Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.  

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for March can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. The Russian industry is failing to meet the shipbuilding plans for the Northern Sea Route
2. FSUE Atomflot has announced plans to expand ship repair capacity in Murmansk
3. The icebreaker Yakutia has completed its first vessel escort along the Northern Sea Route
4. Two Arctic emergency rescue tugboats have been commissioned
5. The International Maritime Organization has approved new requirements for marine fuel and established new emission control areas
6. Russia plans to acquire 16 vessels for dredging operations in Arctic ports
7. A decline in cargo turnover is being observed at all Arctic ports except Arkhangelsk
8. Russia plans to double the number of container shipments between Arkhangelsk and China in 2025

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
9. Russia has denounced agreements with Barents region countries on cooperation in the fields of economy, science, transportation, and the environment
10. The EU has mandated that all transit vessels provide proof of insurance in an effort to restrict the operations of Russia’s shadow fleet
11. A sanctioned tanker from Russia’s shadow fleet maneuvered off the coast of Norway for more than a week
12. Imports of Arctic LNG from Russia to the EU declined in April
13. Russia discusses cooperation with the U.S. on rare earth metals mining in the Arctic

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
14. The shortage of vessels with the required ice class will prevent the Syradasayskoye deposit from reaching its declared capacity
15. Around 1 trillion rubles have been invested in the sanctioned project to develop the Baimskaya ore zone
16. Energy Strategy 2050: By 2030, Russia will have seven operational LNG plants
17. Russia plans to issue 176 licenses for mineral resource development in the Arctic by 2035

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
18. Permafrost on Svalbard is expected to begin decreasing over the next 30 years
19. In the winter of 2025, the extent of Arctic sea ice reached its lowest level in recorded history
20. The WWF and maritime law experts have called on Arctic states to take urgent action to protect the Arctic
21. Yakutia has become the leading region in terms of wildfire risk in the Russian Arctic

Northern Sea Route and shipping

The Russian industry is failing to meet the shipbuilding plans for the Northern Sea Route ↑

Over the past five years, only 15 ships have been built for the Northern Sea Route at Russian shipyards — half the planned number, said Andrey Zaytsev, a representative of the Krylov Center, at the Arctic Shipbuilding Conference in Arkhangelsk. Among them are Arktika-class nuclear icebreakers, an Arctic shuttle tanker, several support vessels, and a drifting platform for scientific research. He attributed the lag to systemic problems in the industry, exacerbated by international sanctions.

According to estimates by the consulting company N.Trans Lab, at least 13 nuclear icebreakers are needed to ensure stable navigation along the Northern Sea Route. Provided that Leningrad, Chukotka, and the planned Stalingrad vessels are commissioned on time, there will still be only nine, as three of the eight operational icebreakers are expected to be decommissioned in the coming years.

However, Andrey Makarov, Head of the Commercial Department at FSUE Atomflot, expressed the view that the existing and under-construction nuclear icebreakers will be sufficient to fully support cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route by 2030 —apparently assuming that the service life of the three icebreakers previously slated for decommissioning is extended.

According to Vladimir Rachin, Deputy Director of the Sales and Contracting Department for Civil Shipbuilding at USC (United Shipbuilding Corporation), 116 new vessels of various types are needed for the Northern Sea Route by 2030 — but more than 100 of them still lack design projects.

At a shipbuilding conference in Arkhangelsk, Andrey Zaitsev, a representative of the Krylov State Research Center (a state-owned enterprise), cited different figures: according to him, around 140 ice-class cargo vessels with a deadweight ranging from 20,000 to 120,000 tons need to be built for operations in the Arctic. However, this would require processing 2.5 million tons of metal—almost eight times more than the current capacity of Russian shipyards, which stands at 320,000 tons, he emphasized. He also noted that 230 million man-hours of labor are needed, while only 30 million are currently available, and that more than half of these vessels cannot be built without establishing new production facilities.

The Eastern State Planning Center (Vostokgosplan) also emphasizes that Russian ship repair enterprises face capacity shortages, with less than 30% of Russian vessels undergoing maintenance within the country. Although Murmansk and Arkhangelsk have the facilities to service the fleet, demand from neighboring basins remains low due to seasonal inaccessibility — 94% of vessels from the Far Eastern basin and 87% from the Baltic basin are restricted in their ability to operate along the Northern Sea Route for seven months of the year.

FSUE Atomflot has announced plans to expand ship repair capacity in Murmansk ↑

On April 25, at the “Shipbuilding in the Arctic” conference in Arkhangelsk, Ilya Akulov, Deputy General Director for Ship Repair at FSUE Atomflot, stated that the company plans to expand ship repair capacity in Murmansk due to peak season overloads in August and September. The project includes extending the piers, installing a new floating dock, developing infrastructure to accommodate personnel, and constructing a new building for equipment storage.

To support this effort and to develop infrastructure for servicing floating power units, a new company—EnergoFlot Murmansk LLC—was registered in Murmansk on April 28, 2025. Its founder is Rosatom Mechanical Engineering, a division of the Rosatom State Corporation. The company’s primary stated activity is the construction of ships and floating structures. As part of this project, Rosatom plans to build a specialized shipyard in Murmansk for the production of floating power units. The design and survey work is expected to be completed by the fall of 2026.

Specialists at Vostokgosplan also point out the deterioration of infrastructure—the average age of floating docks in the Arctic is 51 years, and the region’s only dry dock is already 84 years old. According to their estimates, modernizing the ship repair industry in the Russian Far East and the Arctic will require investments of around 153 billion rubles.

The icebreaker Yakutia has completed its first vessel escort along the Northern Sea Route ↑

In April, one of the new nuclear-powered icebreakers, Yakutia, set out on the Northern Sea Route for the first time and completed its maiden escort mission. On April 18–19, the icebreaker escorted the motor vessel Grigory Shelikhov from the ice edge near Cape Zhelaniya to Severnaya Bay in the Yenisei Gulf. Project 22220 nuclear-powered icebreakers are designed for escorting vessels and year-round lead convoy operations in the Western Arctic region, in the shallow areas of the Yenisei River and the Ob Bay, towing ships, as well as aiding and performing rescue operations in both ice-covered and open water conditions.

Two Arctic emergency rescue tugboats have been commissioned ↑

At the end of April, two Arctic emergency and rescue tugboats, Timan and Tepsey, were commissioned in Murmansk. These tugboats, built under the federal project “Development of the Greater Northern Sea Route,” are intended for participation in emergency response and rescue operations, oil spill cleanup, and other tasks. The head of the Marine Rescue Service, Viktor Chernov, stated that the agency expects to receive several more vessels to ensure safety along the Northern Sea Route by the end of the year.

The International Maritime Organization has approved new requirements for marine fuel and established new emission control areas ↑

During the 83rd session of the International Maritime Organization’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), held from April 8 to 11, two mechanisms for decarbonizing global shipping were approved: new standards for marine fuel and the establishment of a special Net Zero regulatory framework. These decisions involve imposing fees on ships that do not meet the established carbon dioxide emission requirements. The new requirements will be mandatory for all ships with a gross tonnage of over 5,000 tons, which are responsible for approximately 85% of CO₂ emissions in global maritime trade. Final approval is scheduled for October 2025, with the regulations set to come into force in 2027.

The session also approved the establishment of a new Emission Control Area (ECA) in the northeastern part of the Atlantic, including the Arctic waters of Greenland and Iceland, which is set to come into effect in 2027.

The Clean Arctic Alliance, of which Bellona is a member, expressed concern over several issues following the 83rd session:

• The Alliance believes that the measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are insufficient, and that the approved agreements — including the carbon intensity indicator — fail to deliver the necessary level of ambition, effectively locking in the status quo in shipping, which poses risks to the Arctic and the planet as a whole.
• The Alliance expressed concern over the IMO’s decision to postpone consideration of a ban on the use of scrubbers in environmentally sensitive areas, including the Arctic—especially in light of new data showing the low effectiveness of this technology and its harmful impact on the marine environment.
• Despite black carbon being recognized as one of the major “super pollutants” affecting both climate and human health, the IMO has yet to take concrete action to reduce its emissions. The Alliance is calling on the IMO to develop concrete proposals and discuss them at the 13th session of the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR) in early 2026.

At the same time, the Alliance welcomed the creation of the new Emission Control Area in the northeastern Atlantic Ocean, viewing it as a positive step that will help reduce emissions from ships, including those operating in the Arctic.

Russia plans to acquire 16 vessels for dredging operations in Arctic ports ↑

On April 18, a meeting was held in Arkhangelsk dedicated to the development of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor—a maritime route from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok via the Northern Sea Route (previously referred to as the “Greater Northern Sea Route”). At the meeting, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Alexei Chekunkov spoke about Russia’s upcoming steps to develop the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor and the Northern Sea Route.

Chekunkov explained that to develop the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor and the Northern Sea Route, the government plans to expand Arctic ports, build new marine terminals, and establish its own dredging fleet consisting of 16 specialized vessels. This is necessary to reduce dependence on foreign contractors and curb rising costs. Otherwise, port fees could increase tenfold due to the sharp rise in the cost of dredging operations, which became six times more expensive in 2024 as a result of renting foreign vessels.

The plan also includes creating new cargo access routes to increase the transportation of coal, fertilizers, and containers, with a forecasted growth of cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route from 70 to 109 million tons by 2030.

In addition, the development of the “Dry Port” concept in Yekaterinburg is ongoing. Goods produced in central Russia and intended for transport to the Far East or export to Asia are planned to be consolidated at a logistics center in Yekaterinburg and delivered overland to seaports in Yamal, from where they will be shipped via the Northern Sea Route. This project was presented to the Consul General of China in early April as a basis for potential cooperation.

A decline in cargo turnover is being observed at all Arctic ports except Arkhangelsk ↑

In the first quarter of 2025, cargo turnover at seaports in the Arctic basin decreased by 8.7% compared to the same period last year, totaling 21.5 million tons. The decline is mainly due to a 16% drop in dry cargo handling and a 6% decrease in liquid cargo. The most significant reduction was recorded at the port of Varandey (-31.6%), followed by Murmansk (-9.2%) and Sabetta (-3.8%). The only port that showed an increase in cargo turnover was Arkhangelsk, with a growth of 6.7%.

Russia plans to double the number of container shipments between Arkhangelsk and China in 2025 ↑

On April 23, the Governor of Arkhangelsk Region, Alexander Tsybulsky, speaking at a session of the regional legislative assembly, announced that in 2025 it is planned to double the number of container shipments between Arkhangelsk and China via the Northern Sea Route.

In 2024, ten container shipments were carried out between Arkhangelsk and China along the “Arctic Express No. 1” route. The shipments to China included lumber, pulp, polyethylene, and cardboard, while the return voyages delivered auto parts, construction materials, passenger cars, and consumer goods. A total of around 13,500 twenty-foot containers — approximately 230,000 tons of cargo—were transported. In 2025, 20 such voyages are planned.

Bellona’s comment:

«This year’s news clearly shows that the development of the Northern Sea Route has significantly slowed down and there are no prospects for rapid growth in either the number of users or the volume of cargo shipments.

In addition to sanctions targeting major gas extraction and liquefaction projects in the Russian Arctic — which were expected to sharply increase cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 and 2025 — the closure of access to the shipbuilding and ship repair sectors of the G7 countries, South Korea, and the European Union has revealed that Russia lacks the technological capacity to build the number of vessels needed to intensify use of the NSR, carry out dredging operations in Arctic ports, and ensure adequate emergency and rescue infrastructure. The expansion of shipbuilding and ship repair capacities is outlined in all government plans, but state funding is unlikely to be sufficient for rapidly scaling up production.

In addition, cargo traffic along the NSR, particularly crude oil, is heavily dependent on exports to two countries, China and India. Any change in these countries’ plans to purchase Russian oil leads to a decline in cargo traffic. Thus, the drop in cargo turnover of Varandey port in the first quarter by almost a third was caused by India’s unwillingness to buy Russian oil, which was transported from Varandey by tankers that fell under US sanctions in January 2025. By April, Russia had found a way to circumvent these sanctions by transferring oil ship-to-ship onto non-sanctioned tankers, so cargo traffic is likely to increase in the coming months.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

Russia has denounced agreements with Barents region countries on cooperation in the fields of economy, science, transportation, and the environment ↑

On April 16, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to denounce two agreements, officially ending Russia’s participation in treaties with Norway, Finland, and Sweden on cooperation in the Barents region:

• The 2007 agreement on the establishment of the International Barents Secretariat—a body coordinating cooperation among countries in the region.
• The 2008 agreement on cooperation in the field of prevention and response to emergencies.

Both agreements were part of the framework of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), established in 1993. Russia is now formally ending its participation in these institutional cooperation formats.

In 2023, Russia had already announced its withdrawal from the BEAC after Western countries suspended cooperation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The EU has mandated that all transit vessels provide proof of insurance in an effort to restrict the operations of Russia’s shadow fleet ↑

The European Commission has amended the Vessel Monitoring Directive (2022/59/EC), requiring all ships passing through EU waters to provide proof of insurance, even if they do not call at EU ports.

The European Commission and member states have already sent a proposal to the International Maritime Organization to amend existing mandatory ship reporting systems in order to align them with the new requirements.

This initiative is part of the EU’s strategy to counter Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” which is used for exports to circumvent sanctions.

Magda Kopczyńska, Director-General for Mobility and Transport in the European Commission, stated that this measure reflects the EU’s commitment to making maritime shipping safer and more environmentally friendly, aligning its regulations with international standards, and reducing risks associated with hazardous cargo and the tense geopolitical situation.

In December 2024, the EU included 52 such vessels in its sanctions list under the 15th package, and in February 2025 added another 74 under the 16th package, bringing the total number to 153.

A sanctioned tanker from Russia’s shadow fleet maneuvered off the coast of Norway for more than a week ↑

The shadow fleet oil tanker Unity, which was placed on the EU’s February 2025 sanctions list, has been maneuvering for more than a week near the Varanger Peninsula in northern Norway. The vessel, sailing under the flag of Gambia without confirmed insurance has been stuck at the Norway–Russia border on April 18, even though ship tracking data indicated it was scheduled to arrive in Arkhangelsk by April 20. Despite environmentalists’ concerns, Norwegian authorities took no action and continued to monitor the situation. Frode Pleym, head of Greenpeace Norway, warns that an accident involving such a vessel is only a matter of time.

Imports of Arctic LNG from Russia to the EU declined in April ↑

According to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), in April, imports of Russian liquefied natural gas to the EU— mainly from the Arctic Yamal LNG project—decreased by 35% compared to April of the previous year. This sharp decline came after two years of steady growth in deliveries, which reached a record high in 2024. The largest reduction occurred in Spain, with a smaller decrease in France. The news emerged a month after the EU introduced a ban on transshipment of Russian LNG; however, the decline in deliveries is most likely linked to the temporary shutdown of one of the three production trains at the Yamal LNG plant, rather than a deliberate move away from Arctic gas.

Russia discusses cooperation with the U.S. on rare earth metals mining in the Arctic ↑

In early April, Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, met in the United States with representatives of the Trump administration and Republican lawmakers. The meeting focused on potential prospects for cooperation in the Arctic in the field of rare earth metal extraction, as well as in other sectors of mutual interest.

According to the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources, about 76% of Russia’s reserves of rare and rare-earth metals are concentrated in the Arctic zone. In terms of reserves of these resources, Russia ranks second after China, with a raw material base of 28.7 million tons. There are more than 30 deposits in the Arctic with reserves of niobium, tantalum, zirconium, gallium, and other metals used in the production of electronics, equipment and industrial applications.

The issue of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States in the Arctic is not new. Before 2014, Russian and U.S. companies planned joint projects in the region. For example, in 2013–2014, Rosneft and ExxonMobil signed agreements worth about $3.2 billion for hydrocarbon exploration on the Kara Sea shelf, as well as in other Arctic zones including the Chukchi Sea and the Laptev Sea. However, after the tightening of U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017, cooperation was frozen.

Bellona’s comment:

«In April, the international situation continued to follow previous trends: Russia proceeded with the official termination of cooperation with countries supporting Ukraine, while EU member states continued to impose sanctions on vessels from Russia’s shadow fleet—sanctions that can still be circumvented.

An unexpected development was the report that the United States had discussed prospects for cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, including in the extraction of rare earth metals—an area that has attracted increased attention since the beginning of this year. The prospect of such cooperation seems unlikely amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, even with Donald Trump as President of the United States.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

The shortage of vessels with the required ice class will prevent the Syradasayskoye deposit from reaching its declared capacity ↑

One of the key components of the Northern Star company’s project to develop the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in Taimyr is the Yenisei seaport. However, its development is being hindered by a shortage of vessels with the required ice class. This was stated by Vitaly Kulak, CEO of Northern Star LLC, at the forum “Mining Industry: Investment Projects and Support Measures,” held on April 10 in Moscow.

“In addition to the challenges common to the industry, such as sanctions, export bans, and an increase in the key interest rate to a level that makes projects of this scale unfeasible, we are facing a shortage of icebreakers, Arctic-class cargo vessels, and dredging fleets. All of this prevents us from reaching the planned capacity of 10 million tons that we intended to ship via the Northern Sea Route,” said Vitaly Kulak.

Recall that the Northern Sea Route Development Plan by 2035, developed by the Russian government, specifies the project’s maximum capacity as 12 million tons, with commercial coal production initially scheduled to begin in 2022.

Around 1 trillion rubles have been invested in the sanctioned project to develop the Baimskaya ore zone ↑

Investments in the development of the Baimskaya ore zone amount to around 1 trillion rubles, 260 billion of which have been made over the past five years, said Georgy Fotin, General Director of Baimskaya Management Company, at the forum “Mining Industry: Investment Projects and Support Measures.”

Initially, the extraction of copper-porphyry ores and the launch of the Baimsky mining and processing plant in Chukotka were planned for 2026. However, due to the impact of sanctions, the timeline has been postponed multiple times. The new commissioning date for the first phase of the facility—35 million tons of ore per year—is set for 2029, and the second phase—70 million tons per year—is scheduled for 2030. Active construction began in April of this year.

Energy Strategy 2050: By 2030, Russia will have seven operational LNG plants ↑

The Russian government has approved the Energy Strategy by 2050. According to the document, three new LNG plants are expected to become operational in the Russian Arctic by 2030: Murmansk LNG, Arctic LNG-1, and Ob LNG. The first plant is projected to have a capacity of 20.4 million tons per year, while the second and third are expected to produce 19.8 million and 4.8 million tons per year, respectively.

According to the strategy, Russia plans to produce 90–105 million tons of LNG by 2030 and 110–175 million tons by 2050. As of now, out of the 34.7 million tons of LNG produced by Russia in 2024, 21.2 million tons came from the Yamal LNG plant—the only operational LNG facility in the Arctic zone.

Another project mentioned in the strategy, Arctic LNG-2, was unable to secure buyers for its products due to sanctions and suspended operations shortly after launching commercial production in August 2024, having completed only six shipments. The new strategy envisions that Arctic LNG-2 will reach its design capacity by 2030.

Russia plans to issue 176 licenses for mineral resource development in the Arctic by 2035 ↑

Since 2023, special licensing programs for the Arctic—designed through 2035 and prepared by Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources—have been introduced to stimulate the development of mineral extraction and processing. So far, auctions have been held for 64 sites, with a total of 176 licenses planned to be issued.

“In 2025, tenders will be held for 30 subsoil plots. The largest among them include the Amerika deposit, with titanium reserves of 3.5 million tons, and Gremyakha-Vymers, with titanium resources of 122.3 million tons and phosphorus totaling 62,440 tons—both located in the Murmansk region. In Yakutia, an auction will be held for the Odinokoye deposit, which contains 127,500 tons of tin and 10,500 tons of tungsten. The Porozhinskoye manganese ore deposit, with reserves of 29,460 tons in Krasnoyarsk Krai, is also being prepared for auction,” said Alexander Kozlov, Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources and Environment.

Bellona’s comment:

«International economic sanctions against Russian industry are not leading to a reduction in mineral extraction plans in the Arctic. Strategic documents are being updated, but the planned production volumes remain at consistently high levels. Thus, the new energy strategy assumes that previously planned, sanction-hit LNG projects will still be launched by 2030—despite the sanctions and the ongoing inability, for a second year in a row, to find buyers for gas from the Arctic LNG-2 plant.

The large number of mineral resource sites in the Arctic zone being put up for auction and special simplified licensing procedures, are intended to attract private investment to help build infrastructure in the region—thereby promoting its economic development. Concerns about the negative environmental impact of the extractive industry and the need to comply with environmental standards are not usually included in such news reports on subsoil development in the Arctic zone.

The large number of mineral sites in the Arctic Zone are up for auction and special simplified licensing procedures are intended to attract private investment that would help build infrastructure in the region, thereby facilitating its economic development. Concerns about the negative environmental impact of extractive industries and the need to comply with environmental standards are not usually included in such news stories about subsurface development in the Arctic Zone.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

Permafrost on Svalbard is expected to begin decreasing over the next 30 years ↑

Scientists from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute have resumed monitoring the state of permafrost in the Russian settlements of Barentsburg and Pyramiden on Svalbard. According to their estimates, at the current pace of warming, the rate of ground subsidence could reach up to 12.5 cm per year over the next 30 years, posing a threat to the structural stability of buildings. Based on the collected data, a decision will be made on whether to equip buildings with thermal stabilizers to cool the ground and slow permafrost subsidence.

In the winter of 2025, the extent of Arctic sea ice reached its lowest level in recorded history ↑

In 2025, the extent of winter sea ice in the Arctic reached a record low for the 47 years of observations, according to NASA and the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center. The most dramatic reduction—nearly 300,000 square kilometers—occurred in January due to cyclones and abnormally high temperatures, which were 12°C above average.

The WWF and maritime law experts have called on Arctic states to take urgent action to protect the Arctic ↑

WWF has called on the governments of Arctic countries to urgently change their approach to Arctic governance, making it legally binding and focused on the protection of nature, ecosystems, and the rights of Indigenous peoples—rather than on industrial development.

The appeal was prompted by the publication of a chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Arctic Governance, written by experts from WWF and Utrecht University. The chapter highlights the ineffectiveness of current governance systems and stresses the need to utilize existing tools—such as the BBNJ agreement (the international treaty on the protection of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, signed in 2023) and the national authorities of Arctic states.

Yakutia has become the leading region in terms of wildfire risk in the Russian Arctic ↑

A study by researchers from the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the spread of wildfires in the Russian Arctic has been published in the journal Arctica: Ecology and Economy. The researchers analyzed satellite data from 2000 to 2024, created a map of thermal anomalies, and refined wildfire statistics.

Over the past 25 years, approximately 36.5 million hectares in the Russian Arctic have been affected by wildfires. Since 2018, the number of fires has tripled, spreading to new areas, including tundra regions where fires were previously rare. The increase in wildfires is being driven by warming temperatures, growing aridity, and more frequent lightning strikes—particularly in Yakutia and Chukotka.