After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for November and December 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for October, September and August. Download a PDF of this digest here.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for November-December 2024
1.1. Events of nuclear diplomacy
1.2. Events at the ZNPP
1.3. The technical state of the ZNPP
1.4. Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by IAEA experts
1.5. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.6. Military threats at other nuclear sites in Ukraine
1.7. Attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Slovakia stockpiles Russian nuclear fuel
3. Westinghouse to conduct safety analysis for licensing fuel for Kozloduy NPP
4. USA and UK extend cooperation in developing fourth-generation nuclear technologies, with Russian no longer participating
5. Romania plans to resume uranium mining
6. US determines potential domestic suppliers of low-enriched uranium
7. Negotiations on NPP construction in Kazakhstan

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
8. Russia places restrictions on uranium export to USA
9. Rosatom to withdraw from several joint uranium producing enterprises in Kazakhstan
10. Russia withdraws on international agreement on multilateral nuclear and environmental program in the Russian Federation
11. Last spent nuclear fuel removed from Gremikha
12. Nuclear icebreaker fleet construction
13. Events in Rosatom projects abroad

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for November-December 2024 ↑

Events of nuclear diplomacy ↑

In the first week of November a rotation took place of IAEA teams at Ukraine’s nuclear plants – the occupied ZNPP, and also at the operating Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine and Rivne NPPs.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted that the Agency’s missions at nuclear sites of Ukraine assess their nuclear safety and security, provide relevant information to the public and the international community, and also deliver a comprehensive program of technical support and assistance to Ukraine that includes nuclear safety and security-related equipment, as well as expertise, advice and medical assistance.

“We will stay at these sites for as long as it is needed to help avert the threat of a nuclear accident that could have serious consequences for human health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond. As the nuclear safety and security situation remains highly challenging, our experts are continuing to play a crucial stabilizing role at all these facilities,” Grossi said.

Later, on 13 November, Grossi confirmed these intentions: “We will continue to be there until the conflict comes to a new phase, at least less combat and maybe a ceasefire – no, a frozen conflict, whatever phase we enter into, but without this looming threat.”

The Russian Federation responded sharply, in the characteristic language of the Russian Foreign Ministry, to this statement by the IAEA Director General, calling Grossi’s comments on the duration of the Agency’s representatives’ stay unacceptable, outrageous, and beyond the organization’s authority. According to Russia, the experts are present at the ZNPP exclusively with the consent of the Russian government and will remain there as long as Russia deems their presence justified. Their task, Russia emphasized, is to report “Ukrainian provocations against the NPP and its staff.”

The Ukrainian operator Energoatom called these threats another act of Russian nuclear terrorism, emphasizing that the presence of IAEA international experts at the ZNPP and other nuclear power plants in Ukraine is the result of agreements between Ukraine and the IAEA aimed at ensuring continuous monitoring and preventing possible incidents.

On 10 December, during the rotation of IAEA teams at the ZNPP, a drone hit an armored IAEA vehicle. There were two people in the vehicle, who were both unharmed, but the rear of the vehicle was destroyed. The vehicle was in a convoy moving towards the handover point on the frontline to meet the IAEA team that had been stationed at the ZNPP for the past month.

On 12 December, Grossi announced that despite the attack during the rotation of teams stationed at the ZNPP, the IAEA remains committed to maintaining a presence at the plant, to help prevent a nuclear accident during the military conflict.

Grossi stated that the drone hit a vehicle with a clearly visible IAEA logo, and that the model used was designed to explode on impact, leaving no discernible debris to be recovered for an investigation into the incident. 

“Whoever did this knew exactly what was being done. It was our vehicle that was hit. There was a clear intention to intimidate us. But we will not be intimidated by this brazen and deplorable attack. We will stay as long as it is needed and continue our indispensable work,” Grossi said.

Russia called the incident a Ukrainian provocation ahead of the extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors convened on December 12 at Ukraine’s initiative. During the session, Russia’s representative to international organizations in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, stated that the incident raised concerns about ensuring the safety of IAEA experts during group rotations at the ZNPP and suggested considering a safer route — through Russian territory.

TASS reported Grossi as saying that there are no plans to reconsider the route for the expert team: “We have a system, it works quite clearly with the full agreement of both sides — Russia and Ukraine — and we will continue to work this way.”

Events at the ZNPP ↑

On 13 November, as part of a working visit to Enerhodar, the first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration Sergey Kiriyenko visited the ZNPP. Kiriyenko met with ZNPP representatives and discussed issues related to the current state of the ZNPP, ensuring its nuclear safety, as well as measures jointly taken with the Enerhodar’s municipality to improve the resilience of the energy and heating supply system of Enerhodar.

On November 20, it was announced that a new general director had been appointed to the JSK Operating Organization of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (EO ZNPP) — Ramil Galiev, who replaced Oleg Romanenko. Galiev had previously held the position of director of the Department of Safety Control and Production at the Concern Rosenergoatom. (The ZNPP administration notes that Yury Chernychuk remains the director of the ZNPP itself, and that the JSK EO ZNPP is required to ensure the safe operation of the plant and the professional activity of its personnel.)

Nuclear Supervision of the Russian Federation) issued a license to the ZNPP for the operation of radiation sources. Yuri Chernychuk commented that this is the first Russian license received by the plant.

On 25 December, Galiev announced that he plans to transition the ZNPP to the standard organizational structure of Rosenergoatom NPPs. Another task is to prepare the units for power generation mode. According to him, a package of documents is currently being prepared for Rostekhnadzor to obtain a license for the operation of the first unit, followed by the remaining five units.

“As soon as the situation allows and a corresponding decision is made, we will put the units of the ZNPP into operation.” He also stated that in order to replenish water reserves in the ZNPP cooling pond, where the water level is continuously decreasing, a decision has been made to manufacture new pumping station equipment and install it in the Dnipro riverbed.

On 29 December, Kiriyenko visited the ZNPP again to discuss the results of the year and the plans for the station’s development. The meeting was attended by Ramil Galiev and ZNPP director Yuri Chernychuk. It was announced that 2025, in addition to ensuring the safety of the NPP, the second priority is to transition ZNPP to generation mode: “We must start preparing for the fastest possible launch of all six units.”

The technical state of the ZNPP ↑

On 2 November unit 1 was returned to cold shutdown mode after a leak discovered on October 31 on one of the impulse lines was repaired. Experts have received confirmation that all six units would remain in cold shutdown throughout the winter period, with heating provided by on-site boilers. In the first week of December, IAEA experts were informed that gamma radiography conducted at around 30 other locations on Unit 1 revealed another worn-out welded seam, which was not yet leaking but was also repaired.

In early November, experts were informed that the operation of two backup transformers had been resumed after successful high-voltage testing at the end of October. The maintenance of the remaining four backup transformers is planned to be completed by the end of 2024.

In the first half of November, maintenance work was carried out on the water regulation valves of one of the three safety trains on units 4 and 5. Following that, one more safety train from each unit was taken out of service for scheduled maintenance. In early December, work began on elements of the safety systems of units 2, 3, and 6. The work on units 2 and 6 was completed by the end of December.

In the first week of December, the IAEA team at the ZNPP was informed that the voltage stabilizer for the ” Dniprovska” 750 kV power line at the open switchyard outside the plant, had been automatically disconnected by the activation of a protection mechanism. It was confirmed that the connection itself was not affected, and that the stabilizer was undergoing repairs, with plans to return it to operation by the end of December.

On 30 December, Energoatom reported that from November 23, the occupiers tried to repair the demages shunt reactor of the 750 kV Dniprovska line, which stabilizes voltage and is installed at the 750 kV switchyard of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. They had twice unsuccessfully tried to bring it back into operation.

In January 2025, representatives of the IAEA at the Zaporizhzhia NPP were informed that the voltage stabilizer (note – shunt reactor) had been successfully reconnected after repairs on 31 December.

In December, IAEA experts reported that three new mobile diesel generators had appeared by the turbine buildings of three reactor units (in addition to the 20 fixed emergency diesel generators that are designed to provide on-site power, in case of a total loss of off-site power, and another seven mobile diesel generators received by the ZNPP in late 2022 which are currently disconnected and not in use). The IAEA team was informed that these generators comply with the regulations of the Russian Federation, as part of post-Fukushima Daiichi accident measures, and in addition to those previously implemented by Ukraine. They will be used in case of a blackout in addition to the fixed emergency generators.

The IAEA team was informed that on 18 December the circulation pump of unit 4 was switched off. It was used to maintain the water level in the cooling pond, pumping water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels. The ZNPP confirmed that water from the 11 groundwater wells is sufficiently feeding the sprinkler ponds that provide cooling to the six reactors in cold shutdown. 

From 20-22 December and from 24-25 December the sole functioning 330 kV back-up power line at the ZNPP was disconnected for maintenance.

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by IAEA experts ↑

In November and December, the updates from the Agency did not provide detailed descriptions of walkdowns conducted by the IAEA team at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. They only reported that the team continues to carry out inspections across the entire station site and monitor technical maintenance (see above). Additionally, we may note that:

• From 1-7 November, the reactor and containment of Unit 4, as well as several emergency diesel generators of Units 1 and 5, were inspected.
• In the first two weeks of November, experts visited the turbine halls of Units 1-4 (without access to their western parts).

In November, for “security reasons,” experts were denied access to the central warehouse and diesel fuel storage outside the station’s premises. For the same reason, in December, the planned visit to the 750 kV switchyard was cancelled (where the above-mentioned shunt reactor is being repaired).

The last information circular from Russia to the IAEA on 15 November, describing the “actual state of affairs” at the ZNPP (including what was shown to the IAEAM team) concerned events for the entire month of October (previously these messages were issued weekly, like the IAEA updates). The Russian permanent mission to international organizations did not provide any more information for November and December. Besides the above mentioned INFCIRC/1259 of 15 November, there was only one Russian report, INFCIRC/1266 of 13 December, with a letter from the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the attack on an IAEA vehicle (see above).

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

IAEA experts at the ZNPP regularly reported throughout November and December 2024 that they heard frequent explosions at varying distances, sometimes daily. However, no damage to the plant was reported.

On 16 and 21 November, the ZNPP was left without power from its primary 750 kV line, relying instead on a single backup 330 kV line. This was caused by Russian shelling, which damaged one of the power lines on the right bank of the Dnipro River in Ukrainian-controlled territory. On November 30, the backup 330 kV line was disconnected for two days.

Military threats at other nuclear sites in Ukraine ↑

On 7 November, Ukraine’s State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate informed the IAEA that the Central Storage Facility for Spent Fuel, located within the exclusion zone of the Chernobyl NPP, had lost off-site power for two hours and relied on emergency diesel generators for electricity during this time. On 11 November, two units at the Rivne NPP, both units at the Khmelnytsky NPP and all three units of the South Ukraine NPP temporarily reduced their power output as a preventive measure as a result of military activities.

Throughout November and December 2024, IAEA teams at the three operational Ukrainian plants reported frequent air raid alerts. Numerous drones and missiles were detected in the vicinity of NPP sites. In December, IAEA members at the Khmelnytsky NPP had to take shelter several times. (This is mentioned in every IAEA update during this period, as well as in Ukraine’s information circulars for IAEA members INFCIRC/1258 and INFCIRC/1267).

On 25 December, the nuclear subcritical neutron source facility at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology was without external power for five hours, relying on an emergency diesel generator during this time (as we wrote earlier, at the beginning of the war the installation was switched to a deep subcritical state, and contains only a small amount of radioactive material).

Attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ↑

Russia continues to launch mass attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 17 November, Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — reduced their production capacity as a precautionary measure. These plants were not directly affected and did not cease operations; however, according to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, several substations critical to the plants’ functioning were damaged. The main power lines from four substations were disconnected, and two 330 kV power lines at Rivne NPP were rendered unavailable.

The IAEA notes that the functioning of energy infrastructure directly affects nuclear safety, as nuclear power plants require grid connections not only to transmit the electricity they generate but also to receive external power for reactor cooling.

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 20, Grossi recalled that following a similar attack in late August, an IAEA expert team inspected several substations identified as crucial for nuclear safety. During these inspections (in September at the Kyiv substation and in October at six others), extensive damage was documented, and it was concluded that the network’s capacity to provide reliable external power to Ukrainian nuclear power plants had significantly decreased. Ukraine carried out repair work and implemented additional protective measures, but four of these substations were damaged again by shelling on November 17.

On 25 November, an independent UN experts’ statement was published, warning that Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s power system pose a threat of nuclear disaster. The statement said that on October 22, 2024, 13 UN special rapporteurs and working groups had addressed the Russian government, emphasizing that attacks on energy infrastructure vital for the survival of the civilian population are prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The United Kingdom made a similar statement at the OSCE meeting in Vienna on November 7. The statement also said: “We have also heard Russia threaten Ukraine in this room that it could turn off 75% of its remaining electricity by hitting just five targets. This could only be a reference to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.  Such threats are unacceptable.  As is the risk to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants of an unreliable power supply due to Russia’s sustained attacks against Ukraine’s grid.”

On 28 November, as a result of another large-scale Russian attack, the three operating Ukrainian nuclear power plants had to reduce their output again as a precautionary measure. At the Rivne NPP, one reactor was disconnected from the grid, and the Khmelnitsky NPP lost the connection to two of its power lines (off-site electricity supply to all stations was not interrupted). No direct damage to the nuclear plants was reported, but the strikes once again affected crucial electrical substations necessary for nuclear safety. By December 5, the power capacity of the plants had been gradually restored, although some of the off-site power lines used for both receiving and transmitting electricity were still disconnected.

On 12 December, at Ukraine’s request, an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors was held to discuss the consequences of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The resolution adopted following the meeting highlights that the attacks violate one of the “seven indispensable pillars” of safety defined by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, specifically the requirement to ensure reliable external power supply for all nuclear facilities. It calls on the IAEA to continue assessing the risks and extent of damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including substations identified as necessary for maintaining nuclear safety and protection, and urges member states to continue providing political, financial, and technical support to strengthen IAEA’s activities in Ukraine.

During the meeting, Russian representative Mikhail Ulyanov stated that the topic of discussion was not related to nuclear safety, as IAEA safety requirements for nuclear plants do not prioritize the power supply, since disruptions in the electricity grid should not threaten the operation of nuclear power plants. He emphasized that nuclear plants have emergency power sources, safety system channels, and passive emergency cooling systems. His statement also emphasized that assessing the energy infrastructure goes beyond the Agency’s mandate.

The resolution was adopted with 22 votes in favor, 2 votes against, and 10 abstentions.

On the following day, 13 December, Russia again launched a massive strike on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Five reactors at the three operating Ukrainian nuclear power plants reduced their power output once again, and two others continued operating at reduced capacity after the attack on November 28 (total power generation from Ukrainian nuclear plants was reduced by 2.5 GW). Air raid sirens were heard at all nuclear power plants, and military objects were spotted flying approximately 300 meters from the South Ukraine NPP.

From 16-23 December, IAEA experts visited seven critical substations essential for the safe operation of nuclear power plants (not only the three operational ones, but also the ZNPP and the Chernobyl NPP), where they documented damage and collected evidence highlighting the vulnerability of the power grid due to Russian attacks. During the mission, the team met with experts from Ukrenergo, Energoatom, and the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate. Drawing on information from this mission and two previous substation assessments, the IAEA will work on targeted technical assistance to prevent a nuclear accident.

On 25 December, Russia launched another massive strike on Ukraine’s energy sector, causing several reactor units to reduce their output for several hours.

Commentary by Bellona:

«It seems that the situation surrounding the occupied ZNPP is heading towards a rather predictable conclusion, as no unique events had occurred at the site or in its vicinity at the end of 2024.

Russia is firmly convinced that once a “silence regime” is reached, meaning the cessation of mutual fire, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will remain a Russian facility. But it is clear that this decision, like other territorial decisions, will not be recognized by the international community (perhaps with the exception of Belarus and a few other “friends of Putin”).

Therefore, Rosatom is quietly working at the ZNPP, performing maintenance tasks, preparing (and even already beginning) to obtain licenses from its own nuclear regulatory body to operate the station’s facilities, including reactor units, as they prepare to put the units into power generation mode. Russia is increasing the external energy supply to the plant, so unless direct shelling of the facility occurs, the station’s safety in its current condition is practically not at risk.

Since Rosatom head Likhachev has not yet deigned to visit the ZNPP, while Kiriyenko has been making more frequent visits, including to discuss the current state of the plant, the plant is evidently under the political and administrative control of the Russian presidential administration. This is also confirmed by the reactions from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russia’s representative in Vienna to certain actions by the IAEA that they disapproved of.

It is also clear that if in the past harsh remarks towards the IAEA were made by minor officials and local Zaporizhzhia journalists, recently senior Russian officials have been more open about “putting the IAEA in its place,” explaining what falls within its scope of responsibility and what does not.

Earlier, when the Director General of the IAEA stated that the agency’s mission would remain at the ZNPP for as long as needed, Russia remained silent. But now Russia openly states that the IAEA’s presence at the ZNPP will only continue as long as Russia allows it, despite provocations such as the incident involving the IAEA staff vehicle.

By the end of 2024, Russia increased strikes on energy facilities located outside Ukrainian nuclear power plants, but which are crucial for their safe operation. The goal of these strikes is clear – to freeze the population, cripple healthcare centers and disrupt other essential service… The IAEA’s periodic missions to these facilities angered Russia to such an extent that its representative, Ulyanov, “angrily stated” at an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors that the Agency’s assessment of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure goes outside its mandate.

At the Board’s meeting, another resolution was passed which as usual “expressed concern” and affirmed support for the Director General’s activities. What stands out is that even for such a formal resolution, only two-thirds of the member states voted in favor, while the others “shamefully remained silent” or were against it.

It’s hard to say what Ukraine is hoping for. It seems to understands that after a ceasefire the ZNPP along with other territories will remain under some form of Russian control. The IAEA mission will leave the facility, and Rosatom will at least attempt to switch the reactors which are not loaded with American fuel into generating mode. However, in any case, the decision on the fate of the ZNPP will largely depend on the outcomes of political agreements, the nature of which is difficult to predict.»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Slovakia stockpiles Russian nuclear fuel ↑

14 November. The Slovakian energy company Slovenské elektrárne, operator of the Mochovce and Bohunice nuclear power plants, has taken the opportunity to stockpile Russian-produced nuclear fuel. The existing fuel reserves in Slovakia are sufficient for the next two and a half years, but Slovenské elektrárne will continue purchasing fuel under the contract with Rosatom’s fuel company TVEL, which has been in effect since 2019. The contract is set to expire in 2026, but it includes an option for extension until 2030.

The director of Slovenské elektrárne stated earlier in July this year, that Slovakia intends to exhaust this contract. In November, Slovakia’s Minister of Economy, Denisa Saková, announced that the energy company had taken advantage of the contract extension and would be able to secure nuclear fuel supplies for the next six years.

The Slovak company has signed agreements for alternative fuel supplies with Westinghouse and Framatome, but the fuel from both companies will not be used at Slovak nuclear power plants until 2027. Moreover, Framatome plans to supply fuel under a Russian license during the first few years of deliveries.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Slovakia’s decision to extend contracts for Russian fuel supplies can to some extent be explained by difficulties and delays in developing alternatives, particularly the problems Framatome is facing in creating its own fuel for VVER reactors and the joint production of this fuel with Rosatom structures at the plant in Lingen, Germany. We wrote a detailed article on the situation surrounding the Lingen plant that was published in The Moscow Times, and it is available on our website.»

Westinghouse to conduct safety analysis for licensing fuel for Kozloduy NPP ↑

On 20 December, the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria signed a contract with Westinghouse Electric Company to conduct a safety analysis for licensing a new design of nuclear fuel assemblies compatible with the design of the resident fuel for Unit 6 of the plant.

Previously, realizing its goal to diversify nuclear fuel suppliers, Kozloduy NPP signed a contract for the supply of nuclear fuel for Unit 5 with Westinghouse, with the first batch being loaded in June 2024. For Unit 6, which uses a different modification of Russian fuel compared to Unit 5, the plant signed a supply contract with Framatome. The first partial loading of French fuel (to be produced at the plant in Lingen, Germany, under Rosatom’s license) was initially planned for the autumn of 2025.

Commentary by Bellona:

«On the one hand, Westinghouse has extensive experience and broad expertise in working with nuclear fuel, so its involvement in the work on Unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP may be quite natural, regardless of the type and design of the new fuel assemblies.

On the other hand, given the plans to convert Unit 6 from Russian fuel to French fuel manufactured by Framatome, this could raise a number of questions.

First of all, if the initial phase of the transition involves Framatome supplying fuel assembled under Rosatom’s license and identical to Russian design, then perhaps the additional safety assessment that has been assigned to Westinghouse is unnecessary.

Secondly, if the new design of the nuclear fuel assembly for which the safety analysis will be conducted refers to the future proprietary design from Framatome, which the company is still developing, it seems odd that this analysis was not assigned to Framatome itself.

Thirdly, it is possible that this means Westinghouse will conduct a safety analysis for its own fuel assemblies. The fact is that Units 5 and 6 at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant use different modifications of Russian fuel. Unit 5 uses TVSA fuel assemblies, while Unit 6 has been fully loaded with improved TVSA-12 fuel since 2020. Westinghouse’s TVS-WR fuel assemblies can be co-loaded in the 5th reactor’s core with TVSA assemblies, which was done in 2024, as this experience has already been gained in Ukraine.

However, according to the Bulgarian media, American fuel is not compatible with the TVSA-12 assemblies. Therefore, a safety analysis must be conducted to obtain a license for testing and using this fuel. It is possible that as part of the new contract with Westinghouse an additional study will be conducted to explore the possibility of switching the 6th reactor at Kozloduy to American fuel instead of French fuel. This may be caused by delays in the production of Framatome’s own fuel and the suspension of the Russian-French fuel production project because of disputes surrounding the plant in Lingen.»

USA and UK extend cooperation in developing fourth-generation nuclear technologies, with Russia no longer participating ↑

During the COP-29 conference in Baku, the United Kingdom and the United States signed a new framework agreement on 18 November, which will allow them to continue their cooperation within the Generation IV International Forum, initiated in 2000 and officially registered in mid-2001.

The goal of the forum is to support the exchange of information on advanced nuclear technologies necessary to test the feasibility and performance of Generation IV nuclear systems, and to make them available for industrial use by 2030. Six technological concepts were identified for potential development: gas-cooled fast reactor, lead-cooled fast reactor, molten salt reactor, sodium-cooled fast reactor, supercritical water-cooled reactor, and very high-temperature reactor.

Currently, the alliance includes 13 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as Euratom, representing the 27 members of the European Union.

The United States and the United Kingdom became the first two countries to sign the new Framework Agreement. Once a third country signs it, the agreement will officially come into effect on March 1, 2025. Other member countries will have three years to pass the agreement through their national decision-making bodies if they wish to continue participating in the forum’s activities.

Under the new agreement, the Generation IV International Forum will no longer include Russia, which had been a member since 2009, in order to “ensuring future collaborations remain among mutually willing parties who respect nuclear safety norms.”

Commentary by Bellona:

«This exclusion of Russia from the Generation IV agreement reflects the growing division within the global nuclear community amid the deepening conflict between Russia and Western countries. On the one hand, under the current circumstances, such cooperation between Russia and many Western countries would be difficult or impossible, though there are exceptions, such as the ITER international fusion reactor project, where cooperation continues.

On the other hand, this exclusion of Russia may further contribute to the consolidation of nuclear projects and strengthen atomic cooperation within the BRICS+ countries, as we wrote in previous digests.

As far as the technological concepts of fourth-generation reactor systems are concerned, Russia has a significant lead, and can lay claim to global leadership in at least three of the six concepts: sodium-cooled, lead-cooled, and molten salt reactors. China leads in the implementation of gas-cooled reactors. Thus, within the BRICS countries, cooperation between Russia and China (which may possibly remain part of the new Generation IV agreement with Western countries) could result in the creation of a powerful alternative center for the development of fourth-generation reactor technologies.»

Romania plans to resume uranium mining ↑

On 21 November, the Romanian government approved the country’s energy strategy for 2025–2035, which includes the resumption of uranium mining.

It is reported that the Tulgheș-Grințieș deposit will be developed. The concession license for uranium mining activities at this deposit was granted to the Romanian energy company Societatea Națională Nuclearelectrica (SNN) in 2021 to consolidate the nuclear fuel cycle. Investors are expected to be involved in the development.

Currently, SNN, which also operates the two CANDU reactor units at the Cernavodă NPP, owns a uranium conversion plant in Feldioara and a fuel fabrication plant for CANDU reactors in Pitești. The uranium concentrate for these facilities is imported.

Earlier, Romania mined uranium at the Crucea-Botușana deposit, but production ceased in 2021 after the deposit was depleted.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The rise in prices on the uranium market and for conversion and enrichment services in recent years, driven by the prospects of global nuclear energy development and spurred by the reduction of cooperation with Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, is stimulating investments in the sector and prompting a revision of energy strategies in various countries.

Over the past two years, we have already noted renewed interest in uranium mining projects in countries such as the United States, Finland and Sweden, and now in Romania as well. These projects can be welcomed as a way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies and strengthen energy security, but it is important to carefully assess the environmental risks and alternatives associated with these projects.»

US determines potential domestic suppliers of low-enriched uranium ↑

On 10 December, the US Department of Energy announced that it has selected six companies for potential contracts to supply low-enriched uranium (LEU) as part of efforts to stimulate the development of new uranium production capacity within the country. (The request for proposals for purchasing LEU was announced in June 2024.)

These companies are American Centrifuge Operating (a subsidiary of Centrus), General Matter, Global Laser Enrichment, Louisiana Energy Services (operator of Urenco USA’s centrifuge enrichment plant), Laser Isotope Separation Technologies, and Orano Federal Services (a division of Orano USA). The Department of Energy plans to purchase LEU under these contracts produced from new domestic sources — at new facilities or through projects expanding existing capacities. The contracts will be concluded for terms of up to 10 years, with a minimum value of $2 million and a maximum total value of all contracts reaching $3.4 billion.

Four of these companies (American Centrifuge Operating, General Matter, Louisiana Energy Services, and Orano Federal Services) were selected in October as potential suppliers of HALEU enrichment and storage services.

We may also note that on 18 December, the Department of Energy announced the allocation of $80 million to support industry partners developing innovative technologies and approaches to strengthen the HALEU supply chain in the United States. The funding will support demonstration projects on an engineering or pilot scale, as well as early-stage applied research and development projects.

Commentary by Bellona:

«As noted above, the drive to boost domestic production in the nuclear fuel cycle across various countries is unfolding alongside efforts to phase out supplies from Russia, and a renewed interest in nuclear energy. The strategic intention of the United States to promote its own production, after significant dependence on enriched uranium from Russia in previous years (up to 30% of supplies), is gaining momentum, involving an increasing number of participants and larger contract amounts for future supplies.

Nevertheless, one of the most significant factors that could influence the pace of implementing the uranium and broader energy strategy adopted by the previous US administration is the new Trump administration, which may introduce adjustments to the plans outlined in recent years. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to the intensified development of domestic nuclear projects (and consequently increased competition and the displacement of Russia from these markets, at least in the US), or if it will have an opposite effect.»

Negotiations on NPP construction in Kazakhstan ↑

Following the referendum on 6 October that approved the decision to build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, and reports that Kazakhstan intends to entrust the construction to an international consortium, negotiations with representatives of countries whose projects were shortlisted back in 2019 have intensified. These include China’s CNNC (HPR-1000 reactor), Rosatom (VVER-1200 and VVER-1000 reactors), South Korea’s KHNP (APR-1400 reactor), and France’s EDF (EPR1200 reactor).

In October 2024, meetings were held in South Korea at the ministerial level and in France, where Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev paid a state visit. The uncertainty regarding the selection of the main participants in the future consortium, along with the high likelihood of Rosatom’s involvement in some capacity, prompts us to closely monitor this negotiation process, without providing detailed commentary for the moment.

On 14 November, Kazakhstan Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev. According to the press release, one of the topics discussed was cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. (The publication Orda.kz believes this confirms the October rumors that following the referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, Rosatom requested a meeting with President Tokayev or Olzhas Bektenov on either 28 October or 14 November.)

On 27 November, talks were held between Tokayev and Putin, who was visiting Kazakhstan on a state visit. According to Likhachev, who accompanied Putin, the issue of NPP construction was discussed in both the closed and extended parts of the negotiations. Likhachev also believes that only Russia has the ability to assemble large international consortiums for the construction of nuclear power plants.

On 29 November, a meeting took place between the CEO of Kazakhstan Atomic Power Stations Timur Zhantikin and the Chief Economist of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Huang Mingang. The meeting focused on bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, with the main point being the discussion of collaboration on the nuclear power plant construction project in Kazakhstan, including issues related to site selection and securing funding.

From 4-6 December a Kazakh delegation led by Minister of Energy Almasadam Satkaliyev made a working visit to France. Negotiations were held with French organizations in the nuclear industry, including the energy generation company and operator of nuclear power plants EDF, the developer and manufacturer of nuclear power plant equipment Framatome, as well as the supplier of turbine equipment for nuclear power plants Arabelle Solutions.

In addition, a meeting was held with the international consulting company Assystem, specializing in engineering services, project management, and digital solutions for complex infrastructure projects, including nuclear power plants.

We should note that on 3 January, Tokaev stated that the issue of the international consortium was discussed during Putin’s visit, and that “it was agreed that the Kazakh side would be the main operator in the consortium” and that “the project related to the construction of nuclear power plants may involve the company Rosatom, which has extensive experience working in foreign countries and possesses high qualifications,” but the achievements of China in the construction of civilian nuclear facilities are also being considered, and negotiations are ongoing with them as well.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Russia places restrictions on uranium export to USA ↑

On 14 November, Russia imposed temporary restrictions on the export of enriched uranium to the United States or under foreign trade contracts concluded with entities registered in the U.S. Exceptions will be made for supplies under individual licenses issued by the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control in cases where this is in Russia’s interests. According to the current wording of the decree, this ban (along with the ban on the export of several other goods) will remain in effect until the end of 2025. Rosatom commented that the implementation of uranium product supplies to other countries will continue without changes.

It is stated that this decision was made in response to the restrictions imposed by the U.S. in May on the import of Russian enriched uranium, with a complete ban set for 2028.

The American company Centrus, a reseller of Russian LEU, received permission from the US Department of Energy in July to import Russian LEU in 2024 and 2025.

After the restrictions imposed by Russian authorities, Centrus reported that on November 18, Tenex, a subsidiary of Rosatom and the largest supplier of low-enriched uranium to the company, notified them that its general export license for uranium products had been revoked. Tenex will now need to obtain a special export license for each shipment to Centrus. The Russian company stated that it plans to request the necessary licenses in a timely manner to fulfill its contractual obligations, but cannot guarantee that they will be issued or issued on time.

According to Centrus, if Tenex is unable to obtain export licenses, it will affect the company’s ability to meet its supply commitments to customers.

Commentary by Bellona:

«There is no exact information yet on whether the ban imposed by Russia has affected the actual shipments of enriched uranium to the US. Formally, all current contracts for deliveries to the US can continue after new licenses are registered and obtained. It is unlikely that authorities will refuse to issue these licenses.

Firstly, because this would lead to a reduction in Rosatom’s revenue, as shipments of enriched uranium to the U.S. (about $1 billion annually) account for nearly half of their export earnings from such products abroad. In giving the order to impose such restrictions during a meeting in September, Putin stated that they should be implemented “only if it does not harm us.”

Secondly, while these restrictions will be justified by the decisions of government agencies, they may affect the ability of Rosatom’s structures to fulfill contractual obligations, as the company highly values its reputation as a reliable supplier.

Therefore, it is most likely that the main purpose of the imposed restrictions is to create informational noise and achieve a propaganda effect. In practice, it is unlikely to lead to significant supply limitations on Russia’s part. Instead, it may serve to present the decline in uranium supplies, which will probably be caused by US restrictions, in a more favorable light for the domestic Russian audience.

Moreover, these American restrictions already seem to be taking effect. According to Comtrade data, in the first three quarters of 2024, shipments of enriched uranium from Russia to the US amounted to only 313 tons, which is just a quarter of the shipments for the entire 2023 year (1190 tons).»

Rosatom to withdrawn from several joint uranium producing enterprises in Kazakhstan ↑

On 17 December, Kazatomprom reported that the Rosatom subsidiary Uranium One Group had sold part of its assets in Kazakhstan to Chinese companies—specifically, a 49.979% stake in the joint venture Zarechnoye to Astana Mining Company Limited, the ultimate beneficiary of which is State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Company. As of the beginning of 2024, uranium reserves at the deposit being developed by this joint venture amounted to about 3,500 tons of uranium, with extraction planned to be finished in 2028.

According to some estimates, the deal could have amounted to $300–400 million, while others suggest it could have been $400–500 million.

It is also expected that 30% of Rosatom’s stake in SP Khorasan-U (with uranium reserves of 33,000 tons and an operating life until 2038) and 30% of its stake in Kyzylkum (which does not have any mining rights and only provides uranium processing services) will be sold to China Uranium Development Company Limited, the ultimate beneficiary of which is China General Nuclear Power Corporation.

Kazatomprom, along with Uranium One Group, still has several joint ventures. These include the joint venture Karatau at site 2 of the Budennovskoye deposit, the joint venture Akbastau developing sites 1, 3, and 4 of the Budennovskoye deposit, and the joint venture Budennovskoye for sites 6 and 7. (The mining rights to site 5 of the Budennovskoye deposit belong solely to Kazatomprom.)

In addition, they are co-owners of the South Mining and Chemical Company – Kazatomprom holds 30%, while Uranium One Group holds 70%.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The news about the sale of Kazakhstan’s assets by Russia’s Uranium One Group came as quite a surprise. Neither the Russian and nor the Chinese have provided detailed comments regarding the deals.

Not long ago, in 2023, Rosatom proudly reported a large deal to purchase part of the Budennovskoye deposit in Kazakhstan. Vladimir Putin even played a role in facilitating the deal, for which the head of Rosatom thanked him during a personal meeting. It seemed that Rosatom was expanding its presence in the uranium market in Kazakhstan and had no intention of selling anything there.

Nevertheless, the trend for consolidation is likely to continue, as the assets being sold relate to relatively small and already depleted deposits, with total uranium reserves of less than 20,000 tons. The share purchased by Rosatom in the more promising Budennovskoye deposit has twice as much in reserves — about 60,000 tons, considering the 49% share of Rosatom structures in the deposit.

However, the high planned production volumes at the Budennovskoye deposit, up to 6,000 tons per year, are still to be reached. Also, the development pace is behind schedule — 2,500 tons were expected to be mined in 2024, but only 201 tons were extracted in the first half of the year. Therefore, in the short term, uranium production at the remaining Rosatom assets in Kazakhstan may even decrease, as according to the financial report from Kazatomprom for the first half of 2024, the total uranium extraction at the Zarechnoye and Khorsan-U joint venture deposits, which are being prepared for sale by Rosatom, amounted to over 1,100 tons, compared to just 201 tons at the recently acquired Budennovskoye deposit. The total uranium production at Rosatom’s Kazakhstan assets in 2023 was 4,831 tons.»

Russia withdraws from international agreement on multilateral nuclear and environmental program in the Russian Federation ↑

On December 28, Russia denounced the framework agreement on the multilateral nuclear and environmental program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR agreement) and the related protocols. The bill for denunciation was submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on November 22. The explanatory note to the bill states that cooperation under the MNEPR agreement was effectively suspended as early as 2015–2017.

The MNEPR agreement was signed in 2003. The signatories were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK, the US (which did not join the Protocol), the European Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. The goal of the agreement was to cooperate in ensuring the safety of handling spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in the Russian Federation during the disposal of decommissioned nuclear submarines and nuclear-powered service vessels in northwest Russia. A key part of the cooperation was the environmental rehabilitation of the former naval bases of the Russian Navy in Andreeva Bay and the settlement of Gremikha. The project was financed by France, the EU, Germany, the UK, Canada, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.

More details about the purpose of the MNEPR agreement, what was accomplished as part of it, and what still remains to be done in the Norwegian, Barents and Kara Seas and other areas can be found in the Bellona article, “We wanted Norway to stay in the projects until the very end.”

Last spent nuclear fuel removed from Gremikha ↑

On December 2, Rosatom reported that in November, the removal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the coastal technical base of the Northern Fleet in Gremikha had been completed. The last set of spent fuel elements (SFE) with uranium-beryllium fuel from the reactor of a nuclear submarine with a liquid-metal coolant was dismantled and sent for reprocessing at the Mayak Production Association. In total, the dismantling and removal of all SFEs took more than ten years. The project for rehabilitation was funded by the international community, with significant contributions from France (which is not mentioned in Rosatom’s press release).

According to Vasily Tinin, Director of State Policy in the Field of Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel, and Nuclear and Radiation Hazardous Objects at Rosatom, there is currently only one SNF storage facility left in the Russian part of the Barents Sea – in Andreeva Bay, from where more than half of the SNF has already been removed. The removal work is planned to be fully completed by the end of this decade.

Commentary by Bellona:

«As we have written many times before, all international projects related to the elimination of the nuclear legacy on the Kola Peninsula and elsewhere were closed or frozen after the war began. Russia cannot and therefore does not plan to open new international projects in the near future, so it is not surprising that international agreements, such as the MNEPR, which formalize legal arrangements and rules, have been denounced by Russia.

No one paid much attention to these Russian actions, since there was essentially nothing to lose or regret. By the time the war began, almost all countries, except for a few (Norway, France, Italy), had exited the joint projects for the liquidation of nuclear legacy. The logic of the countries was simple — when Russia needed help and its nuclear legacy posed a threat beyond its borders, assistance was necessary, but when Russia began building several nuclear submarines per year and also found money for other weaponry and luxury items, while moving away from democracy toward autocracy, it was no longer reasonable or feasible to shift these expenses onto foreign taxpayers.

Russia still has remnants of its nuclear legacy, and the responsibility for their elimination largely lies with Rosatom. Therefore, when new reports emerge that the last spent nuclear fuel has been removed from Gremikha, this information serves more as publicity than as a substantive assessment.

This batch of spent nuclear reactor components with uranium-beryllium fuel from a nuclear submarine using liquid metal coolant did not have any negative impact on the environment or human health. It was simply not the right place to store it with the intention of dismantling and properly placing it in storage. Therefore, it was removed, although nothing would have changed if it had been removed earlier or later. In other words, it was a routine operation for transporting nuclear and radiological materials.

It will be more interesting to observe the timelines and safety levels for the elimination of the emergency spent nuclear fuel storage at Andreeva Bay.»

Nuclear icebreaker fleet construction ↑

On 18 December Kommersant newspaper reported that Rosatom is proposing the introduction of a new Arctic investment levy for shippers of the Northern Sea Route starting in 2028. The fee would be charged as a surcharge for icebreaker escort through the eastern sector of the NSR. The state corporation hopes that this will help fund the construction of icebreakers, as the company currently lacks sufficient funds to complete them.

The publication writes that shippers are already complaining about the rising tariffs for icebreaker escort, so the prospect of further increases is even less appealing to them. It is also noted that only the super-powerful icebreaker of the Leader project (Rossiya) is being built entirely with budget funds. Icebreakers of the 22220 project are being built on a mixed scheme: 50% from the budget and 50% from off-budget sources. Four new non-nuclear icebreakers are proposed to be built entirely from off-budget sources.

On 20 December, the keel-laying ceremony for the multifunctional nuclear service vessel (MSATO) of project 22770, named the “Vladimir Vorobyev”, took place at the Baltic Shipyard. The construction contract was signed in May 2023, with commissioning planned for 2029. Although the development plan for the Northern Sea Route up to 2035 indicated the project timeline as 2023–2027, this plan has not been updated since its approval in August 2022, except for amendments made in April 2023 regarding the search for new suppliers of essential components for icebreakers due to anti-Russian sanctions.

On 13 December, at the 14^th International Forum “The Arctic: Present and Future,” Ignaty Vodennikov, Technical Director of the Baltic Shipyard, spoke about the construction of the nuclear icebreaker fleet. He noted that sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022 have affected the 22220 series, particularly the “Yakutia”. Equipment ordered from European manufacturers was never delivered, and issues arose with the commissioning of components already delivered to the shipyard.

Vodennikov noted that as part of the import substitution program, Russian-made products have replaced coatings, insulation materials, forgings and castings (shafts and propellers), fire suppression systems, special energy materials, general ship system components (pumps, filters), stern tube bearings and cooling systems, main thrust bearings, and elevator equipment. Despite these difficulties, the Baltic Shipyard has remained on schedule. Construction of the Leningrad icebreaker is underway on the slipway, while the Chukotka is being outfitted at the completion quay, with delivery expected in 2026. The final two icebreakers of the 22220 series are planned for completion in 2028 and 2030.

On 28 December the state flag was raised on the Yakutia nuclear icebreaker. Its construction took 4.5 years.

As for the lead nuclear icebreaker of the 10510 Leader project, it was reported at the above-mentioned forum that it will be able to operate in the Northern Sea Route in 2030, which already differs from the originally planned schedule.

On 23 December the ship Ursa Major which was sailing from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok sank in international waters between Spain and Algeria. The ship was transporting two large port cranes and two 45-ton top of the two reactors for the nuclear icebreaker Rossiya.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The successful development of the Northern Sea Route that has been entrusted to Rosatom depends heavily on the number and quality of ice-class and support vessels capable of performing their functions in the Arctic waters. Currently, FSUE Atomflot (a Rosatom subsidiary) operates four older-generation nuclear icebreakers (50 Let Pobedy, Vaigach, Yamal, Taymyr) and three new-generation icebreakers of Project 22220 (Arktika, Sibir, Ural). By 2030, it plans to expand the icebreaker fleet in the Far East to 17 vessels and to 18 by 2035. This includes adding four more nuclear and four non-nuclear icebreakers to Rosatom’s fleet, and one non-nuclear icebreaker to the fleet of the Federal Marine and River Transport Agency.

It is difficult to say how many icebreakers Russia will actually be able to build in the near future to meet the government’s goal of a “24/7 Northern Sea Route”, as the country’s political situation and economic potential are unstable. Everything will depend on the capabilities of Russian shipbuilding facilities and the financing of planned projects.

In the draft Russian budget for 2024–2026, funding for the construction of new nuclear icebreakers has been reduced. Specifically, the allocation for the lead icebreaker Lider was decreased by 5.24 billion rubles, while funding for the third and fourth serial Arktika-class icebreakers was cut by 0.56 billion rubles, for the fifth by 2.36 billion rubles, and for the sixth by 1.36 billion rubles.

Funding for the construction of a nuclear service vessel is also proposed to be reduced by 0.91 billion rubles.

At the end of 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev announced that given the planned increase in traffic along the Northern Sea Route, an additional 10 icebreakers and 46 auxiliary vessels would need to be built. However, the timeline for completing this ambitious project remains unknown.»

Events in Rosatom projects abroad ↑

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On 4 November, a ” melt trap” was delivered to the construction site of Unit 4 of the nuclear power plant, and its installation began on November 19. (The melt localization devices for Units 1 and 2 were installed in 2023, and for Unit 3 in 2024.)

On November 23, a law came into effect ratifying the protocol to the agreement on providing Egypt with a state export loan for the construction of the El Dabaa nuclear power plant, originally dated November 19, 2015. The protocol extends the loan utilization and repayment period by two years and exempts the debtor from paying accrued penalty interest, provided that the accumulated interest debt since March 2022 is repaid on time. Implementing the protocol will enable Egypt to resume servicing the loan, repay overdue debt currently totaling approximately $185 million, and allow Russia to resume project financing using state credit funds.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. Bangladesh and Russia continue negotiations on repayments for the loan provided by Russia for the construction of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. In September we wrote that Bangladesh was ready to make payments, with approximately $809 million accumulated in a designated deposit account at the Bangladesh Bank. However, a secure and seamless payment method has yet to be found. Russia proposed payments through a Chinese bank in yuan, but Bangladesh rejected this option, considering it legally inconvenient at the international level.

In November, reports indicated that Russia was pressuring Bangladesh to open a branch of a Russian bank in Dhaka (a clause allegedly included in the loan agreement) to facilitate fund transfers for debt repayment either directly to Russia or under its control. However, both countries failed to reach an agreement on this proposal.

On December 5, another solution was announced: a foreign currency account in the name of the Russian government would be opened at the local branch of the state-owned Sonali Bank in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where loan repayments would be deposited. However, the proposed account at Sonali Bank will handle future payments, while the funds already accumulated in the deposit account at the Bangladesh Bank will not be transferred to the Russian account. The Bangladeshi government has already agreed to start the account opening process, while Russia is still considering the proposal.

The total estimated cost of the Rooppur project is $12.65 billion, of which 90% ($11.38 billion) is financed by the Russian government in the form of a loan, while the remaining 10% is provided by the Bangladeshi government. However, as of August 14 this year, Russia had allocated $7.33 billion to Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, the Anti-Corruption Commission began an investigation in December into allegations of corruption, embezzlement, and money laundering related to the Rooppur nuclear power plant project. According to the commission’s report, the ousted Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, her son, and her niece are accused of embezzling $5 billion from an inflated project cost of $12.65 billion.

Rosatom called the allegations of embezzlement in the construction of the nuclear power plant project false and stated its readiness to “defend its reputation” in court.

Regarding the technical aspects of construction, on 18 December, Rosatom announced: “We have entered the final stage of preparing the first power unit for physical startup.” This phase involves testing the functionality of equipment and mechanisms, including the initial launch and trial operation of the main circulation pumps. “

In addition, we may note that Rosatom had hoped to achieve the physical startup of Unit 1 in December 2024 (this was mentioned in August 2024).

Kudankulam NPP, India. On 30 November, Russia and India ratified agreements related to credit arrangements originally signed in December 2023. These agreements provide for debt restructuring, outlining procedures for repayment and servicing obligations in Russian rubles.

In early 2024, Russia and India discussed the possibility of accelerating the construction of the second phase of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (Units 3 and 4). Additionally, in January 2024, Likhachev stated that Unit 3 would definitely be commissioned that year, along with Unit 1 of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh.

Details about the progress of the construction of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant can be found in the Bellona article “Despite challenges at Kudankulam project, India and Russia likely to deepen civilian nuclear cooperation.”

Paks-2 NPP, Hungary.  On November 29, Hungary’s National Atomic Energy Agency (Országos Atomenergia Hivatal, OAH) passed a resolution allowing the construction of NPP units to begin.

Hungary’s atomic regulator granted approval for the installation of Units 5 and 6 back in August 2022 but included hold points for future operations. One such point required the submission of an updated preliminary safety report. Paks-2 submitted the report in November 2022, followed by several revisions. OAH has now lifted this hold point, allowing work on the first concrete pour to commence once the necessary permits are secured, marking the start of construction on the reactor island for the unit.

Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, stated that the country expects to begin pouring the first concrete at the start of 2025.

Akuuyu NPP, Turkey. On 11 November, the concreting of the dome section of the outer containment dome for the reactor building of Unit 1 was completed (the metal components of the dome were installed in two phases in August and September).

On December 12, the turbine installation for Unit 1 was completed. The event marking this milestone was attended by Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev and Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar.

Xudapu NPP, China. At Unit 4 of the Xudapu Nuclear Power Plant, which is being constructed with Rosatom’s involvement, a reactor vessel was installed under the technical supervision of representatives from Rosatom’s Engineering Division.

Recommended publications ↑

The report “The IAEA’s Role in Times of War” by Bellona expert Alexander Nikitin is available on Bellona’s website. The report provides a survey of the agency’s structure and capabilities while analyzing the limitations of its influence on current challenges, particularly the threats to nuclear facilities in Ukraine. An online presentation of the report including a Q&A session took place on 23 January. A recording of the event is available on Bellona’s YouTube channel.

Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin on the unraveling of environmental agreements with Russia — this article is the transcripting of a podcast with Alexander Nikitin about Russia’s withdrawal from the environmental agreement on the Soviet nuclear legacy was posted on Bellona’s website on 12 February.

The article “This German Town Could Decide the Future of EU Reliance on Russian Nuclear Fuel” by Bellona expert Dmitry Gorchakov, was published in The Moscow Times. It analyzes the situation surrounding the nuclear fuel plant in the German town of Lingen and highlights its crucial role in Europe’s efforts to phase out nuclear fuel imports from Russia.

Bellona hosted a side event “The Russian Arctic During the War: Current Situation and Forecasts” at the Arctic Frontiers 2025 international conference in Tromsø, Norway. A video recording of the event is available on our website.