Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.  

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for November can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route. Results for 2024
2. Shipbuilding news

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. EU imposes new sanctions against Russia
4. There are indications that Novatek is attempting to remove the Arctic LNG 2 project from U.S. sanctions
5. New report analyzes the impact of sanctions on Russian LNG supplies to the EU in 2024

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
6. Mining of almost all types of minerals has increased in Chukotka
7. Nornickel Reports on the implementation of the Sulfur Program
8. Norilsk Nickel has approved its cooperation strategy with China
9. The launch of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in the Krasnoyarsk Territory has been postponed to 2025

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
10. The prosecutor’s office has identified violations of environmental protection legislation in the Chukotka branch of “Rosmorport”
11. New studies on climate change in the Arctic

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Northern Sea Route and shipping

Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route. Results for 2024 ↑

The Rosatom State Corporation, which operates the Northern Sea Route, has summed up the results for the past year. In 2024, specialists from the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route issued 1,312 permits for navigation in the NSR waters (previously, a maximum of 1,228 were issued per year), which indicates a continuing increase in shipping activity. The total volume of cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route reached 37.9 million tons, exceeding the 2023 figures by more than 1.6 million tons, but significantly lagging behind the planned figure.

The number of transit voyages has also increased. According to Rosatom, 92 transit voyages with a total cargo volume of over 3 million tons were registered in 2024. This is almost 1.5 times more than in 2023. The Norwegian High North Logistics Centre recorded 97 transit voyages in 2024.

• Main routes: from Russia to China (34 voyages), from China to Russia (27 voyages), between Russian ports (36 voyages). As in 2023, there were no international transit voyages.
• In terms of transportation volume, the route from Russia to China dominated, accounting for 2.9 million tons of cargo (95% of the total volume).
• Main categories of cargo: crude oil, bulk cargo (coal, fertilizers, iron ore concentrate), and container cargo.
• Crude oil exports from Russia to China amounted to 1.89 million tons over 18 voyages (three voyages from the Arctic Gate terminal in the Gulf of Ob to China are not included in the statistics).
• Bulk cargo transportation reached 877 thousand tons, including iron ore concentrate, coal, and fertilizers.
• In addition, 14 voyages carrying container cargo were conducted between China and the Russian ports of Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg.

Shipbuilding news ↑

According to Kommersant, Rosatom has submitted a proposal to the government to introduce an Arctic investment levy for shippers using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) starting in 2028. The levy is expected to be charged as a surcharge on icebreaker escort fees in the eastern sector of the NSR. Companies using the route for cargo transportation, surveyed by Kommersant, have complained about the high icebreaker escort tariffs. Another tariff increase could reduce the attractiveness of this route.

The funds raised from the investment levy are planned to be allocated for the construction of new nuclear icebreakers, for which Rosatom lacks sufficient financing.

On December 28, 2024, the icebreaker Yakutia was officially commissioned, with the state flag raised on board. It became the eighth icebreaker in the Atomflot fleet and the fourth icebreaker of Project 22220, built at the Baltic Shipyard. The universal icebreakers of Project 22220, including Arktika, Sibir, and Ural, are designed to ensure year-round navigation in the western part of the Arctic. Currently, the Baltic Shipyard is continuing the construction of three more vessels in this series: Chukotka, Leningrad, and Stalingrad.

The Zvezda shipyard is building the Rossiya icebreaker of Project 10510 Lider, which is supposed to provide year-round escorts in the eastern Arctic. However, on December 23, the vessel Ursa Major sank near Spain while transporting equipment for this icebreaker—two 380-ton port cranes and two 45-ton reactor compartment hatches. The cargo was en route from St. Petersburg to the Zvezda shipyard in Primorsky Krai.

Russia is in negotiations with India regarding the construction of four additional non-nuclear icebreakers. By 2030, the icebreaker fleet on the Northern Sea Route is planned to consist of 17 vessels.

At the 14th International Forum “The Arctic: Present and Future”, held on December 12–13, Nikita Melnik, a representative of Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, reported that the construction of the first five Arc7 ice-class gas tankers for the Arctic LNG-2 project is 90% complete. These vessels are being built at the Zvezda shipyard and are intended for transporting liquefied natural gas from the Arctic LNG-2 plant. In total, 15 such tankers are planned to be constructed under the contract with Zvezda.

On December 25, the Arc7 ice-class vessel Alexey Kosygin was released for sea trials. This is one of 15 gas tankers designed to transport liquefied natural gas as part of the Arctic LNG 2 project, which are being built at the Zvezda shipyard. If the trials are successfully completed, the tanker could be delivered to the customer as early as the first quarter of 2025, but the sanctions imposed by the United States could limit the use of the tanker for LNG deliveries.

Bellona’s comment:

«The results of the year for cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) were as expected. While the total volume saw a slight increase compared to the previous year, it fell significantly short of the planned target. The nature of transportation and cargo structure remained largely unchanged. Most shipments consisted of exports of natural resources extracted in the Russian Arctic (AZRF), including gas, oil, coal, and minerals. The increase in transit indicates that more Russian resources were transported to China via the NSR.

International economic sanctions have successfully slowed down new resource extraction projects in the Russian Arctic, leading to the failure of plans for a sharp increase in cargo turnover on the Northern Sea Route. Nevertheless, Russian authorities continue to invest political efforts and state funds into building NSR infrastructure and promoting the route to China. However, it is evident that the NSR lacks commercial attractiveness, and it is unlikely to gain significant appeal in the near future.

The increase in icebreaker escort fees—already noted as high in the past—suggests that the organization of vessel passage along the Northern Sea Route is unlikely to be financially viable at this stage, especially under international economic sanctions. Additionally, according to the Baltic Shipyard itself, the construction of nuclear icebreakers remains largely unprofitable. (For more details on the situation with nuclear icebreakers, see the previous issue of Bellona’s Nuclear Digest.)

The planned non-nuclear icebreakers are unlikely to be completed by 2030, as no shipyard has yet been designated to take on the project. Meanwhile, newly built LNG carriers will immediately fall under sanctions and join the shadow fleet. If sanctions against Russian LNG tighten further, it remains unclear who these carriers will deliver to—finding buyers may prove impossible.

However, since the Northern Sea Route is a personal priority for Vladimir Putin, and there is hope for China and global warming, any financial gaps will be covered by the Russian state budget as much as possible. In the near future, much will depend on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly whether international sanctions against Russian industry will be lifted. Regardless, the high risks and questionable profitability of the NSR will likely persist for decades to come.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

EU imposes new sanctions against Russia ↑

On December 17, the European Union adopted its 15th package of sanctions against Russia, aimed at further restricting its ability to wage war against Ukraine. As part of these new measures, 52 vessels – including 44 oil tankers and 7 LNG carriers – have been banned from entering European ports. The restrictions specifically target the shadow fleet that Russia uses to circumvent previous sanctions on oil and gas transportation.

Among the sanctioned LNG carriers is Christophe de Margerie, an Arc7 ice-class tanker operating under the Yamal LNG project. This marks the first time sanctions have been directly imposed on Yamal LNG. Previously, in August, the U.S. had only indirectly affected the project by sanctioning Novatek China Holdings, a subsidiary of Novatek responsible for selling Russian LNG to China, including Yamal LNG products.

However, even before being added to the sanctions list, Christophe de Margerie was taken out of service on December 10. The vessel was unable to undergo maintenance at European shipyards due to its affiliation with the Russian shipping company Sovcomflot, which is under sanctions.

Additionally, the 15th sanctions package includes LNG carriers Pioneer, La Perouse, North Way, North Sky, North Air, and North Mountain, some of which had already been sanctioned by the U.S. and/or the UK.

There are indications that Novatek is attempting to remove the Arctic LNG 2 project from U.S. sanctions ↑

According to Reuters, NOVATEK is taking steps to improve its relations with the United States. In the first week of December, company representative Denis Solovyov visited Washington to engage with an American lobbying firm in an effort to remove the flagship Arctic LNG-2 project from U.S. sanctions. NOVATEK is attempting to argue that it does not contribute to financing the war in Ukraine due to its preferential tax status. For example, its Yamal LNG project is exempt from taxes until 2030. A formal message to U.S. government agencies is expected in the coming weeks.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt confirmed that the State Department is aware of NOVATEK’s visit to Washington. However, he emphasized that now is not the time to resume normal business relations with Russia.

Additionally, NOVATEK’s Singapore-based subsidiary, Novatek Gas & Power Asia, participated in the 24th World LNG Summit held in Berlin from December 9–12. The company’s presence sparked criticism and raised questions about why EU representatives allowed NOVATEK to promote its interests at the event.

This trend continued into January, when a senior NOVATEK executive traveled to Brussels in an attempt to soften Europe’s hardline stance on Russian LNG.

New report analyzes the impact of sanctions on Russian LNG supplies to the EU in 2024 ↑

A new report, “A Bumper Year for Russian LNG in the EU, Abetted by Germany“, examines the impact of sanctions on Russian liquefied natural gas deliveries to the European Union in 2024. The report was prepared by four organizations: Deutsche Umwelthilfe, Urgewald, Razom We Stand, and Bond Beter Leefmilieu.

According to the study, despite sanctions, Russian LNG imports to the EU increased by 9% compared to 2023. The volume of gas that remains and is consumed in Europe, rather than being re-exported or transited, rose even more—by 19.3%.

The report highlights that while Germany has not purchased LNG directly from Russia since the start of the invasion, it plays a key role in facilitating record-high imports of Russian LNG into the EU. Securing Energy for Europe GmbH (SEFE, formerly Gazprom PJSC)—a company nationalized by Germany after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—has become an active buyer, purchasing 58 cargoes of Russian LNG in 2024, totaling 5.7 billion cubic meters. This is six and a half times more than in 2023. The German government claims that SEFE remains contractually bound to NOVATEK and can only terminate its agreements under force majeure if a pan-European ban is introduced.

The report’s authors call for greater transparency in the EU’s internal gas market and urge decisive measures to reduce Russian LNG imports, up to and including a full ban on supplies. They also propose sanctions on ice-class LNG carriers transporting gas from Yamal and the inclusion of NOVATEK and its CEO, Leonid Mikhelson, on sanctions lists.

Bellona’s comment:

«The sanctions crackdown on Russia’s shadow fleet—both oil and gas—continues. However, as before, this does not apply to LNG from Yamal. European companies are unwilling to unilaterally terminate long-term LNG supply contracts, which are valid until 2035–2038, likely fearing legal penalties for contract breaches. Meanwhile, European politicians are too concerned about energy price fluctuations to add Yamal LNG to the sanctions list.

NOVATEK’s active efforts in the U.S. and EU indicate that Russia is hoping for favorable treatment from a Trump administration, as well as from right-wing European leaders who have a chance of coming to power in some countries in the upcoming elections. How successful NOVATEK’s lobbying efforts will be remains uncertain. Much will depend on the outcome of negotiations between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky on a ceasefire and its terms—one of which will inevitably be the question of maintaining or lifting sanctions.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Mining of almost all types of minerals has increased in Chukotka ↑

Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the easternmost region of the Russian Arctic, saw an increase in the extraction of almost all types of minerals in 2024.

Gold production increased by 3%, with ore gold extraction remaining at the previous level of 21.5 tons, while placer gold production rose by 31% to just over 3 tons. Silver production grew by 13% to 138.4 tons. Coal extraction also increased by 7%. Natural gas production remained at the 2023 level.

The development of one of the world’s largest copper-gold deposits, located in the Baimskaya ore zone, has been postponed once again. This was announced by Georgy Fotin, General Director of GDK “Baimskaya,” at the 14th “Arctic: Present and Future” Forum, held on December 12-13, 2024.

The launch of the Baimsky mining and processing plant was initially scheduled for 2026 but has been postponed several times due to sanctions—first to 2028 and now to 2029. On May 1, the Baimskaya Mining Company itself was added to the U.S. sanctions list. The project is expected to increase Russia’s copper production by 25% and gold production by 4%.

Nornickel Reports on the Implementation of the Sulfur Program ↑

Russia’s leading metallurgical company, Norilsk Nickel, has reported on the results of its Sulfur Program, launched in 2023 at the Nadezhda Metallurgical Plant for sulfuric acid production to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. In 2024, pollutant emissions decreased by 386,500 tons, which is 21.5% lower compared to 2022.

Nornickel’s Vice President for Ecology and Industrial Safety, Stanislav Seleznev, stated that sulfur dioxide emissions are expected to decrease by 734,000 tons in 2025, with plans to capture and utilize 920,000 tons of pollutants by 2026.

In 2022, Norilsk topped the list of the most polluted cities in Russia, according to Rosprirodnadzor. The organization reported that sulfur dioxide emissions in Norilsk reached approximately 1.8 million tons per year (10.5% of the country’s total emissions), while local environmentalists estimated the figure at up to 2 million tons. In 2023, emissions decreased to 1.7 million tons.

In December, Norilsk Nickel launched an online air quality monitoring system in Norilsk. Sixteen automated control stations were equipped with sensors measuring concentrations of sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter. The system allows tracking data over a two-week period; however, users only see a pollution index ranging from 1 to 10, without details on specific substances.

The Copper Plant of Norilsk Nickel, being the main polluter of Norilsk, was initially included in the “Sulfur Program”; however, its implementation became impossible due to sanctions, leading the company to consider relocating part of the operations to Chinese enterprises.

Norilsk Nickel has approved its cooperation strategy with China ↑

Norilsk Nickel has finalized its cooperation strategy with China, aligning it with government priorities. In April, company president Vladimir Potanin announced plans to build a plant in China to relocate the smelting capacities of the Copper Plant in Norilsk. However, the updated strategy aims to retain the tax base and jobs in Russia by expanding the production capacities of the Nadezhda Plant. Currently, Norilsk Nickel is negotiating with the Chinese company Xiamen C&D to acquire a stake in an existing smelting plant in China, but a final agreement has not yet been reached.

Thus, Norilsk Nickel plans to send copper concentrate for processing in China, which will address issues with importing equipment into Russia, reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, and provide access to battery material production technologies. Meanwhile, the industrial capacity of the Copper Plant is planned to be transferred to the Nadezhda Plant, maintaining the workload of partner enterprises, including the Krasnoyarsk Non-Ferrous Metals Plant. By 2028, Norilsk Nickel aims to increase tax contributions to the Russian Federation by 60 billion rubles annually and create 4,500 new jobs by 2030.

The launch of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in the Krasnoyarsk Territory has been postponed to 2025 ↑

The development of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit, with an investment volume of 33.8 billion rubles, located in Taimyr, has been postponed to 2025. The project, implemented by the company “Severnaya Zvezda,” includes the construction of a coal mine with an initial capacity of 5 million tons per year, with plans to increase to 10 million tons per year. Additionally, the project encompasses the building of a coal processing plant, a highway, a power plant, a rotational camp, and the “Yenisey” seaport.

Earlier, it was expected that the Syradasayskoye deposit would provide several million tons of high-quality coal as early as 2024, and coal transportation via the Northern Sea Route was projected to reach 7 million tons per year by 2026, with a further increase to 12 million tons. However, these plans have stalled. The construction of the processing plant was suspended due to equipment supply issues related to sanctions. Additionally, “Severnaya Zvezda” lacks the vessels necessary for coal export via the Northern Sea Route.

In 2024, Russian coal exports decreased by 6%. According to the International Energy Agency, this is due to the impact of sanctions, infrastructure issues, and reduced profitability.

Bellona’s comment:

«The necessity to replenish the Russian budget, coupled with the limited perspective of Russian authorities, leads to an increase in the extraction of natural resources in the Russian Arctic for export. Despite international sanctions against Russian industry and delays in the commissioning of previously planned projects, a slight increase in extraction is still occurring. Along with the growth in extraction, the negative impact on the environment is also increasing.

The sulfur emission reduction program in Norilsk is unlikely to fundamentally change the air pollution situation in the city. Investments in the sulfur processing plant were made before the military invasion of Ukraine; therefore, Norilsk Nickel continues its Sulfur Program, although Potanin is clearly preoccupied with other issues. His main task now is to circumvent international sanctions and maintain the company’s profits; hence, the idea of relocating the copper plant to China is being considered. Judging by the interim results of the Sulfur Program, the volume of sulfuric acid capture and processing in Norilsk will not cover all of Norilsk Nickel’s emissions, especially considering the planned expansion of the Nadezhda plant.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

The prosecutor’s office has identified violations of environmental protection legislation in the Chukotka branch of “Rosmorport” ↑

The prosecutor’s office has identified environmental legislation violations in branches of FSUE “Rosmorport,” including the Anadyr branch located in the Arctic. It was found that measures were not taken to identify facilities having a negative impact on the environment, which entails administrative responsibility under Article 8.46 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation.

FSUE “Rosmorport” is a state-owned enterprise operating maritime infrastructure, including ports along the Northern Sea Route. According to legislation, it is required to identify and account for objects that have a negative impact on the environment. Without considering such objects, it is impossible to accurately assess how the branch’s activities affect the environment, which creates additional risks.

New studies on climate change in the Arctic ↑

A new study published in December in the journal Nature Communications by scientists from the University of Gothenburg predicts that the first ice-free day in the Arctic Ocean could occur before 2030, significantly earlier than previously anticipated. The study specifies that the Arctic is considered “ice-free” when sea ice extent is less than 1 million square kilometers. While this technically does not mean the complete disappearance of ice, at this level, its amount is extremely low, indicating radical climate changes.

According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), the Arctic sea ice extent continues to decline. On January 1, 2025, it measured 12.141 million km², setting a new historical minimum for this month since the beginning of satellite observations of Arctic ice in 1979. The absolute record low for Arctic sea ice extent was recorded in September 2012, when it dropped to just 3.41 million km².

At the same time, scientists from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) consider the disappearance of the ice cover in the Arctic Ocean by mid-century unlikely. Their forecast suggests that between 2030 and 2050, a phase of air temperature decrease is expected, which will help maintain ice volumes at an average level, albeit below the 1979–2000 figures.

A group of scientists from Yakutsk, Tomsk, and Moscow has published a study titled “Climate Change and Permafrost in Arctic and Subarctic Yakutia from 1965 to 2023” on the scientific portal MDPI. The researchers recorded a significant increase in the average annual air temperature over this period, especially pronounced since 2005. As a result of permafrost thawing, the landscape is changing, ecological risks are emerging, and conditions for construction and infrastructure operation are deteriorating.

Scientists from Tomsk State University have studied how fires destroy the moss-lichen cover of peatlands, accelerating permafrost degradation and increasing greenhouse gas emissions. They noted that mosses and lichens serve as a protective layer for permafrost, helping it maintain its structure. However, even decades after fires, vegetation only partially recovers. As a result, the surface albedo decreases, leading to increased heating and accelerated permafrost thawing.

In December, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released the “Arctic Report Card: Update for 2024,” compiled by 97 scientists from 11 countries. The report highlights rapid changes in the Arctic, including the transformation of the tundra from a carbon sink to a carbon source, increased winter precipitation, a rate of temperature rise four times the global average, and a decline in caribou populations, among other findings.

In December, the journal Science published a study on the catastrophic decline of the common murre population due to a marine heatwave in the northern Pacific Ocean from 2014 to 2016. As a result, more than half of the population—about 4 million birds—perished in Alaska. These heatwaves, driven by human-induced climate change, disrupt marine ecosystems by reducing primary production and causing mass mortality among predators.

Accidents and incidents in the Northern Sea Route ↑

In December, there were no recorded major accidents or oil spills in the Arctic. However, the incident involving the “Volgoneft” tankers in the Kerch Strait sparked active discussions about the environmental risks that a similar accident could pose in Arctic conditions. An assessment of the potential consequences of such an accident for the Arctic can be found in an article on the Bellona website.

Experts from the UWEC Work Group have identified a connection between the “Volgoneft” tankers and the shadow fleet, noting that vessels used to circumvent sanctions pose a significant threat, especially in the Arctic, where accident response is considerably complicated by extreme climatic conditions.

Even according to Rosatom’s official estimates, the damage to water bodies from an oil spill on the Northern Sea Route would exceed 100 billion rubles in the first 24 hours. This underscores the necessity of developing emergency rescue infrastructure in the region.