Nuclear activity in the Arctic region of Russia has been ongoing for over 70 years. More than 100 nuclear tests were conducted here, and more than a hundred nuclear-powered submarines, military ships, and civilian vessels were built, operated, and decommissioned here. Several nuclear power plants, dozens of military bases, and other facilities with radioactive materials were built and still operate in the area. And, of course, there have been many radiation accidents.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of these facilities were left in a very dangerous state and comprised what we call the nuclear legacy. History shows that when a major nuclear state collapses due to economic problems and military expenses, it creates significant risks for everyone around it. We know it from the past. But we may face this again in the future when the Putin regime collapses, sooner or later.

Bellona has been actively involved in solving nuclear legacy problems for about 30 years, first simply drawing attention to them, and then actively promoting international assistance toward eliminating them.

Nuclear legacy issues still unresolved

The good news is that many of the nuclear legacy problems have been resolved, many with the help of international financial and technical assistance. European countries, including Norway, have spent about €2.5 billion to address these issues.

Among those, we can mention Sayda Bay, where reactor compartments of nuclear submarines are securely stored. And the nuclear service ship Lepse, a floating storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, which was finally disposed of last year.

A partially solved problem is Andreeva Bay. This former submarine base is a storage site for more than twenty thousand spent fuel assemblies of the Soviet Northern Fleet, just 40 km from the Norwegian border. The base has been brought to a safe state, and since 2016, half of the some 22,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies have already been removed from here. But the second half, which is more complex, remains.

The problem of scuttled nuclear hardware is no less important than Andreeva Bay. There are some 10 nuclear reactors at the bottom of the Arctic seas. The most dangerous are those aboard the sunken submarines K-27 and K-159.

The issue of raising them was discussed among Russia and foreign partners until 2022, when the war in Ukraine began. It is now unlikely that Russia will be able to raise them alone, both because it lacks the technology and money, and because it is no longer a priority for Moscow.

Last year Bellona published a special report about the nuclear legacy of the Russian Arctic where all these problems are discussed in detail.  

Increased military activity in the Arctic and Nuclear escalation

Russia’s main focus now is to confront the West. Most of the nuclear legacy comes from past military programs, but nuclear militarization in the Arctic is still ongoing. By early 2025, the Russian Northern Fleet had accrued around 30 nuclear ships and submarines. The Navy remains the main operator of nuclear installations in the Russian Arctic. Among those are some 40 nuclear reactors—many more than the 25 reactors operated in a civilian capacity within the nuclear icebreaker fleet and at nuclear power plants.

And no less important are the 300 nuclear warheads on combat duty on strategic submarines. Russia spends $10 billion a year on its nuclear weapon programs. In recent decades, Russia has built over 10 new nuclear submarines and is developing new nuclear weapon carriers. This will create a new nuclear legacy in the future and poses risks of accidents during testing and operation today.

Among accidents with nuclear vessels over the past few decades, we must note the tragedy of the Kursk nuclear submarine, the sinking of the K-159 submarine, and a fire aboard the top-secret Losharik submarine. In 2019 the Burevestnik cruise missile, equipped with a nuclear reactor, suffered an accident that caused a radiation release in the Arkhangelsk region and killed five Rosatom engineers. These tests have now been moved to another site in the Arctic –the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago.

The Novaya Zemlya test site has seen 132 nuclear explosions. Fortunately, no full-scale nuclear tests have been conducted here since 1990. However, the site has never been officially closed and is deliberately kept open and ready for use. This is a part of Putin’s strategy to intimidate the West. In recent years, he has taken many of steps toward nuclear escalation.

Last year, in fact, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. And in a year, the New START treaty between the United States and Russia will expire. This means that, likely next year, for the first time in decades, we will find ourselves in a situation where there are no treaties between the two largest nuclear powers limiting their nuclear arsenals. Potentially, this will allow Russia to quickly place up to 100 additional nuclear warheads on existing submarines in the Arctic.

Unfortunately, if the nuclear escalation continues, we may well see the resumption of nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya within in a few years—the very activity that Bellona opposed 35 years ago.

Big plans for civilian nuclear programs in the Arctic

In addition to military activities, Russia is also developing civilian nuclear projects in the Arctic that are closely connected with the extractive projects in this region.

The primary example of civilian nuclear technology in the Arctic is Russia’s nuclear icebreaker fleet.  These have been used on the Northern Sea Route for 65 years. Today, there are eight nuclear icebreakers working there, which exceeds what was in operation during Soviet times. Half of these icebreakers are new and were commissioned in the last five years—and Russia plans to build four more.

But in recent years, these plans have faced problems. First, the war in Ukraine has caused a breakdown in industrial cooperation with many European countries, including Ukraine itself. Second, there is less government funding for building icebreakers. And third, the region’s economic development, which needs icebreakers to forge forth, is occurring more slowly than expected. Last year, the plan was to transport 80 million tons of cargo along the Northern Sea Route. But in reality, shippers managed only half that amount.

Russia also broadly uses nuclear energy in the Arctic. Out of 11 nuclear power plants in Russia, three are located in this region. Two of them, Kola and Bilibino, have been working for more than 50 years. In the future, Russia plans to build five new nuclear power plants in the Arctic with a total number of reactors of up to 16.

Both in Soviet times and today, Russia has chosen the Arctic for special nuclear installations due to its extreme conditions. Currently, Rosatom is planning to build new reactor types in the Arctic that would be unlike anything built elsewhere in Russia. These technologies are being tested here with the goal of future export.

We can classify most of these projects as small modular reactors, which is a new direction in nuclear energy development that many countries are currently interested in, even Norway.

Most of these reactors in Russia are intended to power industrial projects in remote areas. However, the success of these projects depends on the export of extracted resources. With sanctions on Russia, it’s unlikely that all these projects will be completed.

Conclusions and Key Points

First, nuclear legacy issues are still dangerous and unresolved. In the current situation, nuclear cleanup projects may slow down or stop indefinitely.

Second, new risks arise from ongoing nuclear militarization of the Arctic.

Third, the lack of reliable information from Russia makes these problems even worse and more difficult to respond to. Bellona is working to address this by publishing analytical materials and monitoring the situation in the Russian Arctic and in Russian Nuclear industry in our monthly digests.