After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.

Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments in order to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.

This survey covers events from March 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for February, January 2025, November–December 2024. Download a PDF of this digest here.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for March 2025
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities
1.3. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
2. Orano and Energoatom sign enrichment services supply agreement for Ukrainian nuclear power plants

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. Orano to Begin Uranium Mining in Uzbekistan
4. Orano to receive European Investment Bank loan for expansion of enrichment plant in France
5. Enusa to Manufacture VVER-440 Fuel Assemblies for Finland’s Loviisa NPP
6. Ghana selects suppliers for construction of its first nuclear power plants

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Russia and Myanmar sign agreement on construction of small nuclear power plant
8. Prospects for the Northern Sea Route and challenges in shipbuilding discussed at Arctic Forum
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for March 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting held in Vienna from March 3 to 7, Director General Rafael Grossi presented a report titled “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine”, covering the period from November 13, 2024, to February 27, 2025. The report is based on information that was made available to the Agency and verified by it during this period.

According to the Agency’s assessment, the overall nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP has not significantly changed compared to the previous reporting period and continues to be assessed as unstable. The Agency notes violations of six of the Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict.

Throughout the reporting period, access restrictions remained in place for the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ), particularly with regard to the western parts of the turbine halls of all six units, as well as to the central storage facility, diesel fuel tanks, the isolation gate of the ZNPP cooling pond, and the 330 kV open switchyard at the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant.

ISAMZ did not observe any heavy military equipment during walkdowns of the areas to which it had access. However, to fully verify the absence of such weaponry at the ZNPP, timely and comprehensive access to all areas relevant to nuclear safety and security is required.

The IAEA also reports the presence of armed troops — who, according to the Russian Federation, are members of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) and specialists in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection — as well as military equipment, including armored personnel carriers, military logistics support vehicles, and armored vehicles equipped with mounted weapons. According to ISAMZ, armed troops prevented its access to the western parts of the turbine halls.

It is noted that maintenance activities continue at the plant; however, the scope of these activities does not correspond to the level expected during normal operational conditions. The IAEA team observed some work being carried out on safety systems, but stressed that such activities do not ensure sufficient reliability.

The report states that the sound of shelling continues to be regularly heard near the plant. In January, a drone strike on the ZNPP’s training center was documented. Despite this, the Agency has not recorded any formal violations of the Five Concrete Principles for protecting the ZNPP in a conflict situation established by the IAEA in May 2023. However, it emphasizes that the situation remains associated with a high level of risk.

The report also includes information previously covered in earlier digests for the reporting period.

In response, Russia submitted comments to the IAEA describing the report as “unbalanced and containing serious inaccuracies.” Among its main objections were the lack of any reference to the Zaporizhzhia NPP being under Russian jurisdiction — as claimed by Moscow — and what it viewed as an insufficiently strong assessment of the disruptions to IAEA expert rotations at the plant, for which Russia blames Ukraine. Russia also expressed dissatisfaction with what it saw as the neutral coverage of the December 10 attack and the complete omission of the February 12 shelling of the expert team. It stated that the February rotation was conducted entirely through Russian territory for the first time and took place without incident.

Russia considered the report’s treatment of Ukrainian UAV strikes on the ZNPP and Enerhodar to be inadequate. It rejected the characterization of the presence of CBRN troops at the ZNPP as a safety threat, described the report’s references to the Ukrainian nuclear regulator as absurd, and reminded the Agency that oversight at the plant is carried out by Rostekhnadzor.

Russia also deemed unacceptable the IAEA’s assessments regarding the qualifications of ZNPP personnel and potential timelines for restarting the plant’s units. (The report states that no reactor will be restarted as long as the nuclear safety and security situation at the plant remains threatened by the conflict.) Finally, Russia stated that the deployment of IAEA missions to Ukrainian substations and the assessment of damage to energy infrastructure fall outside the Agency’s mandate.

On March 19, US President Donald Trump held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. According to subsequent US statements, the discussion included issues related to the security of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including nuclear power plants.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that President Donald Trump offered US assistance in managing Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, citing the country’s expertise in the energy and utilities sector. According to Leavitt, Trump believes that US involvement — or even ownership — of these facilities could provide the best protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Similar statements were made by other US administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright confirmed that, in principle, the United States could take over the management of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

The statement from the Office of the President of Ukraine regarding the call made no mention of nuclear power plants.

Commenting on the US statement, the President Volodymyr Zelensky clarified that his conversation with Trump focused solely on the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which is under Russian control, and that there was no discussion of the ownership or transfer of other Ukrainian nuclear plants. Speaking at a press conference in Oslo, he emphasized that all nuclear power plants in Ukraine belong to the Ukrainian people and are not privately owned. Zelensky also noted that Kyiv is open to discussing US involvement in the modernization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP if it is returned to Ukrainian control.

According to the IAEA Director General, the inclusion of the Zaporizhzhia NPP in negotiation efforts is an encouraging sign. The Agency is ready to provide technical support for the implementation of any future agreements, and its representatives will remain at the plant for as long as necessary to ensure nuclear safety.

Russia, for its part, stated that any transfer of the Zaporizhzhia NPP to Ukraine or any other country is out of the question. It also maintains that joint operation of the facility with any foreign state is unacceptable.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Political debates, reports, and statements from the various parties involved in the Zaporizhzhia NPP issue no longer generate much public or media interest — or emotion. It is widely understood that these processes will continue until the military and political situation is resolved and final or interim decisions are made by the plant’s legal owner, Ukraine, and by Russia, which is currently occupying the facility.

Nevertheless, the increased engagement by the United States and its proposals regarding the future of the Zaporizhzhia NPP have prompted additional reflections among experts. The US proposals introduced a new element — a fourth potential scenario for the plant. Until now, experts from various organizations, including Bellona, have considered three main possibilities: the plant is returned to Ukrainian control and resumes operation within Ukraine’s power grid; the plant remains in occupied territory, with attempts made to connect it to the power grids of areas under de facto Russian control; or — as a third option — the plant remains inactive for the long term or permanently, unable to operate as intended due to the ongoing conflict and the positions of the warring parties.

If the US proposal were to be implemented, it would set a historic precedent: never before has a nuclear power plant located virtually on the front line between two warring (or hostile) states been managed by a third party. At present, both belligerents — particularly Russia — show little willingness to agree to such a scenario. Experts also have many questions about the American proposal, ranging from how safety would be ensured, to the uncertainty over whether the plant could supply electricity to either the Ukrainian or Russian grids, and including complex social and staffing issues that would need to be resolved on-site.

The second major development during the reporting period was the release of a new IAEA report on events in Ukraine. The report comes as a pleasant surprise. First, it contains a number of bold statements regarding the militarization of the ZNPP site and facilities, as well as the ongoing violations of the Five Concrete Principles for protecting the plant in a conflict situation. Second, for some reason, the IAEA appears to have stopped looking over its shoulder and worrying about how Russia might react to its assessments.

As a result, Russian officials responded to the report with strong dissatisfaction, accusing the Agency of every possible shortcoming — from what they viewed as the “neutral” coverage of incidents for which they blamed Ukraine, to alleging that the IAEA had overstepped its mandate.

The reasons for this shift in what had previously been relatively cordial relations between the IAEA and the Russian side are still unclear. However, it gives the impression that the Agency has long seen and understood everything taking place at and around the ZNPP — and that now, as the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war (including the fate of the ZNPP) moves toward some kind of resolution, however uncertain, the IAEA has decided that its frank assessments in the report will no longer do any harm or affect the outcome.

Nevertheless, even if some form of political agreement is eventually reached, the story of the Zaporizhzhia NPP will continue to attract the attention of experts and the interested public for a long time to come.»

Operational status of the ZNPP and IAEA walkdowns of site facilities ↑

Maintenance of various systems at the Zaporizhzhia NPP is ongoing, and some of this work has been observed by IAEA experts during their walkdowns.

In February, maintenance work began at the 750 kV open switchyard on a circuit breaker for one of the three 750 kV power lines that remain disconnected due to the conflict. In March, maintenance was performed on the main transformer of Unit 5 and on the circuit breaker linking it to the open switchyard. A new fixed diesel generator was installed at the 750 kV switchyard to strengthen on-site power resilience. In addition, maintenance activities were carried out on Unit 1 safety systems and on a circuit breaker in the 330 kV backup power line switchyard.

In its latest report on the situation in Ukraine, published on March 6, the IAEA stated that the Russian management of the ZNPP had provided the Agency with a maintenance plan for 2025 covering all the plant’s reactor units. However, the report notes that the maintenance currently being conducted has not yet reached the comprehensive level that would normally be expected.

On March 27, it was reported that the IAEA experts had been informed of the restoration of the connection between the 330 kV switchyard of the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant and the 750 kV switchyard of the ZNPP, which had been lost about a month and a half earlier due to damage. The line can once again serve as a back-up external power supply route.

At the end of March, the IAEA team observed operational tests of diesel generators to confirm their functionality.

The ZNPP has a total of 20 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) for its six reactors. There are also six mobile diesel generators (MDGs) that were installed by Ukraine following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident; four are connected to reactor units, while two are used outside the site. In 2024, Russia procured three additional MDGs for the plant — they are located near the turbine buildings of three units but have not yet been connected to power supply systems. The tests involved one of the EDGs and one of the new MDGs.

On March 26, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Georgii Tykhyi stated on Twitter that he had received information about a spill from a damaged diesel fuel tank — reportedly enough to power the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) for 25 days. Ukraine requested that the IAEA verify this information.

On March 27, the IAEA reported that, when asked about the alleged leak, the plant’s Russian management replied that no such incident had occurred and that the information was inaccurate. They stated that there was sufficient fuel in storage to operate the diesel generators for ten days. The IAEA team requested access to the fuel tanks to conduct an independent assessment.

On March 28, the IAEA team at the ZNPP inspected fuel tanks located outside the perimeter of the plant. The experts observed no signs of damage, fuel spillage, or evidence of any repair work being carried out. Fuel levels in the tanks were within the normal range.

Director General Grossi stated that the ability to promptly and independently verify such reports highlights the importance of the IAEA’s continued presence at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.

In mid-March, during a visit to the reactor building and safety system rooms of Unit 2, IAEA specialists noted the presence of condensation on the walls and floor of the reactor hall and preliminary signs of corrosion in some unpainted areas. Russian representatives at the plant stated that the condensation was due to the reactor being in cold shutdown.

In addition to monitoring the maintenance activities described above, the IAEA’s updates on the situation in Ukraine note that the Agency’s team at the ZNPP visited several other facilities:

Update No. 280: IAEA specialists measured the water levels at all 12 sprinkler ponds at the ZNPP site, confirming that they hold sufficient water to cool the six shut-down reactors.

Update No. 282: The team inspected the waterworks facilities and the reactor building of Unit 4. In the latter, they observed traces of dried boric acid in some rooms and a pump seal defect.

Update No. 284: The IAEA team visited the reactor buildings of Units 1, 3, and 5, as well as the turbine halls of Units 1 and 2. (No mention is made of any access restrictions to parts of the turbine halls.)

Russia did not submit any information circulars to the IAEA in March regarding the situation at the ZNPP.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

In March, the IAEA team stationed at the Zaporizhzhia NPP regularly reported hearing military activities at varying distances away from the site. It was noted in all of the Agency’s updates on the situation in Ukraine issued during the month (Updates No. 280–284).

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

On March 13, the IAEA reported that Ukrainian firefighters had fully brought under control the consequences of the drone strike on the Chernobyl site that occurred on February 14. The strike created a hole in the arch of the New Safe Confinement (NSC), which covers the reactor of Unit 4 destroyed in the 1986 accident and set off fires within its structure that smoldered for more than two weeks.

On March 7, the situation was downgraded from an “emergency” to a “controlled situation.” Radiation monitoring conducted by both the Ukrainian side and IAEA specialists detected no increase in radiation levels.

The IAEA stated that the protective function of the confinement structure — to shield the environment and prevent the degradation of the old shelter structure from external factors — has been compromised.

Following the extinguishing of the fire, efforts began to assess the extent of the damage to the NSC arch.

In an interview with Deutsche Welle, the head of the State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management stated that the drone strike created a hole of approximately 15 square meters in the roof of the NSC arch. In addition, more than 200 openings were made during firefighting efforts, which lasted for nearly three weeks. The structure’s airtightness has been compromised, with elevated humidity and the shutdown of the pressure control system reported.

The same publication includes opinions from Ukrainian experts on the implications of the damage to the arch. They emphasize that there is no immediate radiological threat, but the damage sustained makes it impossible to safely dismantle the old sarcophagus — the very purpose for which the NSC was built. Eighteen unstable structures remain within the Shelter object, and their potential collapse could lead to the release of radioactive dust.

According to Dmytro Humeniuk, Head of the Safety Analysis Department at Ukraine’s State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, “It won’t be possible to weld, repair, or fix the confinement structure directly on site, because radiation doses there are too high and people would be exposed. The arch was originally assembled at a distance and then slid over the sarcophagus on rails. Now that the rails have been dismantled, something similar will have to be done in reverse.”

The dismantling of unstable structures within the old sarcophagus was scheduled to begin by October 31, 2025. This now appears to be no longer feasible.

To provide an independent assessment of the condition of the New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure following the drone strike, Greenpeace experts were invited to the site. Citing Chernobyl NSC and Shelter lead engineer Artem Syryi, Greenpeace reported that about 50% of the northern section of the roof was damaged, along with parts of the southern side and the lateral walls. The roof cladding and key load-bearing structures were affected, and the breach in the structure’s integrity poses a risk of corrosion to the steel components. Syryi stated that the structure is no longer operating in accordance with its design and licensed specifications.

Preliminary analysis by Jan Vande Putte, a nuclear specialist at Greenpeace Ukraine, indicates that repairing the New Safe Confinement (NSC) may require rolling the structure back along rails to the site where it was originally assembled. Such a procedure would demand substantial financial and technical resources.

Greenpeace also engaged the firm McKenzie Intelligence Services (MIS) to analyze the attack. According to MIS findings, the strike was carried out using a Geran-2 drone (Shahed-type), which is used exclusively by Russian forces.

The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine has opened a criminal case into the strike, classifying it as a war crime.

On March 4, an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of the International Chernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA) was held jointly with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, and the State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management. During the meeting, it was decided to allocate €400,000 from ICCA funds to conduct an expert assessment of the consequences of the Russian drone strike on the protective shell of the New Safe Confinement (NSC).

On March 18, representatives of the EBRD visited the Chernobyl  site to inspect the NSC damage firsthand.

At the same time, Russian drones continue to fly over nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Throughout the month, air raid alarms sounded almost daily at Ukraine’s operational nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — as well as at the Chernobyl NPP.

On March 8, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine informed the IAEA of observed drone activity near the Chernobyl site. On March 21, a drone was recorded flying within 3 kilometers of the facility; the IAEA team heard an explosion and visually confirmed the presence of a drone. Similar events were reported on March 30.

On March 21, Ukraine submitted to the IAEA a report detailing sightings of drones near the South Ukraine and Khmelnytskyi NPPs recorded by Energoatom between February 13 and March 11, including specific dates and the number of drones observed.

Commentary by Bellona:

«As Bellona has repeatedly stated, for as long as the war continues, drones and other aircraft, as well as shells and missiles, will keep flying — some of them accidentally or intentionally hitting energy facilities, including nuclear power plants, or posing a threat to them.

Russia will continue to accuse Ukraine of staging provocations — as it did following the shelling of the confinement arch at the Chernobyl NPP — while Ukraine will defend itself by presenting its own version of events. The current international nuclear safety framework has neither the mandate nor the capacity to investigate such incidents, determine who is responsible, or impose any form of punishment.

Apparently, this is why Ukraine invited the international organization Greenpeace — so that at least some relatively independent international body could inspect the site and, if possible, provide its own assessment of the incident, even though, clearly, this holds absolutely no significance for Russia.

This case once again brings us back to the broader question of what kind of international nuclear safety system should exist and how it should function during an armed conflict involving countries with civilian nuclear industries.

For now, all we have are IAEA reports — and its Director General continues to stress that military activity near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (as well as near other Ukrainian NPPs) has become an almost everyday occurrence.

As for the condition of the ZNPP and the ongoing maintenance activities, it seems that all sides understand the plant’s future remains undecided. This likely explains why the maintenance plan for 2025, submitted to the IAEA, “has not yet reached the comprehensive level that would normally be expected.”

The logic of the plant’s Russian management is straightforward: Why invest significant resources in maintenance if we might eventually be forced to hand the plant over to the US or Ukraine? At the same time, since IAEA experts are present at the site, asking questions and observing operations, there has to be at least some appearance that the staff is carrying out maintenance.

There’s also the matter of keeping personnel — who are still receiving salaries — occupied, so they don’t start having “troubling thoughts” about whether it was right to agree to work under the Russian administration.

Against this backdrop, Energoatom’s statement seems entirely appropriate: that the current technical condition of the ZNPP and the state of staff preparedness do not allow for a safe restart of the reactor units without a full inspection of all equipment, systems, and components.

In any case, regardless of which country ends up operating the plant in the future, it will not be possible to return the ZNPP to normal operation without a full and comprehensive overhaul — and possibly without replacing the nuclear fuel that has remained in the reactors for an extended period.»

Orano and Energoatom sign enrichment services supply agreement for Ukrainian nuclear power plants ↑

On March 6, French nuclear materials producer Orano and Ukrainian nuclear operator Energoatom announced the signing of a long-term agreement for the supply of enrichment services. The agreement will remain in effect until 2040.

As a reminder, another enrichment services supplier for Energoatom is Urenco. Natural uranium hexafluoride (including uranium and conversion services) is supplied by Canada’s Cameco, while nuclear fuel is provided by Westinghouse.

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Orano to Begin Uranium Mining in Uzbekistan ↑

On March 10, French nuclear materials producer Orano and Uzbek uranium producer Navoiyuran signed a tripartite agreement laying the foundations for the industrial development of the South Djengeldi deposit in Uzbekistan’s Navoiy region. The development will be carried out by Nurlikum Mining, a joint venture established in 2019 (with 51% owned by Orano and 49% by Navoiyuran).

The third party to the agreement is Japan’s ITOCHU Corporation, which acquired a minority stake in Nurlikum Mining (the size of the stake was not disclosed).

Under the terms of the agreement, the project will be integrated into Navoiyuran’s existing production infrastructure, with Navoiyuran serving as its operator.

Exploration work at the South Djengeldi deposit began in 2020. In 2023, a pilot in-situ leaching (ISL) facility was commissioned, and the first 350 kgU (kilograms of elemental uranium) was extracted. According to Nurlikum Mining, indicated resources are estimated at 4,070 tU, with inferred resources of 2,813 tU.

According to Navoiyuran, the project is expected to be deployed over a three-year period. Initial capital investment will amount to approximately $100 million, with total investment over the mine’s lifetime exceeding $200 million. Foreign companies will serve as the primary investors. Annual uranium production is projected to average around 500 metric tons, with peak output reaching 700 metric tons per year. Uranium production is scheduled to begin by the end of 2025.

The partners will also embark on an exploration program with the goal of at least doubling the joint venture’s mineral resources. Nurlikum Mining holds two exploration licenses for uranium deposits — North and South Djengeldi.

According to the World Nuclear Association, Uzbekistan is the world’s fifth-largest uranium supplier. From 2019 to 2022, its annual uranium production averaged around 3,500 metric tons. In 2022, the Uzbek government announced plans to increase output to 7,100 metric tons per year by 2030.

Navoiyuran’s ability to reach this target will depend on the rapid expansion of its resource base to continue replacing depleting deposits. In addition to its cooperation with Orano, Uzbekistan also plans to engage China in the development of its uranium deposits. In September 2024, an agreement was signed outlining plans for geological exploration with China National Uranium Corporation.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The launch of uranium mining in Uzbekistan by Orano — albeit still on a modest scale — marks an important step toward diversifying global uranium supply, especially for the EU, which is seeking to reduce its dependence on Russia amid rising demand and instability in other uranium-producing countries such as Niger.

Unlike Kazakhstan — which actively involves nearly all major global players in its uranium mining sector and leads the world in uranium production — neighboring Uzbekistan is undertaking its first uranium project with foreign partners through this initiative with Orano and ITOCHU. Notably, despite its geographic proximity to Russia, Moscow’s political influence, and an ongoing Russian-Uzbek project to build a small nuclear power plant, Rosatom is not the first foreign partner in modern Uzbekistan’s uranium sector.»

Orano to receive European Investment Bank loan for expansion of enrichment plant in France ↑

On March 10, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Orano announced the signing of a €400 million loan agreement. The funds will be used to finance part of the investment in the expansion of the Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant located in Tricastin, France. The loan will contribute to a total investment of nearly €1.7 billion, which Orano is directing toward increasing the plant’s capacity by 30%.

The project was launched in October 2024. At the same time, it was announced that €300 million received by Orano from the French state — which purchased its newly issued shares — would also be used to finance the project.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The European Investment Bank’s €400 million loan to Orano for the expansion of the Georges Besse II enrichment plant in France is a logical step in the EU’s strategy to strengthen key segments of the nuclear fuel cycle and reduce dependence on Russia.

Together with the previously announced state contribution (€300 million via a share purchase), the project now stands to gain the financial stability it needs and serves as further evidence that European authorities are ready to move from political declarations to the support of concrete, practical measures.

As we noted in October of last year, the major Western suppliers of enriched uranium — Urenco and Orano — have already begun implementing their plans to expand capacity.»

Enusa to Manufacture VVER-440 Fuel Assemblies for Finland’s Loviisa NPP ↑

On March 12, Westinghouse Electric Company and Spain’s Enusa signed a Technology Cooperation Agreement extending their current licensing agreement for an additional ten years. The companies also signed a contract under which Enusa will fabricate fuel assemblies for the VVER-440 reactors at Finland’s Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.

The new contract builds on the collaboration between Westinghouse and Enusa on VVER-440 fuel production, which began in September 2022. In 2023, Enusa began reconfiguring a production line at its Juzbado facility in Spain to support this effort. The fuel assemblies are scheduled for delivery to the Loviisa plant in late 2025.

As a reminder, Westinghouse and Finnish utility Fortum — the operator and owner of the Loviisa NPP — signed a contract in November 2022 for the design, licensing, and manufacture of VVER-440 fuel. In the summer of 2023, a test assembly without uranium pellets was loaded into Unit 2 of the Loviisa NPP for mechanical testing, followed by the loading of the first batch of nuclear fuel in August 2024.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Finland’s decision to purchase Westinghouse fuel instead of Russian fuel is a direct consequence of the war in Ukraine. The slow but steady shift toward alternative fuel sources shows that even in technologically demanding sectors such as VVER-440 fuel, nuclear operators in the EU are prepared to cut ties with Rosatom. The extension of the licensing agreement between Westinghouse and Enusa, along with the contract with Fortum, indicates that a stable production base for alternative VVER-440 fuel is taking shape within the EU.»

Ghana selects suppliers for construction of its first nuclear power plants ↑

On March 27, the Ghana News Agency, citing Dr. Stephen Yamoah, Executive Director of Nuclear Power Ghana, reported that the country has selected technology suppliers for the construction of its first nuclear power plants.

US-based NuScale Power and Regnum Technology Group, in partnership with Japanese firms, will construct small modular reactors — 12 modules of 77 MW each (for a total capacity of 924 MW). The project will be financed through a public-private partnership.

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) will construct a large-scale 1200 MW nuclear power plant. The project will be financed under a Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) model, with participation from local investors.

While construction contracts have not yet been signed, framework agreements with both NuScale and CNNC were concluded earlier in 2024.

It is worth noting that in 2015, Ghana signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. As recently as last year, Rosatom was considered one of the potential technology suppliers for the West African country’s nuclear program. Proposals from France and South Korea were also under consideration.

Commentary by Bellona:

«African countries represent a promising — although high-risk — market for energy companies and projects, including those in the nuclear sector. In recent years, Russia has actively pursued cooperation with nations across Africa, regularly organizing Russia–Africa economic summits.

Rosatom has signed memoranda and preliminary agreements on potential partnerships for nuclear technology development with Burundi, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ethiopia, and also plans to develop uranium projects in Namibia and Tanzania. However, not all of these plans are progressing as initially envisioned.

Competition in the region and in the global nuclear market is intensifying. As Bellona has previously noted, China is also positioning itself to compete for these markets. In politically and economically complex environments — which are not always transparent or governed by market principles — China may be able to outmaneuver both Western suppliers and Rosatom, which remains the main builder of NPPs abroad.

For China, which has a relatively small portfolio of international nuclear projects (its only completed foreign project so far being a nuclear power plant in Pakistan), the NPP in Ghana could become a landmark initiative for the Global South. It would also showcase a new project delivery model — Build–Operate–Transfer.

As for NuScale’s small modular reactor plans in Ghana, it is too early to assess their prospects. Unlike China’s large-scale nuclear units, NuScale’s SMRs have yet to be demonstrated in practice with a reference project.»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Russia and Myanmar sign agreement on construction of small nuclear power plant ↑

On March 4, during an official state visit by a Myanmar delegation to Russia, the two countries signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction of a land-based small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear power plant in Myanmar. The agreement outlines the terms and main areas of cooperation for the implementation of a 110 MW SMR project, with the option to expand capacity to 330 MW in the future.

This agreement follows the Intergovernmental Agreement on cooperation in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes signed in February 2023.

Prospects for the Northern Sea Route and challenges in shipbuilding discussed at Arctic Forum ↑

On March 26–27, the 6th International Arctic Forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” was held in Murmansk. Speaking at the session titled “A Long-Term Development Model for the Northern Sea Route (NSR),” Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev outlined the conditions necessary for increasing cargo traffic along the Arctic shipping corridor.

At present, with cargo volumes around 40 million metric tons, navigation along the route is supported by 11 icebreakers, including eight nuclear-powered vessels: Taymyr, Vaygach, Yamal, 50 Let Pobedy, Arktika, Sibir, Ural, and Yakutia.

Likhachev noted that sanctions pressure affects not only technological equipment but also transportation, financing, and long-term contracts for the sale of resources extracted in the Arctic zone. However, he emphasized that if the development of northern resource deposits proceeds successfully, cargo traffic along the NSR should be projected to increase to 100–150 million metric tons by 2030.

This, he said, will require expanding the icebreaker fleet to 15–17 vessels, as well as building up the cargo fleet. Achieving this will require international cooperation, as Russia alone cannot meet its shipbuilding needs. Negotiations are underway with China, India, and a number of other “shipbuilding-competent” countries.

The challenges facing the achievement of planned cargo volumes along the Northern Sea Route and the construction of new nuclear-powered icebreakers have been repeatedly covered in our previous digests:

– “The impact of sanctions on building nuclear-powered icebreakers” (May 2023)

– “Budget financing for construction of icebreakers reduces, while they increase in price” (October 2023)

– “Transportation volume on NSR grows. But at slower rates than planned in 2022, and future plans are being adjusted” (January 2024)

– “Russia’s shipbuilding development strategy” (March 2024)

– “Nuclear icebreaker fleet construction” (November–December 2024)

On March 17, Vedomosti, citing the Baltic Shipyard’s 2024 financial report under Russian accounting standards (RAS), reported that the shipbuilding enterprise expects to receive additional funding from the customer for the sixth and seventh Project 22220 universal nuclear icebreakers — Leningrad and Stalingrad. According to the publication, the cost of the vessels could increase by up to 30%.

A revised budget will also be required for the construction of the Project 22770 multifunctional nuclear service vessel. According to the Baltic Shipyard’s report, additional funding is needed to prevent cash flow shortages in operational activities.

Commentary by Bellona:

«When it comes to developments around the Northern Sea Route (NSR), little has changed in recent months beyond what Bellona has already covered in its overview report “Rosatom in the war years of 2023 and 2024: Key Events, Projects, Decisions, Facts, and Problems” and in the digests cited above.

The only notable new development is the increasingly frequent mention in official Russian sources and at various events — including the International Arctic Forum — of a shortage of shipbuilding and ship repair capacity needed to expand Russia’s icebreaker and cargo fleets.

According to figures presented at a number of Arctic-focused events involving senior officials, Russian shipbuilders have commissioned only about 15 vessels for the NSR over the past five years — just half the planned number. At present, there are around 850 vessels of various classes operating in Russia’s Arctic ports, one-third of which are more than 25 years old and therefore require at least medium-level repairs. This underscores the urgent need to expand Russia’s shipbuilding and repair capacity.

Only 30% of Russian vessels currently undergo maintenance within the country. As a result, there are plans to establish a large ship repair cluster in Murmansk Oblast, expand Atomflot’s infrastructure to implement a major investment project (the details of which have not been disclosed), and modernize the ship repair industry in the Russian Far East and along the Arctic coast. These efforts are expected to require investments of at least 160 billion rubles.

It is difficult to say how feasible this is in the near term, given the impact of Western sanctions, which have cut off access to many foreign shipbuilding and repair facilities. On top of that, Russia has seen a sharp increase in orders for ship construction and repair from the Ministry of Defense. The newly established Maritime Board is now drafting a federal law on state regulation of the shipbuilding industry, along with a new national shipbuilding strategy. How these plans, laws, and strategies will actually be implemented remains to be seen…»

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On March 4, installation of the second tier of the inner containment at the Unit 2 reactor building was completed. The operation began on February 16.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On March 4, Akkuyu Nuclear reported the completion of the installation of the second tier of the inner containment at the Unit 4 reactor building. On March 12, a pressurizer — used to maintain pressure within the primary circuit of the reactor — was installed at Unit 2.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. On March 18, Rosatom announced the completion of hydraulic pressure tests on the primary circuit systems and equipment, and on March 21 — the completion of turbine installation at Unit 1.

Recommended publications ↑

On March 13, The Moscow Times published the article ”Enriched Uranium Fuels Russia’s War Machine. But the US Still Imports It” by Bellona Nuclear Project expert Dmitry Gorchakov, analyzing the situation with Russian enriched uranium supplies to the United States.

On March 17, the Ukrainian State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS) published an interview with Bellona Nuclear Project expert Alexander Nikitin on its information portal Uatom, titled “Nuclear Crimes without Punishment: Why Are World Mechanisms Powerless?”. The interview is also available on Bellona’s website.

Over the past month, Bellona experts have repeatedly commented on US-Russia negotiations concerning a potential resolution of the war in Ukraine, including the possible fate of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Their insights appeared in The Washington Post, the French newspaper L’Express, and on Bellona’s website in the articles “Could The US Assume Control Of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant?” and “Russia Rebuffs US Notion Of Taking Over Embattled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant.”