After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for June 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for May, April and March. Download a PDF of this digest here.

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In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for June 2024
2. Ukrainian parliament ratifies EBRD financing plan for ensuring safety at the country’s nuclear facilities 

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. 14th EU sanctions package: Paks-2 excluded again, Rosatom logistics company included 
4. News on the uranium market
5. US Department of Energy plans contracts for US production of low-enriched uranium
6. Kozloduy NPP: US fuel in reactor of unit 5, malfunctioning steam generator in unit 6

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Rosatom projects for export construction of land-based SMRs
8. Rosatom’s other projects abroad in brief  

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for June 2024 ↑

Events in nuclear diplomacy. From 3 to 7 June the IAEA held a session of the Board of Governors. Before the session 11th report was published on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine, covering events from 24 February to 24 May 2024.

In his speech at the session, IAEA general director Rafael Grossi, describing the current situation at the ZNPP, noted that all seven pillars of nuclear safety had been fully or partially violated, which included the April attacks on plant facilities, the fragility of external power supply, limited access of IAEA experts to areas important for nuclear safety, and the inability to communicate openly with staff.

On 6 June, Grossi met with Ukrainian energy minister German Galushchenko at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. They discussed efforts to support nuclear safety in Ukraine. Grossi noted that the situation at the ZNPP remained especially unstable, but that it was also potentially vulnerable at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine in the light of attacks on the country’s energy structure in recent months, including at the electric substations providing external supply of electricity to operating Ukrainian NPPs and the ZNPP.

German Galushchenko expressed concern over the technical state of ZNPP power units, the lack of qualified staff at the plan, the militarization of the plant site, the mining of its perimeter and the instability of the external power supply because of constant Russian shelling.

Grossi informed Galushchenko that after a meeting with Likhachev in May he could confirm that there was an understanding that work at the ZNPP would not be renewed as long as the conflict continues.

Prior to this, on 3 June Grossi held a press conference where he noted that the meeting in Kaliningrad did not lead to any official agreements, and that he had discussed technical aspects with Likhachev and asked about the Russian side’s intentions due to the earlier appeared talks about restarting the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Grossi noted that the Russian side agreed that the restart was currently impossible because of ongoing military operations and the unreliability of energy supply for the NPP. He noted that the Russian management did not intend to decommission the plant, and discussions also touched on the fact that the IAEA was prepared to take part in assessing the state of the NPP if the Russian side decided to resume its operation.

On 15-16 June in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, the first Summit on Peace in Ukraine was held, where 100 delegations took part, including 57 heads of state and governments from all over the world (over 160 delegations were invited). The joint communique of the summit was supported by 84 of the 100 delegations participating in the summit (later the number of supporters of the declaration rose to 92). One of the three aspects expressed in the joint communique was radiation and nuclear safety. The communique states that Ukrainian nuclear power stations and facilities, including the Zaporizhzhia NPP, must work safely and reliably under the full sovereign control of Ukraine and in accordance with IAEA principles and under IAEA observation.

Military threats. IAEA experts at the ZNPP continue to report that they hear explosions some distance away from the plant almost daily. In mid-June explosions were also heard near the NPP. The IAEA team was informed that on 11 June one mine exploded near the cooling pond, but the explosion did not cause damage or casualties. The reason for the explosion was not reported. On 16 and 17 June experts once more heard explosions near the site, and ZNPP representatives informed them that there were no consequences for the plant or nearby territory.

On 10 June, IAEA mission experts visited one of the electricity substations located in Enerhodar, to assess the consequences of alleged shelling which they were informed took place on 8 June. This shelling caused a fire and damage to the substation which services the town council building where the main connection hub between the ZNPP and Enerhodar is located (the communications lines were not damaged).

According to information of ZNPP representatives, on 19 June in Enerhodar a drone strike caused damage to the Luch power substation, and disruptions to the electricity supply took place in Enerhodar. This substation provides electricity to several districts of Enerhodar, the water pump station, the industrial zone and small neighboring settlements.

On 20 June, inspectors examined the incident location, confirming damage and equipment failure.

On 21 June a drone damaged one of the two transformers of a second Enerhodar substation, Raduga. IAEA experts examined it on 22 June, and saw electric components and other fragments of a drone, and also an unexploded device next to the damaged transformer.

The damages were less significant than at the Luch substation. Experts were informed that the drone strike had made a hole in the transformer and that cooling oil had leaked. They were informed that at the moment of inspection the oil spill had already been covered with sand, and that repair works would be completed later that same day. IAEA representatives said that they did not see traces of oil on the transformer itself. Enerhodar was left without electricity again.

In both cases, the drone attacks did not affect the electricity supply for the ZNPP, as its power lines are not connected with these two substations. However, the strike on the Raduga substation affected electricity supply to the industrial zone next to the ZNPP, and also at the transport unit of the plant, the pump for its tap water and several area’s external environmental radiological monitoring stations, which ceased to function for a time after their batteries ran out.

Representatives of the Russian administration of the ZNPP informed the IAEA that on 24 June, shelling and a fire had destroyed the external radiation monitoring station located approximately 16 km from the ZNPP (in the settlement of Velikaya Znamenka). Experts were unable to receive access to the accident location and observe the damage caused, due to the security situation.

Previously, in early June, the IAEA team was informed by ZNPP representatives about the state of the radiation monitoring stations. The stations network are used for constant monitoring of radiation levels and in case of emergency for swift assessment of the current and potential radiological impact, and to establish what protective measures may be required. At this moment all four stations located on the NPP site were functioning, but three of the 14 stations outside its boundaries were damaged in 2022 and have not functioned since that time. Now four external monitoring stations are not functioning.

Measuring the radiation background at the ZNPP is also carried out manually, including weekly by the IAEA team. Experts also was informed that there are plans to purchase new radiation monitoring stations (complying with Russian Federation standards) and a mobile laboratory for radiation measurements in case of a nuclear or radiation accident.

Besides damage at the power substations and the malfunction of the radiation monitoring station on 3 June, ZNPP representatives reported that drone attacks on facilities in direct proximity to the site had caused forest fires. IAEA experts reported that they saw thick smoke and heard explosions from the direction of the 750 kV open switchyard. Firefighters were working at the site. The electricity supply to the plant was not interrupted.

Water supply to the ZNPP. Since the Kakhovka dam burst in June 2023, the water level in the large cooling pond has dropped by 1.5 meters to just over 15 meters. Now six reactors in cold shutdown mode are cooled by the sprinkler ponds, replenished by 11 underground wells that provide approximately 250 m³/h of water.

Attempts are being made at the plant to maintain the water level in the cooling pond. ZNPP representatives informed IAEA experts that a submersible pump was installed near the isolation gate of the discharge channel of the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant with a capacity of 100 m³/h to collect water to the channel from river outlets remaining on the former territory of the Kakhovka reservoir. From there water is pumped into the cooling pond. Also, excess water is pumped from the wells replenishing the sprinkler ponds. The total volume of water entering the pond is 310-350 m³/h.

Staff situation. In discussing the number and qualifications of operators at the main control rooms of the plant, IAEA experts were informed that at present, when all six units are in cold shutdown, at each shift three authorized personnel will be on duty at the control room (ZNPP representatives say that the minimum requirement for permanent presence is two people).

For three years now, Sevastopol State University has been conducted targeted recruitment of applicants planning to work at the ZNPP in future. This year around 100 applicants are expected (in 2022 there were 10 applicants, and 46 in 2023). Training staff at the university is part of the major plan of events for integrating the ZNPP into the structure of Rosatom. It is expected that the first graduates will work in the plant in 2026 and 2027.

It is also noted that ZNPP employees without higher specialized education attend special further education courses at the university to ensure that they comply with the Russian standards for their positions.

Maintenance and repair. IAEA experts discussed the maintenance plan for reactor units 1 and 2 with ZNPP representatives. On 18 June after a month of technical works the main electrical transformer of unit 2 was once more put into operation. Experts were also informed that the ZNPP plans to purchase a reserve transformer in future.

Information is given below about walkdowns carried out by the IAEA team and described in June IAEA updates and information circulars of the Russian Federation Permanent Mission in Vienna (this information is given in italics).

31 May – 6 June (Update 231)

– 750 kV open switchyard. The process of ongoing maintenance of the relay protection of unit 2 transformer was discussed. It was noted that some of the switchyard components for one of the 750 kV lines damaged in 2022 were dismantled, but the ZNPP does not plan to complete this repair, as the line itself is damaged far from the plant site.

– Two fresh fuel storage facilities.

– Unit 6: turbine building, access to the western part of the building was once again not granted.

7 – 13 June (Update 232, INFCIRC/1221, INFCIRC/1223)

– Unit 2: testing of one of the three safety trains were observed (reserve systems independent of each other). Loss of the system of regular power supply to the safety train was developed and its switching to its emergency diesel generator. Experts were informed that problems in testing were not detected. Main control room, back-up control room.

– Unit 4: pump station. One its circulation pump is used to maintain the flow of cooling water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels.

– Dry spent fuel storage facility. The monitoring system of the storage casks, containing spent fuel was observed.

– Units 1-6: main control rooms

14 – 21 June (Update 233, INFCIRC/1224)

– Unit 5: testing of parts of the safety unit system were observed, including the emergency diesel generator.

– ZNPP training center. Mock-ups of different components of the plant and two of the three full-scope simulators were observed, including one where employees of the operation shift of the control room are trained.

– Unit 2: main electrical unit transformer (T-2)

– Dry spent fuel storage facility.

22 – 27 June (Update 235)

– Units 1-6: main control rooms (including for monitoring the situation of operational staff, some of whom were appointed to their positions in recent months).

– Unit 4: experts were present at testing of the emergency diesel generator.

– Unit 5: turbine hall building. ZNPP representatives confirmed to IAEA experts that in the turbine hall activities were being undertaking for preservation of equipment, but were again prevented from accessing its western part.

28 June – 3 July (Update 236, INFCIRC/1227)

– Reactor unit 4 (experts observed testing of the third safety system train and switching of the spent fuel pool pump; they observed the solid radioactive waste storage, and the main equipment of the reactor hall: steam generators, main circulation pump, pressurizers).

– Unit 5: machine hall.

– Site’s metrology laboratory; non-destructive testing department.

– Two storage facilities of fresh fuel.

– Several emergency diesel generators; different parts of reactor safety systems.

– Waterworks facilities. The walkdown was interrupted because of an air raid alarm. (The Russian information circular states that the IAEA team examined the cooling pond’s shutter, the sprinkler modules, cooling towers, pump station of the cooling pond, sprinkler fields, shutters of the TPP discharge channel and the pump station of technical water).

Commentary by Bellona:

«There is an impression of a certain standstill around the ZNPP and even in military operations on the frontline. It is hard to understand the reason for this. Perhaps the election campaign in the USA and several European countries have distracted politicians from the war, as well as officials at various levels, or perhaps there is a sense of general fatigue and a feeling that a dead-end has been reached, or even just a general need for a rest during the summer heat.

It is hard to say, but as for the ZNPP, the daily routine continues there – they continue to tinker with individual equipment and systems, calling this maintenance, and talks have died down at all levels on possible restarting the ZNPP power units. IAEA inspector complete their walkdowns at the sites they are allowed access to, while Ukrainian drones, if they reach this area, do not fly further than Enerhodar, Ukraine’s Energoatom continues to repeat that “the water level at the ZNPP cooling pond is stable, and the radiation background is within permissible norms”. In a word, there is a “lull” and a sense of uncertainty as people wait to see what happens next.

Perhaps they are waiting for a possible start of talks between Russia and Ukraine, the end of elections in the USA, or an increase in military operations after Ukraine receives promised weapons and F-16s. The one thing that is clear is that Russia has no intention of giving up the Zaporizhzhia NPP just like that, without a change in the global military and political situation, and Ukraine will continue to insist on the fulfillment of its demands and the resolution on the first “peace summit” on returning the ZNPP to Ukraine.

Bellona will continue to keep a close eye as events unfold at the largest NPP in Europe, which has been captured by the army of a neighboring country»

Ukranian parliament ratifies EBRD financing plan for ensuring safety at the country’s nuclear facilities ↑

On 5 June the Ukrainian government passed a law ratifying the Framework agreement between Ukraine and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for activity of the International Chernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA).

The ICCA was created in 2020 for accompanying and financing projects for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety at the Chernobyl NPP and the Exclusion Zone. The framework agreement of December 2023 expands the possibilities for using funds to finance elimination of damage caused by Russian troops at the ChNPP, in the Exclusion Zone and other nuclear facilities and radioactive waste management facilities in Ukraine.

The ICCA replaced the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, which invested over 2.1 billion Euros in works at the Shelter facility and creating the New Safe Containment. At present it is planned to complete pre-designed work with allocated funds for dismantling unstable structures of the Shelter facility (the license for dismantling last year was extended to the end of 2029) and other works at the ChNPP site. An according grant agreement was signed on 21 February 2024 (the second under the project, the first agreement in March 2022 was directed towards restoring fire safety in the Exclusion Zone).

The EBRD reports that in the long-term perspective the ICCA foundation will concentrate on supporting sustainable infrastructure and long-term safe decommissioning in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. The consequences of Russian military actions will still have to be assessed, but it is now clear that the possibilities for stable work at the site have been undermined.

Commentary by Bellona:

«For a long time, Bellona has been implementing a project that concerns the elimination of the uranium legacy at the Prydniprovsky chemical factory located in the town of Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Ukraine. The problems of this factory remain unresolved, primarily due to lack of financing for carrying out practical works on the factory site, and also for developing necessary laws, standards and rules regulating the process of eliminating the legacy at this site.

Perhaps the ratification of the framework agreement between Ukraine and the EBRD, under which Ukraine will receive a grant, will make it possible to solve several tasks of the project for eliminating the nuclear legacy at the factory such as preparing necessary regulations, and taking organizational decisions concerning the interaction of the structures of the Chernobyl zone and the factory. Bellona hopes that the Ukrainian project will make it possible to complete the task of eliminating the uranium legacy at the factory»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

14th EU sanctions package: Paks-2 excluded again, Rosatom logistics company included ↑

On 24 June the European Union passed its 14^th sanctions package on Russia in response to its aggression in Ukraine. Changes were made to previously passed sanction documents concerning the Paks-2 NPP under construction by Rosatom in Hungary.

Exceptions for this project were already prescribed earlier, in the 12^th sanctions package in December 2023: “In view of the importance of the Paks II project for the interests of Hungary in relation to security of energy supply,… exemptions and derogations in this Regulation concerning civil nuclear projects are fully applicable to all goods and services needed for that project”, and in all points describing exceptions for the civil nuclear sector, the phrase was added “such as the Paks II project”.

The new edition of sanctions stipulates the complete exemption of construction of the Hungarian NPP from any bans and restrictions. It states that the measures prescribed in the sanctions must not influence planning, construction, design, commissioning, servicing or fuel delivery for Paks-2. For this reason, Paks-2 is given horizontal exemption from the prohibitions stipulated in the sanction measures. Now there is a separate article in the sanctions document for Paks-2.

For any activity connected with the Paks-2 project, individuals and legal entities, organizations and institutions involved in construction and the subsequent servicing of the Hungarian NPP will notify the competent authority of the EU Member State in which they are registered. The state, in its turn, shall inform other EU Member States and the Commission on the information received.

According to the Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó, this means that European companies involved in investments (French, German and Austrian) will not have to apply for permissions from the authorities of member states. “This general exemption has created a situation regarding the Paks investment as if there were no war in Ukraine, and the war did not entail sanctions or economic restrictions,” he said.

Additionally, we may note that on 28 June the EU applied financial sanctions for one of the leading Russian transport operators and railroad carriers, the company Transcontainer (part of the Delo company group, in which Rosatom has a 49% share), and its general director Mikhail Kontserev. Previously, in February 2024, this company was already included on US sanctions lists. The reason for the restrictions were suspicions of the company’s involvement in illegal weapons trade with North Korea and delivering various types of ammunition for the Russian army.

Kommersant writes that this decision, like the US sanctions, will not have a significant impact on the company’s activity.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The Paks-2 NPP project in Hungary, the only example of an ongoing NPP construction project by Rosatom in the European Union, has never been directly harmed by any sanction restrictions. A directly prescribed exception for this project from the EU sanctions was already present in the 12th sanctions package, and previously there was an unwritten exception for the project from sanctions, like in any other civil nuclear projects between Russia and the EU, which are largely not subject to direct sanctions.

Nevertheless, the Paks-2 project has encountered delays of at least two years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was partially caused by the impact of other sanctions on the project involving Russia’s interaction with the EU in financial, logistic and other spheres. Nevertheless, the project is being realized, and evidently in the next half year the first concrete of the first power unit will be poured.

What is more telling is the inclusion of the Transcontainer company on the sanctions list. Rosatom has recently been actively working on consolidating transport assets and companies, planning to broaden its presence significantly on the market of domestic Russian and international transportation. This includes the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), where Rosatom has traditionally been present as the operator of the nuclear icebreaker fleet, and recently as the sole infrastructural operator for the development of the entire NSR.

The main logistic flows on the NSR involve the transportation of minerals produced in the Arctic region – LNG, oil, non-ferrous metals and coal. However, Rosatom hopes to develop its growing activity in the transport and logistics sphere through transit on the NSR between Europe and Asia, including multimodal transit – using both railroad and sea transport.

It is the potential for developing this field that may be affected by the new sanctions on Transcontainer. We should add that previously the EU already included Atomflot on the sanctions list, a Rosatom structure that manages the nuclear icebreaker fleet. Thus, the gradual accumulation of these restrictions on Russian and internal Rosatom logistic structures may have a negative impact on prospects for developing transit on the NSR»

«The exemption of Paks-2 from sanction restrictions is primarily a political decision. Recently the Hungarian leadership has increasingly “begun to irritate” the EU leadership, including the structures of the EU Commission and the EU Parliament. The openly hostile and provocative position of Prime Minister Orban and his unconcealed support of Putin’s policies may negatively influence European decisions on Hungary, including decisions on Paks-2. We are now entering a time of unpredictable events and decisions, so we will see what happens…»

News on the uranium market ↑

Bloomberg has calculated that over the last five years the cost of uranium has grown by 233% (an article of 13 June examines the potential of developing a uranium field in Saskatchewan, Canada, which may make Canada the largest producer of uranium in the world). The reason for this is the revived interest of many countries in nuclear power as a source of stable non-carbon power, and accordingly an increase in demand for uranium.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also made a contribution, as many consumers began to look for alternatives to Russian uranium. As a result a significant gap has arisen on the market between supply and demand from Europe and the US, Japan, India and China. According to certain assessments, by 2030 demand may exceed supply by more than 100 million pounds per year (around 45,000 tons).

USA. On 6 June the US Energy Information department published the 2023 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, with data on activity on the US uranium market from 2018 to 2023.

Summary purchases of raw uranium in the USA (including domestic production) from 2022 to 2023 grew by 27% – from 40.5 million pounds of U308-equivalent in 2022 to 51.6 million in 2023 (29.9 million pounds of natural uranium, 11.5 million pounds of UF6 and 10.2 million pounds of enriched uranium), the largest volume since 2019. Last year the volume of purchases decreased by 13% by year. In 2023 the largest uranium suppliers were foreign producers – Canada was in first place, 26% of the total volume of deliveries, then Australia and Kazakhstan, 21% each, and Uzbekistan with 10%. Materials from the USA accounted for 5% of the total volume of deliveries.

Russia’s relative share last year remained at the level of 12% as in 2022, in absolute terms coming to 6 million pounds of U308-equivalent in 2023 versus 4.8 million in 2022. This volume included deliveries of natural uranium (U308 oxide), uranium hexafluoride (UF6, natural uranium conversion product) and enriched uranium.

Russia remains the leader for delivery of services for enriched uranium for American NPPs. In 2023, Russia’s share in this segment came to 38% of import services (27% of all deliveries, taking into account US domestic production), or 4.1 million SWU versus 3.4 million SWU in 2022 (although this figure is comparable with 2021).

Finland. On 18 June, the Finnish company Terrafame, producer of nickel for electric car batteries, as well as cobalt and zinc, received permission from regulatory bodies and began to produce natural uranium at a site in Sotkamo, Finland. The production process enables the low concentration of natural uranium found in the ore to be used as a by-product. The uranium will be transported abroad for further processing, after which it will be used in nuclear energy production. It is estimated that the recovery plant will operate at full capacity by 2026, when uranium output will total about 200 tons per year, which according to the company corresponds to approximately nine months of consumption at the new Olkiluoto-3 nuclear power unit, the largest in the country and in Europe as a whole. The plan is to continue uranium production alongside the production of other metals throughout the operating period, which covers the next 30 years.

The Finnish government granted a permit for uranium production to Terrafame in 2020. Permission has now also been received by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) which held an inspection for commissioning the plant. Finland is currently the only EU member country that produces uranium domestically. Sweden also plans to launch domestic uranium production.

Belgium. The energy company Engie Electrabel reported that it will no longer use uranium from Russia for the operation of the Belgian NPPs Doel 4 and Tihange 3 after 2025 after these units recently received a 10-year life extension. The company states that following a series of discussions since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it decided not to conclude any more contracts with Russian companies for the supply, processing and enrichment of uranium. The last deliveries from Russia arrived at the end of 2021.

Engie reports that for the operation of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors, only supplies and contracts for materials and services from western suppliers will be used, including companies in Canada and Australia, despite the growing demand of orders on the market which has come under severe pressure. Engie also notes that uranium prices have almost doubled over the last year, and the cost of processing and enrichment has increased by more than 20%.

Niger, France and Russia. Bloomberg, citing anonymous informed sources (in Moscow and the West), reported on 3 June that Russia was planning to take uranium assets in Niger under control owned by the French state company Orano, and that Rostom had contacted military authorities in Niger concerning their acquisition. It was specified that the talks were probably focused on permissions for production. The source in Moscow said the discussions were at any early stage and had not reached negotiations, and that the conditions of transfer had not yet been specified. It is also reported that the IAEA is aware of the possible transfer of assets.

Orano operates the SOMAÏR open pit mine together with Niger, and also owns a share in the underground mine Cominak, closed in 2021 (currently undergoing recultivation), and the Imouraren project suspended since 2015.

On 4 June Rosatom denied this report, stating that the corporation had no plans to acquire Orano assets. Orano announced that it knew nothing about any discussions between Russia and Niger.

On 4 June Orano also resumed preparation work at the Imouraren uranium mine and reported that at the request of the authorities it had presented Niger with a specific technical proposal allowing to carry out development of the mine as soon as possible.

On 15 June Bloomberg reported that on 11 June the Niger ministry for the mining industry had sent a letter stating that the proposed plan for developing this mine did not correspond to the authorities’ expectations and that the operating permission could be withdrawn.

This is what happened on 20 June, although Orano reports that it remains willing to keep all channels of communication open with the Niger authorities on this subject, while reserving the right to challenge the decision to withdraw the mining permit before the competent national or international jurisdictions.

After permission was withdraw, the mine returned under Niger’s control, a decision justified by the claim that Orano had not honored its commitments despite two formal notices handed to it by the ministry for the mining industry in February 2022 and March this year.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The growth in prices on the uranium market and services for conversion and enrichment in recent years, caused by the growing demand and prospects for developing world nuclear energy, and spurred on by the reduced cooperation with Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, is stimulating investments in the industry. We can see this from the examples of the opening and expansion of a number of production facilities in the USA and Europe, stimulated by the market situation and by political and state support directed towards raising energy safety. At the same time, competition and the battle for resources in third-party countries such as Niger may also contain elements of market competition between corporations, and a political confrontation between western countries and Russia in attempts to influence decisions by local authorities, and to create difficulties for opponents, either in reality or through propaganda and rumors spread by the media.»

US Department of Energy plans contracts for US production of low-enriched uranium ↑

On 27 June the US Department of Energy published a request for proposals for the purchase of low-enriched uranium (LEU) of US production. This request for proposals is supported by a sum of USD 2.7 billion allocated by the ministry after the ban on import of Russian LEU.

“DOE is helping jumpstart uranium enrichment capacity here in the United States, which is critical to strengthening our national security and growing our domestic nuclear industry,” said US Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm.

As part of this request for proposals, the DOE will acquire LEU produced by new sources of domestic facilities for uranium enrichment, which may include new enrichment systems or projects which will expand the capabilities of existing systems.

The proposal states that two or more contracts are planned with a timeframe of up to 10 years. All LEU must be manufactured and stored in the USA (it is planned that production and conversion will also take place in the USA, but these stages may be carried out in allied countries or partner countries of the USA). The minimum guaranteed price of the contract will be USD 2 million, but the upper ceiling of the contract is USD 3.4 billion (note – allocation of this sum was mentioned back in June 2022). Proposals will be accepted until 26 August 2024.

At present the only enrichment plant for LEU manufacture in the US is the Urenco USA plant in New Mexico, which in July last year announced an expansion of its facilities.

On 28 June, the Global Laser Enrichment company (jointly owned by the Australian Silex Systems Limited (51%) and the Canadian Cameco Corporation (49%)), the exclusive world licenser of the patented laser-based uranium enrichment technology Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX) announced its intention to take part in the tender for this request for proposals, in order to accelerate the commercial introduction of next generation technologies at the laser enrichment plant. GLE signed an agreement with the US Department of Energy in 2016 to use its technologies to enrich 200,000 tons of “tails” of enriched uranium stored at the former gas diffusion plant in Paducah in west Kentucky. At present the company is in the process of purchasing a land plot adjacent to the plant where it plans to build its own plant.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The law passed in the USA banning purchases of enriched uranium from Russia opens the path to stimulating US domestic production, including for new technological approaches. Historically, there have not been successful examples in the US of developing the centrifugal method of uranium enrichment, which is the dominant technology of enrichment in the world at present.

However, state support and financial injections in the uranium enrichment sector in the US open the path to develop new methods such as laser enrichment. The success of this technology is not guaranteed, but like many startups in the US nuclear sector in recent years, especially in the sphere of small reactors, the mere fact of their growing number show that some of them may eventually become more or less successful.

So stimulating the uranium enrichment sector may also give results and in future lead to expansion of facilities for uranium enrichment and also for new methods and technologies»

Kozloduy NPP: US fuel in the reactor of unit 5, malfunctioning steam generators in unit 6 ↑

On 10 June in unit 5 with a VVER-1000 reactor at the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria, scheduled maintenance was completed with 43 fuel assemblies were loaded into the reactor (a quarter of the total fuel in the core) containing RWFA fuel produced by the Westinghouse company. Previously the reactor had only used fuel of Russian manufacture. The license for the use of the new fuel was issued by the Bulgarian nuclear regulatory agency on 22 April 2024. The process of partial reloading and parallel operation of both types of fuel will continue for four years.

On 29 May, the executive director of the NPP Valentin Nikolov announced the decision to annul the contract with Russia valid until 2025 for the delivery of nuclear fuel. Existing supplies of Russian fuel will be used as a reserve. Nikolov also noted that the cost of US fuel was comparable with the cost of Russian fuel.

It was also reported that talks are currently continuing with the French company Framatome on fuel deliveries for unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP. It is planned that in autumn 2025 the reactor will start to work with the partial loading of French fuel.

On 15 June, unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP was shut down for scheduled and preventative maintenance work. One reason was signs of leakage in the steam generator, which caused cooled water from the first circuit to enter the second circuit. The problem was solved and after repair the unit was connected to the energy grid on 8 July.

This is not the first time such problems have arisen. The Bulgarian acting energy minister Vladimir Malinov addressed this issue in the Bulgarian parliament on 27 June, explaining that frequent accidents meant it may be necessary to replace the steam generator at the plant. The problem gives rise to disputes concerning the equipment of the suspended Belene NPP, in particular concerning the steam generators. In 2023, a work group for realizing equipment for the Belene NPP asked the Kozloduy NPP on two occasions for a finding on the possibility of using steam generators at the functioning NPP, but as Malinov said, the two responses received were contradictory.

The director of the Kozloduy NPP Valentin Nikolov announced that it was necessary to conduct a thorough technical analysis of this possibility, but the plant lacks the necessary documentation, as the National electricity company of Bulgaria is wary of providing it without the manufacturer’s permission. Additionally, replacing the steam generator will also be technically difficult, as the steam generators for the Belena NPP project are different in size.

The steam generator is also part of the deal discussed since July last year for the sale of equipment of the Belene NPP nuclear island to Ukraine, which plans to use it for building units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnitsky NPP. The head of Energoatom Petro Kotin said in April that he hoped the contract would be signed in June, but this did not take place. On 28 June the Bulgarian socialist party submitted a resolution to the national assembly on suspending talks and actions for the sale of equipment of the Belene NPP.

Nikolov confirmed that Russia remains the only alternative option for manufacturing a steam generator

Commentary by Bellona:

«Loading fuel from the Westinghouse company in unit 5 of the Kozloduy NPP is the first example of using an alternative to Russian fuel in power units of Soviet design in EU countries since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukraine has long been moving away from the use of Russian fuel, and in the EU in the coming years alternative fuel is expected for NPP reactors in the Czech Republic, Finland and Slovakia. Nevertheless, the difficulty in changing suppliers for both fuel and equipment for NPPs of Soviet remains, and is clearly demonstrated by Bulgaria’s example. French fuel for unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP is still not ready and is not completely free of Rosatom technologies. The issue of the application and use of steam generators from the uncompleted Belene NPP either for replacements in Bulgaria or for the construction of new units in Ukraine shows the continuing difficulty in manufacturing equipment for this type of energy unit without Russia’s involvement»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom’s projects abroad

Rosatom projects for export construction of land-based SMRs ↑

On 26 June, a protocol was signed in Uzbekistan on the site for the future construction of a nuclear power plant with six small modular reactors (SMR), establishing that a contract for building the plant signed in May would enter into force. The project will be realized at a previously approved site by Tuzkan Lake, located in the Forish District, Jizzakh Region. Work on the NPP infrastructure is planned to begin in autumn 2024. The start of the first reactor is planned 60 months after work begins, and the units will then be commissioned at six-month intervals, with the full start of the plant planned after 2023.

Kyrgyzstan is also discussing construction of a small nuclear power plant with Rosatom. In March. Talaibek Baigaziev, the deputy energy minister of Kyrgyzstan at that time, reported that Rosatom had already developed a technical and economic justification, and the construction of one or three RITM-200N power units of a capacity of 110 – 330 MW is planned. A memorandum on cooperation in building small nuclear plants between Russia and Kyrgyzstan was signed in January 2022.

Russia and Myanmar completed the procedure for coordinating intergovernmental agreement on the construction of a land-based  small NPP in June, and the timeframe for signing it are under discussion. The agreement on cooperation between the countries on the use of nuclear power for peaceful goals was signed in February 2023.

We may note that there two more countries where Rosatom plans to build new NPPs are also interested in building small NPPs, but they are also holding talks with the USA in this area.

On 28 June, Yusuf Ceylan, a representative of the Turkish energy ministry, reported that Turkey was holding talks with the USA on building large NPPs and small modular reactors. Turkey plans to build three four-reactor NPPS and supplement them with small and medium reactors with a total generation capacity of 20 000 MW to diversify the structure of electricity production.

On 3 July, the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigorian announced that Armenia was discussing with the United States the possibility of building a new nuclear NPP with small modular reactors under a US project, which will replace the operating NPP in Metsamor when it is decommissioned in 2036. At present Armenia is discussing the issue of creating a legal basis for this with the USA. Discussions on building an NPP in Armenia with US small modular reactors have been continuing for several months.

Rosatom’s other projects abroad in brief ↑

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. The head of the State Duma energy committee Pavel Zavalny claims that Turkey is 90% likely to entrust Rosatom with realizing the NPP project in Sinop. He stated that it is planned to build two units with two reactors with a capacity of 1,250 MW each. “A 50/50 scheme is proposed, project financing, joint attraction of investments and a Turkish general contractor. But this will be one of the proposals, from the Russian side. The Turkish Energy Ministry is also examining a Korean and a Chinese proposal. The process has not yet been completed,” said Zavalny.

Kudankulam NPP, India. Four steam generators were installed at unit 4 on 19 June.

Xudapu NPP, China. On unit 4, the dome was raised and installed on the reactor building in a one-stage format. This was the second time this operation was carried out in a one-stage format in the practice of Russian nuclear workers.