In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.  

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest. Our previous monthly highlights for February can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Development of the NSR, Elimination of Environmental Damage in the Arctic, and Other Issues Discussed at the International Arctic Forum
2. Rosatom presented its vision for the future development of the Northern Sea Route
3. Putin announced the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor project
4. Rosatom: “Shipping development has no negative impact on the environment”
5. Rosatom Arctic to become the sole maritime operator of the Northern Delivery operation starting in 2026

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. Signs of a possible resumption of operations have emerged at Arctic LNG 2
7. Russia has begun supplying Arctic oil to Syria amid ongoing sanctions pressure
8. Since 2022, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has exercised control over the Arctic fleet serving the Yamal LNG project
9. A Russian national established a fake insurance company in Norway to cover for Russia’s shadow fleet

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
10. Geological exploration in Chukotka
11. In Yakutia, development of the Tomtor rare earth metals deposit is planned
12. Gazprom to discontinue publication of its annual environmental report
13. Rosneft reported on the progress of the Vostok Oil project

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
14. In 2024, the increase in the global average annual temperature exceeded the threshold set by the Paris Agreement by 0.05°C
15. Wildfires enhance the formation of ice clouds, accelerating Arctic warming, a new study shows
16. High ocean temperatures are the main cause of the melting of Svalbard’s largest glacier
17. Since the 1990s, winter temperatures in the Arctic’s marine areas have increased by more than 4°C, and summer temperatures by around 2°C by 2018–2020

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Northern Sea Route and shipping

Development of the NSR, Elimination of Environmental Damage in the Arctic, and Other Issues Discussed at the International Arctic Forum ↑

On March 26–27, the International Arctic Forum “Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” was held in Murmansk. The business program featured around 20 sessions grouped into four thematic tracks: “The Arctic and the Northern Sea Route: Competing on the Global Stage”, “The Arctic and the Northern Sea Route: A Magnet for Investment”, “The Arctic and the Northern Sea Route: Developing Key Settlements” and “International Cooperation and the Environment”.

Rosatom presented its vision for the future development of the Northern Sea Route ↑

At the forum session titled “Long-Term Development Model for the Northern Sea Route,” Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev emphasized increasing cargo traffic as the main priority. However, he noted that due to sanctions affecting technology, logistics, finance, and long-term contracts, the development of the NSR is being planned with various potential scenarios in mind.

For instance, maintaining the current cargo traffic level (38 million tons in 2024) requires the existing fleet of 11 icebreakers. However, if cargo traffic grows to 100–150 million tons, 15–17 icebreakers and additional cargo vessels will be necessary, which implies an expansion of shipbuilding capacities. Alexey Likhachev emphasized that since domestic capacities alone are insufficient for this purpose, international cooperation is essential. He noted that dialogue is already underway with China, India, and several other countries with expertise in shipbuilding.

In addition, the head of Rosatom noted that “the cost of icebreaker escort, cargo transit, and cargo services was integrated into the economics of Arctic projects” — in other words, it would not be based solely on commercial principles.

More on the challenges of building new nuclear icebreakers can be found in the Nuclear Digest.

Putin announced the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor project ↑

At the plenary session on March 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor project — a renewed version of the Greater Northern Sea Route. He stated that the Northern Sea Route will serve as a key element of the new corridor linking St. Petersburg and Vladivostok via Murmansk. Rosatom had reported on the preparation of a similar project to develop the Greater Northern Sea Route as early as August 2024.

The President instructed the Russian Government, with the involvement of Rosatom, VEB, and the relevant State Council commission, to approve the financial, economic, and organizational model for implementing the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor by August 1.

The cargo base of the corridor is expected to be built through increased resource extraction and processing in the Arctic, growth in international transit, and integration with Russia’s domestic railway network — from the Northwest to the Far East, including the Baikal–Amur Mainline (BAM) and the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Rosatom: “Shipping development has no negative impact on the environment” ↑

At the session “Environmental Well-Being of the Arctic: Strategies for Government and Business Cooperation,” Vladimir Panov, Special Representative of the State Corporation Rosatom for Arctic Development, stated that since 2021, Rosatom has been conducting environmental monitoring in the Arctic in partnership with Moscow State University. He emphasized that Arctic shipping has no negative impact on the environment. Session participants also discussed the framework of the upcoming national project “Environmental Well-Being” in the Arctic regions. A top priority identified was the elimination of accumulated environmental damage in the Arctic zone. In particular, the need to clear water areas of sunken vessels was discussed — this issue was identified as one of the key challenges for the Arctic regions. Federation Council Member Tatyana Sakharova emphasized that the presence of underwater “graveyards” hinders navigation and fishing, and also has a negative impact on the environment.

Rosatom Arctic to become the sole maritime operator of the Northern Delivery operation starting in 2026 ↑

The Russian Government has approved the appointment of JSC Rosatom Arctic as the sole maritime operator of the Northern Delivery. Starting January 1, 2026, the company will be responsible for route planning, scheduling, and cargo deliveries to remote areas of the Far North, including the supply of food, fuel, and medicine.

The Northern Delivery is a set of logistical operations aimed at delivering essential goods to hard-to-reach territories. Deliveries are carried out via the Northern Sea Route, among other routes,  navigating the region’s harsh climatic conditions. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin announced during a meeting with deputy prime ministers on March 24 that approximately 3.5 million tons of cargo are planned to be delivered to these regions in 2025.

The federal law “On Northern Delivery” was adopted on August 4, 2023, and came into force in April 2024. Previously, Vladimir Panov, Rosatom’s special representative for Arctic development, highlighted major shortcomings in the existing Northern Delivery system: the lack of a unified logistics standard and the short-term nature of contracts with shipowners.

Bellona’s comment:

«Statements by government officials at major Arctic-related forums confirm what we’ve previously reported in our Arctic Digests:

1. The Russian authorities and businesses do not consider environmental protection in the Arctic a higher priority than economic development. Claims that shipping causes no environmental harm sound, implausible, to say the least. Vessels operating along the Northern Sea Route still use heavy fuel oil and there are no plans to phase it out in the near future, despite the International Maritime Organization’s agreement to ban its use in Arctic waters starting mid-2024. Soot and other harmful emissions have a negative impact both on climate change and on the overall environmental situation. The transfer of invasive species, underwater noise, and heavy ship traffic through narrow straits along the Northern Sea Route – areas that intersect with migration and habitat routes of various animal species – also contribute to the deterioration of the environment.

2. The intensification of shipping along the Northern Sea Route and the increase in cargo traffic are not possible without expanding the capacity of the shipbuilding industry — something Russia currently lacks the financial and technological resources to achieve on its own. Before the war, many large cargo vessels used on the Northern Sea Route were commissioned from foreign shipyards. Following the introduction of international sanctions, these orders were halted, and Russia is now seeking new partners in China and India.

3. The Northern Sea Route is unlikely to become a commercially viable route in the near future. Its development is directly tied to government funding through various support programs, such as national projects for the development of the Arctic and the NSR, tax incentives for extractive companies operating in the Arctic, and similar measures. Arctic shipping involves high risks and additional requirements for both vessels and crew, which naturally makes its costs significantly higher than those of shipping in other maritime regions.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

Signs of a possible resumption of operations have emerged at Arctic LNG 2 ↑

On March 30, satellite images captured flaring activity at the Arctic LNG 2 plant, which had suspended operations in the fall of 2024 due to international sanctions. While the flaring may be related to technical maintenance, it could also indicate preparations for restarting production, as Novatek is reportedly hoping for a potential easing of U.S. sanctions.

According to Bloomberg, in February, representatives of Novatek — the lead participant and largest shareholder in the Arctic LNG 2 project — stated at an oil forum in India that the sanctions imposed on the Arctic LNG 2 project could be lifted in the near future amid ongoing dialogue between Russia and the United States. In this context, the company offered Indian buyers the opportunity to purchase LNG at a discounted price while the sanctions remain in place.

In addition, Igor Tonkovidov, head of Sovcomflot, announced that the tanker Aleksey Kosygin, built for the Arctic LNG 2 project, is preparing for its first voyage along the Northern Sea Route. At present, the tanker—which is also subject to U.S. sanctions—is undergoing sea trials in the Pacific Ocean.

Russia has begun supplying Arctic oil to Syria amid ongoing sanctions pressure ↑

According to reports from Syrian state media, Russian Arctic oil has been delivered to Syria for the first time. In March, two sanctioned tankers — Aquatica and Sakina — unloaded crude at the Baniyas oil terminal.

On March 21, the tanker Aquatica, with a deadweight of 106,000 tons, delivered 722,000 barrels of Russian oil to Baniyas. On March 25, the vessel Sakina (150,000 DWT), registered in Barbados and owned by a Hong Kong-based company, also unloaded cargo at the same port.

Both vessels were added to U.S. sanctions lists in January 2025 and were subsequently sanctioned by the European Union in February.

The oil was loaded from the floating storage unit Umba, located off the coast of Murmansk. Umba and a similar nearby storage vessel, Kola, receive oil from three Russian Arctic projects — Varandey, Prirazlomnoye, and Novy Port. Both Umba and Kola are also under U.S. sanctions.

According to Bloomberg, the sanctioned vessels briefly listed Syria as their destination before altering course toward China and India. This practice may indicate attempts to circumvent shipment tracking systems and complicates monitoring of the so-called shadow fleet.

Since 2022, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has exercised control over the Arctic fleet serving the Yamal LNG project ↑

The Arctic-focused analytical outlet High North News published an investigation into the growing influence of the FSB over vessels involved in one of the Arctic’s key liquefied natural gas projects — Yamal LNG.

According to journalists, since 2022 the FSB has begun coordinating the operations of the Arctic fleet, including 15 specialized Arc7-class LNG carriers. These vessels transport liquefied natural gas from Sabetta (Yamal) to Europe and Asia. As part of a targeted FSB operation, foreign—primarily Western—officers and engineers were replaced with Russian crew members to establish tighter control over onboard activities.

The authors of the investigation believe that the LNG carriers may have been used not only for transporting liquefied natural gas, but also for moving undeclared cargo between Russia and Europe. As such, the fleet could have been involved in covert operations related to sanctions evasion or other confidential shipments.

A Russian national established a fake insurance company in Norway to cover for Russia’s shadow fleet ↑

Danish outlet Danwatch and Norwegian broadcaster NRK published a joint investigation revealing a scheme involving a fake insurance company, Ro Marine. The company was registered by a Russian national from St. Petersburg and was used to issue fraudulent insurance certificates to vessels that are part of the so-called Russian shadow fleet.

According to the journalists, Ro Marine issued fake certificates for 255 tankers, at least 76 of which are linked to the shadow fleet transporting Russian oil in violation of sanctions.

The company claimed to be operating under a license allegedly issued in 2016 by the Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority. In reality, however, the license was fake, and Ro Marine did not exist at that time.

A fake insurance certificate leaves a vessel without any financial or legal protection, which, in the event of accidents or oil spills, can lead to far more serious environmental consequences.

Bellona’s comment:

«Russia continues to adapt to international sanctions targeting its oil and gas sector by seeking new markets in countries that have not joined the sanctions regime and by employing illicit schemes to circumvent restrictions. Moreover, representatives of Russian oil and gas companies appear to hold out hope for a lifting or easing of U.S. sanctions during President Trump’s term.

Although workarounds to sanctions are being found, it would be more convenient and profitable for companies to operate within the legal framework and resume business with their former Western buyers. This is why the Russian press has given extensive coverage to the possibility of restoring the Nord Stream pipeline and to President Trump’s remarks suggesting that sanctions on Russia could be lifted.

In reality, there are no real prospects for Western countries to ease sanctions on Russia. The EU also intends to completely stop importing Russian oil and gas by 2027. However, much depends on the poorly predictable situation in Ukraine.»

Heightened industrial activity in the russian Arctic

Geological exploration in Chukotka ↑

At the International Arctic Forum, Chukotka Governor Vladislav Kuznetsov announced that geological exploration is underway at promising deposits in the western part of the region.

As part of the federal project “Geology: Revival of a Legend,” geological exploration will be carried out at promising deposits in Chukotka. Over 2 billion rubles have been allocated for the exploration of four deposits in the western part of the region. Currently under development are two chromium ore sites — the Chyrynai Massif and the Krasnogorsky Massif — as well as gold and silver deposits at the Terkeney area and gold-copper porphyry ore at the Skromnoye ore field.

In Yakutia, development of the Tomtor rare earth metals deposit is planned ↑

On March 26, at the International Arctic Forum in Murmansk, Head of Yakutia Aisen Nikolaev announced that development of the Tomtor rare earth metals deposit — one of the largest in the world — will begin in the coming years. According to the original plans of the state subprogram “Development of Traditional and New Materials Production,” under which the deposit is being developed, the first batch of ore was to be shipped in 2024 — but this did not take place. The subprogram has now been extended until 2030, with the deposit expected to be put into operation no later than that date.

The estimated resources amount to 154 million tons of ore with a high content of oxides of 10 rare earth elements, including niobium, terbium, yttrium, and scandium. The deposit’s reserves are estimated at 30 million tons of ore and 82,000 tons of monazite concentrate. The content of rare earth oxide in the ore reaches 10%, and niobium oxide — 4.5%, making it one of the richest deposits in the world in these indicators.

Earlier, on March 6, RAS academician and geologist Nikolai Pokhilenko noted that the development of the Tomtor rare earth metals deposit and the Popigai impact diamond deposit could serve as the foundation for creating a new industrial zone in the Arctic, comparable to Norilsk. This region would encompass the Tomtor and Popigai deposits themselves, transportation to the port of Khatanga, transshipment in Dudinka, and further production in Krasnoyarsk Krai.

Gazprom to discontinue publication of its annual environmental report ↑

On March 17, at a meeting of the Board of Directors, Gazprom decided to discontinue the preparation and publication of its annual environmental report. The company amended its internal regulations on information disclosure and environmental policy, including the removal of requirements to produce a report on environmental protection. Instead, Gazprom will continue publishing a social responsibility report, focusing on the company’s contribution to Russia’s social and economic development.

Meanwhile, at the International Arctic Forum, Gazprom Neft CEO Alexander Dyukov announced that hydrocarbons extracted by the company in the Arctic now account for 50% of its total production volume.

Rosneft reported on the progress of the Vostok Oil project ↑

Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft, published details of its flagship project Vostok Oil in Krasnoyarsk Krai in its latest report.

In 2024, the project area expanded from 52 to 60 license blocks, and the resource base increased from 6.5 to 7 billion tons of oil.

Last year, seismic surveys were carried out, along with the completion of well testing and drilling operations. In 2024, several production wells were drilled at the Payakhskoye, Ichemminskoye, and Baikalovskoye fields, and oil transportation was organized to the nearby Suzunskoye field.

Construction continues on the main oil pipeline that will connect the fields to port facilities, along with other infrastructure, including berths and oil processing stations.

The development of oil fields under the Vostok Oil project on the Taymyr Peninsula and the shipment of oil via the Northern Sea Route were initially scheduled to begin in 2024, with a projected increase in NSR cargo traffic of 30 million tons in 2024, 50 million tons in 2027, and 100 million tons by 2030. However, due to international sanctions, Rosneft has decided to postpone the launch of the project’s first phase by two years.

Bellona’s comment:

«International economic sanctions — particularly the ban on supplying equipment for extractive industries — have had a negative impact on the timelines for launching new mineral resource development projects in the Arctic. However, these measures have not brought the process to a halt. Nearly all projects originally scheduled for development and commissioning between 2022 and 2024 have been delayed. This is evident in both Rosneft’s mega-project Vostok Oil and the development of the rare earth metals deposit in Yakutia.

Russia plans to fully meet domestic demand for rare earth metals by 2030, but under current conditions, this target is unlikely to be achieved on time. In 2024, domestic production amounted to less than 50 tons, while imports totaled 1,500 tons of rare earth metals.

The second major development this month is the announcement that Gazprom will discontinue publishing its environmental report. This underscores the fact that major Russian companies whose products are export-oriented have demonstrated concern for the environment and engagement in environmental activities only to the extent necessary for successful exports to Western countries.

Now that Western countries have significantly reduced their import volumes, environmental issues have been pushed to the background — which, in reality, reflects the place they occupy in the mindset of the current Russian authorities and business community. When a major corporation demonstrates such an attitude toward environmental protection, it is likely that smaller companies, including those involved in mineral extraction in the Arctic, also feel little sense of environmental responsibility.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

In 2024, the increase in the global average annual temperature exceeded the threshold set by the Paris Agreement by 0.05°C ↑

In its annual climate report, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) stated that in 2024, the average global temperature exceeded the pre-industrial level by 1.55°C and surpassed the previous record set in 2023 by 0.1°C. The threshold for global temperature rise set by the Paris Agreement is 1.5°C.

At the same time, WMO scientific coordinator and lead author of the report, John Kennedy, emphasized that the situation is not entirely bleak, as the Paris Agreement refers to a long-term average temperature increase, which is currently estimated at 1.34–1.41°C. This is already very close to the threshold set in the agreement, but has not yet exceeded it.

At the same time, 2024 was marked by a range of extreme weather events across various regions of the world — from floods and hurricanes to droughts and wildfires. Wildfires alone forced 800,000 people to leave their homes, the highest number recorded since tracking began in 2008.

In addition, such a rise in temperature is bound to affect the Arctic and Antarctic regions, warns Kennedy, which in turn will lead to serious global consequences — including changes in ocean currents across the world’s seas.

Wildfires enhance the formation of ice clouds, accelerating Arctic warming, a new study shows ↑

Under normal conditions, clouds composed of ice crystals form at –38°C. However, due to aerosol emissions of organic carbon from wildfires, they can begin forming at just –15°C, according to researchers from Japan’s National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR), based on the example of the 2023 summer wildfires in Canada. This is the first study in history to examine the impact of wildfire aerosols on the formation of ice clouds.

Clouds play an important role in regulating the climate by affecting the amount of solar radiation that reaches the Earth’s surface. Ice clouds, however, have a lower reflectivity than clouds composed of water droplets.

Since 2018, the number of wildfires across most of the Arctic has more than tripled, according to the environmental organization Arctida. In the Russian Arctic zone alone, fires have affected around 365,000 km² since the beginning of the 21st century — just 12,000 to 20,000 km² less than the total area of Japan or Norway.

High ocean temperatures are the main cause of the melting of Svalbard’s largest glacier ↑

According to the World Meteorological Organization, the primary cause of glacier degradation in Europe is the human-induced rise in atmospheric CO₂ levels. However, a new study by the Norwegian Polar Institute (Norsk Polarinstitutt) shows that in Arctic conditions, additional factors may also come into play.

Researchers at the institute analyzed data on glacier melt in Svalbard from 2016 to 2022. Their findings revealed that the primary driver of degradation of Svalbard’s largest glacier, Austfonna, is high ocean temperatures.

As the researchers note, rapid glacier melt was recorded even in October and November, when air temperatures in Svalbard drop to –20°C.

“The ocean can stay warm well into autumn, cause melting and calving of glacier fronts,” emphasized glaciologist Geir Moholdt, one of the study’s authors, in an interview with The Barents Observer. “We should be concerned about this because glacier mass loss happens all over the world, especially in Arctic regions like Svalbard, the Canadian Arctic, and Alaska. All these glaciers together, excluding the Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets, contribute to 20% of the current sea level change”.

Since the 1990s, winter temperatures in the Arctic’s marine areas have increased by more than 4°C, and summer temperatures by around 2°C by 2018–2020 ↑

These figures are presented in a new report by Roshydromet on climate conditions in Russia for 2024. The most significant temperature increases in the Arctic part of the country have been observed in the Kara and Chukchi Sea areas, which lie along the Northern Sea Route. Data from meteorological stations along the coast and on the islands show that between the 1970s and 2018, winter air temperatures rose by 6°C, while summer temperatures had increased by nearly 3°C by 2020. However, by 2023, winter temperatures had dropped by almost 3°C compared to 2018, and summer temperatures by 1°C compared to 2020 levels — but in 2024, the upward trend resumed.

The report also includes data on changes in Arctic sea ice extent. According to Roshydromet, from 1980 to 2012, the sea ice area in the Arctic Ocean at its seasonal minimum in September decreased by a factor of 2.2. In winter, the reduction in sea ice is much smaller than in summer. From the maximum recorded in March 1982 to the minimum in March 2016, sea ice extent declined by 9% across the Arctic Ocean as a whole, and by about 1% in the seas along the Northern Sea Route.

In the waters of the Arctic seas along the Northern Sea Route, ice cover in September has been shrinking since 1996, alongside rising summer air temperatures. Over a ten-year period, it decreased eightfold — from 1,892,000 km² to 234,000 km². After 2006, the ice extent remained roughly at that level, reaching a record low of just 26,300 km² in 2020.

Accidents and incidents in the Northern Sea Route ↑

On March 16, a diesel fuel spill occurred on the Yana River in Yakutia. The contaminated area covers 592 square meters. In response, a local state of emergency has been declared in the affected area.