major sources like China to Greenland via ocean currents can take up to 150 years,” explains one of the study’s authors, Professor Rune Dietz.

As a result, mercury concentrations in polar bears and toothed whales are now 20–30 times higher than pre-industrial levels. Mercury is a powerful neurotoxin capable of harming the immune system and reproductive health.

The team plans to continue studying the impact of mercury on the fragile Arctic ecosystem. Professor Rune Dietz says that modeling the time required for mercury to move from major sources of pollution to different regions of the Arctic may be the key to understanding and ultimately countering this long-term threat.

A rise in natural radiation levels has been recorded in Novaya Zemlya, likely linked to permafrost thaw ↑

Participants of the Arctic Floating University expedition working on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago detected an increase in natural radioactivity levels. The scientists recorded higher concentrations of radon, which, according to their preliminary assumptions, may be directly linked to the thawing of permafrost.

At the same locations where measurements were taken last year — for example, in Russkaya Gavan — current radon levels turned out to be roughly twice as high, explained expedition member Evgeny Yakovlev, head of the Laboratory of Environmental Radiology at the Federal Research Center for Integrated Arctic Studies. According to him, the normally thick permafrost layer restrains this gas, and its release to the surface indicates active thawing of frozen ground.

At the same time, the specialist emphasized that the recorded radiation background does not pose a danger to humans. However, for Arctic territories, where levels are usually very low, its increase is an important indicator that may point to significant permafrost thaw.

Scientists have recorded unprecedented freshening of Arctic waters ↑

Scientists from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and the Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences studied the spread of freshwater in the Eastern Arctic using the example of the Lena River plume. Analysis of satellite data and expedition measurements showed that due to rapid sea ice melt and stronger winds, the area of the freshened layer has expanded significantly, reaching a record 870,000 km² in certain years. The plume extends far beyond its usual boundaries, spreading northward — just 1,300 km from the Pole — and eastward to the Chukchi Sea.

According to forecasts, in the coming decades the Eastern Arctic will continue to see shrinking ice cover and stronger winds during the warm seasons, making such anomalous plume sizes the norm. In the future, freshwater may even reach the Bering Strait.

Accidents and Emergencies in the Russian Arctic

In the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, serious environmental incidents related to oil production were recorded in June–July ↑

In June 2025, the Yamal-Nenets environmental prosecutor’s office reported contamination of forest areas with oil-containing liquid caused by the company Kharampurneftegaz (a Rosneft subsidiary). The court ordered the company to pay more than 25 million rubles (€263 405) in damages and carry out land reclamation of the affected areas. This case is part of a systemic problem: in 2023, the company was already held liable for an oil spill covering about 8,000 m² with damages exceeding 8.8 million rubles (€92 718), and in 2022 an incident was recorded at the North Kharampur field due to a pipeline leak, with damages of around 2 million rubles (€21 072).

On June 14, local residents recorded an oil spill at the Zapadno-Noyabrskoye field in the Tazovsky District, which contaminated 1.5 km² of soil and posed a risk of petroleum products entering nearby water bodies close to the village of Antipayuta. Eyewitnesses reported a strong smell of fuel and suggested that the leak was coming from tanks located near the shore. On June 16, Rosprirodnadzor collected soil and water samples, but the results have not yet been published.

Oil spill from a vessel and state of emergency in the Murmansk Region ↑

In early June, it became known that in Teriberka, Murmansk Region, a small vessel had run aground during low tide, leaking fuel directly into the Barents Sea. On June 6, a commission from the Kola District administration recorded a rainbow of oil near the hull but nevertheless stated that the water area was generally clean with no signs of oil pollution. Later, specialists from the Center for Laboratory Analysis and Technical Measurements found that samples of seawater exceeded permissible concentrations of petroleum products. Rosprirodnadzor issued a warning to the vessel’s owner and ordered the violations to be corrected; however, as of June 11, the vessel had still not been towed away, and no updated information on its fate was available.

In Murmansk, a regional state of emergency was introduced on July 1 due to operations to remove the PD-50 floating dock that sank in 2018. The dock still lies on the bottom of the Kola Bay, and its recovery carries the risk of fuel and lubricant leaks and damage to the marine environment.

Oil product spills in Komi ↑

Two oil product spills have been recorded in Komi. On June 30, at the Kyrtaelskoye field, an oil-containing liquid was released during pipeline replacement by Ukhtaneftegaz, though the contamination did not reach water bodies. And on July 1, in the Usinsky District, a spill covering 1,200 m² was detected, caused by an unauthorized discharge. According to the Komi Ministry of Natural Resources, the contamination was contained with booms and natural barriers, and the nearest river, the Kolva, is three kilometers from the site of the incident.

Recommended Materials ↑

Bellona has published a new report, “The Northern Sea Route: Russia’s industrial and political expansion, its environmental costs, and Arctic shipping risks,” which presents information on Russia’s plans for developing the Northern Sea Route as well as the environmental and political risks of increased shipping. The report examines the legal and environmental aspects of navigation, the risks of industrial development, the impact of international sanctions, and the state of emergency response infrastructure. The report will be useful for policymakers, experts, and journalists working on Arctic issues.