After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for July 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for June, May and April. Download a PDF of this digest here.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for July 2024
2. Nuclear materials to Ukraine will be delivered using loan funds
3. Operational occurrences at the South Ukrainian and Rostov NPPs

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
4. Fuel for European VVER reactors from Framatome under Rosatom license
5. Deal for sale of Rosatom’s German asset nears completion
6. Other news in brief

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Baltic Shipyard suffers losses in nuclear icebreaker construction
8. Rosatom takes part in import substitution of parts for Airbus and Boeing planes
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear risks and the war in Ukraine

Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for July 2024 ↑

Military threats. IAEA mission experts at the ZNPP continue to report that practically every day they hear and see signs of military activity in the region of the plant and Enerhodar (smoke from fires, explosions and sounds of shooting), and also receive information about military activity from Russian representatives.

Experts were informed that on 3 July several drones carried out strikes in the environs of the ZNPP. In one case a drone exploded in a forest next to a 750 kV open switchyard. IAEA representatives themselves say they saw thick smoke and heard explosions from the substation area. There was no disruption to the electricity supply at the NPP.

Another report concerned an attack by three drones on the Raduga electricity substation on the same day during maintenance work. Eight employees of the ZNPP were injured and both transformers at the substation were damaged. Besides the disruption to the electricity supply of Enerhodar, the electricity supply was also disrupted to auxiliary buildings of the plant that are located outside the industrial site: the transport building, printing works, production and equipment supply building.

The IAEA team was later informed that on 5 July, a transformer at one of the Enerhodar substations had been damaged in an attack, which led to an hours-long blackout, and on 10 July shelling in the environs of the town damaged a water pump station and another electricity substation. The town was without tap water and electricity during the day. These incidents did not affect the electricity supply to the ZNPP.

Commenting on these and earlier reports, IAEA general director Rafael Grossi called for a stop to these attacks. Although they did not target the plant’s industrial site directly, as in April, these attacks violate several of the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety formulated by IAEA at the start of the war. In particular, Grossi mentioned the one on protecting the plant staff, referring to the eight plant employees injured on 3 July.

Furthermore, Grossi said, “the sporadic loss of basic living essentials such as electricity and drinking water is affecting the staff and families at all nuclear power plants and facilities throughout Ukraine, potentially impacting on their ability to perform their important nuclear safety and security work”.

On 11 July, the IAEA team also reported fires around Enerhodar, without clarifying their cause. Smoke from fires was also recorded on other days over the course of the month.

On 11 July, an air raid alarm prevented experts from performing planned walkdowns, although they did not hear sounds of military activity at this time.

On 17 July, the Enerhodar substation was damaged again, and the town suffered a blackout, and there were also problems with the water supply. Exprts reported that several buildings at the site lacked tap water.

It was reported that the electricity supply in Enerhodar was restored by 26 July.

In June at a meeting with Ukraine energy minister German Galushchenko, Grossi noted that attacks on the energy infrastructure also presented a direct danger for other nuclear sites of Ukraine. On 17 July the Ukrainian permanent representative office for international organizations in Vienna informed the IAEA that there had been an increase in the number of attacks by missiles and drones, including on energy sites of Ukraine, with the aim of disrupting energy supply in the country.

It was reported that drones were noticed near Ukrainian NPPs: on 10 July five drones at a distance of 25 km from the Rivne NPP, 5 drones at a distance of around 4 km from the site of the South Ukrainian NPP. On 11 July a drone was detected around 1.4 km from the 750 kV open switchyard at the Khmelnitsky NPP site. This violates the first of the five principles of the IAEA, which must be observed to ensure nuclear safety during an armed conflict.

Events in nuclear diplomacy. On 11 July the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding that Russia immediately return full control over the Zaporizhzhia NPP to Ukraine. The resolution “Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” was supported by 99 countries, 60 abstained, and 9 countries – Belarus, Burundi, Cuba, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria, and Russia itself – opposed it.

The resolution also demands that all military and unsanctioned personnel be withdrawn from the NPP, and calls on Russia to provide the IAEA mission with full access to all facilities and territories important for nuclear safety and security, until it returns the plant.

The document also calls for the immediate cessation of Russia’s attacks against critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine, which increases the risk of a nuclear accident at all nuclear facilities of Ukraine. It also calls upon both parties to implement fully the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict and the five concrete principles of the Director General of the IAEA to help to ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP.

The deputy of Russia’s permanent representative at the UN Dmitry Polyansky called the resolution passed on the ZNPP a politicized project “which will not have any effect whatsoever on the ground, just like the previous ones.”

Maintenance and repair. In July work continued on scheduled and preventative work on the safety systems of units 1 and 6, and maintenance work also began at the main transformer of unit 3. The IAEA team was present at several of the maintenance activities.

For example, the team observed work on the disassembled transformer of unit 3, maintenance activities in the reactor hall and the nuclear auxiliary building of unit 6, including the refueling machine crane and the heat exchangers, as well as maintenance of some electrical and instrumentation and control equipment.

According to ZNPP representatives, the majority of the maintenance work is being performed by contractors.

IAEA experts also checked the current state of several of the 20 emergency diesel generators. The IAEA group is regularly present at tests of these generators (for example the emergency generator of unit 4 or the emergency diesel generators of the safety train of units 5 and 6).

Additionally, the experts assessed the availability of diesel fuel in the reservoirs at the fuel storage facility. They were informed that there is currently 1300 m³ of fuel available, and that this is sufficient for operation of generators for 10 days. If necessary, the ZNPP can receive additional fuel in 24-48 hours (We should note that in the information circulars of the Russian permanent mission in Vienne to the Agency in recent months it has always been indicated that supplies of diesel fuel at the plant are sufficient for 19-20 days of operation, for example in the report of 11 July).

In late July IAEA experts also reported that the three main fuel reservoirs could be filled to a maximum of 90% capacity, and that their maintenance was planned.

ZNPP water supply. The water level in the cooling pond continues to drop. At present, when all six ZNPP reactors are in cold shutdown mode, the cooling pond serves as a reserve water source if the availability of water for sprinkler ponds is disrupted, which is used in the current state for cooling.

In hot weather, the water level dropped by around 1 cm per day. ZNPP workers admit that if this tendency continues, it will soon become problematic to take water from the pond. In June it was reported that in attempts to maintain the water level in the cooling pond, around 310-350 m³/h was pumped from the ZTPP discharge channel and outlets from drilled wells.

On 1 July Bellona published the report “The Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant: analysis of technical and political aspects”, where the state of water supply after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam was examined. From June 2023 to June 2024 the water level in the cooling pond dropped from 16.67 to 15.3 m. In late July the level came to 14.82 m.

Information on walkdowns by the team of experts described in July in IAEA updates and information circulars of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in Vienna (this information is given in italics):

4 – 10 July (Update 237, INFCIRC/1230, INFCIRC/1232)

– The cooling pond and its cooling water facilities (cooling pond’s shutter, sprinkler modules, cooling towers, pump station of the cooling pond, sprinkler fields, ZTPP discharge channel shutters, technical water pump station). (Note by Bellona: Russia gave the same information on hydrotechnical structures in NFCIRC/1230, but IAEA experts reported that the planned inspection was interrupted by an air raid alarm).

– Station of radiation monitoring of the environment at the site.

– Spare parts warehouse, basic diesel fuel warehouse.

11 – 18 July (Update 238, INFCIRC/1232, INFCIRC/1234)

– Units 3, 4, 5 and 6: main control rooms, several safety systems rooms.

– Unit 1: turbine building. Experts were able to visit all floors, but once again were denied access to the western part of the building. According to information of the RF, experts inspected the turbine, first lift condensate pump, condenser, turbo feed pump, secondary pumps.

– Training center (observed simulator activities).

– Back-up diesel power plant and the electrical department workshops.

19 – 25 July (Update 239, INFCIRC/1234, INFCIRC/1235)

– Unit 6: reactor hall, turbine hall (experts were denied access to the western part), electrical equipment rooms.

– Training center.

– Metrology laboratories, radioactive source storage facilities, water chemistry laboratories.

– Radiation control panels in special buildings 1 and 2

– Unit 4: main control room, backup diesel power plant, onshore pump station and circulation pumps.

26 July – 1 August (Update 240)

– 750 kV open switchyard.

– Unit 5: reactor hall and safety systems rooms.

– Hydraulic structures.

Nuclear materials to Ukraine will be delivered using loan funds ↑

On 17 June, NNEGC Energoatom signed a loan agreement with a consortium of global banks, including Deutsche Bank AG and Barclays Bank PLC. A loan of up to 181 million pounds will be used to finance the deliveries of natural and enriched uranium hexafluoride under a contract between Energoatom and Urenco. Under the contract Urenco will deliver enriched uranium for Ukrainian NPPs until 2035, with possible extension to 2043. The loan will be long-term, for 5 years, and the UK government will provide the guarantee. Financing will be provided by Energoatom without state guarantees from Ukraine.

Operational occurrences at the South Ukrainian and Rostov NPPs ↑

South Ukrainian NPP, Ukraine. On 16 July, the Ukrenergo press service reported that at one of the power facilities of Ukraine equipment had broken down, causing a deficit of power in the system, and that on 17 July that this equipment had resumed working, and emergency shutdowns had been cancelled. On 18 July accidents at two power facilities were reported once more.

On 18 July, the Ukrainian media reported that at the South Ukrainian NPP on 16 July two transformers had burned out because of the heat, and on 18 July a third transformer had broken down, so one of the reactors was disconnected from the grid. It was reported that Ukrenergo had not disclosed the reasons for the emergency shutdowns. Ukrainian energy minister German Galushchenko, commenting on these reports, said that this was fake news, and that initially the report had appeared in Russian sources, and from there had spread to the Ukrainian media space, while in fact there had not been any disruption to the operation of the nuclear unit. Energoatom also wrote about this on its Telegram channel.

On 25 July, deputy of the Supreme Rada Yaroslav Zheleznyak announced that Galushchenko’s statements did not correspond to reality, and that in response to his inquiry Ukrenergo had reported that on 15 July an emergency situation took place at the South Ukrainian NPP, causing damage to the electricity transformers, which led to one unit and three electricity lines being shut down. The current measuring transformer short-circuited, causing damage and fire. Repair work was completed on 18 July.

On the same day, the Ukrainian energy minister denied this statement, claiming that this was fake news spread by Russian propaganda in an attempt to conceal the accident at the Rostov NPP, that no shutdown of the energy transformer at the SUNPP took place, and if it had, it would have made the generation of electricity impossible and would have led to the need to shut down the nuclear power unit.

On 26 July, the IAEA stated in its weekly report that in the preceding days, unit 2 at the SUNPP had been temporarily shut down following the actuation of electrical protections due to a transformer problem at the 330 kV open switchyard located outside the NPP site.  After the electrical connection was restored, the reactor was restarted and commenced supplying electricity to the grid, reaching full power just over 24 hours after the shutdown.

After the IAEA report, the chief state inspector for nuclear and radiation safety of Ukraine Oleg Korikov commented that it was incorrect to call the incident an accident, and that in fact an operational occurrence had taken place at the SUNPP. The plant staff established its cause and took appropriate measures to ensure that the power unit was connected to the electricity grid as soon as possible.

Rostov NPP, Russia. In the same days an “operational occurrence” also took place at the Rostov NPP – on 16 July the electrical protection system of the turbogenerator was activated, “in accordance with design algorithms”, causing unit 1 (VVER-1000) to be disconnected from the grid (news about this on the Rosenergoatom website is currently unavailable).

The Russian energy ministry subsequently announced temporary blackouts in the south of the country (consumption was restricted to 1.5 GW). Rosatom later stated that the restriction on electricity consumption was not only linked to the disconnection of the Rostov NPP unit, the main reason was anomalously high temperatures: energy consumption increased significantly, and power was shut off to avoid accidents at power system facilities.

On 17 July, Rosenergoatom reported that the reason for the unit shutdown was a false activation of the generator protection device, and that after inspection the unit was once more connected to the grid.

After this incident, on 18 July, information began spreading on social networks that a radiation leak had taken place at the Rostov NPP, with a rise in the radiation background around the plant. This information was also distributed by the head of the Ukrainian center for combatting misinformation, whom German Galushchenko cited in a discussion of the situation at the South Ukrainian NPP in the Supreme Rada.

There was discussion in the media that if a radiation emission really did take place, Russia would conceal this, but there are no statements to this effect by IAEA or any other organizations monitoring the radiation level outside and within Russia, and no rise in the radiation level was recorded by border stations in neighboring countries.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The war continues, and there is no respite in military operations, so the appearance of Ukrainian drones over the occupied territory of the ZNPP and its environs so longer draws any particular reaction or even mild surprise. It’s a good thing that drones or shells are not yet entering areas where the reactor units are located, or poorly protected storage facilities for nuclear and radioactive materials.

As for the staff which comes under fire, the attitude towards them from Ukraine is understandable – they are either collaborators or recruited Russian specialists, and no sympathy is felt for them. Unfortunately, this situation will continue until the end of the war, and only the fact that all reactors have been reliably shutdown and practically switched off gives any guarantee that there will not be a nuclear disaster.

Nuclear diplomacy is once again wasting its breath by adopting a resolution with demands that Russia ignores. The Russian representative clearly stated “…it will have absolutely no effect on the ground, just like the previous ones.” This is the kind of diplomacy which has been playing like a broken record for two and a half years now.

So-called SPR (scheduled preventative repairs) continue. This is also a pointless activity, as when the decision is made (if it ever is) to put power units into operation, all maintenance will have to begin again from scratch, and at quite a different scale that we are seeing at present. In the current situation, there is simply the need to find some way to keep the staff busy who are paid a salary.

As for discussions about what took place at the South Ukrainian and Rostov NPPs, where power units were shut down and the electricity deficit increased, it is important to know the details and read the document “The IAEA Nuclear Safety and Security Glossary” (terminology used in nuclear safety and radiation protection).

The document explains what an “accident” and an “operational occurrence” are, and defines around 1000 different terms in the space of 300 pages. So there is not really anything to discuss, as everything is spelled out clearly in this glossary, although we often see that “public non-specialists” find it easier to call such events “disasters”, which is guaranteed to draw the media’s attention»

«Concerning the shutdown of units at the South Ukrainian and Rostov NPPs, and especially the media effect surrounding them, we should note that during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, nuclear facilities have not only been subjected to direct threats in military operations, but have also become the subject of an information war. Rumors and manipulation connected with possible accidents and radiation emission at nuclear sites are used in attempts to sow panic among the population and inspire distrust in the authorities. These rumors were not rare before the war either, especially in Russia, where people are highly distrustful of the authorities and fearful of radiation accidents.

However, during the war these rumors may have also been additionally inflated and spread by structures working to disinform and destabilize the enemy. At the same time, for power structures both in Russia and in Ukraine, this kind of activity may be used as a convenient argument to explain away their mistakes and failures, attributing any criticism to enemy subversion.

This is another aspect of war which negatively impacts the nuclear safety situation in warring countries, as it leads to a lack of transparency and distortion of information concerning these issues, including from official sources. And, as in the situation surrounding the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, in these cases the role of outside observers such as the IAEA is extremely important»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Fuel for European VVER reactors from Framatome under Rosatom license ↑

On 23 July, the French company Framatome and the Slovakian utility company Slovenské elektrárne signed a contract for the long-term supply of nuclear fuel for the Bohunice NPP (two VVER-440 reactors) and Mochovce NPP (three VVER-440 reactors, and a fourth is under construction). This contract follows on from the memorandum of mutual understanding signed in May 2023, one point of which concerned diversification of fuel deliveries.

At present, all Slovakian reactors operate with Rosatom fuel, and the contract for its delivery is valid until 2026. The diversification strategy of Slovenské elektrárne proposes the presence of at least two alternative suppliers of nuclear fuel and potential suppliers of materials and services in the delivery chain for its production. Besides Framatome, the Slovakian company signed a contract with Westinghouse in August 2023 for the licensing and delivery of fuel assemblies.

The Framatome press release states that in the short-term perspective, the company will produce fuel that is identical to what is currently used in European VVER rectors (evidently this means Rosatom fuel). It is planned to deliver this fuel to Slovakia from 2027.

At the same time, Framatome is developing and qualifying “100% European sovereign fuel” for VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors. In June a new Euratom project was launched, financed as part of the Study and Training Program – Safe and Alternative VVER European Project (SAVE).

The project coordinated by Framatome unites 17 partners from eight European countries, including ČEZ, Fortum, MVM Paks and Slovenské Electrárne. It will be carried out from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2028, its total budget will come to €18.68 million, including EU investment of around €10 million (participants and their investments in the project may be seen at the following link).

The aim of the SAVE project is “to strengthen VVER fuel security of supply in Europe and Ukraine by qualifying a reliable and safer sovereign VVER-440 fuel design, by developing a fast-track licensing path and improving European capabilities for VVER-440 fuel design qualification.”

This is the second EU project on fuel diversification for European reactors of Soviet design. In January 2023 the fast-track program for introducing safety of fuel deliveries for VVER (APIS) was launched, headed by Westinghouse Electric Sweden.

In March 2023, Framatome submitted an application to receive permission to manufacture hexagonal fuel assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors at its plant in Lingen, Germany, where fuel rods are manufactured for PWR and BWR reactors (including Sizewell B in the UK, Doel in Belgium and Ringhals in Sweden). (Previously, in January 2023, Framatome and Russia’s TVEL created the joint enterprise European Hexagonal Fuel SAS, registered in France, for licensing Russian technologies).

The application for a license includes several changes at several production and test types of equipment, and also the installation of certain additional equipment in existing buildings for the manufacture of these fuel elements. It is planned that this will be the first step at which assemblies will be manufactured that are identical to Rosatom fuel assemblies.

As part of the planned cooperation, TVEL, a Rosatom subsidiary, will provide Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH (operator of the Framatome Lingen plant, a wholly owned subsidiary of Framatome GmbH) with the necessary licenses, as well as provide fuel assembly and quality control facilities that will be integrated into the production process at the German facility.

The Ministry of the Environment in Lower Saxony, where the plant is located, commissioned a legal assessment last summer in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine, which examined Germany’s internal and external security concerns over the requested permit and the conditions under which the right of refusal could be exercised.

The assessment states that Rosatom’s production of fuel assemblies in Lingen could be a step toward increasing the dependence of European countries on Russian uranium and Russian fuel rods, which could be associated with the risk of threats or potential blackmail. It also states that it is possible that allowing the Lingen plant to cooperate with a Russian state-owned company could jeopardize Germany’s internal or external security. Additionally, the assessment states that due to the lack of information for further consideration, information should be requested on the extent to which representatives of the Russian company will have access to the production system (equipment and its maintenance); the extent to which TVEL will be integrated into the decision-making structures of the joint venture, whether there will be agreements on information rights or veto rights in strategic decision-making, and to what extent this may affect the operation of the plant; and what responsibility Russian employees of TVEL or Rosatom will have at the plant, and how their reliability from the safety standpoint may be checked (including possible spying and sabotage).

Objections to issuing Framatome the license were received from 4 January to 3 March 2024. On 22 July a report was published that around 11,000 people had expressed concern to officials in Lower Saxony in written form, and at present the Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony plans to hold public hearings in Lingen from 19 to 22 November 2024.

“The extremely high number of opponents [of the authorization] gives a very clear signal: there is a great deal of concern about external and internal security issues such as sabotage, espionage and the influence of the aggressor, Russia. I have always made it clear that one should not do business with the warmonger Putin, especially in the sensitive nuclear sector,” said Christian Meyer, the Minister for the Environment of Lower Saxony.

Deal for sale of Rosatom’s German asset nears completion ↑

On 8 July it was announced that the Japanese company Muroosystems Corp had signed an agreement on acquiring Nukem Technologies Engineering Services GmbH (NUKEM), a German company specializing in providing services in the field of radioactive waste and spent fuel treatment, and also decommissioning nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities. It will acquire all shares of NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH, and also a significant proportion of shares of the parent company NUKEM Technologies GmbH.

Since 2009, NUKEM has been owned by Rosatom’s affiliated companies – Atomstroexport, then TVEL. The decision on the sale of NUKEM was made in 2022 “taking into account the tense geopolitical situation and the difficulties connected with continuing the existence of a company with a Russian owner.”

According to Kommersant, Rosatom conducted a financial rehabilitation of NUKEM in 2023 and paid off debt to make the asset more attractive. But due to legal uncertainties surrounding Russian ownership and the legality of such an acquisition, the sale attempts could not be finalized. In April, the company filed for insolvency under self-administration, which separated it from the Russian ownership structure and opened new opportunities for interested parties to participate as investors without fear of possible legal repercussions.

Muroosystems Corporation specializes in IT solutions focused on decentralized data centers and is involved in energy development projects, primarily based on renewable energy.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The German company Nukem Technologies Engineering Services was one of Rosatom’s main assets in Europe in the field of decommissioning nuclear power facilities, or backend. Rosatom saw this as a promising area (due to the aging nuclear fleet in Europe) for diversifying its nuclear business in Europe, where Rosatom had little prospects for building nuclear power units before the war, and where many other areas of work, such as supplying fuel for VVER reactors and Western-style reactors, were curtailed after the war. With the loss of Nukem, Rosatom’s prospects in the European backend market are also diminishing»

Other news in brief ↑

Finland. The Finnish company Fennovoima plans to demolish buildings at the site of the Hanhikivi NPP, previously owned by RAOS Project Oy, a construction company in the nuclear power sphere, an affiliated company of Rosatom which previously worked in this region. Fennovoima purchased land and buildings on it in May 2024. The site has been left by the last Rosatom employees. Now the entire territory allocated for the NPP project belongs to the Finnish company, and it plans to concentrate on selling it.

USA. Centrus Energy received the first waiver for the import of low-enriched uranium (LEU) from Russia. In a filing of 19 July with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Centrus said that it had submitted a waiver request to the Department of Energy in May for permission to import LEU which it plans to deliver to its clients in the US from 2024 to 2027.

On 7 June, Centrus applied for permission to import LEU from Russia for processing and re-export to its foreign clients.

On 18 July, the US Department of Energy issued Centrus permission to import Russian uranium in 2024 and 2025. For 2026 and 2027 the decision was deferred to an unspecified date, closer in time to the deliveries.

Centrus also plans to submit a third application to permit import LEU from Russia in 2026 and 2027 for use in the USA, but buyers have yet to be determined for it.

United Kingdom. The UK government has announced a grant of up to £70 million to develop a commercial low-enriched high-enriched uranium oxide (HALEU) deconversion plant and a HALEU metal deconversion facility. Acceptance of bids for the tender began on July 1 and will end on September 30.

Industry co-financing will be required at a minimum rate of 70:30 (government: industry). It is stated that the HALEU oxide deconversion facility should be designed, built and commissioned by 2031, with an initial capacity of at least 10 tons of uranium per year, but the design should allow for future expansion to 30 tons per year. The plant should also allow for the future inclusion of a metal deconversion line in the event of market growth. The second objective is to design a HALEU metal deconversion plant with a minimum capacity of 5 tons of uranium per year.

This grant is part of the UK’s £300 million HALEU program. In May, Urenco, which is partially owned by the UK government, received the first £196 million tranche of the program to build a uranium enrichment plant at the Capenhurst site in Cheshire, which is also planned to be operational by 2031.

Commentary by Bellona:

«With the outbreak of war, the process of “squeezing” Rosatom out of the western nuclear market began. However, as many expert groups have predicted, including experts at Bellona, it will be impossible to dispense with Rosatom’s services swiftly and simply. Hence the restrictions and delays in levying sanctions on the production of Rosatom’s companies which are we can see today. It has proved easier to stop construction of new NPPs of Russian design in the West than to cancel services for delivery of nuclear fuel, enriched uranium, conversion services etc.

Bellona has regularly analyzed processes taking place in this sphere, and informed its readers about them (“Europe doubled its import of Russian nuclear fuel for 2023, data say”, “Rosatom during the war: how militarization of the Russian nuclear giant took place”).

However, western countries continue to look for ways to dispense with Rosatom’s services, as well as to reduce its participation in companies that are located in Western countries. For obvious reasons, Ukraine is at the forefront of this process, despite the fact that all of its NPPs are built according to Soviet (Russian) design.

Today, the West’s main task is to replace Russia’s centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. Rosatom currently has 40% of the world’s enrichment capacity and is the world leader. Bellona estimates that replacing these capacities will require a considerable amount of global resources and time»

Events in the Russian nuclear sphere and in Rosatom’s projects abroad

Baltic Shipyard suffers losses in nuclear icebreaker construction ↑

The Baltic Shipyard, which builds nuclear icebreakers, has published its annual report for 2023. The shipyard’s turnover for last year grew by 7% to 21.1 billion rubles, and pure loss reached almost 19 billion rubles compared with the profit of 5.1 billion a year previously. The report states that “the main loss arose from the fulfillment of unprofitable orders: the first and second project 22220 series vessels (“Siberia”, “Ural”)”.

The main reasons, the company states, were caused by the low profitability of the contract under the initial calculation, the project adjustments and the large number of changes made to the design and construction documentation; growing costs in supplying materials and equipment caused by price rises and the weakening ruble; and the postponement and prolongation of construction period, which led to an increase in the prime cost of the contracts.

“Based on the results of fulfilling the contract for the construction of the third and fourth Project 22220 series universal nuclear-powered icebreakers, a negative financial result is forecast,” the report states

At present two more Project 22220 icebreakers are being built – “Yakutia” (planned for completion in 2024) and Chukotka. The shipyard has also begun working on building a new flagship vessel – a multifunctional vessel for nuclear servicing, for which a contract was signed in May last year. According to schedule, it will be put into service in 2029.

The Baltic Shipyard is still trying to recover losses incurred from the termination of its contract with Finnish company Wärtsilä after the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022. Wärtsilä was to supply diesel generators and shafting line equipment for the Yakutia and Chukotka nuclear icebreakers.

On July 14, the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ruled that Wärtsilä Oyj Abp was liable to pay €7.6 million in compensation under guarantees for returning advance payments for non-delivered equipment.

Last year, Wärtsilä requested that the dispute be transferred to an international commercial arbitration body – the Arbitration Institute of the Helsinki Chamber of Commerce, as specified in the supply agreement. Representatives of the Finnish company cite “failure to prove that the earlier arbitration agreement is unenforceable due to the application of restrictive measures against the Baltic Shipyard”.

Rosatom takes part in import substitution of parts for Airbus and Boeing aircraft ↑

An industrial site to manufacture parts for Airbus and Boeing planes is planned for launch in August. The site meets a need that arose when by sanctions were placed on the delivery of spare parts to Russia after the invasion of Ukraine.

Components will be manufactured for aircraft air-conditioning, electricity supply and lighting systems, and also emergency rescue, oxygen and fire-fighting equipment parts. The industrial site is a joint project between Aeroflot and Rosatom.

This cooperation between Rosatom and Aeroflot was announced in September 2023. Development and manufacture of parts is carried out by the Rosatom division “Science and Innovations”. Additionally, a department of Rosatom’s fuel division, the Chepetsky mechanical plant, began manufacturing titanium rods for the aviation industry last year. In the near future Rosatom will also submit an application to approve production facilities (certificate FAP-21G) for the manufacture of metallic, plastic and compositional parts for aircraft.

“This can be considered the start of a new aviation direction in Rosatom,” the Aeroflot press service announced.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Rosatom has to some extent become one of the chief companies in Russia involved in import substitution of the main industrial resources and products lost due to the war. According to aviation experts, Russian airlines will face severe problems with spare parts for foreign-made airplanes in 2-3 years.

Time will tell to what extent Rosatom will be able to cope with the problem of spare parts for aircraft, but the “import substitution policy” for high-tech products which has been adopted and implemented in the Russian economy raises many questions and doubts. At least, there is no information about the successful import substitution of electronic, computer and even household equipment.

As for the Baltic Shipyard and its further prospects for the construction of modern vessels of various classes, on a technical tour of the shipyard in 2018 (after the completion of docking trials of the Akademik Lomonosov floating NPP), the chief engineer of the shipyard informed participants of the tour (who included representatives of Bellona) with the shipyard’s prospects for development.

Major plans were announced, but there was one important question about the limitations and impossibility of necessary development of the shipyard in the very cramped space that it occupies. According to the chief engineer, this constraint began to affect the quality and cost of the shipyard’s production. The construction of large modern ships requires large spaces that cannot be provided in the center of St. Petersburg where the Baltic Shipyard is currently located.

Perhaps we are now seeing the consequences of these limitations, along with other difficulties that have arisen because of the war. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that construction of new shipbuilding facilities has begun in the Primorye region in the Far East»

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Turkey. On 18 June a work meeting was held in Istanbul by Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev and the Turkish minister for energy and natural resources Alparslan Bayraktar, where they discussed the progress of construction of the Akkuyu NPP and possible prospects for expanding cooperation.

In early July, Akkuyu Nuclear reported that around 70% of equipment installed at the Akkuyu NPP currently under construction had undergone pre-commissioning activity. The reactor section of power unit 1 already has most of the main equipment installed, the assembly of the reloading machine is underway, and the assembly of the electronic motors of the main circulation pumps is being completed. In July the first stage of assembly of the monitoring and control systems for unit 1 reactor began.

As Bayraktar says, Rosatom’s work experience in the nuclear industry in Turkey makes the company the most suitable for building the new NPP in Sinop. Likhachev proposed to “take a broader view” of this project and add wind and solar power generation to it.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. At power unit 1, the refueling machine was prepared for loading the imitation core (163 imitators of fuel assembly rods).

In July mass protests began in Bangladesh against the present government. A high-level national alert was declared and the Internet was switched off almost throughout the entire country. Rosatom reported that “at the construction site of the Rooppur NPP everything is under control. Work is being carried out according to plan, and life is continuing as normal.”

Hundreds of people were killed in the crackdown on protests which continued to escalate, and finally the military turned against Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who resigned and left the country. The Bangladesh president dissolved parliament and the military is now forming an interim government in the country.

Recommended publications ↑

• A study by McKenzie Intelligence Services commissioned by Greenpeace: “Analysis of the activity of the Russian occupying forces in the zone of the cooling pond of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant” (in Ukrainian).
• A Bellona report that examines Rosatom’s actions in preparing for a restart of the ZNPP, and the accompanying risks: “The Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia NPP: analysis of technical and political aspects”.