News

Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, February 2025

Publish date: 14/04/2025

In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.  

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for January can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Construction of the Emergency Ministry’s Rescue Center in Tiksi is delayed
2. Russia lacks the vessels required for operations along the Northern Sea Route
3. The Hydrographic Enterprise, a subsidiary of Rosatom, is planning to carry out large-scale dredging operations along the Northern Sea Route
4. More than half of the cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 was accounted for by liquefied natural gas
5. There are plans to establish an environmental monitoring center for the Northern Sea Route, as the current monitoring system is deemed ineffective

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. The European Union and the United Kingdom have imposed new sanctions against Russia
7. Russia and the United States held talks on joint energy projects in the Arctic following a meeting in Saudi Arabia
8. Due to sanctions, NOVATEK is relocating its LNG transshipment point from Belgium to the area near Kildin Island

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
9. Expansion of Oil and Gas Extraction in the Russian Arctic
10. NOVATEK plans to complete construction of the Murmansk LNG plant by 2030
11. Plans for lithium extraction in the Murmansk region may be reduced

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
12. In Chukotka, preparations are underway to raise another batch of sunken vessels from the seabed
13. Extremely High Temperatures at the North Pole and Other Negative Records
14. The research project “Arсtida” has compiled a ranking of Russia’s Arctic regions based on their progress in the energy transition

Northern sea route and shipping

Construction of the Emergency Ministry’s Rescue Center in Tiksi is delayed ↑

Federal and regional authorities acknowledge that there is no rescue infrastructure along a stretch of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) exceeding 3,000 kilometers. This refers to the section between Dudinka and Pevek in Yakutia.

To enhance safety along the Northern Sea Route, an emergency rescue center was commissioned in Pevek in June 2024. The next EMERCOM (Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations) rescue center is planned for Tiksi, but its development is facing financial challenges.

Port of Pevek on the Northern Sea Route. Photo: Consfone

Stanislav Alekseev, a representative of EMERCOM in Yakutia, stated that the construction of the center in Pevek, completed in June 2024, cost 2 billion rubles. Government funding for a similar center in Tiksi may only become available by 2028. An earlier launch would be possible only with co-financing from state corporations and mineral resource developers.

Russia lacks the vessels required for operations along the Northern Sea Route ↑

Sergey Buyanov, Director General of the Central Research and Design Institute of the Merchant Marine, spoke about the shortage of container ships in Russia. He noted that transporting cargo along the Northern Sea Route requires ice-class bulk carriers with a deadweight of up to 120,000 tons, multipurpose vessels (including those with ice-class capability), supply ships, and many others.

At the same time, the operating icebreakers are wearing out, but instead of being decommissioned, they are being repurposed for use in less demanding conditions. For example, the “Avraamy Zavenyagin” icebreaker, built in 1984 and previously used at the port of Dudinka on Norilsk Nickel projects, is now in poor technical condition. It is planned to be repaired in Arkhangelsk and then deployed for operations in the ice-covered areas of the Northern Dvina River, as well as the Dvina and Onega Bays — similar to the deployment of its sister ship, “Captain Yevdokimov”.

The Hydrographic Enterprise, a subsidiary of Rosatom, is planning to carry out large-scale dredging operations along the Northern Sea Route ↑

At the 8th Congress on “Hydraulic Engineering Structures and Dredging,” a Rosatom representative reported that the current volume of capital dredging underway along the Northern Sea Route amounts to 4.4 million m³. The projected volume at the project preparation stage stands at 28.6 million m³. The projected volume of maintenance dredging needed to maintain design depths is estimated at 34.4 million m³ by 2030.

Key sites include:

  • The port of Sabetta on the western shore of the Ob Bay in the Kara Sea – 4.8 million m³
  • The maritime channel leading to it – 19 million m³ 
  • The Utrenny terminal on the western side of the Gydan Peninsula – 5.4 million m³ 
  • Other sites (Tambey, Bukhta Sever, Syradasay, Nagleynyn, Tiksi) – ranging from 400,000 to 2.1 million m³

However, the available dredging fleet is insufficient to carry out the planned volume of work. According to estimates by the Hydrographic Enterprise, an additional eight vessels of various types will be required in 2025 to complete the tasks.

Andrey Chumachenko, Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise, proposed addressing the fleet shortage by using federal budget subsidies, loans, engaging contracting organizations, and entering into concession agreements with investors.

Large-scale dredging operations may have a significant impact on the ecosystem, raising concerns among environmentalists and local communities. According to Vladimir Bogdanov, a representative of the Institute of Plant and Animal Ecology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in the most vulnerable areas — such as certain parts of the Ob Bay — dredging could lead to the complete disappearance of several marine species unique to the region.

More than half of the cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 was accounted for by liquefied natural gas ↑

According to data from the consulting firm Gecon, based on statistics from Rosmorrechflot, liquefied natural gas (LNG) accounted for 57.69% of the total cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024, amounting to 21.86 million tons. Oil accounted for 21.37% (8.1 million tons). The total cargo volume along the NSR reached 37.89 million tons.

The volume of LNG transported in 2024 increased by 8.6% (1.73 million tons) compared to the previous year. A Rosatom representative explained that this growth was driven by the launch of NOVATEK’s Arctic LNG 2 project. Mikhail Grigoryev, Director of Gecon, added that in 2024, NOVATEK did not suspend operations at Yamal LNG for scheduled maintenance, as it did in 2023.

The LNG carrier MERAK, built by Mitsui OSK Lines for Yamal LNG. Photo: kees torn

There are plans to establish an environmental monitoring center for the Northern Sea Route, as the current monitoring system is deemed ineffective ↑

The environmental monitoring center for the Northern Sea Route is planned to be established on the basis of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI). This center will be responsible for coordinating the monitoring system of the NSR’s marine ecosystems, collecting and analyzing data, and transmitting it to the State Environmental Data Fund and the Federal State Information System “Ecomonitoring.” The documentation package for the establishment of the center is currently at the legislative proposal stage, and the project itself is included in the Northern Sea Route development plan through 2035.

Currently, environmental monitoring along the Northern Sea Route is carried out by various organizations — the Russian Federal Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography (VNIRO), Rosatom, the Marine Research Center of Moscow State University, the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), and others. However, the coverage is incomplete, the methodological framework is insufficient, the collected data is fragmented, and there is no unified platform for data storage. According to Alexander Makarov, Director of AARI, it is not feasible to build an effective monitoring system based on existing structures, as none of them fully account for the specific characteristics of the Arctic zone, nor do they adequately cover the necessary parameters and monitoring targets across the NSR waters. A centralized system for aggregating all collected data is also required.

Bellona’s comment:

«To achieve the goals outlined in Russia’s strategic documents concerning the Northern Sea Route, the state lacks sufficient financial resources. There is ongoing discussion about the shortage of various types of vessels needed for NSR operations — icebreakers, cargo carriers, dredging vessels, and emergency rescue ships. Funding is also insufficient to build the necessary infrastructure within the planned timeframes, as illustrated by the case of the rescue center in Tiksi.

At the same time, the government’s ability to cover funding gaps appears to be diminishing. This is evidenced by plans to involve extractive companies in financing the construction of the rescue center in Tiksi, as well as the proposal to increase the cost of icebreaker escort services in order to fund the completion of new icebreakers.

Meanwhile, cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route grew by only 4% over the past year—an outcome that signals more of a failure than a success in meeting the goal of doubling cargo volumes by 2024. The future expansion of shipping along the NSR now depends largely on the launch of new oil, gas, and mineral extraction projects in the Arctic zone, the success of which, in turn, depends on the willingness of other countries to purchase these resources. Continued and expanded sanctions against Russian companies would mean stagnation in the development of NSR infrastructure.

On the other hand, the United States’ anticipated “trade war” with much of the world, along with the uncertain prospects for an end to the war in Ukraine, could lead to unpredictable outcomes in Arctic development — both on the part of Russia and other countries, particularly the United States.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

The European Union and the United Kingdom have imposed new sanctions against Russia ↑

On February 24, marking the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union adopted its 16th package of sanctions aimed at weakening the Russian regime’s ability to continue the war.

The new EU sanctions include:

  • A ban on port access and the provision of maritime transport services for 74 tankers belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet, which are used to transport Russian oil in circumvention of existing sanctions. This brings the total number of vessels sanctioned by the EU to 153. Additionally, owning or operating ships within the Russian shadow fleet is now considered grounds for imposing sanctions on individuals and legal entities. Some of these tankers operate in the Arctic, including Lokosao and Lorena Grand.
  • Additional restrictions have been imposed on the export of goods and technologies, particularly software related to the exploration of oil and gas fields.
  • A ban has been introduced on the provision of goods, technologies, and services for oil projects in Russia, specifically targeting the Vostok Oil project for oil extraction and export on the Taymyr Peninsula.
  • A ban on the temporary storage of Russian crude oil and petroleum products within the European Union has been introduced. The restriction applies to all such oil and petroleum products, regardless of purchase price or destination.
  • A ban on the import of Russian aluminum, a significant source of revenue for Russia, has been introduced. European buyers will be allowed to continue importing Russian aluminum under a quota system for one year, but by the end of 2026, all imports are to be fully phased out. In the Arctic zone, Russia extracts aluminum in the Murmansk region, specifically at the Khibiny deposit group.

On February 24, the United Kingdom announced its largest package of sanctions against Russia since 2022. The sanctions list includes 40 vessels from the “shadow fleet” transporting Russian oil, bringing the total number of such sanctioned ships to 133.

Russia and the United States held talks on joint energy projects in the Arctic following a meeting in Saudi Arabia ↑

On February 18, talks between Russia and the United States took place in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. This meeting marked the first official contact between the two countries since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

According to POLITICO, the talks included discussions on the possibility of joint energy projects in the Arctic. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), noted that while the discussion was general in nature, the parties did touch upon specific projects in the Arctic.

Nikita Lipunov, an expert at the Institute for International Studies of MGIMO University, believes that a priority for the United States in the context of potential cooperation could be the revival of the joint project in the Kara Sea. Until 2018, Rosneft and the American company ExxonMobil were working on field development there, but ExxonMobil withdrew from the project due to sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union.

Due to sanctions, NOVATEK is relocating its LNG transshipment point from Belgium to the area near Kildin Island ↑

Russia’s largest natural gas producer, NOVATEK, is preparing to relocate the liquefied natural gas (LNG) transshipment point for its Yamal LNG project from the Belgian port of Zeebrugge to the area near Kildin Island, not far from Murmansk. Sanctions banning the transshipment of Russian LNG within the EU are set to take effect at the end of March. However, according to the newspaper “Kommersant”, NOVATEK has already begun moving new tankers to the Kildin Island area.

LNG transshipment at this location has been taking place since 2020, but the company now plans to increase volumes and make it the primary transshipment point. The logistical changes are expected to affect only shipments to Asia, while exports to Europe are projected to remain unchanged.

Bellona’s comment:

«Against the backdrop of yet another round of sluggish sanctions from the EU and the UK targeting Russian companies and the shadow fleet transporting Russian oil and gas, the U.S. statement on the potential revival of joint resource extraction projects in the Russian Arctic came as a surprise — much like many other statements made by the new American administration.

It is too early to draw conclusions about the feasibility of these projects due to geopolitical factors. However, it is important to note that the mentioned potential joint project in the Kara Sea involves offshore oil extraction—an activity that could pose a serious threat to Arctic ecosystems, particularly given the lack of transparency, insufficient emergency infrastructure, and the fact that environmental safety is not a priority for either the current Russian or U.S. authorities.

Bellona advocates for a complete ban on offshore oil and gas extraction in the Arctic zone due to the disproportionately high risk of environmental damage in the event of an accident.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian arctic

Expansion of Oil and Gas Extraction in the Russian Arctic ↑

According to the Ministry of Natural Resources, at the current production rate, Russia has natural gas reserves sufficient for more than 100 years and oil reserves for approximately 64.5 years.

Russia’s largest gas fields — Urengoy, Tambey, and Shtokman — are located in the Arctic zone within the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. One of the country’s largest oil fields, Payakha, is also situated in the Arctic, in the Krasnoyarsk Krai region.

In the near future, production is expected to begin at the Parusovoye, Severo-Parusovoye, and Semakovskoye fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. These fields contain over 450 billion m³ of natural gas and more than 7 million tons of liquid hydrocarbons.

The head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug announced that the first batch of oil from Lukoil and Gazprom’s joint venture, Layavozhneftegaz, is scheduled to be produced in 2026.

NOVATEK plans to complete construction of the Murmansk LNG plant by 2030 ↑

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, speaking before the Federation Council, stated that the construction of the Murmansk LNG plant is scheduled to be completed by 2030. By the same time, the Volkov–Murmansk gas pipeline is expected to be built to supply the plant with feedstock. The gas for liquefaction is planned to be sourced from the Gydan Peninsula.

The plant is expected to have an annual capacity of 20.4 million tons and will consist of three trains, each with a capacity of 6.8 million tons. The first train is scheduled for completion in 2027, the second in 2029, while the timeline for the third train has not yet been specified.

Polar Lithium site. Photo: atommedia.online / Polar Lithium

The Murmansk LNG project was initially scheduled for launch between 2027 and 2029. However, on June 24, 2024, as part of its 14th sanctions package, the European Union banned new investments as well as the provision of goods, technologies, and services necessary for the completion of the Murmansk LNG plant. As a result, work on both the LNG facility and the associated gas pipeline was suspended.

In January, it was reported that construction of the LNG loading terminal in the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea—intended for the Murmansk LNG plant—had been accelerated. In 2024, a project proposal for the terminal was submitted for public review with a planned completion date of 2033; however, the hearings were canceled. According to new materials from the preliminary environmental impact assessment (EIA), the terminal is now expected to be completed by 2030.

Plans for lithium extraction in the Murmansk region may be reduced ↑

At a roundtable held on February 12 in the Federation Council on the topic “Extraction and Processing of Rare Earth Metals: Challenges and Solutions,” representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade acknowledged that the projected growth of domestic lithium consumption to 10,000 tons by 2028 may be overly optimistic. Currently, consumption stands at approximately 1,000 tons.

A significant increase in lithium consumption in Russia is unlikely, due to a decline in electric vehicle production. Meanwhile, the global lithium market is currently saturated with supply from major producers — Australia, Chile, and China.

Polar Lithium — a sanctioned joint venture between Rosatom and Norilsk Nickel—plans to begin lithium extraction at the Kolmozerskoye deposit in the Murmansk region by 2031. The company has not yet announced any adjustments to its plans.

Bellona’s comment:

«The past three years have shown that, despite sanctions imposed by the G7 countries and the EU, there remains demand for Russian natural resources on the global market, and workarounds for these sanctions continue to be found. As a result, Russia’s plan for mineral extraction in the Arctic is still being implemented — albeit at a slower pace than originally envisioned in strategic documents. The majority of extracted resources are expected to be exported, as is currently the case.

Domestic demand cannot support significant consumption due to the underdevelopment of the industrial sector. The case of lithium illustrates this clearly. Despite government incentives aimed at boosting domestic electric vehicle production, output is declining rather than growing—likely unable to compete with Chinese alternatives.

The accelerated construction of the LNG terminal in Murmansk is likely linked to European sanctions on the transshipment of Russian LNG at the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. For now, ship-to-ship transshipment is planned near Kildin Island, close to Murmansk. Whether this will be followed by a similar acceleration in the construction of the Murmansk LNG plant remains uncertain and will depend on the evolution of international sanctions. As of today, given its sanctioned status, the future Murmansk LNG facility is unlikely to secure buyers—much like Arctic LNG 2, which was forced to remain idle for much of last year.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

In Chukotka, preparations are underway to raise another batch of sunken vessels from the seabed ↑

The operation concerns five vessels that sank in Krest Bay near the settlement of Egvekinot. A diving survey is planned for this summer to determine whether the ships contain petroleum products or other pollutants, assess their condition, and, in some cases, establish their exact coordinates. The actual salvage operation is scheduled for 2026. A total of 8 million rubles has been allocated for this effort, which is being carried out under the federal project “General Cleanup.”

Earlier, in 2023 and 2024, three sunken vessels were raised in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug from the seabed near Emma Bay, close to the settlement of Provideniya. Approximately 150 tons of metal were recovered from the coastal seabed of the bay.

Extremely High Temperatures at the North Pole and Other Negative Records ↑

In early February, the EU’s Copernicus Climate Monitoring Service recorded a record-high temperature of 0.5°C at the North Pole—20°C above the seasonal average for this time of year.

The beginning of the year also saw another negative milestone. In mid-February, the combined sea ice extent in the Arctic and Antarctic dropped to 15.76 million square kilometers—the lowest winter ice coverage ever recorded.

Just a month earlier, Arctic sea ice extent was also well below average, measuring 13.13 million square kilometers— the second-lowest figure for that month since satellite observations began in 1979. And the month before that, an all-time record low for December sea ice extent was set.

The situation is no better for continental glaciers. A recent study by researchers from the United States and the United Kingdom found that the number of fractures in the Greenland Ice Sheet—the world’s second-largest ice sheet after Antarctica—has increased by 5% over the past five years, while the total area of ice damage has grown by 25%.

Husky dogs running on frozen sea pulling a sledge in front of a glacier, Qaanaaq, Greenland. Photo: Kedardome

The research project “Arсtida” has compiled a ranking of Russia’s Arctic regions based on their progress in the energy transition ↑

The ranking is based on an analysis of the development of renewable energy, electric transport, and energy efficiency measures in buildings across 10 northern regions of Russia. No region received high marks across all categories. Karelia, the Murmansk region, and Krasnoyarsk Krai showed the strongest performance relative to other regions. These areas have visible electricity generation from renewable sources (with 384 MW of installed capacity in Murmansk and 314 MW in Karelia, while the other regions have no more than 10 MW), infrastructure for charging personal electric vehicles, urban electric transport, energy-efficient new buildings, and plans under development to further improve these indicators.