In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic.

Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.   

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for April can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Russia plans to expand its fleet for the Northern Sea Route and ensure up to 80% of components are produced domestically
2. Icebreaking container ships and tugboats for the Northern Sea Route are currently being built in China
3. The Audit Chamber has recommended reducing the plans for building emergency and rescue vessels for the Northern Sea Route
4. The Prosecutor’s Office reported typical violations of legislation on the Northern Sea Route
5. Russia expects $160 billion in tax revenues from Northern Sea Route development projects by 2035
6. One of the three berths at Russia’s northernmost seaport in Chukotka is set to be reconstructed

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
7. The EU and the United Kingdom have tightened sanctions against Russia
8. Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 Plant Launches Second LNG Production Line
9. The European Commission has presented a plan to completely phase out Russian energy imports by 2027

INCREASED INDUSTRIAL PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
10. The Arctic accounts for 11% of Russian exports
11. Rosneft Begins Pilot Oil Production at Two Vostok Oil Fields
12. Norilsk Nickel has reported a 23% reduction in its annual sulfur dioxide emissions
13. New industrial projects in the Russian Arctic: a brief overview

Commentary by Bellona

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHALLENGES IN THE ARCTIC
14. Environmental organizations are calling for urgent measures to protect marine mammals from the consequences of increasing shipping activity along the Northern Sea Route
15. Shipping Noise in the Arctic Ocean Could Quadruple by 2030, Warns the Arctic Council
16. Permafrost Thaw Adaptation Plan for the Russian Arctic Zone to Be Approved by Year-End

ACCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC

RECOMMENDED MATERIALS

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Russia plans to expand its fleet for the Northern Sea Route and ensure up to 80% of components are produced domestically ↑

On May 12, the Russian government published an updated Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding Industry. According to the document, building vessels for operations along the Northern Sea Route and increasing cargo traffic on this route are among Russia’s key priorities in shipbuilding — both in the medium term (through 2036) and in the long term (through 2050).

The strategy also includes plans to build a fleet for operations along the Northern Sea Route. By 2036, the number of cargo fleet operating on the Northern Sea Route is expected to reach 51, and by 2050 — to grow to 135. According to estimates, demand for shipbuilding by 2036 could reach up to 130 vessels, including container ships, bulk carriers, supply vessels, and tankers for transporting oil, gas, and petroleum products.

mport substitution of ship equipment is also listed among the priorities: by 2036, Russian enterprises are expected to account for around 50% of component production, and by 2050 — up to 80%.

The final document also includes recommendations from Russia’s largest shipbuilding holding, the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC).

On May 21, at the POLAR 2025 conference in St. Petersburg, the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) presented new Arctic vessel projects, including a tanker for transporting crude oil, gas condensate, and petroleum products; a semi-submersible vessel for heavy cargo; as well as conceptual designs for an ice-class container ship and a research vessel.

Icebreaking container ships and tugboats for the Northern Sea Route are currently being built in China ↑

The Chinese logistics company LEDOCO, in cooperation with the Russian state corporation Rosatom, has begun construction of five ice-class container ships for transportation along the Northern Sea Route. This was announced by LEDOCO CEO Ke Jin at the Russia-China Forum held on May 19–20 in Khabarovsk. According to him, using the NSR has already reduced cargo delivery times from China to Russia by more than 30%.

In addition, China has started building a series of Arc4-class icebreaking tugboats commissioned by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. These vessels, with a towing capacity of up to 60 tons, are intended for mooring operations, rescue missions, and firefighting in Arctic conditions. The project is being implemented at the Zhenjiang Huigang Machinery Equipment shipyard with the involvement of Russian engineers.

The Audit Chamber has recommended reducing the plans for building emergency and rescue vessels for the Northern Sea Route ↑

The Audit Chamber — a government body overseeing the use of Russia’s budget funds — has proposed that Rosmorrechflot revise its plans for building rescue vessels for the Northern Sea Route. This recommendation was voiced by  Audit Chamber auditor Valery Bogomolov during a meeting at the Federation Council. He explained that the existing fleet is sufficient for emergency and rescue operations, while the construction of new vessels is becoming increasingly expensive and budget resources are needed to support the war effort.

An audit revealed that out of 105 vessels operated by the Marine Rescue Service, only 44 are used to carry out state-assigned tasks, with many being leased for commercial purposes. Between 2013 and 2021, 11 multipurpose vessels were built with federal funding, but some have not been used as intended. For example, the Baltika vessel, which cost 3.3 billion rubles, was operated under charter contracts from 2021 to 2023 and was not involved in state missions.

The development plan for the Northern Sea Route through 2030 originally included the construction of 46 vessels; however, the timeline has since been delayed due to sanctions and rising equipment costs. Work on eight contracts valued at 46.4 billion rubles is behind schedule, with cost overruns already reaching 18.2 billion rubles. Two vessels were commissioned in 2024, and the delivery of another 12 is planned for 2025. Rosmorrechflot has been advised to assess the feasibility of continuing further construction given the current resources.

The Ministry of Transport, meanwhile, insists that the need for a rescue fleet remains high: covering the entire Russian coastline requires 184 vessels, including 54 for the Arctic, whereas currently there are only eight. Construction of certain series, such as the T3150-ZD project tugboats, is facing delays. Despite this, the demand to strengthen emergency and rescue capabilities persists amid growing cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route.

The Prosecutor’s Office reported typical violations of legislation on the Northern Sea Route ↑

The Prosecutor’s Office identified several common violations of legislation in the operation of the Northern Sea Route. This was reported by Roman Dotsenko, Acting Prosecutor for Northwest Transport, at the 12th St. Petersburg International Legal Forum held from May 19 to 21.

The main violations identified include:

• Errors by seaport captains, including insufficient control over vessel traffic and ineffective use of administrative powers.
• Weak government oversight of pilotage services.
• Violations in the operation and maintenance of berths.
• Infractions in the training and certification of merchant fleet crews.
• Deviations from environmental requirements by owners of maritime terminals on the Northern Sea Route.

Russia expects $160 billion in tax revenues from Northern Sea Route development projects by 2035 ↑

According to the Russian government, Arctic projects along the Northern Sea Route could generate over $160 billion in tax revenues for the federal budget by 2035. Currently, the Arctic accounts for 7.5% of Russia’s GDP and 11% of its exports, and these figures are expected to grow.

Despite sanctions and delays affecting projects such as Arctic LNG 2 and Vostok Oil, major companies — Novatek, Gazprom, Rosneft, Nornickel, and Lukoil — remain actively engaged in the region.

In 2024, nuclear icebreaker fleet operator Atomflot conducted 976 vessel escorts, earning up to $700,000 per passage. From LNG shipments from the Yamal LNG plant alone during the 2024 winter, the company earned over $50 million.

One of the three berths at Russia’s northernmost seaport in Chukotka is set to be reconstructed ↑

Glavgosexpertiza (the Russian Federal State Expert Review Authority) has approved the reconstruction project for Berth No. 3 at the Arctic port of Pevek — the northernmost town in Russia. Originally built in 1969, Berth No. 3 had been out of operation due to severe physical deterioration. After reconstruction, it will be able to accommodate large vessels with a displacement of up to 25,000 tons, and the projected cargo turnover will increase to 945,000 tons per year. The berth’s depth will be increased from 5 to 9 meters through dredging, which will remove silted sand and foreign objects from the seabed.

Pevek, located along the Northern Sea Route in the Chaunskaya Bay strait of the East Siberian Sea, serves as a key hub for resource transportation and the supply of Arctic territories.

Commentary by Bellona:

«On May 12, the Government of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Government) published an updated Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding Industry (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy).

This event drew particular attention and interest from Bellona, as the government document addresses the current state of the entire Russian shipbuilding sector, including the impact of geopolitical changes following the outbreak of the war. Moreover, shipbuilding and the civilian fleet are closely linked to developments currently taking place in the Arctic and along the Northern Sea Route in particular.

The published government document acknowledges that Russia currently lacks a competitive shipbuilding industry. Since 2022, many conditions under which the shipbuilding industry operated and the vessels of the Russian civilian fleet were maintained have undergone significant changes. As noted in the Strategy, Russia’s civilian shipbuilding sector has faced a number of new external and internal challenges. The main ones are:

— traditional partners in military-technical cooperation have turned to Western manufacturers;

— the need has arisen to develop domestic competencies in building large-capacity cargo vessels, which are currently lacking;

— the supply of critically important materials and ship components has stopped (on average, the share of imported components ranges from 30% to 80% of total material and equipment costs);

— the processes of obtaining warranty and post-warranty servicing for ship components previously installed on vessels have become more difficult or ceased altogether;

— the upgrading of equipment to improve the production capacity of ship repair yards with the involvement of foreign experts has become more difficult or stopped;

— vessels sailing under the Russian flag have faced restrictions on entering most European ports, including for the purpose of ship repairs;

— the main large ship repair enterprises (Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center, the 82nd Ship Repair Plant, the 10th Ship Repair Plant, and others) specialize almost exclusively in the repair of military vessels under the state defense order; there are no other large shipyards in Russia;

— Russian ship repair enterprises owned by major corporations primarily focus on servicing their own vessels used by the owners of these corporations. Such enterprises are established and operate to meet the internal needs of the owner and to avoid dependence on external contractors;

— high accumulated debt burden on enterprises;

— the use of borrowed and credit funds, high interest rates on loans, as well as unresolved pricing issues for products under the state defense order have a negative impact on the financial and economic condition of enterprises;

— extremely low profitability of shipbuilding orders or a complete lack of profit after order fulfillment;

— a severe shortage of highly qualified personnel (including highly skilled project managers and developers), as well as an overall shortage of staff — particularly engineers, skilled production workers, and specialists in digital technologies;

— the previously accumulated scientific potential has now been almost completely exhausted, leading to a certain lag behind the global level of scientific and technological development in the shipbuilding sector.

The challenges listed above are the result not only of the geopolitical changes that took place in 2022, but also of the policies pursued by the Russian leadership in the field of shipbuilding throughout the years following the collapse of the USSR. The Strategy notes that most of the vessels currently operated by the Russian Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport were built in the 1970s and 1980s. This means that the majority of these vessels are outdated, and in the coming years, there will be a large-scale decommissioning and disposal of maritime and inland civilian vessels.

As for the vessels that are used (or may be or are planned to be used) on the Northern Sea Route, the situation is similar.

As of 2023, the Russian icebreaker fleet consisted of 45 icebreakers, of which 37 (84%) were diesel-electric and 8 (16%) were nuclear-powered. The Russian icebreaker fleet requires renewal, as 43% of the vessels (28% by displacement) are over 40 years old. Only 13% of the icebreakers (6 vessels), accounting for 30% of the fleet’s total displacement, are less than 10 years old.

The tanker fleet is characterized by a high level of wear: 68%, or 572 vessels, are over 30 years old. The most outdated segment is oil tankers, with 564 vessels in the over-30-year age category. The dry cargo fleet also shows a high degree of deterioration: 76%, or 1,076 vessels, are over 30 years old. The most obsolete segment consists of general cargo and refrigerated cargo vessels, totaling 1,037 units.

As of 2023, the number of maritime support vessels stood at 732. The main types of support vessels include tugs (449 vessels) and research vessels (65 vessels), while the rest are vessels of various classes and purposes.

The government document concludes that the current rate of vessel commissioning observed in recent years is insufficient to offset the expected decommissioning of outdated vessels. As a result, in the near future, the shipbuilding industry may face a sharp decline in the total number of operational vessels.

The Strategy acknowledges that the problem lies not only in the fact that around 80% of all existing vessels are either outdated or cannot be repaired for various reasons. The most serious issue is the severe shortage of construction and launch facilities needed for the serial production of large-capacity ships and vessels. Only a few (two or three) shipbuilding enterprises in the Russian Federation are capable of building civilian vessels longer than 170 meters. Russian shipbuilding currently lags behind the world’s leading shipyards in terms of production and technology. By 2036, over 95% of the fixed assets of enterprises in the shipbuilding sector will be worn out, making the situation critical.

97% of all imported equipment was purchased from countries that are now considered unfriendly, which is why the share of imported equipment and components for shipyards reaches 70–100%. Russia also lags technologically in block construction of ships (the country has virtually no shipyards that use this method), in the production of hull structures with minimal tolerances, and in the use of optoelectronic computerized measurement systems, as well as other forms of automation and industrial robotics.

The Strategy concludes that an analysis of the capabilities of shipbuilding enterprises and the financial and economic condition of shipowners, transport, and leasing companies shows that it will be impossible to meet the domestic market’s demand for civilian vessels and maritime equipment in the next 10 years. Despite the critical situation, the government believes that the top priority should be the construction of vessels to support the transport corridors of the Northern Sea Route. According to estimates, demand for shipbuilding by 2036 could reach up to 130 high Arctic-class vessels of various types, including container ships, bulk carriers, multipurpose supply vessels, crude oil tankers, product tankers, and gas carriers.

The published Strategy also provides other important and noteworthy data. The document shows that, as of today, Russia effectively lacks a modern civilian fleet and does not have a shipbuilding industry capable of competing in any meaningful way with foreign companies.

It is surprising that such a document was made publicly available. We’ll be watching closely.»

The international situation in the Arctic and sanctions on Russia’s activities in the Arctic region

The EU and the United Kingdom have tightened sanctions against Russia ↑

On May 20, 2025, the European Union approved its 17th and most extensive sanctions package against Russia, aimed at reducing its revenues from the sale of energy resources used to finance the war with Ukraine. The sanctions affected 189 vessels of the so-called “shadow fleet” involved in transporting Russian oil and LNG in circumvention of sanctions. The total number of vessels sanctioned by the EU reached 342. These measures include a ban on port entry and a ban on services that enable maritime transportation.

In addition, the EU for the first time imposed individual sanctions on companies and intermediaries ensuring the operation of the “shadow fleet.” The restrictions affected shipping companies and insurers from the UAE, Turkey, and Hong Kong, as well as one of Russia’s key insurance companies – VSK, which had already been sanctioned by the United Kingdom.

Some of the sanctioned vessels operate in the Arctic region. Several of them regularly pass through Norwegian waters and call at the port of Honningsvåg in northern Norway for refueling and servicing. According to The Barents Observer, at least seven tankers included in the 17th sanctions package were located off the Norwegian coast at the time of publication. Among them are the tankers Arabesca, Arctic Metagas, and Raven.

New LNG tankers serving the Arctic Yamal LNG project were also sanctioned: North Ocean, North Light, and North Moon. These vessels began operating only a few months ago and have already been transporting LNG for this project.

According to the EU, since the introduction of the oil price cap and earlier sanctions, Russia’s oil revenues have decreased by €38 billion. In March 2025, revenues were 13.7% lower than in March 2023 and 20.3% lower compared to March 2022. However, analysts from Pole Star Global point out that more than half of the known “shadow fleet” vessels remain unsanctioned. Of 266 tankers linked to eight major fleets, only 89 are currently subject to restrictions.

The EU also imposed restrictive measures on Surgutneftegas, a major Russian oil company operating in the Beloyarsky District of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, which was included in the Russian Arctic zone in March 2024. Earlier, in January 2025, Surgutneftegas was sanctioned by the United States.

In parallel, the United Kingdom announced a new package of sanctions against Russia, targeting the defense industry, energy exports, financial structures, and propaganda distributors. This list also included 18 vessels from the “shadow fleet.”

Additionally, British sanctions halted the delivery of a new floating dock for Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers. This large dock was built in Turkey to service the latest nuclear icebreakers, but became stranded in the Mediterranean Sea after the Russian tug Vengeriya, intended to transport it, was sanctioned. The 220-meter-long, 30,000-ton capacity dock was built by the Turkish Kuzey Star Shipyard under a $68 million contract with Rosatomflot. Russia has no docks in the Arctic capable of servicing Project 22220 icebreakers – Arktika, Sibir, Ural, and Yakutiya – so they are forced to undergo maintenance in St. Petersburg.

Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 Plant Launches Second LNG Production Line ↑

According to Bloomberg, despite Western sanctions and technical challenges, NOVATEK’s Arctic LNG-2 plant in the Murmansk region has launched its second production line with an annual capacity of 6.6 million tons. Main operations had been halted in October 2024 due to sanctions, declining demand, and ice conditions. Although the plant managed to ship several LNG batches in the summer of 2024, none of them were sold due to a lack of buyers.

According to Reuters, the plant’s first production line has been shut down due to overflowing storage tanks and a shortage of tankers to transport the gas. One of the key reasons is the limited availability of Arc7-class icebreaking tankers capable of exporting LNG in harsh Arctic conditions.

Construction of the third production line of the Arctic LNG-2 plant continues in Belokamenka near Murmansk, despite the temporary suspension of the first line and ongoing logistical difficulties. The line will be part of the overall project with a total capacity of 19.8 million tons of LNG per year.

At the same time, the so-called “shadow fleet” — LNG carriers under EU and U.S. sanctions — has become more active at the Arctic LNG-2 plant.Four tankers — North Sky, North Air, North Mountain, and North Way — built in 2023–2024 and previously sailing under the Panamanian flag, have been renamed Iris, Buran, Voskhod, and Zarya. These Arc4-class icebreaking tankers were granted permission to navigate the Northern Sea Route starting in May 2025. They now operate under the Russian flag and are expected to be used to export LNG from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects.

The European Commission has presented a plan to completely phase out Russian energy imports by 2027 ↑

The European Commission has unveiled a plan to phase out imports of Russian energy resources to the EU by the end of 2027. According to this roadmap, short-term imports of both pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia are to be discontinued by the end of 2025, followed by the termination of long-term contracts. Despite the ongoing war, countries such as France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands continue to import Russian LNG under pre-war long-term contracts.

This initiative builds upon the REPowerEU plan adopted in May 2022, which aimed to swiftly reduce the EU’s dependency on Russian energy. While progress has been made—such as the complete cessation of coal imports and reduced volumes of oil and gas—some member states still significantly rely on Russian supplies.

Alarmingly, after a decline in 2022–2023, imports from Russia are once again rising. By 2024, Russian gas’s share in total EU imports rose from 14.8% to 18.8%, with particularly active LNG exports from the Yamal LNG plant.

To meet the 2027 target, the European Commission intends to require EU member states to develop national plans detailing current supply volumes, withdrawal timelines, and measures for replacement. These plans, supported by Commission-led working groups, are expected to be submitted in their initial form by the end of 2025.

The roadmap also calls for a gradual discontinuation of cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector. Further specifics on this aspect are addressed in Bellona’s Nuclear Digest publications.

In June, the Commission presented draft legislative proposals as part of the roadmap implementation.

Increased Industrial Pressure on the Russian Arctic

The Arctic accounts for 11% of Russian exports ↑

The Arctic region accounts for 11% of Russia’s exports and produces 7.5% of the country’s GDP. This was stated by Alexey Chekunkov, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic.

To accelerate industrial development in the Arctic, Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources Alexander Kozlov proposed introducing a 1.5 upward adjustment coefficient when calculating exploration costs under the profit tax for onshore fields in the Arctic and the Far East. He made this statement in the State Duma during a government session on the development of the Russian Arctic zone, noting that due to geological reasons, resource exploration has shifted to hard-to-access areas of the Arctic and the Far East. He also emphasized that the implementation of these projects is impossible without the development of transportation infrastructure in the region.

Rosneft Begins Pilot Oil Production at Two Vostok Oil Fields ↑

Between January and March 2025, Rosneft began pilot hydrocarbon production at the Payakhskoye and Icheminskoye fields, part of the Vostok Oil project.

“In the first quarter of 2025, over 30,000 meters of operational drilling was completed, and four production wells were finished,” the company reported, adding that the construction of two cargo berths and one service fleet berth at the Port Bukhta Sever terminal is also nearing completion.

Vostok Oil is currently the largest industrial project in the Arctic. Its maximum capacity is expected to reach 100 million tons per year — nearly three times the total cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in 2024, which amounted to 37.9 million tons. The initial plan was to reach this volume of shipments by 2030; however, the project is behind schedule. Industrial oil production was originally scheduled to begin in 2024, but due to international sanctions, Rosneft decided to postpone the launch of the project’s first phase by two years.

Norilsk Nickel has reported a 23% reduction in its annual sulfur dioxide emissions ↑

This is detailed in the company’s 2024 environmental impact report, which states that Norilsk Nickel invested 374 billion rubles in environmental protection and social projects—amounting to nearly one-third of its total revenue for the year.

Among its environmental achievements, Norilsk Nickel cites a 23.5% reduction in atmospheric SO₂ emissions—from 1.671 million tonnes in 2023 to 1.268 million tonnes in 2024. The company also launched an environmental monitoring system with air pollution measurement stations, removed 1 million tonnes of waste, cleared 480 hectares of land, and dismantled 406 buildings. Stanislav Seleznev, the company’s Vice President for Ecology and Industrial Safety, stated that SO₂ emissions are expected to decrease by another 734,000 tonnes in 2025, with a plan to neutralize 920,000 tonnes of pollutants by 2026.

According to the company, its social initiatives in 2024 also led to a reduction in workplace fatalities to just three cases—the lowest figure in the company’s history—along with improvements in several other labor conditions.

It is worth noting that two of Norilsk Nickel’s three industrial sites are located in the Russian Arctic zone: the Polar Division (Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai), the company’s largest production site, and the Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company in Murmansk Oblast.

New industrial projects in the Russian Arctic: a brief overview ↑

Rosneft acquires license for development of the Tomtor deposit in Yakutia

On May 20, Rosneft became the owner of LLC Vostok Engineering, which holds the license for the development of the deposit.

The Tomtor deposit is one of the world’s largest rare earth metal reserves. Its estimated resources amount to 154 million tonnes of ore with high concentrations of oxides of ten elements, including niobium, terbium, yttrium, and scandium.

Expansion of the “Capital of the Arctic” Advanced Development Territory (ADT) in 2025

The “Capital of the Arctic” ADT is a special economic zone in Murmansk Oblast designed to stimulate economic activity through a preferential legal regime, including provisions related to environmental protection. Its core focus areas are port operations, logistics, and industrial construction.

Currently, eight projects are operating within the ADT. The largest include the Lavna coal terminal, the Tuloma terminal, the Udarnik fish terminal, and the production of LNG floating platforms and Arctic transport solutions. By 2025, several more companies are expected to join, with plans to invest over 150 billion rubles in the region’s development.

Construction of a mining and processing plant at the Kolmozerskoye lithium deposit planned to begin in mid-2026

The plant, located in Murmansk Oblast, is scheduled for launch in 2028, according to TASS citing Igor Demidov, General Director of Polar Lithium.

The project foresees a phased commissioning of two facilities: an open-pit mine and the first stage of a processing plant. Currently, design documentation is being developed for both the facilities and the required infrastructure.

The enterprise is jointly owned by Norilsk Nickel and Rosatom.

Lunnoye tin deposit in Chukotka put up for auction

Rosnedra has begun accepting applications for geological exploration, prospecting, and mining rights at the Lunnoye tin deposit in the Egvekinot Municipal District. The starting bid is 212 million rubles. According to IA Chukotka, the winner will be granted a 25-year license. The deposit area is 16.81 km², with the nearest major settlement being Pevek.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Vostok Oil is the largest extraction project in the Russian Arctic, expected to generate 100 million tons of cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route once it reaches full capacity. However, the project is currently two years behind schedule, and this delay is likely to grow.

A similar situation can be observed with other extraction projects in the Russian Arctic zone, such as Arctic LNG 2 by Novatek, which was forced to halt commercial LNG production less than a month after its launch in August 2024 due to an inability to secure buyers and a shortage of tankers under sanction pressure. Signs of resumed commercial LNG production at the project in March 2025.

Nevertheless, it is evident that Russia is actively planning new mineral extraction projects in the Arctic zone, and the results of sanction pressure do not appear, for the time being, to be significantly affecting these plans or their projected figures.

Another notable development involves Norilsk Nickel’s reported achievement in reducing its annual sulfur dioxide emissions by 23%—the largest reduction in the company’s history. The previous significant emission reductions were achieved through the closure of production facilities: the smelting shop in the settlement of Nikel in December 2020 and the metallurgical shop in Monchegorsk in March 2021.

At the same time, the problem of air pollution caused by the company’s facilities persists. In 2024, Norilsk recorded sulfur dioxide concentrations exceeding permissible limits. On 6 March, official sources reported that maximum permissible concentration (MPC) levels were exceeded by a factor of 4.26, while local environmental activists cited an exceedance factor of 7. Furthermore, the emission reduction program is being implemented exclusively at the Nadezhda Metallurgical Plant, whereas no comparable measures are currently planned for the company’s second-largest industrial site in Norilsk—the Copper Plant.»

Environmental and Climate Challenges in the Arctic

Environmental organizations are calling for urgent measures to protect marine mammals from the consequences of increasing shipping activity along the Northern Sea Route ↑

At the POLAR 2025 conference, Ilya Chernook, Development Director of the environmental center “Ecofactor,” emphasized the need to strengthen environmental monitoring and implement additional measures to reduce the impact of shipping on the Arctic environment.

He noted that springtime shipping along the Northern Sea Route is particularly harmful to marine mammals, as it affects specially protected natural areas, which often overlap with zones of intensive industrial activity. The greatest overlap between animal migration routes and shipping lanes has been recorded in the Kara Sea — a region of active mineral resource extraction.

At the same time, the head of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, citing a study by Rosatom — the infrastructure operator and one of the main beneficiaries of the Northern Sea Route — stated that shipping along the NSR does not have a negative impact on Arctic ecosystems.

Shipping Noise in the Arctic Ocean Could Quadruple by 2030, Warns the Arctic Council ↑

The Arctic Council has published a new report forecasting that underwater noise from shipping in the Arctic Ocean could nearly quadruple by 2030.

As the Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the rest of the planet, the melting of sea ice is opening new maritime routes and accelerating industrial development across the region. According to the new report issued by the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, the combination of increasing vessel traffic and shrinking sea ice is expected to raise the average level of underwater noise in the Arctic Ocean by 5 decibels by 2030.

Since a 3-decibel increase corresponds to a doubling of sound energy, a 5-decibel rise indicates an almost fourfold increase in underwater noise. This may cause stress in various species of marine animals and severely reduce their ability to detect prey, communicate, navigate, and avoid predators.

The report notes that due to the unique properties of sound propagation in Arctic waters, even a slight increase in shipping activity can have a significant impact on underwater noise levels. Cold temperatures allow sound waves to travel farther and closer to the surface of the water, meaning that noise from ships often overlaps with the sounds made by swimming and diving animals such as narwhals, bowhead whales, and walruses.

The report outlines a number of possible measures to mitigate the acoustic impact, including reducing vessel speed, rerouting shipping traffic away from areas with particularly vulnerable ecosystems, and introducing ship technologies that reduce noise. These strategies, whether applied individually or in combination, could substantially decrease local and regional levels of underwater noise from maritime activity.

Over the past decade, the number of vessels entering Arctic waters under the Polar Code has increased by 37%, and the total distance traveled has doubled. However, despite this significant growth, there is currently no international regulation specifically aimed at limiting underwater shipping noise in the Arctic.

Permafrost Thaw Adaptation Plan for the Russian Arctic Zone to Be Approved by Year-End ↑

A plan of measures to adapt Arctic infrastructure to the thawing of permafrost is expected to be approved by the end of this year, announced Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic, Alexey Chekunkov, during a government session in the State Duma dedicated to the socio-economic and infrastructure development of the Arctic.

He also noted that, according to estimates by some scientists, the loss of soil bearing capacity in the Arctic could reach up to 60% by 2050.

According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, this process has already led to the deformation of 40% of northern infrastructure. The potential economic damage to Russia could amount to at least 5 trillion rubles (€51.1 billion) by 2050, according to Deputy Minister of Natural Resources Sergey Anoprienko.

Accidents and Emergencies in the Russian Arctic ↑

On May 10, a major fire broke out at the Festivalnoye oil field operated by Kharampurneftegaz, a subsidiary of Rosneft, in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Two oil and gas wells caught fire, and one of the drilling rigs collapsed. Three people were injured in the incident. It took ten days to fully extinguish the open flames.

On May 18, reports of petroleum pollution in the Severnaya Dvina River in Arkhangelsk Oblast surfaced on social media. Eyewitnesses reported visible oil slicks moving from Solombala along the Korabelny and Murmansky branches of the river. After rinsing their hands in the water, people noted a persistent unpleasant odor. The Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor) acknowledged the issue but stated it had not identified the source of the pollution. Port authorities inspected the river and suggested that small vessels may be responsible. This is not the first case of oil contamination in the region. In 2023, an oil spill occurred on the Severnaya Dvina, and in 2024, petroleum pollution was recorded in the Solombalka — one of the river’s channels.

Russia has begun developing a project to dismantle the country’s largest floating dry dock, PD-50, which sank in 2018 in Roslyakovo in the Kola Bay. The sunken structure currently obstructs navigation and poses an environmental threat. The Murmansk regional government has been ordered to raise the dock by June 2026.

Recommended Materials ↑

In May, Bellona Europa (the Brussels-based branch of the Bellona Foundation) released a report titled “The EU’s Influence in the Arctic: Climate Leadership in a Strategically Important Region.” The report highlights that, despite lacking direct control over the Arctic, the European Union exerts significant influence through trade, regulation, and demand for natural resources. The authors provide recommendations for updating the EU Arctic Strategy in response to shifting climate and geopolitical conditions.

The document emphasizes that the European Union must adopt a more active role in the Arctic — as a guarantor of sustainable development and climate stability — and must clearly define which activities in the region are unacceptable. These include offshore oil and gas extraction, deep-sea mining, the purchase of any oil or gas produced in the Arctic, and the expansion of commercial shipping along the Northern Sea Route.