After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for January 2025 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the latest three digests for November-December, October and September.

Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for January 2025 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the latest three digests for November-December, October and September.

Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1.  The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for January 2025
1.1.  Technical state of the ZNPP
1.2.  Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team
1.3.  Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4.  Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
1.5. Attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. US sanctions
3. Kazakhstan completes visits to potential suppliers for its NPP project
4. France’s Orano and Mongolia sign agreement on join development of uranium deposit
5. Import of Russian uranium to Germany increased in 2024
6. Vietnam restarts nuclear energy program

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Extending the operating life of RMBK reactors
8. Rosatom expands its logistics business
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for January 2025

Technical state of the ZNPP ↑

On 12 January the plant’s last remaining 330-kV back-up power line was disconnected for 13 hours for maintenance.

The IAEA team was also informed by ZNPP representatives that work had commenced on a safety train in unit 4 and on one of the emergency diesel generators that are designed to provide on-site power in case of a total loss of off-site power (similar works were completed on units 2 and 6 in late December).

On 23 January, the IAEA reported that the team had been informed that another three new diesel generators were being procured for the ZNPP, similar to those received at the end of 2024.

On 24 January during a walkdown of the containment building of unit 5, the IAEA team observed condensation – water drops on the floors and walls, and were informed that the Russian management of the ZNPP was aware of this issue.

On 29 January, the sole remaining 750 kV- power line was disconnected due to the activation of a protection system, and the ZNPP received electricity by the 330 kV back-up power line (the IAEA report does not indicate what caused the protection system’s activation).

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team ↑

The IAEA reports that the team of experts at the ZNPP continues to make regular walkdowns of plant facilities, despite problems from nearby ongoing military activity.

The IAEA report for 17 January states that over the previous week the team inspected:

• units 1-6: main control rooms (made note of staffing levels);
• unit 6: emergency diesel generators (checked fuel levels), observed the switching of the spent fuel pool cooling pump from one safety train to another;
• the cooling pond area, including in the vicinity of both cooling towers, one of which was damaged in a fire in August 2024 (an area where the team was previously denied access);
• unit 2: turbine hall (as usual, access to the western part was denied);

The next period is described in the report for 23 January:

• main and emergency control rooms of four reactor units (without indicating which ones);
• turbine hall of one of the reactor units (also without indicating which one).

Additionally, at the end of January the IAEA team was allowed access to the 750 kV open switchyard for the first time since late last year. The team members confirmed that maintenance on the voltage stabilizers had been completed.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

On 5 January the IAEA team at the ZNPP reported hearing two loud explosions coming from outside the perimeter three hours apart, which coincided with reports of a drone attack on the training center. Additionally, the team heard machine gun fire coming from the site.

The Russian side reported that the drone attack hit the roof of the G building of the training center. No casualties or damage to the center or plant equipment was reported.

The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that air defense systems in the region of the ZNPP and Enerhodar shot down eight drones, and that one of the drones shot down exploded and caught fire on the roof of the training center.

The IAEA team also reported that on this day the intensity of military activity in direct proximity to the NPP increased, including numerous explosions at various distances from the site.

Later throughout the rest of the month IAEA team reported that explosions could be heard almost daily, including near the plant.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

In January, reports of increased military activity came not only from the IAEA expert team at the ZNPP but also from the teams at the three operational Ukrainian NPPs – Rivne, Khmelnytsky, and South Ukraine – as well as at the Chornobyl NPP site. The IAEA teams at these sites reported multiple air raid alerts. Drones were detected at various distances from the Khmelnytsky, South Ukraine, and Chornobyl NPP sites.

The IAEA reports stated that on 14 January two drones were spotted flying close to the industrial area of the Chornobyl NPP, and gunfire was heard (noting that drones had flown over the area repeatedly in the past two months).

On 15 January, drones were also spotted flying as close as 5 kilometers from the site of the South Ukraine NPP.

The following week at the Khmelnytsky and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site, the IAEA teams were informed of drones detected at distances ranging from 2 to 30 km from the sites.

In the information circular to IAEA member countries, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine provided a list of incidents near the South Ukraine and Khmelnytsky NPPs in January, based on reports from Energoatom, indicating the date, time, and number of drones spotted.

Attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine ↑

On 15 January, Russia carried out another massive missile attack affecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. As a precautionary measure, the Rivne NPP temporarily reduced power generation at one of its units, which returned to nominal capacity later the same day.

On 29 January, one of the two 750-kV power lines was disconnected at the South Ukraine NPP due to military activity. As a result, one of its three reactors decreased power output for several hours. (On 6 February, the IAEA reported that the power line had not yet been reconnected).

Commentary by Bellona:

«The armed capture of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, marks its third anniversary. This event was unprecedented, because it was the first time in history such an event occurred, and the occupation was carried out not by some random uncontrolled criminal group, but by a state that is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Bellona has been monitoring the situation at and around the ZNPP almost daily, and therefore wishes to share some of its thoughts, impressions, and reflections.

The good news is that, in the three years since the occupation, there have been no officially recorded nuclear or radiation incidents. But it should be noted that the daily military activities around the plant constantly pose a potential threat, not only of incidents but also of more serious events, including major accidents.

Despite reports from Russian personnel and the IAEA mission regarding maintenance of the plant’s equipment, it is not clear that these activities fully comply with the technical operating documents and requirements, and in fact they cannot, since the plant is currently operating in an extended long-term shutdown of reactors with a core containing fuel in a subcritical state. Furthermore, questions remain regarding the professional training of the current plant personnel.

Whether this could lead to an emergency incident is difficult to say for certain, but the “cold shutdown mode” in which the plant’s reactors are operating ensures, at the very least, the physical impossibility of uncontrolled nuclear processes, unless personnel intervene with specific purposes, such as attempting to restart the shut-down reactors, a possibility that has been hinted at by Russian officials on several occasions.

It is interesting to observe the role and actions of the IAEA mission at the ZNPP, as well as the heated confrontation between Ukraine and Russia during the process of mission rotation at the plant. These confrontations are of course connected to the war and to the fact that each side considers the Zaporizhzhia NPP to be legally its own, believing that the IAEA mission can only be present at the plant with its permission and must enter from the territory it controls. These are specific aspects of the war that, once it is over, will need to be analyzed, studied, and addressed through international decisions and regulations binding on all parties. This also raises broader questions about the role and position of the IAEA in times of war, a topic that Bellona discussed in its report “The IAEA’s Role in Times of War.”

The final question, which is growing more pressing and relevant by the day at all levels, including at the highest political levels, is how and with what outcome the story of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP will ultimately conclude. There are not many possible scenarios — no more than three or four. But that is a discussion for another time…»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

US sanctions ↑

On 10 January, the Unated States announced new sweeping sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. Although they mainly concern the oil industry, senior officials of Rosatom were also added to the SDN list:

• Director General Aleksey Likhachev;
• Deputy Director General for International Activities Nikolay Spassky;
• First Deputy Director General for Development and International Business Kirill Komarov;
• First Deputy Director General for Development of New Nuclear Energy Products Alexander Lokshin;
• Deputy Director General for Execution of State Powers and Budgeting Sergey Novikov;
• Deputy director general for security Konstantin Denisov;
• Director For Public Policy on Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Decommissioning Oleg Kryukov;
• Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions Andrei Nikipelov;
• Deputy Director General for State Safety Policy in The Defense Uses of Atomic Energy Yury Yakovlev;
• Deputy Director General for Development of Rosatom’s Production System Sergey Obozov;
• Deputy Director General for Science and Strategy Yury Olenin;
• First Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy, head of Atomstroyexport Andrey Petrov (listed as the Director General of Rosenergoatom, but since June 2023 this position has been held by Alexander Shutikov instead of Petrov);
• Deputy Director General for Economics and Finance Ilya Rebrov;
• Deputy Director General – Director of The Northern Sea Route Directorate Vyacheslav Ruksha.

It is stated that senior officials of Rosatom have publicly declared that Rosatom enterprises are developing weapons systems, including those intended for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Furthermore, individuals included in the sanction lists facilitate Rosatom’s involvement in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and defense sector, the export of nuclear power plant construction, the development of advanced technologies and materials, the expansion of non-uranium mining industries and related businesses, as well as malign activities, including the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.

It is noted that the inclusion of the company’s senior management in the sanctions list brings the total number of US sanctions related to Rosatom to nearly 70 subsidiary companies and associated individuals. This move aligns US actions with previously imposed sanctions on Rosatom board members by the United Kingdom and Canada.

Referring to the justifications used in the US State Department’s press release, Likhachev stated that the new sanctions look more like an awards list than a sanctions decision, as they highlight the achievements and merits of the state corporation. He also noted that inclusion in the SDN list has no impact on Rosatom’s leadership, as they do not have assets in the US.

Inclusion on the SDN list results in the freezing of assets in the US belonging to sanctioned organizations and individuals, as well as a ban on American citizens and companies conducting transactions with them.

Additionally, on 10 January, the company Polar Lithium, associated with Rosatom, was added to the SDN list. It is a joint venture between Nornickel and Rosatom Nedra, the mining division of Rosatom (formerly Atomredmetzoloto).

Polar Lithium holds the rights to develop Russia’s largest lithium deposit on the Kola Peninsula and aims to become the country’s first producer of lithium-containing raw materials.

On 15 January the US announced sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base, and the SDN-list included several subsidiary companies of Rosatom:

• FSUE Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant – an organization established in October 2022 with the aim of unlawfully claiming ownership rights over Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP. (The Operating Organization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was added to the US sanctions list on 24 February 2023.)
• Science and Production Association Centrotech LLC – a Rosatom subsidiary engaged in the production of gas centrifuges;
• FSUE Mining and Chemical Complex – a Rosatom subsidiary conducting scientific research in the field of nuclear energy.

Additionally, the following entities and individuals were added to the SDN list:

• The Turkish shipyard Kuzey Star Shipyard Denizcilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi for its ties with FSUE Atomflot, which was sanctioned by the US in March 2023. In September 2024, this shipyard completed the construction of a floating dock for servicing nuclear icebreakers, including Project 22220 icebreakers and nuclear service vessels.
• Director General of FSUE Atomflot Yakov Antonov (has held this position since September 2024);
• Director General of FSUE Zaporizhzhia NPP Vladislav Isaev.

Commentary by Bellona:

«In the final days of President Biden’s administration, the US imposed the most extensive sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector since the start of the war. Along with last year’s law banning the purchase of enriched uranium from Russia starting in 2028, these measures make the United States the most active in using sanctions to counter Russia’s nuclear industry abroad and limit its development domestically.

However, it is worth noting that these steps are not capable of halting this development or significantly affecting it in the short term, particularly when it comes to Rosatom’s major international projects — the construction of nuclear power plants in the Global South.

Nevertheless, such sanctions create difficulties and obstacles for Rosatom, even in these projects, leading to additional financial costs, delays, and the need to find new partners to replace Western or Western-linked ones. These effects are already observed at Rosatom’s projects in Turkey, Bangladesh, Hungary, and other locations.

The import of enriched uranium from Russia to the US also nearly halved in 2024 compared to 2023.

Despite the confident statements from Rosatom’s senior leadership that the sanctions pose no threat, this is not entirely true. Over time, if Russia continues its aggressive actions in Ukraine and the broader confrontation persists (though it is possible that tensions between the US and Russia may ease somewhat if Trump returns to power), the burdens and complications for Rosatom will continue to mount.»

Kazakhstan completes visits to potential suppliers for its NPP project ↑

On 21 January, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan announced the completion of a series of visits to potential technology suppliers for the country’s nuclear power plant, which began after the national referendum in October, which approved the decision to build the plant.

Details of the visits that followed the referendum at various levels can be found in our digests for October and November-December 2024. Potential suppliers under consideration include CNNC (China, HPR1000 reactor), Rosatom (Russia, VVER-1200 reactor), KHNP (South Korea, APR1000, APR1400 reactors), and EDF (France, EPR1200 reactor), each offering specific features.

In January, the final visit was a working trip to Russia led by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliyev. The delegation visited the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant to study the operational experience of nuclear power plants and the technology of III+ generation reactor units with VVER-1200 reactors.

On 30 January, as part of a working visit by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, talks were held with Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektanov about bilateral cooperation between the two countries. The Russian delegation included the Director General of Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev. After discussions with the Kazakh side, Likhachev told reporters that based on the context of the discussions, Russia and Kazakhstan are ” moving towards a joint decision” on the issue of building a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakh media outlet Orda.kz noted that Likhachev’s comment gives the impression that Rosatom’s participation in the project is almost decided. However, the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan emphasized that the final decision on selecting a supplier or consortium for the implementation of the project has not yet been made and is expected to be taken in 2025, taking into account national interests and international obligations.

Also, on 30 January, during an extended government meeting, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev ordered ordered the acceleration of the construction of the first nuclear power plant and to begin the search for a site for the second plant. Minister of Energy Almasadam Satkaliyev stated that the second nuclear power plant could be built at the same time as the first one, given the projected electricity deficit in the country.

It should also be noted that inJanuary, the second deal involving the sale of Russian uranium assets in Kazakhstan to Chinese companies was completed. Uranium One Group sold a 30% stake in the companies Khorasan-U and Kyzylkum to China Uranium Development Company Ltd., whose ultimate beneficiary is China General Nuclear Power Corporation.

The first deal, involving the sale of Rosatom’s 49.979% stake in JV Zarechnoye to SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, whose ultimate beneficiary is State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd., was completed in December of last year.

France’s Orano and Mongolia sign agreement on joint development of uranium deposit ↑

On 17 January 2025, an investment agreement was signed in Ulaanbaatar between the French company Orano and the government of Mongolia. The document provides for the development and operation of the Zuuvch-Ovoo and Dulaan Uul/Umnut uranium deposits.

According to the terms of the agreement, the project will be carried out by a joint venture, Badrakh Energy, established by Orano and the state-owned Mongolian company MonAtom. This company had previously conducted research to justify the feasibility of future development of this deposit.

It is expected that the deposit will be developed over four years, after which it will reach a nominal production capacity of 2,500 tonnes of uranium per year.

The total investment is estimated at $1.6 billion over 30 years, with $500 million planned to be invested at the initial stage, before the deposit is brought into operation.

Zuuvch-Ovoo is considered one of the largest uranium deposits in Mongolia, with estimated reserves, including the adjacent Dulaan-Uul/Umnut area, amounting to about 90,000 tonnes of uranium.

Commentary by Bellona:

«France is the main consumer of uranium in the EU and is trying to diversify its supplies, especially in light of certain problems related to the coup in Niger, which has been one of France’s primary suppliers of uranium in recent years. In the future, Mongolia could potentially partially replace the reduction in supplies from Niger and reduce the need for uranium procurement from countries or projects linked to Russia, such as those in Kazakhstan.

However, the French nuclear industry continues to maintain close ties with Rosatom, so monitoring its projects, particularly in the nuclear fuel cycle, is of interest in identifying any explicit or covert cooperation with Russia.»

Import of Russian uranium to Germany increased in 2024 ↑

On 3 January, the German outlet Spiegel, citing data from the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony, reported that uranium imports to Germany from Russia increased by almost 70% in 2024 compared to the previous year. It was specified that last year, at least 68.6 tonnes of uranium (most likely low-enriched uranium, LEU) were imported from two Rosatom subsidiaries to the fuel element production plant of Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) in Lingen, Lower Saxony.

We have already written about this plant, owned by the French company Framatome, which is used to produce fuel for European PWR and BWR reactors (including Sizewell B in the UK, Doel in Belgium, and Ringhals in Sweden).

Bellona analyzed the total purchases of enriched uranium by EU countries based on Eurostat data for the first 10 months of 2024 and concluded that when comparing the import volumes to Germany not only with 2023 but also with previous years, there was no significant increase in import volumes. For the Lingen plant, imports from Russia make up only about a quarter of all imported raw materials.

It can also be seen that within the EU, in 2024, only French companies bought LEU from Russia – about 30 tonnes were imported directly to France, and the 70 tonnes mentioned by Spiegel were purchased by the Lingen plant. Total purchases for the first 10 months of last year came to under 100 tonnes of LEU, less than half the amount for 2023 (about 250 tonnes) and much lower than in 2022 and 2021, which stood at around 430-480 tonnes.

At the same time, Russia’s share in the segment of low-enriched uranium supplies to EU countries decreased to 15% in 2024, while in some years prior to 2022, it even exceeded 50%.

Commentary by Bellona:

«A detailed analysis of the situation regarding Germany’s enriched uranium purchases in 2024 is provided in the article on Bellona’s website, “EU and US reduce Russian uranium and nuclear fuel purchases in 2024.”»

Vietnam restarts nuclear energy program ↑

On January 14 in Hanoi, during an official visit of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to Vietnam, a series of agreements were signed between Vietnamese and Russian departments, including a memorandum on the development of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

Rosatom and the state energy company of Vietnam EVN agreed to step up cooperation in the nuclear sector, although the details of the agreement were not disclosed.

The day before, on January 13, a meeting took place between Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Rosatom Director General Aleksey Likhachev.

In November 2024, the Vietnamese government announced its intention to restart its nuclear energy program.

In 2010, Vietnam and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement for the construction of the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant, with two reactors of a total capacity of 2.4 GW. Russia was expected to provide a loan of $8 billion for the project. Construction was initially planned to begin in 2017 and to be completed by 2023-2024.

Vietnam also had an agreement to build a second NPP with the International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co., Ltd. (JINED).

In late 2016 the country abandoned these two projects with a total capacity of 4,000 MW due to the estimated cost rising to $18 billion, and for environmental and financial reasons.

On 30 November 2024 the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a resolution approving the continuation of the Ninh Thuan NPP project, and approved further research in the field of nuclear energy development.

On 10 January, 2025, Vietnam established a Steering Committee for the construction of a nuclear power plant, headed by Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. At the committee’s first meeting on 15 January, the Prime Minister stated that Vietnam’s first nuclear power plant, located in the central province of Ninh Thuan, must be completed within five years and put into operation by 2030, coinciding with the 100^th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

After the negotiations in Hanoi, Likhachev announced that Rosatom is starting the process of updating the agreements with Vietnam regarding the construction of the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant. A number of parameters will need to be revised, but some of them will remain unchanged. Specifically, Rosatom will propose the construction of two VVER-1200 reactors.

Likhachev also stated that a decision has been made to build a new research reactor of Russian design for Vietnam, with construction planned to begin in 2027.

In December 2024 Japan also confirmed its readiness to resume cooperation with Vietnam on an NPP construction project.

Commentary by Bellona:

«It is hard to say what exactly has prompted the change in the Vietnamese government’s stance on nuclear energy and the return to the nuclear power plant project that was canceled nearly 9 years ago. The five-year construction timeline set by the Prime Minister to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the country’s Communist Party seems too optimistic and too politically motivated.

For Rosatom and Russia as a whole, the interest in expanding its influence and securing new projects is evident. It is worth noting that in recent years, Rosatom has not had any new nuclear power plant projects at new sites, so the emergence of Vietnam as a potential site for future construction may seem like a significant breakthrough.

However, behind the political statements and memorandums, there will need to be meticulous work on the project details, which could bring many surprises and may not be as fast as the project participants would like, potentially even leading to further delays.»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Extending the operating life of RBMK reactors ↑

The Russian nuclear regulator Roskomnadzor has extended the operating license for Unit 3 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (LNPP) with an RBMK-1000 reactor of the second generation until 2030, following modernization and replacement of components that had reached the end of their service life. Since its commissioning in 1979, the reactor has generated over 290 billion kWh of electricity. Previously, after modernization, the operating life of this unit was extended by 15 years. (Units 1 and 2 of the RBMK-1000 reactors at LNPP were decommissioned after 45 years of service, in line with the shutdown of similar units at the Kursk NPP.)

Other units with RBMK reactors are also currently being prepared for an extension of their operating life:

• unit 4 of the Leningrad NPP, also until 2030 (commissioned in 1981),
• units 3 and 4 of the Kursk NPP (1983 and 1995 respectively)
• units 1, 2 and 3 of the Smolensk NPP (1982, 1985 and 1990 respectively).

The plans to extend the operating life of these units to 50 years were included in the general plan for the placement of power generation facilities in December 2022 to compensate for the lag in the pace of construction of replacement capacities in the coming years.

The implementation of a comprehensive set of measures to justify and ensure the possibility of their further operation will make it possible to retain about 7 GW of generating capacity.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Plans to extend the operating life of second-generation RBMK reactors were announced at the end of 2022. These plans are primarily driven by delays in the scheduled commissioning of replacement capacities and the construction of new NPP units in Russia. In addition to the five-year extension of seven RBMK reactors, the extension of the first two units (VVER-440) of the Kola Nuclear Power Plant for up to 65 years is also being discussed.

All of these reactors are located close to Russia’s western borders and Europe. The RBMK reactors at the Leningrad, Kursk, and Smolensk Nuclear Power Plants are less than 70 km from the European border and are Chernobyl-type reactors. Similar reactors outside Russia – in Lithuania and Ukraine – were shut down more than 15 years ago for safety and political reasons. The Kola Nuclear Power Plant, the largest nuclear power plant in the world above the Arctic Circle and one of the oldest in Russia, is located only 100 km from the border with Finland.

The extension of the operation of these reactors for five years raises concerns among neighboring countries, both regarding their own safety and the potential consequences for the Arctic. However, in the context of Russia’s confrontation with the West, international dialogue and discussions on these issues to address concerns will be impossible, and the opinions of neighboring countries will not be a factor that the Russian government will take into account.»

Rosatom expands its logistics business ↑

Rosatom reported that in 2024, FESCO’s (a company under Rosatom’s management) import maritime shipments increased by 39%, reaching 324,000 TEU (a standard unit of cargo capacity based on the volume of a 20-foot intermodal ISO container). The total expected volume of all maritime shipments by FESCO in 2024 exceeded 617,000 TEU, which is 18% higher than the previous year’s figure.

In particular, in 2024, FESCO increased maritime container shipments between Vladivostok and China by 14% (amounting to approximately 250,000 TEU), while land transportation grew by 66%. Cargo shipments between India and Russia also increased.

After becoming part of Rosatom, FESCO launched new maritime container routes and corridors in 2024 aimed at increasing Russia’s trade turnover. In particular, a direct cargo delivery line from China to Novorossiysk was launched, and the geography of freight transportation to India was expanded. The group began container shipments to ports in Kenya and the UAE and, for the first time in nearly 20 years, launched a regular route without calling at Russian ports, connecting Vietnam and Malaysia.

FESCO is also involved in providing logistical support for Rosatom’s projects. In 2024, it handled the transportation of heavy and oversized equipment for the construction of power units at the Kudankulam NPP in India and the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey. Additionally, FESCO retained its status as the sole logistics operator at the Vostochny cargo terminal, located at the Akkuyu NPP construction site.

Rosatom took control of FESCO in November 2023 when the state transferred to it nationalized shares (a 92.4% stake) in the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO’s parent company.

One of FESCO’s former co-owners, Ziyavudin Magomedov, who was sentenced in 2022 to 19 years in a high-security prison on charges of organizing a criminal network and embezzling billions in public funds, filed a lawsuit in a British court in September 2023. He accused former FESCO managers, its current and past shareholders, as well as Transneft and Rosatom, of engaging in a “global conspiracy” to expropriate his assets for the benefit of state structures and themselves.

In January 2025, the court dismissed Magomedov’s lawsuit, ruling that there were “no serious issues to be considered” regarding Transneft, and that any case against Rosatom should not be heard in London.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The integration of FESCO into Rosatom’s management structure at the end of 2023 was part of the state corporation’s broader strategy to diversify its assets and strengthen its position in the logistics sector. This strategy now encompasses the development of the Northern Sea Route, control over key ports, and the expansion of maritime and rail transportation.

In 2023, the contribution of Rosatom’s logistics assets (FESCO and the Delo group) may have already accounted for up to 20% of the corporation’s revenue from new products (approximately 200 billion rubles from a total of 1.1 trillion rubles). The increase in FESCO’s container transport volumes in 2024 may indicate the successful integration of the company into Rosatom’s logistics network and lead to further revenue growth in this sector.

The expansion of transport geography and the emergence of new routes reflect Russia’s drive to strengthen trade ties with the Global South, which is also evident in Rosatom’s export activities in the nuclear technology sector.

FESCO’s logistics infrastructure now plays a key role in supporting Rosatom’s international construction projects, including the Kudankulam and Akkuyu NPPs. Maintaining its monopoly status as the operator of the cargo terminal at the Akkuyu NPP is an important step for controlling equipment deliveries and managing project logistics.

It can be assumed that Rosatom’s logistics assets, given its extensive involvement in military actions in Ukraine, may become a logical target for future Western sanctions, as has already been the case with many of the corporation’s subsidiaries, including several sanctions imposed in January 2025 (see sections above).

Justifications for these sanctions include “supplies of military-grade weapons, components, and advanced technologies to the Russian defense industry to continue Russia’s war against Ukraine,” as well as “participation in the export of nuclear power plant construction.” All of this may to some extent also apply to Rosatom’s transport and logistics business, both in terms of domestic transportation and international operations.»

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On 31 December 2024, the Egyptian Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) received permission from the National Nuclear and Radiation Control Authority (NRRA) to construct a dry storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant site. Construction is scheduled to begin in 2025.

Kudankulam NPP, India. On 15 January 15, Rosatom shipped the reactor vessel for unit 6 of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant to India.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On December 30, 2024, Akkuyu Nuclear announced that the reactor vessel had been installed in its design position at Unit 3 of the Akkuyu NPP. Additionally, the first batch of fresh nuclear fuel for Unit 2 was delivered to the site.

Meanwhile, on January 4, Rosatom CEO Aleksey Likhachev announced that legal action would be initiated against Siemens for the disruption of equipment deliveries for the Akkuyu project. The equipment, a complete electrical gas distribution system needed to supply power to the energy grid, was ordered and paid for in 2020.

In September 2024, Turkey’s Minister of Energy, Alparslan Bayraktar, also spoke about the legal consequences, stating that Siemens’ inability to deliver critical equipment (due to the company being unable to obtain export licenses from the German government) had delayed the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project by several months.

In October 2024, Bayraktar announced that the supply issue had been resolved during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Turkey on October 20. The German leader assured Ankara that the equipment would be delivered. However, the Turkish Minister of Energy added that Rosatom had already reached an agreement to use Chinese equipment and that there was a “99% probability” that the German equipment would not be used.

On 6 February, Siemens Energy told DW that it had finally received the export license from the German authorities, and is now ready to fulfill its obligations to the client, with talks on this issue already in progress.

“We have noted the media reports about the intention to file a lawsuit, but at present no legal action has been taken against us,” commented Tim Proll-Gerwe, spokesperson for Siemens Energy, in a written response to DW’s inquiry regarding Likhachev’s statement. Additionally, in response to DW’s question about cooperation with Russian companies, Proll-Gerwe stated that Siemens Energy has ceased all business activities in Russia and no longer has any contractual relationships there. The company is only obligated to fulfill existing contracts signed before the start of the war in Ukraine.