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Publish date: 01/10/2024
Written by: Dmitry Gorchakov
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As of mid-2024, the state nuclear corporation Rosatom is simultaneously building about 20 nuclear power plant units in seven countries: China, India, Turkey, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran and Hungary.
India is one of Russia’s largest and oldest partners and one of the first customers of foreign nuclear power plants (along with Iran and China). India’s partnership was critical for the newly post-Soviet state of Russia in the difficult 1990s when its nuclear industry was on the verge of complete collapse and bankruptcy. So enduring is the partnership that it predates even the formation of Rosatom in 2007, which replaced its Soviet predecessor Minatom.
For India, the Soviet-era contract for the construction of the Kudankulam NPP (KKNPP), signed back in 1988, was the first and still the only completed project for the construction of a foreign NPP in India in almost 40 years. After the Indian atomic bomb test in 1974 and India’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, foreign partners, primarily Canada and the United States, who helped to build the first few reactors in India in the late 1960s, ceased this civilian nuclear cooperation. Since then, India has set course toward the completely independent development of a civil nuclear program based mainly on reactors with heavy water and natural uranium as fuel.
The Kudankulam nuclear power plant (KKNPP) in India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu, which is being built by Rosatom, is one of the main projects within the Russia-India bilateral relationship. The first stage of the Kudankulam NPP, with two units, is also the most productive NPP in the country, providing up to a third of all electricity generated by nuclear power units in India, according to the IAEA database. Its two VVER-1000 reactors are also the most powerful in India (1000 MW gross capacity versus 200-700 MW for other nuclear power units) and the only NPP units with pressurized water reactors (VVER in Russian terminology) in the country.
The Kudankulam NPP also accounts for about 30% of the operating capacity of Indian NPPs (2 GW of 6.9 GW according to the IAEA) and 75% of the capacity under construction (4 GW of 5.4 GW). Currently, four more units of the station are under construction and the possible construction of new units according to Russian designs is being discussed, including at other sites.
The contract for the first two units of the power plant was signed in 1988, however the construction began only in 2002. The first and second units came online in October 2013 and October 2016, respectively.
According to the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, published in 2017, the initial estimated cost of the Kudankulam NPP Units 1 and 2 was $2.9 billion in 2001 which gradually rose to $3.7 billion in 2014. There also were major delays in start of commercial operations of Units 1 and 2 by more than seven years, “due to delayed supply of equipment/working documents by overseas collaborating partner, changes in design, additional works, erection delays etc.“ the report said.
The initial agreements assumed that Russia would issue a loan for 50% of the cost of the station (about $ 1.5 billion). Despite the increase in the cost of the facility, additional costs were almost entirely covered by the Indian side, including increased interest on commercial loans that were taken out due to project delays. According to the report, by the time the Unit 2 of the station was put into commercial operation in 2017, India had already repaid Russia more than 70% of the loan.
Delays in the construction of NPP units in India are even more striking when compared to another Rosatom construction project undertaken during the same period in the early 2000s in China – the first stage of the Tianwan NPP. There, two VVER-1000 units similar in design were built in seven years, while unit 1 and 2 at the Kudankulam NPP were built in 11 and 14 years, respectively – almost twice as long. The reason for this difference may owe both to Rosatom’s more effective interaction with Chinese industrial and government partners than with Indian ones and to the influence of the freer Indian society, which is the world’s largest democracy.
The construction of the first two units was mired in controversy and beset by anti-nuclear protests, leading to delays and judicial tussles between activist groups and the government throughout decades, all the way up to the eventual start of operations at the site. By contrast the construction of the other four units has been relatively unaffected by the protests. This is not to say, however, that there have been no delays or hurdles to construction.
Difficulties also accompanied the first stage of the station, not only during construction but after its commissioning, as well. According to the IAEA PRIS database, the operating parameters of the units were far from ideal. The cumulative load factor of the reactor units in the first years did not surpass 60%. This means that they were operating at only near half of their maximum capacity. The reasons for this may owe to both the low quality of the supplied equipment and its inefficient operation by personnel. Only in the last couple of years has the efficiency of the units reached the world average with a Load factor of more than 80%.
Construction of units 3 and 4 at the station with similar VVER-1000 power units began in 2017. Units 3 and 4 are 73% complete. They have a cost overrun of nearly 73% and a time overrun of 72 months, according to a project summary released in August 2024 by the Indian government. Units 5 and 6 are almost a third complete and have not run into any cost or time overruns, according to the same project summary.
As indicated by the figures, as of mid 2024, Units 3 and 4 are in advanced stages of construction but have not yet reached the commissioning phase. Units 5 and 6 are in the initial stages of construction, with foundation work and procurement of major components underway.
According to a March 2019 report which quoted KKNPP management, non-payment of dues by local electricity distributors and associated problems of “working capital management” and an inability “to clear off liabilities” had caused delay in the construction of units 3 and 4 of the KKNPP.
Though Indian media speculated in the Spring of 2022 that there would be delays to the construction of units 3 through 6 due to industrial stresses caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, no forecasts were available in open government sources.
However, according to a February 2024 report in The Hindu newspaper, a meeting between the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and Rosatom’officials was scheduled to address issues that were causing delays, specifically delays related to “the supply of certain critical components from Russia”.
However, according to a press release from December 2022 India’s cabinet said that all six units would be complete by 2027.
While Rosatom maintained that no delay is expected in the plant’s completion, Rosatom and India’s atomic energy department in February of 2024 amended an inter-government agreement from 2008 and discussed expediting the construction of Units 3 through 6.
Furthermore, in September 2023 a barge carrying two steam generators meant for the KKNPP’s units 5 and 6 ran aground near where they were to be unloaded. The barge was finally retrieved in October 2023, nearly three weeks later with significant help from the Indian Navy.
While these incidents and indicators together paint a picture of minor delays, India’s mention of delayed Russian components in meetings with their Rosatom counterparts is likely to be the biggest concern. A similar trend has impacted the Indian military, specifically within the construction of the Indian Navy’s native-built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, whose commissioning was pushed back because of significant delay in supply of components, including the aviation complex, from Russia. However, since the Government of India has not revealed the extent of component delays for units 3 and 6 at the KKNPP it is safe to assume the delay didn’t alter the construction timeline enough to present a major setback to either the project or India’s overall energy security.
During a July 2024 summit, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and India’s Narendra Modi recognized civil nuclear cooperation as a focus of their cooperation. The joint statement from the summit notes that India and Russia are in talks on a second nuclear plant separate from the KKNPP “in accordance with earlier signed agreements”. In October 2018, Reuters reported that India and Russia had signed an agreement, but the article, which cited an unnamed Rosatom official, also reported that this was “not a firm contract” but “agreement to work towards a contract”.
The Indian Ministry of External Affair’s press conference and the joint statement after the bilateral summit also mentioned that India and Russia were discussing localizing the VVER-1200 reactor design and exploring avenues for “joint manufacturing of NPP components as well as on cooperation in third countries”. Furthermore, the two sides also discussed NPP fuel supply for Units 3 through 6 of the KKNPP, all but confirming a July 8 report by Bloomberg that India was seeking a long-term supply of Uranium from Russia.
In another unexpected revelation, Indian New Agency, Press Trust of India and Russian state-owned news agency TASS, both reported a Rosatom assertion that Indian firms were engaged in the construction of Bangladesh’s Rooppur NPP. The firm ‘Paharpur Cooling Towers’ was specifically identified in the report as supplying all four cooling towers and two pumping stations for the Rooppur NPP’s power units. This not only highlights India’s private sector involvement with Russian state entities, but also puts them at risk of becoming targets for secondary western sanctions.
Another notable development was a visit by Ajit Mohanty, chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, to Russia’s closed-fuel-cycle demonstration project, the Brest-OD-300 reactor in the Tomsk region, to which he was accompanied by Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev.
Likhachev mentioned several avenues of potential cooperation that Russia foresees with India, including floating and landbased small and modular reactors, or SMR-based nuclear power plants. However, India has yet to seriously show interest in the SMR projects.
According to government plans, India is going to triple its nuclear power capacity by 2032 and build an additional 18 new power units, bringing total capacity to 22.4 GW. Among them, the Kudankulam NPP, by that time with six units, will still remain the largest, accounting for about 25% of all nuclear capacity in the country.
India, like China, has its own program for the construction of nuclear power plants using its own technologies and design, and is actively enlisting Russia in nuclear construction. And, like a number of other countries cooperating with Russia in nuclear construction, such as China and Turkey, India is also open to new projects with other developers. For example, since 2009, India has been negotiating with France on the construction of the large Jaitapur NPP with six French EPR-1600 reactors, with a total capacity of 9.6 GW. In 2021, France’s EDF submitted a feasibility study for the project, but a final decision has not yet been taken.
In recent decades, projects to build nuclear plants with the assistance of the United States, South Korea, Japan and various other countries have been discussed, but none seems to have passed the initial negotiations.
Thus, despite India’s openness to cooperation with various countries in the civil nuclear industry, it is still difficult for those countries to offer projects and guarantees for their implementation that are as attractive and convincing as those offered by Russia. For the foreseeable future, Russia therefore will likely remain the largest and only foreign developer of NPPs in India. And it is unlikely that any political considerations related to the war in Ukraine will seriously hinder India’s civil nuclear energy cooperation with Russia.
Aditya Pareek, an independent researcher studying Russia’s high-tech industries, including state owned conglomerates Roscosmos and Rosatom.
Dmitry Gorchakov, Nuclear Advisor, The Bellona Environmental Transparency Center
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